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It is widely known that the transliteration of Arabic names and places to the
English language throws up certain difficulties for authors.  For research on Libya this
is no different.  For simplicity this thesis will resort to conventional spellings which are
to be found in a wide variety of English language media such as the BBC: E.G
‘Gaddafi’.  It is acknowledged that this may differ from academic figures who take
Libya as a central interest.  For instance: Dirk Vandewalle uses ‘Qadhafi’, Ronald Bruce 
St John has opted for ‘Qaddafi’, while Lisa Anderson has oscillated between ‘Qaddafi’
and ‘Qadhdhafi’.  There are also many other variations to be found.  When citing
directly from a particular source in this thesis, the author’s original spelling will be




















Abstract for ‘Human rights as performance: a discourse analysis of the Western-
led intervention in Libya’. 
The persistent violence, instability and widespread human rights abuses which
have plagued Libya since the Western-led military intervention, have all called into 
question the West’s decisive role in bringing about the fall of the previous Libyan
government.  While previous work has shown a tendency to confirm or repudiate the
humanitarian intentions of the Western state, this thesis offers up a more nuanced
understanding.  In considering the state to be 'performatively' constituted by a range of 
re-iterative discursive practices, it becomes possible to view the Western intervention in 
Libya as the materialization of a ‘human rights’ discourse which exudes both a moral
component- spreading the 'universal' values of 'freedom' and 'democracy'- and a
geopolitical component- the security objectives advanced through the liberalisation and 
democratisation of Libya and the wider region-.  Nevertheless, it is put forward here that 
in the case of Libya, the 'human rights' discourse deployed by Western governments is
pernicious in that its internal logics work to dismiss and disparage too easily the merits
of other interpretations of events- such as a hegemonic ‘civil war’ discourse to be found 
in Western media-, foreclosing in the process more peaceful and potentially more stable
solutions to the violence taking place. This suggests that appeals to ‘human rights’ have 
shown a capacity to undermine and betray the very humanitarian and strategic
























 Summary of the PhD thesis ‘Human rights as performance: a discourse analysis of �
the Western-led intervention in Libya’ 
The Western-led military intervention in Libya of 2011 was carried out in 
response to the violent uprisings taking place, and on the basis that the Libyan 
government was denying the Libyan people their basic human rights.  Nevertheless, the
continued violence, instability and widespread human rights abuses which has followed 
the toppling of ex-leader Gaddafi has raised questions about the legitimacy and the
wisdom of Western actions.  
This thesis has sought to investigate the military intervention, with primary
focus on the discourses used to give meaning to the events in Libya and the actions
carried out by Western governments. This involves an analysis of how the key identities 
were constituted, and also, crucially, an assessment of the consequences of using one
particular discourse-identity-policy cluster as opposed to another.  One of the key
theoretical premises assumed is that it is ‘performativity’ which best explains how the
state constitutes its own identity, and thus the concrete actions taken by it.  Finally, in 
analysing these facets of the intervention, it will become possible to reach conclusions
as to what extent Western actions correspond with what David Slater has called the
‘imperiality of power’ (Slater, 2013). 
The findings show that the Western debate and intervention in Libya (2011) 
revolved around two basic discourses, which constructed the identities of those involved 
in radically different ways, and hence pointed to divergent foreign policy options.  The
‘human rights’ discourse, which was deployed by the US and UK governments,
constructed a dual-Libyan Other comprising an ‘illegitimate’ leader, Moammar Gaddafi, 
and a ‘Libyan people’ who were aspiring to realize their human rights of ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’. This representation of events led to the imposition of a no-fly zone,
Western air-strikes, and ultimately the toppling of Gaddafi and the Libyan government.
In opposition to this, a ‘civil war’ discourse would emerge from media and opposition 
voices to challenge the very precepts of the ‘human rights’ discourse.  Depicting a much 
more complex, yet balanced situation, Gaddafi and government ‘loyalists’ were pitted
against a multifarious, and somewhat ambiguous group of ‘rebels’.  The foreign policy


























analysis has shown that while opposition voices presented a significant challenge to the
US and UK governments this was not enough to derail their policy that Gaddafi ‘must
go’. 
Theorizing the state as ‘performative’ makes it possible to explain the Western 
military intervention in Libya as the materialization of a range of re-iterative discursive
practices which have constituted the state throughout time.  Indeed, the deployment of 
the ‘human rights’ discourse in the case at hand, with its emphasis on ‘freedom’ and
‘democracy’, can be traced and seen already in past performances of ‘human rights’, 
demonstrating a continuity with a long list of governments both in the US and the UK.  
At the same time, one can discern how the ‘human rights’ discourse has been
consistently deployed in relation to, or indeed subordinate to, wider security concerns
and geopolitical strategies.  The advancement of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ becomes a
moral act- both considered fundamental human rights- and a geopolitical act at one and
the same time. A discourse analysis of the military intervention in Libya shows this
latest performance to be no different.  A purportedly moral action on the one hand since
its stated aim is the defence of the ‘Libyan people’ and their ‘human rights’ from a
barbaric and illegitimate regime.  Yet at the same time, it is an action which harnesses
strategic objectives such as the liberalisation and democratisation of Libya and the
Middle Eastern region-bringing it further under Western influence-, in accordance with 
a wider security strategy of ‘integration’.       
An analysis of how Libya has featured in the Western geopolitical imagination
shows precisely how it had become susceptible to the ‘human rights’ discourse in the
first place. While a certain rapprochement had taken place in the years prior to 2011, 
the ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘re-integration’ of Libya was never actually completed.  
Cooperation on issues related to international terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) would ultimately not be enough as several things cast doubt on 
Libya’s ontological capacity for change: stalled political liberalisation and 
democratisation, lack of progress on human rights, and a range of high profile
diplomatic aberrations, amongst other things.  In fact, as the uprisings in Libya brought
these issues to the fore in 2011, it would now be the figure of Gaddafi himself who was
seen as the obstacle to Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’- and by association, the wider security





   
 
  















    
 
to both the aspirations of the ‘Libyan people,’ and the identity of the privileged Western 
Self.  It is for these reasons that he ‘must go’.    
Thus, the deployment of the ‘human rights’ discourse can be said to respond to
both a moral imperative, and also the security interests of the West.  Moreover, in as far 
as the US and UK governments have made appeals to 'universal' values, values which 
nevertheless turn out to be Western liberal democratic values, it is possible to draw
correlations with what Slater has referred to as the 'imperiality of power'.  However, it is 
the main conclusion of this thesis that once set in motion, the very internal logics of the
'human rights' discourse have the capacity to betray and undermine the moral and
security  objectives aimed for by ruling out a priori alternate ways of looking at the
violence in Libya. This, in turn, forecloses the possibility of seeking more peaceful
solutions to the crisis and a more stable political transition.  Discourse theory
illuminates the ways in which these internal logics buttress, shield and immunize the
‘human rights’ discourse, enabling it to absorb and repel elements of what would 
become a hegemonic ‘civil war’ discourse.  Firstly, since the human rights being 
championed -principally freedom and democracy- are by their very ‘nature’ applicable
to all the Libyan people, it follows that Western actions, which have the ultimate aim of 
toppling Gaddafi, must also be understood to be in the interests of all Libyans.  
Questions raised by the civil war discourse about the identity of the belligerents, or 
indeed how much support the ‘rebels’ actually enjoyed amongst the Libyan population, 
become almost inconsequential.  Western officials can brush off these concerns as the
objective remains the same; Gaddafi ‘must go’ as he is the obstacle to the ‘Libyan
people’ realizing their ‘universal’ human rights.  
Secondly, and in relation to the first point, the ‘human rights’ discourse is
governed by a teleology which posits ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ as the 'destiny' of the
Libyan people.  This is indeed logical if such values are considered to be transcendental
in the first place.  It is of course paradoxical that this teleology should need to be
supplemented by raw Western military power; to achieve their objective Western 
governments must deny Libyans by force the very ‘human right’ to choose the existing
leader and government should they so wish.  Yet it is determined that for the Libyan 
Other to correct its backward and deficient state -placing itself on a par with the
privileged Western Self- Gaddafi must be eliminated. What is more, since Libya is
being understood as part of a wider ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon, its fate is tied in a
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crucial way to the uprisings taking place in other parts of the Arab world. An anti-
‘domino’ logic is triggered, whereby the survival of Gaddafi and the Libyan ‘regime’ in 
any shape or form will stifle the democratic murmurings elsewhere.
Thus, the ‘human rights’ discourse is characterised by abstraction, transcendence 
and teleology, which work together to demand the exit of Gaddafi, and also fend off any 
discursive challenges, such as that which came from the ‘civil war’ discourse.  In so 
doing, other foreign policy options which may have brought about a more peaceful
solution are foreclosed.  The emphasis placed on the ‘human rights’ of a seemingly
homogeneous ‘Libyan people’ cloaks and leads to an underestimation of the ethnic, 
regional, tribal, religious and ideological cleavages in Libya.  Historicity is all but
suspended whereby warnings over the glaring institutional gaps, the lack of a functional 
civil society, and the absence of a democratic tradition- at least in the Western liberal
sense- are either ignored or are not heeded.  More acute attention to these facets of 
Libyan political culture and society would have surely aroused greater caution amongst
policy makers when faced with toppling Gaddafi and the Libyan government, and 
crushing the security forces in the process.  The ensuing violence, chaos and instability
which has plagued Libya since then would suggest that other solutions may have helped 
to avoid the exacerbation of an already critical situation.  It is put forward here, 
therefore, that the ‘human rights’ discourse works out to be pernicious in that its internal 
logics can blind decision makers to crucial aspects of a conflict, undermining and 
betraying the very objectives that they are supposedly defending.   
Extending the conclusions reached to a more general level, this thesis calls into 
question the appropriateness of a ‘human rights’ discourse for understanding and giving
meaning to complex geopolitical phenomena.  The foreign policy determinism which 
springs from its deployment means that it becomes extremely difficult -if not
impossible- for policy makers to change course.  Thus, this thesis represents a call for a
return to the particularities of each individual case, paying due attention to the multiple
facets in evidence.  Instead of privileging the global level- on the basis of 
‘transcendental’ or ‘universal’ values-, policy makers should be more attentive to the
full range of geographical scales, including those such as the local or regional. This is
moreover a call for a return to historicity, an understanding of how a particular 
geographical space has taken shape over time, the complexities of the political system






















an appreciation of the disparities between a particular political, social, and economic
culture on the one hand, and the idealized values of Western ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’
on the other. 
Resumen de la tesis doctoral ‘Los derechos humanos como performance: un 
análisis de discurso sobre la intervención occidental en Libia’ 
La intervención militar liderada por Occidente en Libia (2011),  que acaba en el
derrocamiento del ex-líder Gaddafi y su gobierno, se lleva a cabo como respuesta a las
revueltas violentas producidas en el país, y en base a que el gobierno negaba al pueblo 
libio sus derechos humanos básicos.  No obstante, la posterior violencia e inestabilidad, 
así como las amplias violaciones de los derechos humanos, plantean dudas sobre la
legitimidad y la prudencia de las acciones occidentales.  
Esta tesis ha aspirado a analizar la intervención militar,  a partir de un enfoque
en los discursos utilizados para dar sentido a los sucesos y las acciones llevadas a cabo
por los gobiernos occidentales.  Esto involucra un análisis de cómo se constituyeron las
identidades claves, y también, de manera crucial, una evaluación de las consecuencias
de usar una constelación en particular de discurso-identidad-política exterior-, y no otra. 
Los recursos teóricos usados para abordar este fenómeno complejo se enmarcan en la
teoría de discurso posestructuralista, del mismo modo en que se han utilizado con gran 
efecto en el campo de la geopolítica crítica.  Una de las premisas claves de esta tesis es
que la performativity es lo que mejor explica la manera en que el estado constituye su 
propia identidad, y por lo tanto las acciones concretas realizadas por él.  Finalmente, al
analizar estas facetas de la intervención, será posible llegar a conclusiones sobre la
medida en que las acciones de Occidente corresponden con lo que David Slater ha
llamado la 'imperiality of power'. 
Los resultados muestran que el debate occidental sobre la intervención giró en 
torno a dos discursos básicos, los cuales construyeron las identidades de los
involucrados de maneras radicalmente diferentes,  planteando dos opciones políticas
divergentes.  El discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ desplegado por los gobiernos de
Estados Unidos y Reino Unido construyó un Otro libio dual que consiste en un líder
























humanos de ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’.  Esta representación de los acontecimientos
condujo a la imposición de una zona de exclusión aérea para los bombardeos, y el
derrocamiento de Gaddafi y el gobierno libio.  En oposición a ello, emerge un discurso 
de ‘guerra civil’  en los medios Occidentales que  desafía los propios preceptos del
discurso de ‘derechos humanos’, trazando una situación mucho más compleja, pero 
equilibrada, Gaddafi y los ‘lealistas’ del gobierno enfrentados a un grupo de ‘rebeldes’
multifario y ambiguo.  Las opciones de política que se pueden inferir de ella son las de
cautela, diálogo y negociación.  La teoría de discurso ha mostrado que, si bien el
discurso de ‘guerra civil’ alcanza el estatus hegemónico en los medios occidentales, en 
última instancia fracasa en cambiar la postura de los gobiernos de EEUU y GB, en 
cuanto a que ‘debe irse’ Gaddafi.
Si se teoriza que el estado es ‘performative,’ se hace posible explicar la
intervención militar en Libia como la materialización de una rama de prácticas
discursivas reiterativas, las cuales han ido constituyéndolo a lo largo del tiempo.  De
hecho, el despliegue del discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ en el presente caso, con su 
énfasis en ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’, puede verse ya en pasadas ‘performances’ de
‘derechos humanos’, demostrando su continuidad en una larga lista de gobiernos tanto 
en EEUU como en GB.  Al mismo tiempo, uno puede discernir cómo el discurso de
‘derechos humanos’ se ha desplegado una y otra vez en relación con, o más bien 
subordinado a, las preocupaciones de seguridad y las estrategias geopolíticas más
amplias.  La defensa de ‘libertad’ y ‘democracia’ se convierte en un acto moral- ambos
conceptos son considerados ‘derechos humanos’- y un acto geopolítico a la vez.  Un 
análisis de discurso de la intervención militar en Libia muestra que la última
performance no es diferente; por un lado, una acción supuestamente moral, ya que el
objetivo declarado es la defensa del pueblo libio y sus derechos humanos; pero por otro 
lado, una acción que pretende cumplir con los objetivos estratégicos de Occidente tales
como la liberalización y la democratización de Libia y la región de Oriente Medio-
sometiéndose a la esfera de influencia Occidental-.    
Un análisis de cómo se situaba Libia en la imaginación geopolítica occidental
muestra precisamente cómo había llegado a ser susceptible al discurso de ‘derechos
humanos’   En función a este se produjo un cierto acercamiento entre Libia y EEUU/GB 
en los años anteriores a 2011, pero la ‘rehabilitación’ o ‘re-integración’ de Libia no fue























armas de destrucción masiva (WMD en inglés) no sería suficiente, en última instancia,
ya que una serie de cuestiones pone en entredicho la capacidad ontológica de Libia para
el cambio: un proceso estancado de liberalización y democratización política, la falta de
progreso sobre los derechos humanos, un cúmulo de aberraciones diplomáticas de
notoriedad.  De hecho, en la medida en que las revueltas de 2011 tuvieron el efecto de
situar en primer plano estos temas,  la figura del mismo Gaddafi pasó  a ser visto como 
obstáculo al cambio y a la ‘rehabilitación’ de Libia -y por asociación, a los intereses de
seguridad más amplios de Occidente-.  Por lo tanto, el ex-líder de Libia se convierte una 
vez más en el ‘Otro’ radical, una amenaza tanto a las aspiraciones del ‘pueblo libio’
como a la identidad del ‘Self’ Occidental privilegiado.  Es por estas razones que
Gaddafi ‘debe irse’.
Así pues, el despliegue del discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ responde a un 
imperativo moral, y también a las necesidades de seguridad de Occidente.  Además, en 
la medida en que los gobiernos de Estados Unidos y Reino Unido hacen un llamamiento 
a los valores 'universales', valores que reultan ser valores occidentales -democraticos y 
liberales-, es posible hacer correlaciones con lo que Slater ha denominado la
'imperiality of power'. Sin embargo, la conclusión principal de esta tesis es que una vez
que se pone en marcha, las lógicas internas del discurso tienen la capacidad de
traicionar y socavar estos objetivos por excluir a priori otras maneras de ver la violencia 
en Libia.  Esto, a su vez, cierra la posibilidad de buscar soluciones más pacíficas a la
violencia que se producía y una transición política más estable.  La teoría de discurso 
ilumina las maneras en que estas lógicas funcionan para apuntalar, escudar e inmunizar 
el discurso, posibilitando absorber y repeler los elementos de lo que llegaría a ser un 
discurso hegemónico de ‘guerra civil’.  En primer lugar, ya que los derechos humanos
que se defienden -principalmente la ‘libertad’ y la ‘democracia’- son por su ‘naturaleza’
aplicables a todo el pueblo libio, se deduce que las acciones occidentales, las que tienen 
el objetivo último de derrocar a Gaddafi, deben entenderse en favor de los intereses de
todos los libios.  Las dudas planteadas por el discurso de ‘guerra civil’ sobre las
identidades de los beligerantes -en qué consiste los ‘rebeldes’-, o incluso el nivel de
apoyo de que disfrutaba los ‘rebeldes’ entre la población libia, llegan a ser casi
irrelevantes.  Los oficiales occidentales pueden desatender estas preocupaciones porque
el objetivo es el mismo; Gaddafi ‘debe irse’ ya que es el obstáculo para que el ‘pueblo






















En segundo lugar, y en relación con el primer punto, el discurso de ‘derechos
humanos’ es gobernado por una teleología, la cual presupone que el ‘destino’ del pueblo 
libio consta de la ‘libertad’ y la ‘democracia’.  Si es que tales valores son considerados
transcendentales, resulta ser, en efecto, una premisa lógica.  Desde luego es paradójico 
que esta teleología habrá de alcanzarse con el puro poder militar de occidente; para
conseguir sus objetivos los gobiernos occidentales deben negar a los libios por la fuerza
el mismo ‘derecho humano’ de poder elegir el líder y gobierno existente si es que lo
deseen. Ahora bien, para que el ‘Otro’ libio corrija el estado atrasado y deficiente en 
que se encuentra- levantándose al nivel del ‘Self’ Occidental privilegiado- Gaddafi debe 
ser eliminado.  Además,, el hecho de que el conflicto en Libia se entienda como parte de 
un fenómeno más amplio –la ‘Primavera Árabe’- vincula el ‘destino’ de Libia
estrechamente a los demás levantamientos producidos en otros países  árabes, en los que 
se desencadena una lógica anti- ‘domino’, a través de la cual la sobrevivencia de
Gaddafi y el ‘régimen’ libio impiden  el despertar democrático en otras partes.  
Así pues, el discurso de ‘derechos humanos’ se caracteriza por la abstracción, la
transcendencia y la teleología, unos elementos que funcionan para exigir la salida de
Gaddafi, y también para evitar cualquier desafío discursivo, como el del discurso de
‘guerra civil’.  Al hacerlo, se cierran otras opciones de política exterior que podrían 
haber ocasionado una solución más pacífica.  El énfasis puesto en los ‘derechos
humanos’ de un ‘pueblo libio’ aparentemente homogéneo, oculta y conduce a una
subestimación de las divisiones étnicas, regionales, tribales, religiosas e ideológicas en 
Libia. La historicidad está casi suspendida, por lo que se ignoran, o no se tienen en 
cuenta adecuadamente, las advertencias sobre  los huecos institucionales, la falta de una
sociedad civil funcional, y la ausencia de una tradición democrática en Libia -por lo 
menos en el sentido liberal occidental-.  Prestar más atención a estas facetas de la
cultura política y la sociedad libia habría suscitado, seguramente, una mayor cautela
entre los responsables políticos a la hora de derrumbar a Gaddafi y su gobierno.  Que se
machacan las fuerzas de seguridad en el proceso no hace nada más que aumentar la falta 
de autoridad y control sobre el territorio. La situación de violencia, caos e inestabilidad
que vive Libia desde entonces sugiere que otra solución -basada en el diálogo, las
negociaciones y la reconciliación nacional- podría haber ayudado a evitar la

















De esta manera, en esta tesis se concluye   que el discurso de ‘derechos
humanos’ resulta ser pernicioso, en la medida en que sus lógicas internas llevan la
capacidad de socavar y traicionar los mismos objetivos morales y de seguridad que
supuestamente se defiende.
En definitiva, esta tesis pone en tela de juicio lo adecuado que resulta el discurso 
de ‘derechos humanos’ para entender y dar sentido a los fenómenos geopolíticos
complejos.  El determinismo de la política exterior que emerge de su despliegue
significa que se hace extremadamente difícil- si no imposible- que los responsables
políticos puedan cambiar de rumbo.  Así, esta tesis representa un llamamiento a volver a 
las particularidades de cada caso, prestando debida atención a las múltiples facetas en 
evidencia.  En vez de privilegiar el nivel global- en base a los valores globales
‘transcendentales’ y ‘universales’-, los líderes políticos deben estar más atentos a la
serie completa de escalas geográficas, incluyendo lo local y lo regional.  De manera
parecida, se formula un llamamiento a la historicidad, lo cual consta de la comprensión
de: cómo se ha formado a lo largo del tiempo un espacio geográfico, las complejidades
del sistema político y las instituciones vigentes, y también la gama completa de
identidades en juego.  Esto puede también implicar una estimación de las disparidades
entre una cultura política, social y económica, por un lado, y los valores idealizados




'It's pure abstraction.  Human rights, after all, what does that mean? It's
pure abstraction, it's empty’  Gilles Deleuze. 
‘To admit a belief merely because it is a custom – but that means to be 
dishonest, cowardly, lazy! – And so could dishonesty, cowardice and 

















































The political violence which erupted in Libya (2011) was widely contextualized 
within the temporal and geographical parameters of a phenomenon conceived as the
‘Arab spring’.  Heralded as ‘momentous’ and ‘historic’ by Western media and
politicians, this encapsulated a seemingly universal movement in the Middle East that
had as its principal objectives the achievement of greater liberty, democracy and an end 
to corruption. Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali was the first to succumb to 
the popular demands for change, being quickly followed by his Egyptian counterpart
Hosni Mubarak.  Yet the optimism with which this phenomenon was greeted by the
West would not take long in subsiding.  Egypt, the largest country in the Middle East
and at the very heart of Western media coverage, was hauled back into military
dictatorship two years later as part of a Coup d’État. Syria would become embroiled in 
a brutal and bloody civil war, the scale of which horrifying even the most apathetic
observers.  While other uprisings in Bahrain, Yemen and so forth, were violently put
down by state security forces.  Only in Tunisia, if truth be told, has any meaningful and 
propitious advances been made. 
The case of Libya itself enters into the geopolitical sphere of interest primarily
due to the fact that the United States, the United Kingdom and France became directly
engaged militarily in the country.  Moreover, the chaos and chronic instability which has 
ensued since the Western military intervention1 has meant that it has remained of great
interest for Libyans, politicians, academics, political commentators, the media, and 
many others around the World.  Persistent conflict amongst rival armed militias; the
presence of radical Islamic groups such as ISIS; widespread human rights’ abuses;
under-production in the all-important petrochemical industry; and the concomitant
diminution in economic life, have all conspired to produce a climate of hardship for 
significant parts of the Libyan population2. All of these factors have together called into 
question the West’s decisive role in bringing about the fall of previous leader Muammar 
‘Intervention’ can be placed in quotation marks to challenge the euphemistic nature of the term-
also noted by Megoran (2008)-.  A military intervention implies the use of sophisticated high powered
weaponry, the breaching of sovereign borders, loss of life and human injury.  It can thus be seen in the
same light as other terms such as ‘precision’, in ‘precision bombing,’ or ‘collateral damage,’ which 
together contribute to make modern warfare more palatable to Western audiences.
1 
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Gaddafi3 and his government.  This has provoked questions about why, how, and on 
what basis the Western powers came to intervene in Libya.
At a more general level, Western actions in Libya represent the latest in a
catalogue of military interventions which have violated a recognized nation-state’s
sovereignty, and been carried out through appeals to ‘humanitarian’ or ‘universal’
values.  Interventions such as those in Somalia and Kosovo, and more recently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, have all made their mark in one way or another on the Western
psyche.  As have cases like Bosnia and Rwanda, where the political will for taking
decisive action was either in short supply or lacking altogether. Widely considered to be 
human tragedies, these cases have left a considerable stain on the collective Western 
conscience. This means that the Libyan case is also of primary concern for those
interested in how liberal governments exercise power as part of a wider humanitarian 
geopolitics.  Furthermore, the very inconsistency of response shown by the West, as
briefly touched on here, has been enough to arouse suspicion and scepticism in the very
humanitarian motives stated by Western governments. 
Viewing Libya alongside these past cases has often led to simplistic conclusions, 
which merely confirm the humanitarian motivations of Western powers or conversely
cry foul play, alluding to subterfuge and ‘real’ motivations such as the pursuit of Libyan
oil. An uncritical conception of the Western state, one which views it as a fixed,
coherent and unambiguous entity, will be rejected in this thesis.  As will the type of 
cause-effect reasoning and conclusions that can result from a theoretical positivist
stance.  The suitability of positivism for the study of the social and political world is
surely more in doubt than ever before.  The aim of this thesis is thus not to determine
whether or not the Western intervention in Libya can be considered ‘humanitarian’ or an 
example of its offshoot the ‘Right to Protect’ norm.  In fact, it will display a resistance
to these types of logics which often amount to a futile quest for an original cause or 
motivation.  As will be shown in the literature review section, much of the work carried 
out on the intervention in Libya ultimately resorts to this type of reasoning.  The
objectives here will be to answer a quite different set of questions.  
2 Widely held assessments including by a foreign affairs committee set up in the UK (2016) to 
report on the policy pursued by David Cameron and his conservative government. 
3 It has been repeatedly denied that ‘regime change’ was the aim of the military intervention by
Western governments.  The actions by the US, UK. and France do not give much credence to these






















OBJECTIVES AND ELABORATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What is missing from much of the work written on the intervention in Libya is
any account of how the question of ‘human rights’ has come to be meaningful to
Western states in the first place, and why it took on particular resonance in the case of 
Libya in 2011.  Moreover, the consequences of the deployment of a ‘human rights’
discourse have not been fully explored.  From these three principle concerns a set of 
primary and a secondary research question emerges.  In terms of the primary research
questions, this thesis will seek to investigate:
1) What were the main discourses used by Western governments and
oppositional voices to give meaning to the events taking place in Libya
in 2011?  From this primary focus one can then ask: 
2) How did these discourses constitute the identities of those involved?
3) What logics and mechanisms were triggered and which foreign policy
options were suggested and pursued as a result of the deployment of 
these discourses? 
4) How did official US and UK discourse maintain stability faced with 
political and media opposition? 
In answering these primary questions, it will be possible to approach a
secondary question and assess to what extent the intervention in Libya can be situated 
within what David Slater (2013) has called the ‘Imperiality of power’. That is to ask:
 1) � How can the Western discourses used be related with historical
discourses emphasizing the universality of Western values? And in so 
doing: 
(i) � Did this lead to an underestimation of the levels of resistance they

























(ii) � Did western governments overestimate the capacity of those whom
they had intervened to support? 
(iii) � What were the consequences of using the discourses and
understanding the Libyan conflict in these particular ways? 
In answering these sets of crucial questions it will be possible to reach a full
understanding of why, and more importantly how the US and UK governments came to
intervene militarily in Libya.  It will also become possible to shine light on the way in
which both governments were able to mitigate the quite significant opposition to their 
policies that existed in both countries.  In so doing, one can start to appreciate how
alternative solutions to the crisis in Libya were marginalised.  Finally, a response to the
aforementioned questions holds the promise of explaining if and how, as the UK
Foreign Affairs committee report (2016) has concluded, the intervention could lead to:
‘political and economic collapse, inter-militia and inter-tribal warfare, humanitarian and 
migrant crises, widespread human rights violations, the spread of Gaddafi regime
weapons across the region and the growth of ISIL (Islamic State in North Africa)’. 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will turn to the continued promise
of post-structuralism, which has been used to such great effect in ‘critical geopolitics’
scholarship.  In particular, it has been deemed necessary to carry out a rigorous ‘history
of the present,’ in a Foucauldian spirit, paying meticulous attention to context and detail, 
whilst analysing the vast web of discourse.  This amounts to a thorough mapping and 
exploration of the discursive terrain, before and during the military intervention, 
drawing out how crucial objects such as ‘Libya,’ ‘Gaddafi,’ and the ‘Libyan people’
have been shaped and reshaped.  At the same time, it will be necessary to make a
genealogical inquiry into how ‘human rights’ has come to occupy a privileged place
within Western foreign and security policy.  Only in this way does it become possible to
disavow hegemonic power structures, those which invariably reveal and expose
themselves in the very contingency of the objects which they aspire to fix.  Included 
will be an interrogation of any taken for granted, ‘self-evident’ assumptions, which, if
left unquestioned, do little but assist and perpetuate certain interests to the detriment of 
others.  Rather than the simple affirmation or refutation of pre-conceived ideas
























   
pronounced, to create by putting ‘out of joint’4 paradigmatic ways of understanding
geopolitics and the Western military intervention in Libya. 
The forthcoming discourse analysis will be carried out under the premise that the 
issue of identity is crucial to the formulation of foreign policy, and thus the actions
which result from it.  Yet rather than theorizing state identity as something self-evident,
fixed, and pre-discursive- a presumption that realist and liberal accounts of international 
politics have been all too ready to make- it will be understood as something that is
permanently in flux and ontologically relational.  This does not mean that identities can
be constructed at will, nor that states can assume subject positions irrespective of 
context or previously articulated expressions of identity.  On the contrary, the identity of 
the sovereign state is understood to be ‘performatively’ constituted throughout time by a 
plethora of re-iterative state and non-state practices.  This theoretical premise can
certainly be inferred from the chain of past Western military interventions that have
alluded to ‘universal’ values or ‘human rights’ as justification for their actions.  
Understanding identity and discourse in such a way means that the Western military
intervention in Libya can be theorized as a concrete performance and the materialization 
of these historical discursive practices.  And since the Western sovereign state can never 
fully realize the identities which it presumes to possess, it is within this opening that the
thesis will situate itself, and where it will aim to make its own political contribution in 
contestation of Western power. 
This thesis offers up the prospect of adding to existing literature in two main
areas.  Firstly, it will be of interest to those who are concerned with Libya, how this
geographical space has been understood historically by the U.S. and U.K. governments, 
and those interested in the Western military intervention in Libya.  For much of the
period spanning the overthrow of King Idris in 1969 till the 2011 intervention, Libya,
and in particular its ex-leader Muammar Gaddafi, have been represented as something 
of a nemesis to the West; that is, an enigmatic and threatening Other, one which is to be
vilified, punished, and ostracised from the ‘international community’5. Yet this has not
4 By putting ‘out of joint’ the logocentric ‘is’, Jacques Derrida aims precisely to challenge taken 
for granted assumptions about the ‘nature’ of things. As will be touched on later, this has included, 
amongst many other things, the very notions of ‘writing’ and ‘text’ themselves.
5 The idea that there is an ‘International community’ is a political construct and, moreover, will
always refer to a select, specific number of states.  It has been used in justification of actions by Western













                                                                                                   
always been the case as evidenced by the period of ‘rapprochement’ between Libya and 
the West before 2011.   A greater understanding of how the identity of Libya has been 
constructed discursively -in accordance with the particular geopolitical contexts of the
time-  and how this had a bearing on Western constructions of Libya and Gaddafi in 
2011, is surely welcome. 
Secondly, this intervention will contribute to previous critical geopolitics and 
international relations scholarship, which has sought to shine light on a new wave of 
Western military actions following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre.  
Military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq had as their primary objective the
elimination of those who had been recalcitrant to Western power, and remained ‘outside’ 
the hegemonic neo-liberal order. The removal of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, 
however, were also accompanied by a normative narrative which posited the
emancipation of the Afghan and Iraqi populations from repressive rulers.  In relation to 
this, critical authors have spoken of a ‘Colonial Present’ (Gregory, 2004); the ‘Duty of 
the Benevolent Master’ (Cairo, 2006); a ‘Neoimperialism’ (Flusty et al, 2008); or 
perhaps most importantly, as expressions of an ‘imperial mentality’ or ‘imperiality of 
power’ (Slater, 2010; 2013).  These interventions have in one way or another tried to 
highlight the main discourses, and unearth the logics, rationalities and mechanisms
through which the Western liberal state has exercised power.  This thesis on the Western 
military intervention in Libya represents another opportunity to add to this crucial
endeavour. 
25 




















LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
One of the possible downsides of selecting a recent geopolitical event for study
could be the scarcity of investigation and analyses carried out on the subject matter.  
This, nevertheless, should not be viewed as something necessarily dissuasive. After all, 
research must inevitably start from some point or another, and will invariably have to 
make use of the resources one has to hand.  In a thesis such as this one, the onus will be
on the use of primary resources, whether they be taken from governmental, opposition
or media sources.  From these documents it is possible to extract meaningful
conclusions, ones which can then serve other researchers well in the future.  That said, it 
is important to establish a grounding in what has already been written on the case in 
question. And in spite of the relative temporal proximity between the time of writing 
and the NATO-led military intervention in Libya itself, a considerable amount of 
scholarly work has already been undertaken.  It is this work which will provide a
starting point for the main body of research to follow in future sections.   
The objectives of this part of the thesis are essentially threefold.  The first thing
is to gain an understanding of what is already known about the case being analysed.  As
Silverman (2000) has warned, however, this should not only be descriptive, but exude
an analytical and critical edge. While it is certainly possible to find previous work 
praiseworthy, these studies will also invariably contain limitations and weaknesses.  A
critical assessment of academic work in the field can enable the researcher to express
with which texts he/she is more/less in agreement, and in addition, highlight which texts 
have greater relevance to the particular questions that the researcher is tackling.  It is
also useful to review existing literature to place the current study in context, and also to
establish a gap in which a contribution to existing knowledge can be positioned.  In the
event that some authors have already approached the case from a similar theoretical
perspective, or aimed to answer similar questions, an appreciation of this will be vital so 























This section has been broken down into three parts:
1. � First there will be a review of what has been written on the legality of the
military intervention, through recourse to some authors specialized in 
international law.  This will be done under the assumption that an 
understanding of the legal issues surrounding military intervention can shed
light on why and how the US and UK governments used the language they
did in their attempts to justify and legitimize their actions. 
2. � Secondly, it will also be useful to make an approximation to certain scholars
concerned with the ethics of the military intervention.  These authors often
focus on the whether or not the causes for intervention are just – ‘just cause’-
or alternatively, if the consequences betray the intentions and actions
themselves.  Work which treats the latter, for instance, will be relevant to the
research question oriented towards tracing the consequences resulting from
adopting one particular discourse and not another.  
3. � Most importantly, though, it will be essential to acquire knowledge of the
political contributions which have been made, especially any texts which
emerge from within the fields of International Relations and Geopolitics.  It
is within this discipline and sub-discipline which the thesis will ultimately
situate itself.  This will make it possible to both build on existing studies, and 
also compare and contrast the findings arrived at here with the work already
done on the event being investigated.  
It should be acknowledged that while some texts do indeed take on an overtly
legal, ethical or political orientation, many in fact do not.  This is, of course, perfectly
normal, as authors straddle these generic categories, incorporating elements from each 


























review will be conducive to drawing out the principle themes and discussions being 
developed in their respective fields.  Since this thesis aims to, first and foremost, make a 
political intervention, it will be within this area that the greatest amount of attention will 
be focused.
CONCERNING THE LEGALITY OF THE NATO MISSION �
One of the first set of questions to arise from the military intervention in Libya
surrounded the legality of the actions vis-á-vis international law.  In spite of this, some
authors were quick to downplay its significance.  Simon Chesterman (2011) rightly
points out that this was not the first time that a Security Council resolution had been
passed authorizing outside intervention in a sovereign state. This is supported through
reference to previous cases, such as Somalia, when this was indeed decided.  Jennifer
Welsh (2011) has also noted the reticence of Western states to bypass the Security
Council on recalling NATO General Director Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s requirements
of: ‘demonstrable need, clear legal basis, and strong regional support’(Rasmussen cited 
in Welsh, 2011:3; Welsh’s emphasis).   
Most of the work written on the legality of the Western-led intervention in Libya 
centred on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm (Henderson, 2011; Cronoque,
2012; Jubilut, 2012; Berman and Michaelsen, 2012; Zifcak, 2012; Bernstein, 2012;
O'Shea, 2012; Garwood-Gowers, 2013).  The doctrine, which was accepted formally by
all United Nations member states in 2005 at the UN World Summit, is a clear offshoot
of previous notions of ‘humanitarian intervention’.  R2P tries to incorporate and
enshrine in international jurisprudence the ‘responsibility’ which a government has
towards the population over which it presides.  In the event that a government is unable
or unwilling to ‘protect’ its population against barbarisms such as genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, the international community is expected to 
act in a ‘timely and decisive manner’ to address the situation (UN General Assembly,
2005). Articulated in this way, obvious challenges are posed to previously accepted 
notions of nation-state sovereignty, which had offered protection to weaker political
























 In relation to the Libyan case, Catherine Powell (2012) saw this as further 
evidence of a ‘normative shift’ in international law.  It is the latest example of a
transformation in the ‘traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty’, which veers from
‘sovereignty as right’, towards a conception of sovereignty ‘as responsibility’.  All the
same, Powell does recognize that two of the three ‘prongs’ which make up R2P, are ‘not 
binding law’ and would be best considered ‘emerging, influential norms’. This does not 
prevent her from predicting a further ‘process of legalization’ in the matter.  According 
to Powell, the Libyan case is important as it ‘bolsters earlier Security Council efforts to 
address civilian protection, even while it leaves open significant questions regarding
when and how the international community, acting collectively, can or should intervene, 
militarily or otherwise, to protect civilians’ (Powell, 2012:298-302). 
While authors such as Powell are essentially correct in that Western powers did 
receive authorization for intervention from the Security Council -significantly no veto
was lodged from any of the 5 permanent members, unlike in the case of Kosovo- there
are of course other important facets to be considered.  As others have commented, it is
not the same thing to operate in defence of the civilian population, as it is to actively
seek the end of the leader and government already in place.  It is along these lines that
Ulfstein and Christiansen (2013) have argued that the NATO mission in Libya
overstepped the boundaries of legality.  Dividing the military operations into three
separate phases, the authors argue that one must clearly distinguish between actions
which protected civilians, and those which aimed to overthrow Gaddafi on the other.  
While it is acknowledged that the mandate awarded by the UN Security Council
(Resolution 1973) was one which authorized ‘all necessary measures’, it is also recalled
that this was for specific purposes, namely ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated 
areas under threat of attack’. This meant, therefore, that the so-called third phase of the
mission, employed to break the ‘stalemate’ in the conflict, actually went beyond the
original mandate in having a direct bearing on the removal of Gaddafi and the success
of the rebels.  The conclusions reached by the authors raise doubts as to the future























   
 

 THE ETHICS OF THE NATO OPERATION IN LIBYA �
The Western-led military intervention in Libya has also been tackled from an 
ethical perspective.  While some authors like Michael Walzer (2011) did not believe that 
the ethical threshold for ‘just cause’ had been met, since for him it did not constitute one 
of the ‘most extreme cases’, many other authors disagreed. Thomas G. Weiss, avid
supporter of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the ‘Right to Protect’ norm, concluded
before the Western intervention had officially ended that ‘RtoP is alive and well after 
Libya’ (Weiss, 2011).  This is because for Weiss. the actions taken were justified by the
humanitarian causes for that action.  In speaking of the events in Libya he refers to the
‘murderous harm that Muammar el-Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians…and that he 
has continued to use against the “cockroaches” who oppose him’ (Weiss, 2011:1).  The
result of following the right course of action in Libya, therefore, is that it becomes
possible ‘to say no more holocausts, Cambodias and Rwandas- and occasionally mean
it’ (Weiss, 2011:5). 
Another early endorsement of Western policy in Libya came from Robert Pape
in his article ‘When Duty Calls’ (2012).  According to Pape, it was the ‘mass homicide
campaign’ being committed by Gaddafi and the Libyan government that provided the
ultimate justification for Western intervention.  At the same time, however, Pape would
like to put Libya forward as a good example of how a ‘pragmatic humanitarian 
intervention’ should be conducted, with focus also on ‘low-cost’ military plans and 
‘enduring security’. What is more uncertain is how the author can reconcile his concept 
of ‘pragmatic humanitarian intervention,’ with economic considerations placed on the
would-be interveners, with an ethical obligation which simultaneously establishes a
‘duty’ on the would-be intervener.  All the same, for Pape, the ‘successful’ intervention 
in Libya means that the ‘pragmatic’ standard of humanitarian intervention can ‘help
guide decision makers on when to intervene to stop governments from targeting their
own citizens’.
For James Pattison (2011), the issue is not simply a case of whether or not the
intervention was justified, of which he suggests unconvincingly, ‘there may have been 
























civilians- the stated aim of the mission- and the removal of Gaddafi or ‘regime change’. 
In relation to the latter, Pattison shows himself to be unconvinced that the outcomes
would outweigh the consequences of such action.  As he notes, ‘although the Qaddafi
regime is brutal and oppressive, forcible regime change can all too often do more harm
than good, as the war in Iraq has shown’ (Pattison, 2011:272-273).  Yet since Pattison 
judges the intention of regime change to be ‘secondary’ to that of protecting civilians, 
he is able to displace this problem onto the notion of ‘mission creep’. The main issue is
not, therefore, that the real motive was to topple the Libyan leader and government-  
something problematic in Pattison’s eyes- it is that this may become a motive as a
consequence of an initial response.  The question at stake, essentially, is how a war can 
be gauged to be just, when sometimes the objectives change throughout its lifespan.
Putting to one side, for the time being, the fact that Western officials had in fact
demanded that Gaddafi leave power from the very beginning, the displacement of the
issue of regime change allows Pattison to find greater justification on other ethical
aspects of the intervention.  With regards the outcomes of the military intervention,
Pattison is surely unduly optimistic, citing the ‘intervention´s successful promotion of 
basic human rights’.  Moreover, it is also important to assure of a ‘suitable strategy’, the 
‘commitment to stay the course’, ‘local and global support for the intervention’ and the
‘intervener´s fidelity to the principles of jus in bello’. In Pattison´s judgement,
reflection on these aspects draws the conclusion that the Libyan intervention ‘appears
sound according to these requirements,’ which enables him to reach the perhaps hasty
conclusion that it ‘can be expected to be successful in the long term.’ (Pattison, 
2011:275).  Finally, in relation to the theme of ‘selectivity’, or the lack of a consistent
response to situations in other countries, Pattison concludes ultimately that ‘saving 
some lives is better than none’ (Pattison, 2011: 277). 
One of the main issues that one can take with these early articles is that they
privilege the causes – ‘just’- of the intervention to the detriment of the consequences- or 
potential consequences which could occur-.  In part, this is no doubt due to the timing of 
the articles, having being written in 2011 not long after the ousting of Gaddafi and the
Libyan government.  Of course it would have been impossible to predict with any great
certainty the political future of Libya at that time.  Having said that, Pape does express
an awareness of this uncertainty and hints at potential problems on the horizon.  He















   
  
 
   
 
have refused to disarm.’  In spite of this, however, he says optimistically ‘the available
evidence suggests that the country is not descending into the kind of chaos and violence
that would fundamentally undermine the goals of the intervention’ (Pape, 2011:69).  
This effectively means though that Pape’s evaluation of the intervention as being a
‘success,’ and a good example of ‘pragmatic humanitarian intervention,’ is dependent on 
the situation not deteriorating.  If it should descent into chronic instability and violence- 
as is now generally accepted to be the case- Pape’s whole argument would appear to fall 
into serious difficulty.
Secondly, while the issues surrounding the inconsistency of response by Western 
countries is rightly brought up, the answers to this question are not conclusive.   Pattison 
rightfully refers to Syria, Bahrain, Yemen and the Ivory Coast, and the lack of 
intervention or even political will for such action. And while his conclusion may satisfy 
certain branches of moral philosophy, this would leave too many questions unanswered 
in a geopolitical investigation.  That said, claims that the Western intervention in Libya
had ethical intentions are not something which can be dismissed out of hand, as some
authors may be tempted to do- these will be explored later-.  There was certainly serious 
violence taking place in Libya around February of 2011, enough for an international
consensus to piece together an unprecedented resolution to implement a no-fly zone
over Libya.  It is just that to brandish Western actions as exclusively, or even first and 
foremost ethical, with the protection of civilians as the ‘dominant motivation’, can only
ever offer a partial response to what is undoubtedly a complex geopolitical event.
The crux of the matter is, the answer to these questions cannot merely by arrived 
at through a consideration of whether or not a particular intervention can be considered 
ethical. Several crucial questions remain unanswered, even being alluded to in other 
parts of Weiss’s short contribution. The author is correct in pointing out the
inconsistency of response to international crises by Western states, but at the same time
he lays bare perhaps the most pertinent question of all: how can one account for these
different responses?  It is not enough to say that the action taken in Libya was ethical, 
but that that very same ethical compass has been missing in other instances. This
assertion indeed suggests that there are other factors at work, factors which could 
explain the reasoning behind the action taken, and possibly also why events unfolded in 
the way that they did.  In short, what is required in each and every case is a historical

























THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 
The internationalization of the Libyan conflict and the plethora of responses
which resulted from it, have logically led to political analysts approaching the military
intervention in Libya from various angles.  Authors have inquired into the German
government’s passivity and unexpected abstention vis-á-vis UN Security Council
Resolution 1973 (Hansel and Opperman, 2016); others have been interested in the
Italian government's response (Croci and Valigi, 2012), having been hitherto considered 
to be Libya's closest partner in Europe; while Beresford (2015) has tried to understand 
the seemingly incoherent position of the South African government, passing from
perceived tacit support- the South African government may well have executed a
decisive abstention at the Security Council vote on Resolution 1973- to outspoken critic
of the West as events later unfolded. 
Other writers have been more interested in approaching the military intervention
from the supranational level.  Focussing on the specific role of the NATO Alliance, Ivo 
H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis (2012) were quick to hail ‘NATO’s Victory in Libya’
as the ‘right way to run an intervention’.  Several reasons are given for this, the crux of 
which revolve around the ‘rapid response’ to the crisis, which was in turn facilitated by
greater political coordination and unity among member states.  Suggestions of some
improvements in ‘basic infrastructure’ notwithstanding, and acknowledgements
regarding the relatively small size of the operation in Libya, the authors are undeterred
in their optimism about the future of the NATO alliance.  Indeed, there is ample
evidence for the authors to suggest that ‘NATO is uniquely positioned to respond 
quickly and effectively to international crises’ (Daalder & Stavridis, 2012: 3-4).  
Luke Glanville (2013) pointed towards the importance of regional organizations
in securing the two Security Council Resolutions on Libya and asks whether or not this
will be an important part of future interventions.  As he correctly acknowledges, 'it is
noteworthy that no state chose to vote against the resolution authorizing military
intervention in the affairs of a non-consenting sovereign state'. And he continues, 'It
would seem that the request for military measures by the LAS (League of Arab States) 
was crucial in this regard’ (Glanville, 2013:335).  In this way, it is indeed possible to 
argue, as Glanville tries to, that 'the existence of regional consent trumped the absence
33 
  
   





   
 

















of sovereign consent’ (Glanville, 2013:336).  The Western countries leading the
intervention were certainly keen to place emphasis on regional support in seeking 
legitimation for breaching the sovereign borders of Libya. The problem is that the
recourse to regional organizations such as the Arab League and the African Union was
clearly limited.  Glanville actually recognizes this in his article, and raises the potential
problems associated with a) Western countries going beyond the mandate afforded them 
and b) the potential that a would-be intervener merely highlights the regional
organization that gives them most support, while marginalizing any other.  This would
appear to have been the case with the African Union once military intervention had
commenced in Libya. 
In approaching the Libyan crisis from this particular perspective, Alex de Waal's
(2013) contribution has been to highlight how an AU proposal made for a negotiated
settlement was marginalized by Western powers.  His understanding of the African
Union is that of a supranational body devoid of the necessary resources, and replete
with divisions and contrasting interests.  Nonetheless, it is also one which shared the
common interest of ensuring Libya did not descend into chaos, sparking the type of 
instability which could- and would- spread to other countries sharing a border with it.
One example of this would be Mali, where the violence in Tuareg controlled territory
was attributed directly to instability in Libya. Therefore, the alternative proposal being 
made had as its primary objective the return to dialogue, negotiations, and perhaps
peace and stability. This was to be achieved through a cease-fire, followed by
democratization, which in turn would be achieved through dialogue and political
negotiation.  And while de Waal is correct in recognizing that the plan did not guarantee
a peaceful resolution by any means, it is the fact that the option wasn’t seriously
pursued which is most of significance.  
De Waal’s intervention is noteworthy for two particular reasons.  Firstly, it works 
to debunk one of the assumptions underlying many of the texts supporting Western
intervention in Libya, even if that be implicitly. The dubious assumption is that Western 
governments were faced with a zero-sum decision with regards the crisis in Libya. That 
is to say, to intervene -with the inevitable consequence that Gaddafi must leave or be
forced from power- or conversely, to do nothing at all.  Even at an intuitive level this
would amount to a clear underestimation of the full range of policy options available to 




















   
 
indeed appealed to and referenced in attempts to legitimize the military intervention, the 
driving force behind efforts to force Gaddafi from power was indeed from the Western 
governments themselves.  The African Union peace plan failed not simply due to the
limitations of AU organization, resources and diplomacy.  It was also that the US, UK
and France were simply not interested in negotiations whereby ex-leader Gaddafi could 
potentially remain in Libya in some capacity. The proposals made by the African Union 
were duly rejected by both the Western powers and the National Transition Council.  If 
Gaddafi were not to leave immediately, as Western officials had been demanding since
the start of the violence, the only viable option would be his removal by force. 
In their extremely interesting article 'Power in practice: Negotiating the
international intervention in Libya', Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014) have gathered
first-hand evidence which highlights the role of the UK and France in securing both 
Resolutions against the Libyan government at the United Nations Security Council.  
Having conducted a series of qualitative interviews with officials and diplomats, the
authors have tried to lay bare the power of both countries' diplomacy and political nous
in acquiring the relevant support for their own positions.  The authors have shown how
both the UK and France were the driving force behind acquiring the Resolutions, using 
their influence to bring the US on board, and also garner support from a host of other
countries. 
In dealing with the intervention itself, certain works should be commented on. 
While the title of Christopher Chivvis' (2013) book 'Toppling Qaddafi: Libya and the
Limits of Liberal Interventionism' is itself suggestive of a critical perspective, this does
not materialize in any significant way. That said, the author clearly does not want to 
reiterate Western denials which attempt to elide responsibility for the removal of ex-
Libyan leader Gaddafi and his government.  In laying bare the significant role played in 
Gaddafi's demise, the author points to evidence that Western special forces were indeed 
operating on the ground alongside rebel forces in the later stages of the conflict.  
However, all in all, that these actions resembled more like a policy of 'regime change'
than the mere protection of civilians is not dwelt on too much by the author. Having 
passed through the problems which can result from such a foreign policy the conclusion 
reached is that in spite of everything it has been worthwhile. This assessment is
partially based on the understanding that the West could not sit back and do nothing in 




























earlier deployed by Weiss and others-.  There is also motive of supporting the 'Arab 
Spring' and the democratic murmurings taking place in the region.
There are other, more critical interventions to be found.  Perhaps one of the most 
scathing appraisals of Western policy in Libya is to be found in Cynthia McKinney's
edited volume 'The Illegal War on Libya' (2012). As can be inferred from the title of the 
book, the author-s- are in no doubt about the illegality of the actions taken by the West, 
and moreover official claims that the 'intervention' could in fact be preceded with the
qualifying adjective 'humanitarian'.  Stephen Lendman's article is particularly scathing.  
If his hyperbolic assertion, 'the US-led NATO war on Libya' amounts to 'one of history's 
greatest crimes,' is not going to far, then perhaps the analogies he draws with the 'Third
Reich criminals' could be construed as offensive for some.  In spite of these serious
shortcomings, however, the book does offer some interesting first-hand testimony from
the conflict.  Equally caustic in his condemnation of Western actions in Libya is
political anthropologist Maximilian Forte.  In his book, 'Slouching Towards Sirte:
NATO's War on Libya and Africa' (2012), Forte rejects official accounts of the
intervention positing human rights as the principle motivation.  He does so by firstly
setting out to debunk the claims made by Western officials which spoke of state-
sponsored crimes of 'systematic rape' and the use of sub-Saharan 'mercenaries'. These,
having been in fact echoed by human rights organizations Amnesty and HRW, who have 
also questioned Western governments' claims.
There are some key issues that one can take with Forte's intervention, and those
like it that seek to uncover the real causes or motivations for Western intervention.
Firstly, the search often becomes one to uncover the original cause, thus meaning that
they ultimately fail to provide a full answer mapping of the event and the issues in play.
Forte's argument places most weight for this on a fear of Gaddafi's Pan Africanism and 
thus US grand strategy in Africa as epitomized by AFRICOM.  Yet one detects that it
would be possible to make just as good a case for other explanations such as the
Western pursuit of Libyan oil.  Yet more than anything, such contributions appear to
dismiss too early, and too comprehensively, official justifications for intervention.  This, 
it would seem, can be associated with a deep mistrust in Western governments and 
official accounts of especially actions carried out in foreign lands.  Suggesting that
Western governments are not concerned with human rights is difficult to do, 
























their presence in official US and UK discourse. The task, therefore, is to explain in 
what way 'human rights' have featured and how the 'human rights' discourse has been 
deployed.  
Official Western government discourse, moreover, must in some way be
coherent with previous articulations and the representations being made must in some
way resonate with the objective World.  Note that this is not to suggest that the ways in 
which US and UK officials represented the events in Libya can ever be fully accurate
and trustworthy.  But to rubbish claims that human rights issues were at stake in Libya
out of hand, it almost to say that no Libyans lost their lives at the hands of the Libyan
security authorities, or that excessive force was not used to put down original anti-
government demonstrations.  One would have to explain how two UN Security Council
resolutions could have been passed alongside the level of condemnation directed at the
Libyan government from such a wide array of individual states and regional
organizations.
Other authors have tried to shed light on the internal dynamics of what began as
protests in Eastern Libya and then spread throughout the country.  In particular, focus
has been placed on the identity of the groups involved.  Some key texts have, in their 
analysis, called into question Western claims of a homogeneous ‘Libyan people’
struggling against a brutal dictator in ex-leader ‘Gaddafi’.  For instance, in his thorough 
analysis of the situation in Libya during and after the Western intervention, Bassiouni
(2013) has drawn attention to the plethora of armed groups involved in the violence;
these could be distinguished from each other in accordance with ethnicity, tribal
affiliation, or ideological outlook.  Those groups fighting against Gaddafi and the ex-
Libyan government, nevertheless, had this as their common objective.  Exiled Professor 
of Tripoli University Mabruk Derbesh in an interview for the program 'The World 
Today with Tariq Ali (2014) has claimed that the intervention of NATO itself was a key
factor in garnering and galvanising support for Gaddafi.  Of particular significance
would be his claim that the Warfalla, one of the largest tribes in the country, threw their 





   
 
 














 SUMMARY OF SECTIONS �
Part 1 sets out a methodological and theoretical framework through which the
subsequent analysis of the Western debate on the Libyan military intervention will be
carried out. The subject positions chosen will be predominately the United States and
the United Kingdom, with official government documents and four mainstream media
sources chosen as the empirical data to be analysed.  It will also be important to gain an 
understanding of how events in Libya were being understood at the supranational level, 
for instance at the United Nations Security Council.  This section will outline as much a
scepticism toward realist theories and positivist methodologies, as an endorsement of 
poststructuralism and the importance of language for understanding the social and 
political World.  To account for historical changes in the relationship between the West
and Libya, and also to ensure a robust analysis of the debate of 2011, it will be crucial to 
formulate at this stage a conception of discourse.  In line with other research which has
gained prominence in ‘critical international relations’ and ‘critical geopolitics’
scholarship, this present investigation will also place great importance on identity
construction and its relationship with foreign policy formulation.
The next task is to understand how ‘Libya’ has featured in the Western 
geopolitical imagination.  Part 2 will therefore undergo an historical analysis of US-
Libyan and UK- Libyan relations during the period spanning the ‘Green Revolution’ of 
1969 until the onset of Western military action in 2011.  This will involve a
consideration of key events such as the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1985 and the
Lockerbie terrorist attack of 1988.  Yet perhaps more importantly, this will entail an 
examination of how such events were understood and given meaning by the U.S. and 
UK governments.  Crucial here is to analyse how key discourses – ‘terrorism’, ‘rogue
state’ and ‘rehabilitation’- have imbued the geographical space of Libya with meaning
along with the identities of ex-leader Gaddafi and the ‘Libyan people’.  It is worth 
pointing out that although this section adopts an historical perspective, this is not one
which is oriented towards uncovering some kind of underlying progression, evolution or 
coherence.  Rather, contingency will be the guiding principle, with the objective to
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illuminate how context and discourse combine together to shape particular objects in
one way or another.
The final and principal section will comprise a discourse analysis of the Western 
debate on the violent events in Libya of 2011.  Two basic discourses have been  
identified- the 'human rights' discourse and the 'civil war' discourse- and will be used as
analytical structuring devices for the purpose of tracing the complexity of UK and US
foreign policy discourse.  Both basic discourses give meaning to the conflict in very
different ways, constructing divergent identities, and therefore pointing to two 
significantly different foreign policy outcomes.  An appreciation of the extent to which
UK and US officials borrowed from these basic discourses, and moreover the
progression of official discourse in accordance with the events taking place on the
ground, will be taken from this analysis.  It will also be important to assess the stability
of official discourse, how this was challenged by political and media opposition, and
whether or not it was able to establish hegemonic status in the overall debate.         
Since ‘human rights’ occupies a central position within US and UK official
discourse before, during and after the military intervention, it will be useful to first trace 
its conceptual history within foreign and security policy. The emphasis will be on 
developing a performative theory of ‘human rights’.  While the greatest attention will be 
paid to official documents, such as for instance the ‘Human Rights Report’ or ‘National
Security Strategy’, the analysis will also be widened to include non-state performative
instances of ‘human rights’, such as those which are to be found in texts by
‘intellectuals of statecraft’ or think tanks.  In short, it is essential to assess how ‘human 
rights’ has become an integral part of US and UK foreign policy, and how this has
resulted in the political constitution of the Western subject identity.  It is worth 
underlining that this is not meant to be a comprehensive study of the human rights
concept.  Rather, the focus is on how it has been incorporated into US and UK foreign 
policy through re-iterative performative articulations. 
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CHAPTER 1 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH �
DESIGN �
MAKING CHOICES IN POSTSTRUCTURALIST DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
While methodological concerns have not always been at the forefront of critical
analyses of geopolitics and international relations, several authors have argued for a
change in approach (Ó’Tuathail, 2002; Antaki et al., 2003; Hansen, 2006; Muller, 2010). 
This has stemmed from recognition that researchers are faced with a range of choices
which will ultimately affect the nature and scope of the study at hand.  Tackling these
choices at an early stage, and in a logical way, no doubt enhances the research project, 
making it more responsive to the object of study, the questions to be answered, thus
adding rigor to the finished product.  Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that greater 
attention to methodological principles equates with a more rigid and dogmatic approach. 
The range of choices available to investigators means that flexibility is always assured.  
These choices should be viewed as general indicators which guide the research,
allowing for the application of the theoretical framework in a more systematic way.
Lene Hansen (2006), in particular, has highlighted and developed an important
set of methodological principles and questions which can be tackled as part of a
successful research design.  These can be summarised as the following:
1. � LEVELS OF DISCOURSE (see following chapter for theoretical
elaboration) 
Firstly, in as far as one can distinguish between different types of 
discourse, a decision should be taken regarding whether or not the focus
should be on official discourse, or if it should be extended to political
opposition, media discourse, or even that which can be found in popular
culture texts.  A sole focus on official discourse could be undertaken to 





















the official position, neither on the political stage, nor in media channels. 
While this in itself would be rare, such a decision could be taken for a
research design which has the aim of investigating solely the changes
over time in how official discourse has approached a particular issue.  
Alternatively, the objective may be to analyse differences of opinion 
within official discourse.  This could be true for a particularly
contentious issue whereby different key figures may disagree with each 
other and be unwilling or unable to reach a common position.  
2. � SELFS/OTHERS (see following chapter for theoretical elaboration of 
this dichotomy)
Secondly, it is important to fix from the outset a set number of Selves
and Others to structure the analysis around.  This may well amount a
decision as to which nation-states one would like to focus on.  As such, 
this decision may very well be dependent on the specific case or cases
the researcher has chosen to investigate.  For instance, in his study of the
war in South Ossetia, ‘Russia’s Kosovo’ (2009), Gearoid O’Tuathail's
analysis logically incorporated both Russia and Georgia as the competing 
Selves who were responsible for much of the violence.  In other cases, 
where there are multiple actors involved, it will often necessary to make
choices so as to limit the investigation and make it achievable within 
specific time and space restrictions.  Naturally, this should be done with 
care as the omission of a key Self position may invalidate some of the
conclusions reached.
3. TEMPORAL PERIOD AND NUMBER OF EVENTS �


















consideration and which events will comprise the main focus of analysis. 
Again, if the focus is on how a particular Self or nation-state has
responded to an issue over time, it might be appropriate to extend the
analysis over a period of several years or even decades.  If the objective
it to understand why there has been different responses to a similar 
political problem, it may be best to choose two or more examples and
undertake a comparison of the different responses.  
4. EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 
Finally, one will have to make specific choices in terms of what textual
material should be studied.  Since the empirical data selected will
essentially comprise the discursive terrain of the investigation, this will
be undertaken both in relation to decisions taken in the first three
questions, and also with regards the objectives and research questions
formulated. This means that if the investigation will need to take into 
consideration any oppositional discourses deployed in media sources, it
may be a logical decision to ensure that a particular newspaper or 
newspapers is analysed from the beginning until the end of the event in 
question.  In order to see how officials respond directly to challenges
emerging in the media, a particularly useful resource will be interviews, 
whereby journalists have the option to then question the responses given 
and/or put pressure on the interviewee for a more substantial answer.  On 
the other hand, if, the aim is to analyse political opposition and how
official discourse responds to that, it will be useful to look at any
political debates taking place on the issue under scrutiny.  See diagram 1 




       







RESEARCH DESIGN FOR DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN-LED
INTERVENTION IN LIBYA
With these methodological principles in mind, the first thing which must be
decided for the research design of this investigation is the number of events to be
analysed, and the relational temporal period in question.  For a case, such as the
Western-led military intervention in Libya, this may seem straight forward.  Yet it is still 
important to justify the decisions taken both in terms of the events and time period 
chosen, and also those rejected.  Firstly, it has been decided to place the primary focus
on one event, the intervention of itself, spanning what could reasonably be defined as
the temporal period of 2011.  One of the considerations which had to be made for the
present investigation was whether to carry out a comparison of the military intervention 

























certain comparison of both events is potentially fruitful- indeed the event will be visited
and an analysis of sorts will be carried out-, it has been deemed that the events
themselves and the contexts surrounding both events are significantly different so as to 
render any in depth analysis of marginal import. 
For all that, two additional things must be acknowledged at this stage.  Firstly,
the aim to place the focus on ‘one event’ is somewhat misleading and one could quite
reasonably be expected to define what in fact constitutes an ‘event’ and why.  In reality,
the military intervention of 2011 is made up of multiple events and it should be made
clear that the intention is to analyse many of these and also the responses made to them. 
For this, and as an analytical aid, a ‘key events’ timeline will be used, having been
compiled from what are judged to be most significant events in media discourse.  
Secondly, the focus of the investigation will not be exclusively placed on the period of 
the year 2011.  An historical perspective will be adopted, in accordance with the
theoretical framework set out in the following chapter. This will involve two principal
parts.  Firstly, an analysis of relations between Libyan and both the U.S and U.K.  over 
the period spanning the bloodless coup of 1969 until the year 2011.  The temporal
period of the analysis will go from the ‘Green Revolution’ and ousting of King Idris in 
1969, up to the start of the political violence in 2011.  While this obviously points to a
significant challenge in terms of the length of period to be studied, this will be
facilitated by focussing on some of the key events which have shaped the relations
between Libya and both Western powers during this historical period.  In doing so, it
will be possible to see how key identities such as ‘Gaddafi’ and ‘Libya’ have been 
constructed.  Secondly, since ‘human rights’ has been identified as a key discourse it
will also be necessary to trace the conceptual history of how it has featured within U.S
and UK foreign policy. The period in question will be from the Carter administration- 
understood to be significant for when human rights came to the forefront of U.S foreign 
policy- to the Obama and Cameron administrations.
Since this thesis seeks to understand the main discourses used to give meaning 
to the events in Libya, and also the consequences of constituting the events in these
ways, it has been deemed necessary to focus on two of the main Western powers
involved both politically and militarily: The United Kingdom and the United States.  It
is believed that this decision is a logical one in many respects.  Firstly, the UK has been 
























Anglo-French position.  As well as formulating a joint statement with President Obama, 
both Cameron and Sarkozy also released a UK-French statement on the 28th March 
which included stronger language than what had been coming out of Washington.
Whereas Obama had been quite categorical in his assurances that ground troops would
not be deployed, this joint Anglo-French merely stated that ‘we do not envisage any
military occupation of Libya’ (my emphasis).  The proximity of the Anglo-French 
position can also be demonstrated by the way in which both countries worked together
at the United Nations to draw up the draft resolution that would authorize international
military action against Libya (Clinton, 2011).  Finally, the visit made by both Cameron 
and Sarkozy to Benghazi in September 2011 also suggests that it was the British and 
French governments who had invested at least the most political capital in the actions
taken against Gaddafi and the Libyan government. 
The choice of the US reflects the fact that it is the de facto leader of the NATO
alliance, meaning that its participation in military interventions becomes almost crucial
both for its own national prestige, and for other members of the organisation.  This was
indeed the case as the US assumed leadership of the command and control structure at
the early implementation stages of the no-fly zone over Libya before NATO formally
took over (Cameron, 2011).  As was repeated many times by U.S policy makers, this
was due to the ‘unique assets’ or ‘capabilities’ that the US could contribute to the
mission (Obama, 22/03/2011).  At a more general level, the US remains the global
hegemonic power, particularly in terms of its continued military and technological
dominance.  Studies have shown that its vast defence budget still dwarfs that of its
nearest rivals (SIPRI, 2015).  
Choosing two countries who are important allies- the language, cultural, 
commercial and historical ties which exist between both Anglo-Saxon states have
ensured that they have been, and remain staunch allies, particularly in the area of 
foreign policy- and yet have shown signs of divergence, offers up the possibility of an 
interesting comparison through the case at hand.  The selection of this dual-Self, 
therefore, means that it becomes possible to not only understand how both countries
worked together in constructing the events in Libya, but also to gauge to what extent
they differed, highlighting the lines of divergence.












   
 
 
   
 
   











pitfalls which come with the presumption of US omnipotence as a global and 
hegemonic power.  As can be clearly ascertained from US foreign policy and security
discourse, it cannot simply operate alone in shaping World affairs.  On the contrary, it
must acquiesce with its closest allies in order to be successful in achieving its
objectives.  By approaching the military intervention in Libya from the perspective of 
both the US and UK one can gain an understanding of this.  The ‘special relationship’,
as it has come to be known, has seen both entrenched together in military campaigns
including the First and Second World Wars; the Balkan Wars; Afghanistan; and even 
more controversially in Iraq.  The nature of the relationship has been enshrined in
official documents, such as the UK National Security Strategy of 2010 aptly
demonstrates: ‘To do so (stand up for the values our country believes in) requires us to 
project power and to use our unique network of alliances and relationships- principally
with the United States of America, but also as a member of the European Union and 
NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council’ (UK National Security
Strategy, 2010:4).
Returning to the case at hand, the selection of certain subject positions does
however mean that others may not be dealt with in any great detail; the obvious
omission here is that of France. While it would in fact be impossible for any study of a
complex geopolitical event to analyse all of the relevant subject positions, the omission
of France does require further explanation. As has already been mentioned, the
proximity of the UK and French governments before during and after the intervention 
suggests that it is possible to speak of a joint Anglo-French position. As a side issue, 
there are also language consideration to be made. This means that while an analysis of 
official French discourse may not have provided too many problems, an in depth
analysis of French media discourse, for instance, could have been a somewhat more
difficult undertaking, one which could be liable to misinterpretation and thus erroneous
conclusions.  That said, this does not mean that the French position will be passed over
tout court.  Since major statements by Sarkozy and leading governmental figures are
often translated into English, and later reported in UK and US media, these will still be
taken into consideration where possible.  Furthermore, joint statements made by the US, 
UK, and French leaders, such as the one made on the 14/04/2011, suggest a
considerable coordination and concord in the discourses being used by all three Western 





   
 
 

















position will not have a detrimental effect on the outcome, and will not jeopardize the
conclusions reached to any meaningful extent. 
It has also been decided against carrying out an in depth analysis of the
discourses emanating from the Libyan ‘Other’ position, whether that be from Gaddafi
himself, the ex-Libyan government, or the National Transition Council. Again, two 
things could be said to mitigate this apparent shortcoming.  In the first place, like in the
case of the French position, this does not mean that one has to disregard all
pronouncements coming from Libya. The fact that the political violence was quickly
internationalized meant that there was considerable onus on both parties to release
statements in English, being an essential part of the struggle to gain the upper hand in
the public relations sphere, and with the result that these statements would be relayed in 
Western media. Government spokesman Moussa Ibrahim was important in this respect, 
as was the designated leader of the oppositional NTC Mahmoud Jibril.  The second, and 
most important reason for the omission of any sustained engagement with Libyan
discourses is that it has been deemed superfluous to the objectives and research 
questions being pursued.  Being first and foremost an investigation into Western
responses to the Libyan conflict, the objectives do not depend to any great extent on the
ways in which Western and Libyan discourses challenged and responded to one another-
although perhaps this would be an interesting investigation in itself-.  Focussing on the
UK and US Self positions will make it possible to examine how Western liberal
governments have exercised power, to understand the consequences of the discourses
deployed, and to assess what conclusions can be drawn from this. 
Having chosen the Selfs to structure the analysis around and defined both the
event and temporal period, it is now necessary to make a choice regarding which
discursive levels to include.  For the case at hand, and in relation with the research 
questions set out in the introduction, it has been deemed suitable to study official
discourse, that which is to be found in political opposition, and also media discourse.  In 
the knowledge that both political and media opposition existed to the UK and US
governments’ foreign policies, it is necessary to extend the analysis so as to capture any
of these oppositional discourses and to see how they challenged official representations
of the events.  Since it is known that Western governments were successful in their
attempts to both implement a no-fly zone and ultimately bring down the Libyan

























stabilize, confront and neutralize the challenges being faced.  
Finally, what remains is the crucial task of selecting empirical material.  The
choices of which material and sources to be used will be made dependent on the section 
of the thesis, and the objectives to be achieved.  Since the main aim of the first part will
be to analyse, understand and present how key discursive objects ‘Libya,’ ‘Gaddafi,’ and 
the ‘Libyan people’ have featured in the Western geopolitical imagination, resources
will be chosen for the specific purposes of achieving this.    This means that first and
foremost a range of secondary literature will be used, texts that have focussed 
specifically on Libya, taking both ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ as their object, and also those
which have centred on main issues affecting the relations between Libya and the Anglo-
American powers.  Here, one could highlight the work done in Dirk Vandewalle’s ‘A
History of Modern Libya’ (2006), Ronald Bruce St John’s ‘Libya: from colony to
revolution’ (2011), and from the perspective of the US St John’s ‘Libya and the United
States: two centuries of strife’ (2002), and Mahmoud Warfally's ‘Imagery and Ideology
in U.S Policy Toward Libya’ (1988).  These texts will then be supplemented, where
possible, with official governmental material, including declassified national security
documents, statements, speeches and interviews.  
During this preliminary analysis, it will be useful to trace, link and bring into 
view how constructions of Libya can be interwoven with wider geopolitical themes and
discourses.  One example of this would be able to show how Western constructions of, 
and policy toward Libya, was shaped by a wider ‘Cold War’ context.  Perhaps more
importantly could be to highlight any links between the West’s ‘rapprochement’ with
Libya in the lead up to the military intervention, and the wider ‘War on Terror’ context
of which Gaddafi and the Libyan authorities were seemingly happy to be a part of.  This 
means that as well as textual material dealing specifically with Libya, and the foreign
policy stances being adopted by the US and UK governments, a more general
appreciation of some main geopolitical and geostrategic themes will come into play.
And while the purpose of this thesis is not to understand in any great depth the links
between the relationships of the three countries and wider geopolitical discourses, an 
appreciation of context can serve in two inter-related ways; it helps to evade the type of 
analysis which suggests linear historical progression; secondly, the onus switches onto 
disjuncture, contingency, and how power has worked to form and reform the objects
within wider discursive structures. 
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 Finally, to supplement the other resources in this section, foreign policy files
made available by Wikileaks will also be analysed. The utility of such resources cannot
be overestimated.  In past times, direct access to the communications between those
involved in the foreign policy process remained by and large out of reach to 
investigators.  This was especially so when researching periods in temporal proximity to 
the present, when it was extremely difficult, or indeed impossible, to access documents
which remain classified to the public.  In the case of Libya, the diplomatic cables
released under the name ‘cablegate,’ consisting of correspondence between the
American embassy in Libya and other important U.S government bureaus, is one such 
resource available now.  Each one of the 433 cables released will be studied, taken from
the period spanning the 26th October, 2007 until the 25th February, 2010.  This time-
frame is of critical importance and the cables offer unique insights into the
‘rapprochement’ period leading up to the military intervention.  Not only does it become 
possible to corroborate positions put forward in public by officials, but it is also possible 
to obtain a broader perspective of how relations between Libya and other Western
countries stood at the time.
In the second and main part of the thesis, that which undertakes an analysis of 
Western responses to the Libyan crisis itself, a broader range of empirical data will be
needed.  This is primarily to satisfy the demands of tracing official US and UK
government discourse, and moreover to analyse any oppositional discourses used to 
give meaning to the events.  That is to say, how US and UK foreign policy was
formulated and later contested, and also the intricacies of the discursive struggle.  To 
trace official US and UK discourse, it will firstly be necessary to analyse a broad range
of speeches, statements, interviews and press conferences given by both leaders Obama
and Cameron throughout 2011.  To analyse President Obama’s discourse the
whitehouse.archive.gov website has been used, uncovering speeches, statements and
remarks have been analysed.  For Cameron, the comprehensive GOV.uk website was
accessed.  A search using the keyword ‘Libya’, and using the parameters ‘speeches’, ‘all 
policy areas’ and ‘Prime Minister’s Office’ returned 45 hits from the period 01/01/2011 
to 01/01/2012. 
In order to detect variations within official discourse, this preliminary analysis
will be extended to incorporate some of the key figures within both administrations.  






















reports of divisions between the more hawkish position adopted by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton on the one hand, and a more cautious one taken by Defence Secretary
Robert Gates (New York Times, 18/03/2011).  Therefore, an analysis of the statements
made by Clinton and Gates in the same period spanning the year 2011 has also been 
carried out.  In relation to the former, the US Department of State Archives were
accessed and 20 speeches, statements and interviews were analysed.  For the latter, 22 
files were accessed documenting statements made by the Defence Secretary stored at
the archives at the US Department of Defence.  In the case of the UK similarly, the key
posts of Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary were viewed to be crucial in gauging
the internal stability of official UK discourse during the year of 2011.  Again, the
website GOV.uk was accessed, changing the parameters of the search, and this time
uncovering 24 documents for William Hague and 32 for Dr Liam Fox. 
 Since one of the objectives of this thesis is to uncover oppositional discourses
and to assess how these attempt to construct the main identities in a different way and 
point to alternative foreign policy options, the analysis must be extended to the wider 
political debate.  One of the ways of doing this is to review the debates that took place
in the main political institutional settings.  As for as the UK is concerned, the debate in
the House of Commons on the 21/03/2011 is clearly an important event, even though it
took place after UN Resolution 1973 had been passed authorizing the no-fly zone above 
Libya.  In the US, key debates which took place in the House of Representatives on the
03/06/2011 and on the 24/06/2011, along with an earlier one in the Senate on the
30/03/2011 will also be covered.  The debates which took place on the 24th June are of 
particular importance since the President was defeated in the first Resolution - 
retrospectively ‘authorizing limited use of armed forces in Libya’-, but then prevailed in 
the second which had the objective of ‘limiting use of funds for armed forces in Libya’.
Both the debates and votes are indicative of the level of political opposition faced by
Obama at that time.
In addition, it will be necessary to examine mainstream media sources both in
the US and the UK.  As well as offering support to the official governmental positions, 
the media will offer a broader panorama of the debate involving traces of any
oppositional discourses which were working to destabilize the official position.  In 
doing so, it will also be possible to gauge the extent to which ‘media reporting of 

















policies (Atkinson and Dodds, 2000:10; cited in McFarlane and Hay, 2003).  
So as to gain a more balanced overview of media responses, it has been decided 
to analyse two daily newspapers in the US –the New York Times and the Washington 
Post- and two in the UK- the Guardian and the Telegraph.  These choices have been 
made consciously with the view to gaining a greater ideological spread, with the
newspapers in each country occupying different positions on the ideological scale.  
Logically the circulation of these newspapers has also been taken into consideration.  In 
choosing the four national newspapers referred to, not only can it be argued that they are 
widely read, but one can also allude to the prestige of such publications.  This adds to 
their capacity as agenda-setters in their own right since smaller publications will
inevitably use them as a source of news.  The potential for certain political discourses
and stances to be re-iterated is without doubt high in these particular cases. 
The period of analysis will be for the full year of 2011.  This will be sufficient to 
catch the first reports of protests in Libya, and will also cover the period extending 
beyond the death of Libyan leader Gaddafi and the fall of the remaining ‘loyalist
strongholds’ of Sirte and Bani-Walid.  ProQuest has been chosen as the best tool to 
search for the media resources of all four newspapers.  To limit the amount of data, it
has been deemed prudent to search for any articles published with the keyword ‘Libya’
found in the headline of the newspaper in question.  The search returned the following 
results: The Guardian- 376 documents, The Telegraph- 358 documents, The New York 
Times- 374 documents, and the Washington Post- 500 documents.  Once the data has
been acquired, it will be analysed using the qualitative data analysis program QDA. 
Particular programmes such as these can facilitate the analysis by allowing to extract
certain results from a large quantity of empirical data.  This is useful in as far as one can 
focus on certain events, which will be used to structure the analysis, and also certain 
discourses.  By imputing, for instance, ‘human rights’, one can quickly see with what
frequency this was used in articles referring to the Libyan crisis. One can therefore
deduce quicker, and with more accuracy, which basic discourses were being used, and 
how they evolved over the year in question.  See diagram 2 for summary of research 






CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
THE ‘CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS’  RESEARCH PROJECT 
The continued utility and relevance of critical geopolitics resides in the ongoing
and perpetual need to challenge dominant modes of geopolitical power/knowledge.  
These power/knowledge relationships, in their most dramatic and violent expressions, 
harness the potential for armed conflict and war -such as, one would therefore presume,
has been the case with Libya-.  And while it may be possible to suggest a steady
decrease in political violence since the horrors of two World Wars (Dalby, 2011), violent 
unrest and conflict raging in diverse places such as Ukraine, the Democratic Republic of 

















critical tools to unpick the complexities of political violence is therefore, one could say,
as pressing as ever.  Since this violence is often underpinned by paradigmatic ways of 
‘sighting’ (Ó Tuathail, 2005) international politics, critical geopolitics offers the promise 
of exposing these taken for granted assumptions, contesting the methods and theories
which produce and are produced by them, and ultimately challenging the knowledge
claims about our geopolitical ‘realities’.  
On speaking of critical geopolitics6, one must be careful not to homogenize what 
is in fact a diverse body of scholarship (Campbell and Power, 2010).  Rather than a
particular theory, it is best considered as an approach, a ‘general gathering place for 
various critiques of the multiple geopolitical discourses and practices that characterize
modernity’ (Ó Tuathail, 2009).  Since its fairly recent emergence in the late 1980s/early
1990s, critical geopolitics has branched out in several directions in attempts to capture
the full extent of geopolitical power relations.  A perusal through this growing literature
will show that some authors have been interested in developing a ‘feminist geopolitics’
(Dowler & Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2007).  Others have studied the effects of ‘popular
geopolitics,’ such as that to be found in media like film (Power and Crampton, 2005;
Shapiro, 2008), cartoon strips (Dittmer, 2007) and video games (Power, 2007).  Indeed
‘popular geopolitics’ can be viewed as a distinct site in the production of geopolitical
knowledge, differing from ‘practical’ sites- eg political institutions- and ‘formal’ sources 
-eg think tanks (Ó’Tuthail and Dalby, 2007; see diagram 3)-.   
Critical geopolitics should also strictly speaking go in quotation marks in allusion to the











Valuable as this work has been, the analysis of devastating geopolitical events
such as war naturally remains a crucial part of critical geopolitics scholarship.
Important studies have already been carried out on Western involvement in previous
conflicts such as Bosnia (Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006; Ó Tuathail, 2011).  And while
it is of course true that the focus cannot solely be put on Western governments, the
military intervention in Libya does present once more an opportunity to study their 
actions.   
In approaching the complexity of such events, it is important to bear in mind 
what has been referred to as the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ (Agnew, 2004).  
Comprising a range of geopolitical assumptions which informs policy makers and
‘intellectuals of statecraft’ alike, the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ is pernicious in 
as far as it cloaks contingent, historically specific articulations of concepts and 
identities.  Instead, they are assumed to be part of an objective reality.  First, Agnew
outlines specific traits which are part of a tendency to ‘visualize global space’. Two 















    







the World itself, or the ‘world-as-a picture’, meaning that ‘representation and world are
as one’; secondly, borders are used to separate a peaceful, civilized ‘inside’ from a
chaotic or dangerous ‘outside’, which lies beyond what are supposed to be natural
borders.  This means that local differences are explained in terms of ‘worldwide
distinctions’, the meta-binaries which structure thought, and thus ‘the local has meaning 
only in relation to the global’ (Agnew, 2004:15-16). 
Secondly, the ‘modern geopolitical imagination’ reveals a tendency to 
hypostasize and privilege the ‘nation-state’.  The markings of this trait can be seen laced 
through paradigmatic theories of International Relations such as Realism and 
Liberalism, and also in the way in which Western governments approach World politics. 
One of the main problems of a state-centric approach is that: ‘it territorializes power at
the national-state scale and thus denies it to other spatial configurations involving place-
making and spatial interaction’ (Agnew, 2010:779).  The cogency of the ‘territorial trap’ 
is surely as evident as it ever has been.  This, indeed, appears to be at work in the US
led assault on Iraq, whereby the post-war reconstruction plans were bedevilled by the
‘assumption that the population of Iraq was a coherent one that could be ‘rebuilt’ after
the war’ (Reid-Henry, 2010: 754).  Subsequent violence between regional, religious and 
ethnic groups in Iraq has severely called this into question.  Similarly, since Western
politicians were inclined to construct the violence in Libya in terms of a beleaguered
‘Libyan people’, one can immediately detect the neglect or depreciation of not only
other spatial scales such as the regional or local, but also the historical processes which
have given rise to the volatile situation.
Agnew highlights two other features which have characterized Western 
experiences of geopolitics.  One of these is a tendency to turn ‘space into time’. The
example given here is the ‘three Worlds’ topology, in which the ‘second’ and ‘third
world’ are judged to be backward and thus inferior to the ‘first world’ (Agnew, 2004).  
Agnew notes that these judgements are made on the basis of technological and 
economic criteria, and yet there are many other ways of assessing a particular country,
region or continent.  The mere fact that such diverse countries are grouped together
within a particular catch-all category is evidence enough to suggest that such reasoning 
will lead to aleatory conclusions.  The other facet of the ‘modern geopolitical
imagination’ is the unbridled pursuit and desire for ‘primacy’ in the World.  This has




      
        
  


















foreign policies and expansionism.  Agnew’s main point is that these taken for granted
assumptions can often be shown to be anything but that, and can be exposed as
contingent historical constructions.  When they are not understood as such, they can 
consequently lead to undesired consequences.
The 'imperiality of power’ and the '(in) justice' of Western intervention 
The terrorist attacks of 2001 on the World Trade Centre and other sites are
without doubt one of the most significant geopolitical events of recent times. The
'lonely superpower,' as Samuel Huntington had famously referred to the United States,
had received a devastating blow to its seemingly impregnable home borders.  The fact
that the blow had been dealt to one of the most symbolic spaces of global capitalism
attached added significance to the attack.  What followed was a declared 'war on terror'
by the George Bush's Republican administration, which would lead to military
campaigns in Afghanistan and in Iraq.  The de-territorialised nature of the attacks by al-
Qaeda and the subsequent emergence of terrorism as the undisputed principal threat to 
Western societies appeared to suggest that the geopolitical climate had fundamentally
changed.  
On the other hand, it would be perhaps premature to view the interminably
destructive military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq exclusively in relation to the
events of September 11th, 2001.  What can be detected in many critical works that have
tried to make sense of the new military campaigns is not simply a reaction to the new
times or the modern terrorist threat; it is that these actions are indicative of a trend of 
greater longevity which extends well beyond the events in question.  The 'Colonial
present' (Gregory, 2004),  'neo-imperialism' (Flusty et al, 2008) or 'imperiality of power' 
(Slater, 2013), all suggest that the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq can be understood in 
accordance with a wider trend, which brings back into focus a history of military
intervention, domination, and the subjugation of foreign peoples by the United States, 
and Western countries more generally.  Since the military intervention in Libya has
taken place in relative temporal proximity to the other military deployments just
mentioned, questions are raised as to whether or not it too can be understood in relation

























Of all the critical contributions made in the period since the 'end' of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, it is perhaps the work of David Slater and his concepts 'imperial
mentality' and 'imperiality' which are of most relevance to the present study.  In two key 
articles, written in 2010 and in 2013, Slater's contention is precisely that we are not
living in 'post-imperial' times, but that the 'terrain has been 're-imperialized’. Both the
Afghanistan and Iraq wars just mentioned, therefore, turn out to be part of a renewed 
and reinvigorated 'Western desire to control key regions of the world'. As such, past
imperial parameters ‘are still in place’ and the 'imperial mentality’, which has guided
incursions and actions of domination in previous epochs, ‘has not been superceded’
(Slater, 2010: 191).  If this is indeed to be the case, then it can be deduced that the
continuities of which Slater speaks would also be significant for the case of the military
intervention in Libya itself.  For that, a more in depth exploration of Slater's ideas can 
be assumed to be fruitful for the investigation which will follow.  
For Slater, these military interventions have to be understood in accordance with
what he has defined as an 'imperial mentality'. There are three crucial 'dimensions' of 
the 'imperial mentality' which must be unpacked here.  The first thing is that this is
congruent with an 'invasiveness', which, in paraphrasing Cairo (2010) and Klare (2002), 
he argues is 'expressed through strategies of appropriating resources and raw materials'
(Slater, 2010: 198).  This is not to say that 'invasiveness' is a purely political economy
affair; it must be understood as at once 'cultural, political and psychological' (Slater, 
2010: 197).  The 'imperial relation' established in such cases is always rooted in a
'power-over' conception which privileges the Western Self to the detriment of the
subordinated Other. That said, the relationality of power is such that these types of 
geopolitical incursions cannot but generate resistance in the territories targeted.  This is
why in Iraq, in spite of claims that Western actions were being taken to 'liberate' the
Iraqi population, the situation quickly escaped out of the hands of the 'liberators' and the 
country descended into civil war and chaos.  The 'invasiveness' in this case, carried out
at least in part for the appropriation of Iraq's vast natural resources, would always
generate antagonistic relations and anti-imperialist resistance, with potentially
disastrous consequences for both the invader and the invaded.  
Secondly, the 'imperial mentality' is characterised by the imposition of ‘dominant 
values, modes of thinking and institutional practices’ (Slater, 2010: 199).  It would
surely seem trivial to remind that the complexity of the world renders it impossible that
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each nation, people or culture around the globe should respect the very same values in 
the very same way as any other. And yet it is partially on the basis of 'universal' values
that the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq took place, and as will be seen,
almost entirely in reference to 'universal human rights' in the case of Libya. As Slater 
recognizes, this would appear to reflect 'a clear belief in the superiority of the imperial
culture of institutionalization' (Slater, 2010: 199).  Along with the general values which 
are being imposed come 'rules, codifications and institutional practices' (Slater, 2010:
199) such as those related with free-market economics.  It would be somewhat counter
intuitive and illogical for Western governments to intervene in other countries in support 
of 'universal' values of 'freedom' and 'democracy', if it wasn't there very own 
understandings of these concepts which were being promoted.  One pertinent example
could be the case of Egypt, once Mubarak had been deposed.  Western governments
were supportive of free elections in the country and the right of the Egyptian people to 
choose their leaders, yet that was tempered somewhat when it resulted in the
ascendency to power of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The third component which is inherent in the 'imperial mentality' and 'imperial'
relations established is what Slater calls a 'lack of respect and recognition for the
imperialised society' (Slater, 2010: 199).  If, as has been put forward in the second 
point, the 'dominant values' of the imperial power are considered to be 'universal', or 
‘inalienable human rights’, it follows that actions carried out by Western countries must
be considered to be inherently good or advantageous for the people subject to the
impositions.  And yet, as one could quickly infer from past colonial discourses, 'this is
not a new narrative' (Slater, 2010: 200).  Western countries, concurrently, are viewed in 
a favourable light, as civilised and the example to be followed.  It is perhaps interesting 
to note how key figures such as Tony Blair continue to justify the actions taken by his
government for the attack on Iraq. The resultant chaos has happened not necessarily as
a result of Western actions.  Nor is it the case that the values being spread - 'freedom'
and 'democracy'- are not inherently good, or that these values are being imposed on 
others.  Rather, it is the case that the enterprise itself becomes a struggle ‘not between 
civilizations,’ but ‘about civilizations’ (Blair, 2006).  That is to say, the ones who are
resisting in Iraq are doing so on the basis that they are not civilized, like the Western 
Self.
























therefore also co-extensive with a 'continuing quest for global hegemony' (Slater, 2010:
200). 'Invasiveness' and the appropriation of resources, diffusion of 'universal' values,
which turn out to contain essentially Western elements, and the lack of respect for the
Other, are all carried out not for the good of the people being brought under the Western 
sphere of influence. As in the case of colonial times gone past, the 'imperial mentality'
is oriented towards increasing Western power in accordance with wider hegemonic
aspirations.  For Slater, it is notions of 'promoting and sustaining a model of democratic
politics' which provides the key justification for the establishment of the 'imperial
relation' (Slater, 2010: 202).  . 
In his article of 2013, Slater moves on to consider questions of international
justice, or indeed injustice, and the 'imperiality of power'.  His primary concern again is
Western, and in particular US, intervention in countries go the 'global south', how these
interventions come about and are justified by the transgressors, and whether or not these 
can ever correspond with a sense of international justice.  The main argument being 
made is that popular self-determination is the 'the right of a people by their own efforts
to become free, to foster a democratic politics and to question the injustices that
continue to be present.' This therefore means that the overthrow of 'injustice and 
oppression cannot be achieved through outside intervention; it has to be realized
independently' (Slater, 2013: 3).  . 
In order to bolster his argument, Slater returns to the idea of the 'imperial
relation', of which the 'Euro-Americanist veil' (Slater, 2013: 3), as he puts it, is an
important part.  Rather than assuming the Western Self to be superior, 'internally
independent', and the possessor of 'universal' values, and placed in opposition to an 
inferior non-Western Other, this is precisely what has to be overcome.  To achieve this, 
one can use notions of the 'post-colonial' to highlight 'the primary significance of 
colonial/imperial encounters' and the 'durability of particular ways of framing or 
representing the meaning of the colonial/imperial encounter' (Slater, 2013: 5).  In doing
so, it becomes possible to gain an appreciation of how the diffusion of purportedly
‘universal’ Western values and practices are in fact one of the most 'deeply rooted' facets 
of the imperial. 
In what Slater has referred to as the 'imperiality of power', a willingness and





   





    
 
 








values, is fuelled by a sense of self-awarded privilege.  That is to say, the 'desire, will,
capacity and justification to intervene in the affairs of other countries' is an important
'pillar' or the 'imperiality of power’.  It is not possible, however, to understand this
without adopting a historical perspective. To illustrate this point Slater refers to the
primary example of this 'imperiality of power', which is, and continues to be, the United 
States itself. To explain this, he argues, one must go back to the inception of the
country and the movement which saw it gain independence from Great Britain.  One is
then able to see that 'America's geopolitical interventionism is more historically rooted-
than vietnam- and takes us back to the dawn of the republic'. The United States, as 'a
global sovereign', has a shown a consistent tendency to award 'itself the power,
whenever deemed necessary, to act above the law' (Slater, 2013: 27). 
There is a conflict at the heart of the US identity, however.  Since the US can 
also be considered to an extent 'post-colonial', and indeed the only post-colonial nation 
in the West, its history is one in which self-determination plays an important part. This
is problematic since on the one hand, it can't but stand for self-determination, to do 
otherwise would be to negate its very own history of struggle; yet on the other, the US is 
also characterised by imperial notions of supremacy and national exceptionalism.  The
interesting thing here is how the US seeks to reconcile these two seemingly
contradictory components of its identity. According to Slater, it tries to manage this
through recourse to notions of benevolence, or 'universal' values.  Thus, it is possible to 
maintain its privileged status as would-be intervener.  
Ideas of benevolence notwithstanding, the 'imperiality of power' often leads to 
devastating consequences, as was the case with Vietnam, and more recently Iraq; it can
be plagued by a 'depth of misunderstanding, misjudgement and prejudice'. A desire to 
do good, coupled with a 'myth of innocence', which 'is deeply rooted in US geopolitical
history,' protects America from 'the onerous burdens of historical responsibility for war 
or anarchy or injustice or conquest' (Slater, 2013: 25).  In short, the US does not seem to 
be able to learn from its many mistakes in relation to its continual intervention in the
affairs of other countries.  
Slater quite rightly highlights some of the false assumptions which accompanied
the tragic Vietnam experience, issues which can be identified in other cases also.  




























him, four chronic misjudgements are highlighted: firstly, there was an exaggeration of 
the dangers to the US of Vietnamese actions and their 'geopolitical intentions'. 
Secondly, there was the tendency 'to view the 'people of South Vietnam in relation to 
our own experience'. Ethnocentric visions of the World, or a desire to shape the World 
in the image of the privileged Self identity is again something which can be instantly
recognizable in Western geopolitical discourses.  Also, it is suggested that there was an 
underestimation of the power of nationalism to motivate people to fight against the US
in Vietnam.  In more general terms, this point could be extended to include any
resistance.  In the case of Libya, Western leaders were very careful to emphasize that it
was the 'Libyan people' themselves who were overthrowing Gaddafi and the Libyan
leader, no easy task as their assurances were being accompanied by a gradual escalation 
in air-attacks.  Finally, in Vietnam, there was, as Slater puts it, a 'profound ignorance of 
the history, culture and politics of the people in the territory' (Slater, 2013: 25-26).  
QUESTIONS OF ONTOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY IN �
POSTSTRUCTURAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS �
It could be argued that discourse theory has a tendency to privilege the
epistemological over the ontological, as some have done (Neumann, 2001).  A lot of the
time, research questions revolve around the ‘how?’, instead of the ‘what is?’.  All the
same, the first thing that will surely stand out to anyone taking an interest in post-
structural discourse theory is the ontological primacy afforded to language itself.  This
is primarily due to the fact that language is understood to be in a constitutive
relationship with all that there is in the material World; that is to say, objects, people,
physical space etc.  To be in a constitutive relationship means that language effectively
brings its objects and their identities into being and not the other way around. Take for 
example the ‘Middle East’ region.  It would be relatively easy to show how certain
political groups and media channels still favour specific language to constitute this
region as ‘Muslim’, ‘violent’, ‘chaotic’, and perhaps ‘mysterious’-  this is indeed what
Edward Said achieved as part of his landmark work Orientalism (1977) all those years
ago-.  This, in spite of the fact that the Middle East region and its peoples can be
constituted in many, sometimes radically different ways.   
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The primacy of language in post-structuralist discourse analysis certainly does
not amount to a denial of any external reality, an approach which would be situated 
within a strictly speaking idealist ontology. What is asserted is that this external reality
would not be accessible without some kind of pre-existing language structures.  The
outside World cannot exist independently of language, as if it were simply out there
waiting to be discovered by a sovereign subject fully in control of their faculties.  To 
understand what an object ‘is’, one must first possess the language which informs us
what ‘its’ properties are; where ‘it’ comes from; what ‘it’ is used for. This need not be
through commonly-held understandings of a what a language is, such as English, 
Spanish or French.  Rather, any system of signs which enable signification would 
suffice, allowing for the differentiation of one thing from another.  Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe have succinctly explained how post-structuralism can bridge the
idealist-materialist void, insisting: ‘the fact that every object is constituted as an object
of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought, or with 
the realism-idealism opposition..what is denied is not that such objects exist externally
to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as
objects outside any discursive condition of emergence’ (1985:102). 
Post-structuralist discourse analysis also typically adheres to a relational
ontology of language.  This understanding of how language works can already be seen 
in Ferdinand de Saussure’s ‘structuralist’ theory of language (1959).  The principle
linguistic unit is the ‘sign’, which is made up of two distinct parts; Saussure makes a
clear distinction between the ‘signifier’, that which refers to a particular word or the
sound that this may create in our minds, and the ‘signified’, which is understood to be
the concept or the mental impression of that ‘signifier’. The relationship between
‘signifier’ and ‘signified’ is arbitrary since there can be no logical connection 
established between the two.  Evidence of this can simply be taken from the multitude
of languages which are in use around the World.  Each of these has by-and-large their
own ‘signifiers’, and yet these may point to essentially the same ‘signified’. A
relational ontology of language puts forward the rather extraordinary claim that
meaning is not simply derived from the relationship between language and an external
reality as such, but rather from the relationships between signs within language itself.
That is to say, the meaning of a particular sign can only be understood by and through 























Where post-structuralist theory departs from Saussure’s structural linguistics is
in its belief that the structure itself is not fixed and stable, but on the contrary highly
unstable and in permanent flux.  Signs can find themselves in different conceptual
chains depending on the context in which they are used.  ‘Cat’ and ‘gato’ purportedly
refer to the same animal in English and Spanish, and yet cultural differences may yet
prevent the establishment of a definitive correlation in meaning between the two 
signifiers.  If, for example, the signifier ‘cat’ takes on a meaning that is culturally
specific to the English language, or indeed a place which uses the English language, 
then a difference has been established between it and its Spanish ‘equivalent’. Taking
this to be indeed the case, then the whole binary opposition of signifier-signified, which 
sustains the ‘sign’, is critically wounded.  Moreover, this will consequently lead to a
rejection of ontologies which assume that phenomena, such as concepts or identities, 
have fixed, singular and stable meanings.  Since concepts and identities are always
inserted into different chains of signification, chains which are, in turn, permanently
undergoing changes, one can deduce that stability of meaning is something that is
ultimately unachievable. 
The anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist stance characteristic of post-
structuralist theory in general, and which perhaps finds its foremost expression in the
work of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, can be traced back to the oeuvre of 
Friedrich Nietzsche.  Nietzsche displayed a profound scepticism of definitions and 
essences, the idea that meaning can be attained through some kind of abstract and
universal over-arching signification.  One of the problems which can arise from these
assumptions, he argues, is that they are conducive to a lack of historical awareness and 
understanding of how things change over time; they tacitly infer a permanence, one
whereby concepts can be assumed to be timeless.  Nietzsche viewed this as a ‘hatred of 
the idea of becoming’ or a type of ‘Egyptianism’.  The purveyors of this way of 
understanding the World:
 ‘think they are doing a thing an honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie
aeterni (from the viewpoint of eternity) – when they make a mummy of it. All that
philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies, nothing actual
has escaped from their hands alive.  They kill, they stuff, they worship, these conceptual 
idolaters – they become a mortal danger to everything when they worship’ (Nietzsche, 




















   
Adopting a critical posture with regards the supposed essences or foundations of 
concepts will also entail a profound scepticism towards the ‘grand narratives’ or ‘meta-
narratives’ that have shaped, and continue to shape our social and political realities.  In 
as far as Marxism and Liberalism, for instance, comprise a host of concepts, which as a
whole make up a system or totality, post-structuralism cannot accept blindly the stability 
of such systems7. They must be viewed as susceptible to the vicissitudes of time like
anything else.  Returning to the Neorealist theory of international politics and one can
start to see how a blind reliance on objective, taken-for-granted assumptions can be
problematic.  The belief that the nation-state is the corner-stone of international politics, 
and that it exists within a fixed anarchical structure in which states naturally struggle for 
power, is more in doubt than ever before.  Developments over the past decades
including but not confined to an increasingly inter-connected World, expanding global
financial markets, more widespread and better organized international social
movements, have all worked to undermine the credibility of the presumptions
underpinning neo-realist assumptions about World politics, and give credence to those
who seek alternative geopolitical arrangements. 
Indeed, questioning of this sort can even expose the rigidity of such meta-
theories in as far as they give rise to teleological and reductive reasoning.  One example
of this would be that in assuming a Marxist meta-narrative, one is lead to theories which 
merely reaffirm and reduce explanations of complex phenomena to that of the economy
or class conflict. Another would be, as Derrida has argued, that blind faith in the
‘promised land’ of liberal democracy and free market economics can lead authors to 
disregard empirical evidence which would suggest quite the opposite.  In relation to 
Derrida’s critique of Francis Fukuyama’s now infamous text ‘the End of History and the 
Last Man’, John D. Caputo writes:
'whenever the hideous injustices of the Free Market are pointed out, so that it
looks as though, perhaps the End has not yet quite arrived, these are treated as empirical 
shortcomings, contingent blights on the Idea's relentless progress.  The End has arrived;
it is here; it has already come about...the end has not arrived, millions of people are
starving, homeless, persecuted, not only under the Stars and Stripes, but all over the
Of course this also means that even ‘poststructuralism’ itself could, strictly speaking, be
questioned and placed within quotation marks. The crucial difference here again is that like ‘critical
geopolitics’ poststructuralist authors are fully aware and freely recognize that they are not professing 




















globe, but that is but a contingent blip on the Idea's relentless realization of its infinite
task.  Fukuyama follows an unfalsifiable logic which, in the best Hegelian spirit, 
assimilates and consumes every counter-evidence' (Caputo, 1997: 128). 
This is not to argue, however, that one could or should not adopt a ‘Marxist’ or 
‘Liberal’ theoretical position, for instance.  One may well want to do this for either 
strategic reasons, whereby the contingency of its elements should be acknowledged, or 
for research analytical purposes, which would effectively mean putting it ‘under
erasure8’. 
Also problematic from an anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist stand-point is
what can often amount to an often unflinching, unwitting, or unapologetic belief in 
universal transcendental values.  Since no concept can be defined exhaustively and 
succinctly in terms of its inherent characteristics or elements, it follows that there can be 
nothing which is universal or transcendental9. The work of Michel Foucault has strived 
to not simply refute the idea of universals, but to show their historical contingency
through meticulous analyses of taken-for-granted assumptions.  Instead, it is a question 
of historicizing, bring forth the plurality of ways in which a particular universal has
functioned historically, and at the same time show the political consequences of this.
Throughout his work, Foucault has been able to expose the enlightenment universal
belief in ‘continuity’ or ‘progress’, both in an intellectual and in a material sense, by
bringing into focus the discontinuities in discourse.  Even appeals to ‘rationalism’ are
not immune from historicism and Foucault has been able to trace the various guises of 
what to some may appear as a quite natural human capacity.
A pertinent example of universal values in current political and geopolitical
discourse is the recourse which is often made to a set of inalienable ‘human rights’-this
is of course key to this thesis and will be dealt with in greater length further on-.  
8 Derrida has spoken of ‘under erasure’ sous rapture, which has been borrowed and developed 
from Heidegger, to refer to a technique whereby a particular word or concept is used acknowledging its 
contingency beforehand and/or with the intention of transforming it.  
9 One should note here that while Foucault was quite clear about his rejection of universal values,
Derrida’s position would differ slightly in that he believed in ‘justice’.  On this question Foucault has 
stated, ‘it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put
to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a

























   
 
 
‘Human rights’ are defined as a range of principles which are fundamental in the sense
that they belong to every human being, and transcendental in as far as they exist
independently from human interaction.  Moreover, they are understood to be timeless
since they apply over space and time without restrictions.  In a certain way, the
edification of this range of human principles could be considered typical of the
endeavour of Western political philosophy; it demonstrates a desire for abstract, 
universal and utopian principles from which to judge human behaviour. Yet as Foucault 
has pointed out in other cases, such enterprises are pernicious in as far as they can
effectively conceal the functioning of power in society. An anti-essentialist position has 
the advantage of assuming the historical contingency of such concepts, allowing for a
greater critical engagement with them.     
Derrida has referred to the tendency in Western thought to privilege essential
forms in concepts and identities as the ‘metaphysics of presence’.  Closely related to 
this is his critique of ‘logocentrism’- that which privileges speech in the Western 
philosophical tradition10- and ‘phallogocentrism’ – the patriarchal significance of the
aforementioned-.  In 'Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences'
(1978), Derrida has argued convincingly that the history of Western philosophy has
comprised the replacing of one centre for another in the quest for full presence, whether 
that centre be occupied by ‘God’, ‘man’, or anything else.  A ‘rupture,’ nevertheless, 
occurred when the ‘structurality of structure had to begin to be thought,’ and ‘language
invaded the universal problematic.’  Crucially, the idea that such a thing as full presence
can exist, whether that be in the thing itself, or the ‘transcendental signifier’ -the
unquestioned centre point which is presumed to be exterior to signification-, is a fallacy
since there can be no centre which is simultaneously inside a structure and outside it. 
Derrida seeks to go beyond the shortcomings of the ‘metaphysics of presence,’
‘logocentrism,’ ‘truth’ values and the ‘transcendental signifier,’ through a de-centring of 
the subject.  By opening up any inquiry to the ‘play’ of signification, it becomes
possible to avoid the seductive pull of fixed essences, and the naïve faith in full
presence.  For Derrida, there is only ‘différance', which points not only to a relational
ontology of differences between signs, but also to a temporal deferral of meaning,
Derrida has identified this privileging of the spoken word in philosophers ranging from Plato 
through to Rousseau and later de Saussure.  It is based on a desire, he argues, for full presence, whereby















   
 
 








opening up the possibility of difference within signs.  Elaborated this way, the
‘metaphysics of presence’ and ‘logocentric’ thought can be challenged and one can start
to see how ‘différance’ shapes and has shaped that which is supposed to be fully present 
and contain essential elements.      
As Derrida himself has of course recognized, for language to be understood by
somebody in the first place it must contain at least the structural possibility of being
repeatable.  At the very moment that an utterance is made, there must be a ‘trace,’ which 
helps one make sense of a particular experience.  This ‘trace’ can be understood as the
mark of otherness itself as it is characterized by non-presence or exteriority, meaning
that the present itself, or the language which is used to understand the present, must also 
be constituted by what is exterior to the present moment.  On this notion Derrida argues
that ‘in the most universal sense,’ the ‘trace’ ‘is a possibility that must not only inhabit
the pure actuality of the now, but must also constitute it be means of the very movement 
of the ‘différance’ that the possibility inserts into the pure actuality of the now.. the
presence of the present is thought beginning from the fold of the return, beginning from
the movement of repetition and not the reverse’ (Derrida, 1973: 58). 
Finally, and of crucial import for this thesis, one must outline how language
comes to be ‘performative’; that is to say, it does something as opposed to merely
saying something. The multifarious way in which ‘performativity’ has been utilized in 
the social sciences can be traced back to the work of J.L. Austin and his ‘speech-act
theory’ (Austin, 1962).  Originally articulated as a theory of language in general -one
could say a facet of a general theory- Austin exposed the insufficiencies in purely
constative understandings of language.  Refuting claims that utterances merely describe, 
denote or assert, he was able to show that language has a somewhat curious nature in
that a ‘speech act’ has the capacity to say and do something at one and the same time.
‘Performative utterances’ are often most clear when enacted by verbs like ‘pronounce’
‘promise’, ‘declare’, ‘demand,’ and so forth.  For instance, the utterance, ‘I pronounce
you man and woman,’ does not merely describe a situation, it actually does something 
too; it alters a prior status, it brings something new into being.  
Austin’s pioneering work on performative language was later developed by
Jacques Derrida in his now famous text ‘Signature, Event, Context’ (1988), and later in






















contribution stems from his desire to go to the ‘margins’ of previous theoretical work, 
arguing convincingly that Austin was wrong to dismiss the possibility that performative
‘speech acts’ can function in any context.  This means that a performative speech act is
not dependent on a specific authority or agent for their functioning.  Rather, the
performativity of an utterance is dependent on the same re-iterative capacity of language 
as a whole. That is to say, any performative speech-act, such as ‘I pronounce you man 
and wife,’ acquires its performative force not from the agent who is delivering it, but
precisely from the fact that it is repeatable. This is indeed necessary for it to be
understood in the first place.
DISCOURSE, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
The refutation of essentialist and foundationalist understandings of signs and 
language lead to certain crucial implications for how the social world can be understood 
and given meaning.  If it can be shown that meaning is contingent, then it follows that
the social world ‘is not pre-given or determined by external conditions, and that people
do not possess a set of fixed and authentic characteristics or essences.’ This position also 
suggests that 'the ways in which we understand and represent the world are historically
and culturally specific and contingent.’ That is to say, ‘our world-views and our 
identities could have been different, and they can change over time’ (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002:5).  It is thus the task of post-structuralist discourse theory to show how
attempts are made to attach, contest, discredit or even occlude meaning, all the while
bearing in mind that these attempts can never be fully realized: ‘it is impossible to fix a
sign’s meaning, it is contingent; possible, however not necessary. (Jorgensen and 
Phillips, 2002:25). 
A post-structuralist theoretical position asserts that it is through language that
attempts are made to fix meaning in the social and political world.  The primary unit of 
analysis is ‘discourse,’ and this concept is one which can be found in many of the

























theoretical framework will turn first.  This is not without its challenges, however, as
some Foucauldian scholars have even reached the conclusion that ‘discourse’ is in fact a 
‘slippery notion’ in the oeuvre of Foucault (O’Farrell, 2007).  Undeterred, there are
actually certain specific publications to which one can turn so as to make a preliminary
approximation to this crucial concept, casting light on how the theorist himself 
approached the question.  Writing in the Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) it is defined 
thus: ‘We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same
discursive formation; it does not form a rhetorical or formal unity, endlessly repeatable,
whose appearance or use in history might be indicated (and, if necessary, explained)’
(Foucault, 1972:117). 
This citation points to the importance of other important concepts from what has
been understood as Foucault’s ‘archeological’ period, such as ‘discursive formation’, 
and ‘statement’.  A ‘discursive formation’ is the ‘general enunciative system that
governs a group of verbal performances’.  Foucault’s ‘systems’ of thought correspond 
roughly with a particular area of knowledge at a particular- albeit perhaps lengthy-
period of time.  These ‘discursive formations’ are governed by principles which cannot
be reduced to grammar or propositions, and that determine, to a certain extent, the
conceptual and enunciative possibilities.  By dividing the ‘discursive formation’ into
individual ‘statements’, - the relationship between a ‘statement’ and a ‘discursive
formation’ is compared to that of a sentence and a text- the particular focus of any
analysis was to see how objects, subjective positions, concepts and strategic choices are
formed (Foucault, 1972).  The ’Archaeological’ method used by Foucault, therefore, 
allowed him to analyse how different types of knowledge have been produced in 
different fields and at different times of history, in accordance with the underlying rules
of the ‘discursive formation’ in question. 
Crucial to the analysis of ‘discursive formations’, for Foucault, are individual
‘statements’, which he understands to be ‘the elementary unit of discourse,’ or the ‘atom 
of discourse’ (Foucault, 1972:80). What is being dealt with here is not a linguistic
concept of the traditional variety, it is in fact an ‘enunciative function,’ one which can
take on the appearance of different units, such as sentences or propositions.  Foucault
refers to this somewhat enigmatic character of the statement as a ‘quasi-invisibility’, 
since that which is offered up does not reveal its essence entirely. This is due to the fact 

























inhabited by the other, the elsewhere, the distant; it is hollowed by absence’.  The
analysis of statements will therefore be quite different from the analysis of other 
linguistic units.  It will be a case of ‘defining the conditions in which the function that
gave a series of signs (a series that is not necessarily grammatical or logically
structured) an existence, and a specific existence, can operate’ (Foucault, 1972:108).
 Likewise, it will be different from other historical analyses, as Foucault is at
pains to emphasize, highlighting the fact that this should not be an interpretative
exercise which seeks to uncover a hidden meaning. Unlike the ‘history of thought,’ the
aim is not to discover ‘beyond the statements themselves the intention of the speaking
subject,’ or even to ‘search for the ‘unconscious activity that took place.’ On the
contrary, the task is to be non-interpretative and: ‘grasp the statement in the exact
specificity of its occurrence; determine its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits,
establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show
what other forms of statement it excludes’ (Foucault, 1972:28).  It is by necessity a
historical analysis that seeks to answer questions such as what it means for them ‘to 
have appeared when and where they did- and not others’ (Foucault, 1972:109). 
An important part of carrying out any archaeological inquiry is to understand the 
‘rules of formation’ of objects and concepts.  By identifying the ‘surfaces of 
emergence,’ firstly, it will be possible to determine where an object or concept first
appears within a ‘discursive formation’.  One must also, concurrently, take into account
the concomitant ‘authorities of delimitation'.  That would be to determine and focus on 
those who are authorized to speak, write and opine in the ‘discursive formation,’ and on 
the specific discursive objects in question.  When scanning the ‘surfaces of emergence’
it may also be necessary to consider the ‘grids of specification’. This is conceptualized 
in terms of the way objects are broken down, specified, categorized and so forth.  An 
example of this would be Matthew Hannah’s ‘archaeology’ of the object ‘Foucault’
(Hannah, 2007).  Hannah pays close attention to how this object has been assigned
genre, political orientation, and also how he has been given status as a ‘grand theorist’.
Returning to the present object of study, it is possible to demonstrate briefly how 
these three elements might be used as part of an interpretative framework11 when 
As Matthew Hannah (2007) has noted, this is somewhat of an informal interpretative framework. 
Foucault does not often mention these in his work, preferring to concentrate on the discursive material
itself and not to import anything from outside. All the same these provide some loose guidelines on 


















analysing the formation of relevant discursive objects.  For instance, the formation in
the Western geopolitical imagination of the key object ‘Gaddafi’ is clearly of great
significance.  It will therefore be fruitful to map the events from which Gaddafi first
came to the attention of US and UK officials following the coup which deposed King 
Idris.  This itself places added emphasis on the context in which these officials found 
themselves – the Cold War- and the challenges which they were facing at that time.  
Due to the fact that Gaddafi erupted on to the scene, those who had the authority to 
define the object were relatively restricted at the beginning to high level officials within 
the US and UK administrations.  As far as specification goes, it will of course be useful
to consider what possible consequences there were of ‘Gaddafi’ being understood as
‘inexperienced,’, an ‘Arab nationalist’ and ‘mercurial’.   
In as far as meaning is contingent and constituted by discourse, the formation of 
objects, concepts and identities must always in flux.  Thus, it becomes immediately
apparent that changes taking place in the aforementioned are of great significance and 
should logically be accounted for in any rigorous analysis.  In short, it is the temporal
dimension which is of interest here, the transformation of objects and concepts.  
Foucault will seek in his later work to understand precisely how change takes place
through a ‘genealogical’ method, which has its quite obvious precursor Nietzsche.  In 
what he has referred to as a ‘descent’ into history, the aim is to illuminate aspects of a
‘trait or a concept’ through analysis of the ‘myriad events through which-thanks to 
which, against which-they were formed’ (Foucault, 1971:81). 
This is definitely not the search for any beginning, or the origin of a particular 
object or concept, which often goes hand-in-hand with futile attempts ‘to capture the
exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities’ 
(Foucault, 1971:78).  Rather, it is done with a complete respect for contingency and will 
ultimately show that things have not, and indeed do not have to ‘be’ the way they may
seem in the present.  Similarly, it is not a question of trying to find some underlying 
continuity, progress or evolution12 . Teleological theories of history such as those which
may take Hegel and/or Marx as a reference are dismissed.  Instead, one will have to 
recognize and acknowledge the ruptures and accidents which mark the very fields in 
The rejection of great universals such as evolution or progress should be carried out also on the
basis that these are bourgeois concepts, Foucault adds.
12 
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question. A ‘genealogical’ inquiry ‘will cultivate the details and accidents that
accompany every beginning’ (Foucault, 1971:80).  This premise allows for the
reappearance of chance: ‘The world of effective history knows only one kingdom, 
without providence or final cause, where there is only “the iron hand of necessity
shaking the dice-box of chance”’ (Foucault, 1971:88-89). 
What ‘genealogy’ does try to do is strive to uncover the underlying power 
relationships which have conditioned the emergence of a particular object, concept, or 
even statement.  In this regard it ‘seeks to re-establish the various systems of subjection: 
not the anticipatory power of meaning, but the hazardous play of dominations’
(Foucault, 1971:83). This is done on the basis that ‘emergence is always produced 
through a particular stage of forces’ (Foucault, 1971:83).  Foucault famously
conceptualizes this struggle in terms of ‘power/knowledge’ relationships, the imposition 
of which ultimately leading to the consolidation of or the setting up of new forms of 
domination. This exercise of power can be viewed as an attempt to tame chance, to 
repress it without ever reaching mastery over it.  Even the rule of law is not enough to
secure a particular relation of domination: ‘The successes of history belong to those
who are capable of seizing these rules, to replace those who has used them, to disguise
themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect them against those
who had initially imposed them’ (Foucault, 1971: 86). 
A ‘genealogical’ study will be at once an exposure of history in all its
complexity, and implicitly a critique of traditional forms of telling history.  It will be an
‘effective history,’ which at once unashamedly affirms perspective while denouncing the 
‘demagoguery’ of the traditional historian.  That is, the avoidance of the ‘masks’, 
‘truths,’ ‘essences’ and ‘eternal necessities’ (Foucault, 1971:91). In short, a genealogical 
study would entail an effacement of the impartial subject and metaphysics of objectivity. 
A rejection of the ‘subject of knowledge,’ in favour of a pursuit of how knowledge has
been constructed historically, shining light on the injustices which this ‘will to
knowledge’ has left behind. 
The discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985), 
borrows significantly from the work of Foucault, among others -notably Jacques
Derrida and Antonio Gramsci-, striving for a type of synthesis of different approaches to 




    
 













discourse analysis. As is indicative of the post-structuralist tradition, the articulation of 
a rejection of absolute truth and meaning is a guiding principle, the authors being 
instead concerned with the processes involved in the fixation of meaning. Therefore, it
is not a question of definitions, a search for objectivity, which is considered to be purely 
ideological.  But rather an examination of how meaning is assigned to all manner of 
social phenomena, and not just language, through the exercise of discourse. 
Although the work is unmistakably indebted to the authors mentioned 
previously, Laclau and Mouffe introduce a whole range of new concepts.  ‘Discourse,’
thus understood, is structured around key signs, denominated ‘nodal points.’ As
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002:28)have noted, these 'nodal points' reflect the ‘point of 
crystallization within a specific discourse,’ and to which all other signs will then be
related (all signs are in fact referred to as ‘moments’).  ‘Nodal points’ represent a useful
starting point for any analysis in as far as they reveal what signs are being privileged 
over a range of other potential possibilities.  From there it is possible to deduce which 
discourse is in fact being deployed.  These signs become ‘floating signifiers’ when more 
than one discourse strives to define them, of course in diverging ways.  By identifying 
both the ‘floating signifier’ and the discourses being used it becomes possible to 
approximate the political struggle taking place in any particular social field.  When
violence broke out in Libya in 2011, it was the violence itself which can be identified as 
the ‘floating signifier’, since competing discourses were used to give meaning to it.  
Western officials were quick to define the trouble in terms of ‘human rights’, while
some political opposition and media deployed a ‘civil war’ discourse.
 It is on the basis of a particular grouping of signs, whereby differences exist
between signs, which allows for the establishment of meaning. That is to say,
‘elements’ are placed alongside each other in ‘articulations’, pointing to particular 
meanings and discourses.  Concurrently, one should be aware of what meaning
potentials are excluded from any particular ‘articulation’.  Discourses attempt to fix 
meaning, grouping signs together and constituting meaning on the basis of equivalence
or exclusion, but this can only ever be in relation to the signs which have been omitted
from the discourse.  As such, no ‘transcendental signifier’ or centre can fix meaning 
permanently. An illustrative example could be the articulation ‘body and soul,’ whereby 
‘body’ is positioned within a religious discourse (Jorgensen and Phillips, 2002).  One



















meanings, while others are excluded.  It would be just as possible to speak of the body
in terms of its vital organs, placing it within a contemporary ‘medical’ discourse.  In 
both cases, the meaning established is never fixed, and must necessarily remain 
contingent. 
One of the analytical consequences of taking contingency as a starting point is
that one must incorporate that which is effectively excluded from any particular
discourse.  For discourse theory what lies outside, all that which has been effectively
excluded, exists as a realm of possibilities and potentialities and falls under the term,
‘field of discourse.’  It is here where competing formulations, or ‘articulations,’ can
emerge to challenge the unity of a dominant discourse.  Taking for example Ernesto 
Laclau’s own example, the sign ‘democracy’ (Laclau, 1989), one can see how it can 
feature as both a ‘nodal point’ or as a ‘floating signifier’ within a politics discourse.  
This is due to the fact that it is an undeniably ambiguous term, which has been
interpreted in many ways.  In the United States, and indeed most states considered to be
‘Western’, ‘democracy’ has by and large been shaped by a liberal discourse, almost to 
the extent that both ideas have become fused together. The very possibility of a
socialist democracy is often dismissed, discredited, or excluded from discussions in 
relation with viable forms of governance.  A current example of this could be the way in 
which the UK Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn has been almost universally branded
‘unelectable’ by the media, and even members of his own party.  Corbyn’s stances on 
many issues do not sit easily with dominant liberal political and economic formations in 
the country. 
One of the things which becomes clear when assessing Laclau and Mouffe’s
discourse theory is that it is one which remains true to a philosophical and political
tradition emphasizing conflict and the pursuit of hegemony (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, 
chapter 1).  Social antagonisms are understood to be inevitable, and this means that they 
will invariably find their outward expression in discourse. This is not to suggest that
any and every relation will be one of conflict.  It’s just that the possibility will be there, 
and that antagonistic relations, translated through discourse, will inevitably characterize
the social and political world.  Again this can be traced back to the contingency of 
signification itself.  It therefore follows that there can be no utopian peace, or the
elimination of conflict, or even the eradication of the different forms of repression or 
























component of discourse theory.  In fact, Ernest Laclau has considered the development
of a theory of hegemony to be the ‘central piece of the discourse analytical approach to
politics’ (2003).  Intimately related to the struggle over concepts and identities, and 
emerging as a result of the political interaction of groups, it is through a process of 
‘hegemony’ which dominant understandings come to be understood as embodying the
real meanings and not temporary fixations.  Since ‘hegemony’ is conceptualized as a
process, it is not something which one group may or may not possess, or impose on 
another group at any given time.  It is something which is strived for and must be
maintained- or challenged- once a hegemonic relationship is in place.  On this point
Laclau and Mouffe state, ‘the relation, by which a certain particularity, assumes the
representation of a totality entirely incommensurable with it is what, in discourse theory, 
is called a hegemonic relation’ (2001:xiii).
 One of the main reasons why ‘hegemony’ is such a pivotal part of Laclau and 
Mouffe’s discourse theory is because their work is part of a wider political project.
‘Hegemony and Socialist Strategy’, is to be found in the title of their famous book, and
discourse theory itself can be viewed as a fundamental part of this wider strategy in 
pursuit of hegemony.  Finally, it is perhaps useful to tie in some of the previous concepts 
outlined with this central theme. Already mentioned has been the struggle over 
‘floating signifiers’, such as ‘democracy’, and one can see clearly now how this is
crucial to the establishment of any hegemonic relationship.  In turn, hegemony, and the
installation of a socialist ‘social imaginary,’ will only be possible through recourse to 
the ‘logic of equivalence’ mentioned earlier.  In practical terms, this is to say that a
successful socialist strategy will most likely not arise from concentrating solely on class 
struggle and the mobilization of certain working class groups.  For socialism to become
the hegemonic discourse which constitutes the meaning of democracy it will be
necessary to go beyond this, drawing greater numbers of people and groups into the
political project in contestation of the pervasive forces of capital.
IDENTITY, PERFORMATIVITY AND INTERTEXTUALITY IN FOREIGN
POLICY DISCOURSE 




   

















seeking to understand actions carried out by the state and foreign policy.  Concurrently,
paradigmatic ways of conceptualizing state identity as fixed, self-identical and pre-
discursive, have been increasingly challenged and exposed as mere effects of power
and-or the remnants of a ‘metaphysics of presence’. There are several key problems
with these ways of understanding identity. At a general level, one is liable to lose sight
of how in fact state identity-or identities- are formed in the first place.  In making the
ontological assumption that identity is fixed and pre-discursive, the possibilities of 
accounting for historical change become severely compromised, if not entirely
impossible.  Secondly, one can become less sensitive to the ambiguities of identity and 
the ‘Self’ identity in particular.  It is important to recognize that ‘any social field will
harbor more than one type of politically relevant collective identities’ (Neumann, 
1999:36).
Thus, it has been the work of critical geopolitics and international relations
scholars which has been of most relevance in this complex field during the
contemporary period (Ashley, 1988; Campbell, 1992, 1998; Weber 1995, 1998; Agnew, 
1999; Connolly, 2002; Hansen, 2006).  Drawing on the work of post-structuralist
authors like Foucault, Derrida, Laclau and Mouffe, and Butler, it has been possible to 
demonstrate the historical contingency of identity, as determined by and through 
discourse.  In addition, one can expose its ambiguity, relationality and performativity,
and in doing so, shine light on how power relations are tied up with particular 
articulations of identity. 
The omnipotence of discourse in the social and political world, and the way in 
which it constitutes its objects in terms of difference, has inevitably crucial implications
for the formation of identities.  For one thing, individuals are constantly forced into
taking up ‘subject positions’ within discursive structures (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).  In 
this regard, discourses define social roles, which in turn can trigger specific actions and 
behaviours in relation to those positions. This also means that individuals or groups can 
be spoken of as ‘fragmented’ subjects.  It would be perfectly feasible, for instance, for 
an individual to assume the ‘subject positions’ of being an ‘adult’; ‘heterosexual’;
‘male’; ‘socialist’; ‘Glasgow Rangers’ supporter, at one and the same time.  It is worth 
highlighting, at this stage, an important distinction which can be made between ‘subject
position’ and ‘political subjectivity’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 2001).  In contrast to the






















can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the kind of structural determinism inherent in the
work of Althusser (Howarth et al, 2000).  Should there be no scope for individuals to 
assert their own will, develop their own political project, or indeed challenge identity,
then there would effectively be no way to explain how resistance emerges from within 
repressed groups and in contestation of hegemonic discourses.   
The complexity of identity is such that it is not possible to view all spatial, 
political and cultural identities in the same way.  People will invariably feel stronger 
about certain identities than others.  With this in mind, Connolly (2002) has sought to 
make a distinction between those identities which exude less ontological permanence,
making them more readily questioned, and those which are more resistant to change, 
more ‘obdurate’, and which he refers to as ‘entrenched contingencies’.  National
identity may be a good example of an ‘entrenched contingency’ due to the emotive
power it often generates in subjects, and yet it remains contingent nonetheless.  This
does not mean, of course, that an individual can select their identities as and when one
pleases.  It is just that the possibility always exists, or has existed, that the identity in 
question could have been different.  In this way, Connolly disavows essences and 
transcendental principles, while at the same time appreciating how identity becomes
entrenched in ‘corporeal habits, feelings, and dispositions’ (Connolly, 2002: xvi).  It is
precisely due to this entrenchment that a particular identity may seem timeless, 
unchangeable, and unambiguous to those who assume it to be part of their own being, or 
in alternatively attributing it to another person or group.  
Critical authors have, moreover, concentrated their efforts on showing that rather 
than being unequivocal and self-sufficient, identity is relational, inextricably linked
with difference, on which it is dependent.    Here, the creation of boundaries between 
Self and Other is a necessary part of identity formation.  Without this coexistence, the
very possibility of identity would be impossible since it ‘would not exist in its
distinctness and solidity’ (Connolly, 2002:64). This is not, however, a relationship of 
passive coexistence.  Identities are invariably infused by the ‘constitutive force’ of the
Other.  Put another way, ‘Otherness’ is inseparable from and constitutive of any
differential relation. As Neumann (1996) noted so many years ago now, this has been
and without doubt continues to be a crucial part of the ‘pervasive theme’ of identity in
critical international relations literature.  Part of this enterprise has been to show the










   
 
  
failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the 
formation of the self’ (Neumann,1999: 35).  The key questions for Neumann, therefore, 
revolve around not what a particular identity is, with all of the potential consequences
that can result from these efforts.  But rather, ‘how these boundaries come into existence 
and are maintained’ (Neumann,1999: 35).  
It is through attention to the relationality of identity that Lene Hansen (2006) has 
been able to analyse the complexity of the Bosnian war and Western responses to it.
She has argued that by using a ‘Balkan’ discourse, along with all the constructions of 
identity which this implied- spatially Bosnia is not situated in Europe; temporally
Bosnia is ontologically backward, meaning that the war can be defined in terms of 
‘barbarism’ or ‘ancient hatreds’- the West was freed from any ethical responsibility to 
intervene and stop the violence being shed.  This, in turn, had the effect of prolonging
the war further than what may conceivably have been the case otherwise.  It was only
after a ‘genocide’ discourse was mobilized and reached hegemonic status in the United
States, Hansen claims, that a corresponding Western ethical responsibility was
generated and a more robust response to the violence materialized. The ‘genocide’
discourse constructed a multicultural Balkan Self who was at the same time a victim,
and placed it in opposition to a genocidal Serbian leadership. The Serbian leadership, in 
turn, were placed in opposition to an innocent Serbian people as part of a split Serbian 
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There are further crucial implications of understanding identity as being
relational.  Firstly, the potential for conflict can never be fully eradicated. The reason 
antagonisms arise is that the possibility of fully realizing one’s identity is obstructed by
the presence of the Other. As Laclau and Mouffe put it, ‘the presence of an ‘Other’
prevents me from being totally myself.  The relation arises not from full totalities, but
from the impossibility of their constitution’ (1985: 125). Secondly, from this alternative 
account of the ontology of identity, a paradox can be discerned. The privileging of the
‘Self’ identity, which translates into a ‘pursuit’ of that same identity since it can never
be fully fixed or realized, necessarily implies a ‘drive to diminish difference to complete 
itself’.  This is most problematically achieved by ‘marginalizing, demeaning, or 
excluding the differences on which it depends to specify itself’ (Connolly, 2002: xv).   
The crystallization of antagonistic relations in the political and social world can 
be understood by way of ‘logics of equivalence’ and ‘difference’.  It is a ‘logic of 






























into the same discursive system.  Paraphrasing Laclau and Mouffe, Howarth et al
explain that this logic functions by ‘splitting a system of differences and instituting a
political frontier between two opposed camps’ (Howarth et al, 2000:11).  An example
here could be the debate on Scottish independence, which resulted in the polarization of 
an otherwise fairly homogeneous population into two camps; the ‘yes’ camp and the
‘no’ camp.  This was achieved on the basis of strong appeals to either a unitary
‘Scottish’ identity or alternatively a hybrid ‘Scottish/British’ identity. The ‘logic of 
difference’ works in the opposite way. Attempts are made to dissolve sharp differences
between two sides, ‘dissolving existing chains of equivalence and incorporating those
disarticulated elements into an expanding order’.  In relation to the above example, the
‘logic of difference’ may well suggest that a ‘Scottish’ identity cannot account for the
differences held within the population in Scotland as a whole.  It’s worth mentioning
here that neither the ‘logic of equivalence’ or ‘logic of difference’ can ‘a priori be
designated the more progressive way to go’.  And, at any rate, both should not be treated 
in isolation from each other as it is always the case that ‘there is a complex interaction
between the two’ (Howarth et al). 2000:12).    
Closely connected to the ‘logic of equivalence’ is Laclau’s conception of ‘myth’. 
The condition of possibility of ‘myth’ is the very dislocated structure which enables
meaning to be contested through discourse.  ‘Myth,’ however, seeks to bring about
closure to the dislocated structure, to constitute a totality by englobing various
identities, interests and demands within a broad nexus (Laclau, 1989).  This is achieved
through ‘galvanising the imaginary of the masses,’ and thus potentially ‘launching them
into collective action’ (Howarth, 2015:91). As opposed to the ‘logic of difference’, the
key is to make boundaries between groups and interests wither away. As Jorgensen and 
Philips (2002:39) have noted, this is often done through appeals to ‘the country’ or the
‘people’, which attempt to produce society ‘as if it were a totality’.  There is, of course, 
nothing of the sort, and these are mere examples of ‘articulations’, or efforts to achieve
such a thing.  In this way ‘myths’ function in a hegemonic way, and when they reach an
almost taken-for-granted status, in as far as they appear to have dissolved the dislocated 
structure, then they can then be thought of as a ‘social imaginary’.
It is worth mentioning that analyses of the complex relationship between
discourse and identity need not be restricted to textual traces.  While this is certainly
most common when one is analysing for instance official discourse, media sources are
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more inclined to supplement their textual representations with visual material.  For 
overall coherence, it can be assumed that the photos or images on view would 
correspond with the meanings being generated in the article and yet the use of visual
material is often clearer and more to the point.  In this way, it can give the researcher 
clues as to the general direction the author is going. What is of critical concern is how
the subject positions are being depicted in the photos displayed.  It is of course not the
same thing to depict Muslims carrying weapons, praying in the Mosque, or alternatively 
working in a Western style office environment. And yet certain Western media sources





















A useful analytical tool that one can used for the study of how discourse-identity 
constellations are formed and develop throughout a political debate and/or event is the
construction of 'basic discourses' (Hansen, 2006).  As analytical constructions, basic
discourses are assembled from a general and abstract level of the overall debate, 
meaning that they cannot be considered as given.  Rather, they provide a way in which 
government policy discourses can be analysed, since they will inevitably borrow
elements from one or more than one of the basic discourses laid out.  Since the basic
discourses of any political debate are formed at an abstract level, this operation should 
be done by using a large number and wide range of texts, where possible. 
In building the basic discourses certain key principles must be kept in mind.  
Firstly, both should attempt to construct the identities of those involved in divergent
ways. That is to say, the Self/Other identity relationship will be necessarily different,
thus meaning that a different foreign policy is also implied.  It is often the case that the
traces of one basic discourse start to form before another emerges in contestation, even
if this is soon after.  It is one of the assumptions of this current thesis that it is not the
same to define the Libyan crisis of 2011 in terms of 'human rights', with all that this
entails, as it is to argue that there is actually a 'civil war' taking place.  Not only are the
implied identities divergent, but in the former an ethical responsibility is generated on 
the Self which is not the same in the latter.
Since in the case at hand, it is the basic 'human rights' discourse which has been
by and large deployed by both the U.K and the U.S government, the concept of 'human
rights' becomes crucial to any understanding of the Western intervention in Libya.  This
means that it will be crucial to then carry out a conceptual history of how 'human rights'
has featured within wider U.K and U.S foreign policy discourse.  What is more, 
understanding that the identity of the Western state is constituted performatively, it will
also be important to see how the 'human rights' discourse has been deployed and what




















   
Returning to how identity is used to generate meaning in conflict situations, 
David Campbell (2007) has investigated the use of media photography in 
representations of Darfur.  In attempting to critically address the taken-for-granted
assumptions which link an image with its external referent, Campbell instead seeks to
uncover the ‘various economies and technologies’ involved in their construction.  In the
case of Darfur, it has been noted that a significant amount of the photojournalism
surrounding the tragic events there show either refugees, invoking themes of 
humanitarianism, or genocide whereby the conflict is split unambiguously between 
victims and murderers.  By questioning the knowledge claims made by such visual
material, Campbell does not aspire to completely dismiss the veracity of the images per
se. There could be no doubt that huge numbers of people were being displaced and 
killed.  Rather, it is to pursue a different line in ascertaining how the photos were
imbued with performative force, affecting their audience, and pointing to specific policy 
outcomes.  One is moreover drawn to consider the possible implications of representing
the conflict in terms of Arabs vs Africans, whether or not these ways of framing the
conflict do justice to the fluidity of the Sudanese anthropology and identity, and if they
work to re-fuel the conflict at the same time.  
Using the work of Connolly and others, Lene Hansen (2006) has developed an 
analytical framework for studies which try to approach the complexity and importance
of identity in the formulation of foreign policy.  Clustered around the pivotal Self-Other
binary, three general proposals are made: 
1) Firstly, that any analysis of identity should not limit itself to a concern with
locating a radical Other in opposition to the Self.  This is essentially a call to a more
nuanced approach to identity construction, one that takes into consideration the
possibility of degrees of Otherness, and also the instances when one would not be
dealing with Others constructed as unambiguous, coherent wholes.  In the first place, 
Hansen outlines cases where the Other is imbued with more positive values, such as was 
the case with the Russian ‘Westernizers,’ who held up an ideal of the West as something
to be pursued and embraced (Neumann, 1996a; Hansen, 2006).  Secondly, the potential
for a ‘split’ Other becomes a very real analytical potentiality. This indeed appears to be




















government tried to distinguish between a ‘tyrant’ Gaddafi and an innocent ‘Libyan 
people’. The development of the Self-Other theoretical starting point is done so as to
‘adopt an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity construction that 
one might encounter in concrete foreign policies’ (Hansen, 2006:40). 
2) The Self and Other’s do not find themselves situated in isolation from other
signs.  On the contrary, they are invariably positioned within a wider web of textuality
which presupposes the existence of other signs.  The relationships between the Self-
Other binary, and other signs, is to be theorized according to processes of linking. As an 
example, Hansen draws attention to the two main discourses which defined the Spanish 
encounter with the indigenous peoples of the Americas.  While both discourses used the
sign ‘savage’ to construct the identity of local inhabitants, this was accompanied with 
other signs which were crucial in leading to divergent policies to be pursued by the
Spanish authorities.  One cluster of signs supposed that the annihilation of such 
‘savages’ was the correct course of action to take while the other advocated conversion
to the dominant value systems prevalent in Spanish political, religious and societal life
of the time.  A sensitivity to the different ways that signs are linked together can 
therefore be crucial for an understanding of why one particular policy is favoured over 
another.
3) The third axis of the analytical framework seeks to delve deeper into the specific 
components of a particular identity.  For this task, four further dimensions of identity are 
plotted.
(i) The first of these corresponds with the spatial element of identity, naturally
being of crucial concern for studies of geopolitics and political geography.  It is often
useful to think in terms of scale and ascertain if the identities being studied correspond 
with local, regional, national, or supranational geographical scales.  A comprehensive
analysis will be sensitive to how these spatial identities are operationalized, and 
moreover which ones are omitted or excluded in doing so. 
(ii) The second adheres to the ways in which identity is imbued with temporal
attributes.  Is the identity in question construed as ‘backward’, or is it ‘developed’? As
Hansen and many others have noticed, Western civilization discourses have often
portrayed foreign peoples as ‘backward,’ constructions which can later be used as






















the temporally ‘backward’ people in their ‘natural’ development towards the more
‘advanced’ temporal status of the Self identity itself. The paths laid out for such 
identities are often embellished with teleological ontologies which assign purpose to 
history and speak of historical ‘progress’.  Great ideological systems such as Marxism
and Liberalism are constructed in accordance with dialectical logics positing either an
endpoint of a ‘classless’ society or ‘freedom’ as the ultimate and final endpoint of 
political development.  It is therefore a key geopolitical consideration to understand the
links between ideology- understood as a series of linked signs- and temporal identity in 
understanding policies and the material consequences of such policies.  
(iii) Finally, Hansen wants to inquire as to how an ethical responsibility is
created by and through certain articulation of identity.  For instance, constructing a
people as the victims of genocide necessarily points to a situation whereby the Self 
would be expected to help in some way to ease the suffering of the group of people in 
question. This dimension will be of particular significance for the present study due to 
the humanitarian claims made about Libya by Western governments. 
(iv) The fourth and final dimension of the analytical framework is the
identification of basic discourses.  
One of the possible limitations which can be detected in Hansen's excellent
study on Western responses to the Bosnian war, is that it does not quite manage to 
completely dispense with the notion of the pre-discursive sovereign state.  Her thesis, 
that a foreign policy of Western intervention was only adopted after a 'genocide'
discourse was deployed, suggests one of two things: either Western officials wilfully
deployed the discourse- meaning that they construct reality as a sovereign subject- or 
that agency is simply displaced on to discourse itself- establishing a cause-effect
relationship between discourse and the materiality of the actions taken by Western
governments.  What Hansen’s account does not do is explain how a 'genocide'
discourse- that is to say a humanitarian discourse- should come to be meaningful and 
trigger Western actions in the first place.  While this may seem like a trivial point, the
concepts 'genocide' and ‘humanitarian intervention’ clearly possess a history, like all
concepts, meaning that a genealogy of that history should uncover how they have



























Significant as it may be for a full understanding of the Western intervention in
Bosnia, this point is arguably even more resonant for the Libyan case at hand. While in 
both cases a humanitarian discourse was prevalent, the appeals to ‘human rights’ abuses
as justification for military intervention in Libya -and the consequential toppling of ex-
leader Gaddafi- appear to be more ambiguous and therefore contentious.  This renders it 
even more important to avoid the temptation of stopping at ‘human rights,’ assuming
this is reason enough to explain Western actions either as an unambiguous moral action, 
or alternatively as a mere excuse for intervention.  This would be to fall once more into
the trap of assigning full agency to the governments who wield and deploy the
discourse, or to attribute transcendental causative power to ‘human rights’ itself.  For 
that, the challenge will be to trace the historical trajectory of the ‘human rights’ concept
showing how it has been inculcated in official Western foreign policy discourse.  At the
same time, it will be important to understand how ‘human rights’ as discourse has
constituted the moral identity of both the US and UK states.  This means that it will be
necessary to supplement the theoretical framework already elaborated to this point.
One useful way of doing this is to understand the identity of the state as not only
being relational, and fundamentally discursive, but also as being performative- as will
be shown this means that its identity is constituted by and through the practices which
are said to be its result-13 . Earlier work by Austin and Derrida on the performative
nature of language was radically put to work later by Judith Butler in developing her 
theory of gender identity.  In her seminal work ‘Gender Trouble’ (1990) Butler aims to
refute paradigmatic understandings of gender as essentialized identity, fixed, and 
natural; in short, its facticity. Butler makes the quite contrary claim that such identities
are forged socially as a result of hegemonic gendered discourses, which privilege
certain forms of masculinity and femininity.  Naturalized gender ontologies turn out to 
be no more than fictitious appearances as they become cemented over time.  The subject 
cannot come before the social structures and discourses which shape her, and yet neither 
does she pre-exist the performative acts which constitute her gendered identity. As
Butler puts it, ‘gender proves to be performance—that is, constituting the identity it is
purported to be.  In this sense, gender is always a doing, though not a doing by the
It should be noted that Hansen does in fact acknowledge and put to use ‘performativity’ in her
book on the Bosnian War.  Nevertheless, it is put forward here that she does not fully exhaust the



























   
subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’ (Butler, 1990:25) 14 . There is nothing
deliberate about an ‘act’, rather performativity presupposes that they must be
understood through the ‘reiterative and citational practices by which discourse produces 
the effects that it names’ (Butler, 1993:2). 
If it is indeed possible to theorize the constitution of gender identities as a doing, 
or as something which is performed, then this opens up the possibility that other 
identities can also be understood in this way.  It is even possible to extrapolate Butler’s
work into more overtly political realms such as the practices and identity-ies associated
with the state itself (Campbell, 1992, 1998; Weber,1998; Bialasiewicz et al, 2007).  This 
is not, as David Campbell has made clear, to conflate individual identities with
collective identities.  Rather, it is to make the quite different argument that the way
gender identities are brought into being is similar to the way in which those attributable
to the state are.  In short, ‘the performative constitution of gender and the body is
analogous to the performative constitution of the state’.  This means that like gender 
identities, any appearance of essential state identity is merely the ‘ontological effects of 
practices which are performatively enacted’ (Weber, 1998:78).  In this way, the identity
of the state itself can be understood as a subject in process, or perhaps better, in a state
of becoming.  It is brought into being and maintained by discourse, which itself is made
possible by the iterability of citational processes which work to performatively
constitute the state as subject.  Such expressions and acts are not the product of a
sovereign state subject.  Rather, ‘the identity of the state is performatively constituted by 
the very expressions that are said to be its result’ (Weber, 1998:90).  
This appears to be entirely logical since for pronouncements to be meaningful in
the present, the state cannot simply make things up as it goes along.  It must refer itself
back to previously articulated discourses, repeating in certain measure what has come
before. That said, the repetition can never be achieved in a complete sense, as recitation 
and resignification are always susceptible to new formations and possibilities
(Bialasievicz, 2007).  It is for this reason that a theory of performativity can offer so 
much towards uncovering patterns and explanations for social and political change.  By
focussing on the re-iterative and citational practices associated with the ‘human rights’
discourse in Western foreign policy, one should theoretically be able to shed light on 























how it has retained a certain continuity while incurring changes throughout time.  This, 
in turn, will permit a greater understanding of how this particular discourse was
meaningful to Western governments before and after the onset of intra-state violence in 
Libya.
It is useful at this stage to clarify and establish the ontological link between
identity and foreign policy.  Identities, it turns out, are 'produced, and reproduced,
through foreign policy discourse, and there is thus no identity existing prior to and 
independently of foreign policy' (Hansen, 2006:26).  Post-structuralists, Hansen 
continues, 'conceptualize identity and policy as ontologically inseparable' (2006:26), 
which means that 'representations and policy are mutually constitutive and discursively
linked' (2006:28).  
This is not to suggest, it should be made clear, that performativity privileges
exclusively the linguistic to the detriment of the material world.  On the contrary, it
makes room for agency by bridging the idealism/materialism divide, acknowledging 
both that discourse structures the social and political World, and that agents can, and do, 
take material decisions (Bialasievicz, 2007).  To understand this point better it is useful
to establish the distinction between ‘performance’ and ‘performativity’.  Whereas
performativity can be said to be a ‘discursive mode’, one which calls into question the
sovereign subject, performance actually ‘presumes a subject’. The subjects that are
understood to carry out these performances, however, are always restricted by the
‘conditions of possibility brought into being through the infrastructure of 
performativity’ (Bialasievicz, 2007).  Relating these ideas back to the task at hand, this
would mean that an individual performance of ‘human rights’ by the US or UK
government would be at least partially conditioned by how the discourse had hitherto 
performatively constituted the identity of the US and UK states.  
One of the more intriguing aspects of a performative understanding of the state
is that its reliance on previously articulated expressions of identity is not simply a
matter of coherence.  Having said that, it is through previously articulated expressions
of identity which the state functions in its attempts to re-stabilize its identity.  One of the 
key aspects to a performative theory of the state is the chasm which appears between
perceived notions of fixed identity on the one hand, and the ontological impossibility of 
ever actually realizing them on the other.  States, therefore, are on a permanent mission
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to stabilize identities, in ‘permanent need of reproduction,’ and ‘always in a state of 
becoming.’ And yet crucially, this impulse toward the stabilization of the identity will, 
ultimately, prove futile and doomed to failure. Any prospects of closure will prove
ontologically illusive as ‘for a state to end its practices of representation would be to 
expose its lack of pre-discursive foundations: stasis would be death’ (Campbell, 1992:
11).  
The implications of a performative theory of identity for the security practices
which are carried out in the name of the modern state are indeed profound.  Being since
the days of Thomas Hobbes the central tenet of the state, the capacity to provide
security for its subjects has been paradigmatically viewed as the indispensable feature of 
its sovereignty.  Such conceptions of the state posit that security practices logically flow 
from its very being.  Performativity, on the other hand, suggests that the opposite is in 
fact true; it is through security practices that the state in fact constitutes itself, even if it
is actually impossible to fully achieve.  After all, a state of pure security would mean
that the state would effectively cease all its security operations since they would no 
longer be needed (Campbell, 1992).  There would be no more challenges to its key
identity of security guarantor, essentially negating its very being.  To prevent this from
happening a continuous stream of dangers and threats must be forthcoming. And while 
the objects of these discourses of danger have changed, as have the responses to them,
all can be said to fit within ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ discursive
constellations (Campbell, 1992: 11).  It is these very dangers which are the ‘conditions
of possibility’ of the state identity itself. 
‘Security’ is indeed a fertile area for the study of how the state has been
constituted performatively.  For these types of investigations, it is also important to 
remember that security strategies and the imaginative geographies which accompany
them imply: ‘an assemblage of practices – state policy, ‘non-state scribes’ and the
representational technologies of popular geopolitics – which together produce the effect
they name, stabilizing over time to produce a series of spatial formations through the
performance of security’ (Bialasievicz et al, 2007:419).  By studying these textual
resources, Bialasiewicz et al have been able to discern the emergence of a post-Cold


























   
identity exclusively in terms of Self /Other constellations, that is based merely or 
predominately on exclusion, this variant has taken as its organising principle
‘integration’.  Attempts are made to draw states into the US sphere of influence, and in 
doing so, satisfy both military security concerns and accomplish economic security
goals.  In the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11th this strategy has become
more pronounced as ‘integration’ is viewed more necessary than ever. 
While Bialasievicz et al. seem to be correct in discerning a new strategy of 
‘integration’ from the range of security practices analysed, there does appear to be
something missing from their analysis.  In addition to the more overt ‘security’
discourses that were deployed in the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, a
‘human rights’ discourse was also concurrently used by US and UK officials. There
may be a temptation to dismiss this as mere posturing, a way of justifying the death and 
destruction brought to these countries, and a useful smokescreen to occult more
nefarious objectives such as geostrategic goals of dominating the region or controlling 
oil supplies.  Yet this dismissal what be premature.  For one thing, performativity itself
suggests that discourse functions on the basis of re-citation and re-iteration, meaning
that policy makers cannot just make things up as they go along.  Said in a different way,
the ‘human rights’ discourse has a history within foreign policy and that history is
decipherable.  Secondly, the rejection of any ‘human rights’ rationale can amount to a
rejection of any Western moral identity. Again, it is put forward here, that this position 
is hard to sustain.  In the modern period when events over the world are broadcast in
real time, it becomes more possible than ever to mobilize Western public opinion behind 
global moral issues.  It should be made clear here that what is not being suggested is
that Western governments act unambiguously in the interests of others.  The point is that 
since ‘human rights’ has been identified as the main discourse used by Western
governments for the intervention in Libya, it becomes crucial to understand how this
discourse has constituted the US and UK states as moral. The study of this history can 
uncover important facets of how ‘human rights’ has interacted with other discourses
such as that of ‘security,’ which may subsequently be used to understand present
actions.  This will be explored in the following chapter.  
Before moving on, it is possible to make one final comment on the implications
of a performative theory of the state and state identity. An appeal to the performativity


















understand how embodied actions are carried out and on what basis.  Returning to 
Judith Butler, one of the crucial elements of her original formulation was that in 
challenging supposedly fixed, natural boundaries- defined by hegemonic gender
discourses- she was able to open up a space for transgression at the same time.  It
becomes possible to subvert existing notions, structures, and identities from the inside, 
unleashing important emancipatory possibilities.  Likewise, by recognizing that the state 
constitutes its identity through performative actions, it becomes possible to not only call 
them into question, but also to challenge and alter the very discursive practices which 
constitute and have constituted the state.  As Glass and Rose-Redwood (2014) remind,
scrutiny of the ‘practice of enacting the state’ is infused with ‘the much broader effort to 
repoliticize the performative acts that sovereign authorities, and their intellectual
apologists, have long employed to naturalize the contingency of social and political
norms’.  In short, ‘the performative practices which make up the state are open to re-
articulations and new becomings’ (Glass and Rose-Redwood, 2014: xiv).
Having made the case for the performative constitution of the state by and 
through discursive practices, one must also recognise that foreign policy discourses do 
not exist independently in the social and political world.  On the contrary, discourses are 
inextricable tied up with other textual traces within wider discursive structured.  It
follows, therefore, that foreign policy formulation must take this into account and 
present stable, coherent identity-policy formulations.  The 'goal', therefore, of policy
makers is 'to present a foreign policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its
relevant audience' (Hansen, 2006:28). And yet the fact that this takes place within 
wider discursive structures makes this an almost futile enterprise, as discursive stability
can never be fully achieved.  In the event that discourses are subject to external criticism 
– something which is inevitable itself-, and the link between identity and policy is
destabilized, then one can expect there to be attempts to adjust and 'recreate stability
through modification of either the construction of identity or the proposed policy'
(Hansen, 2006:29).   
Another way in which foreign policy discourses function within wider discursive 
structures is discernible from the connections which can be drawn between different
types of text.  That is to say, an understanding of how discourses are deployed within 
policy documents on the one hand, and for example those texts which can be found in 























   
be useful to outline how this can be theorized and later used as a starting point for the
discourse analysis of the Western-led intervention in Libya.  First though, some remarks 
will be made concerning the concept of 'intertextuality'. 
Julia Kristeva's work on 'intertextuality' was heavily influenced itself by
Ferdinand de Saussure's structural linguistics and Mikhail Bakhtin's work on literary
theory and semiotics.  Like Jacques Derrida, however, Kristeva was not happy to accept
that meaning was generated through fixed linguistic structures, making it possible to 
analyse language in a similar way through the interrelationships between signs.  Rather, 
for Kristeva, signifiers have multiple meanings which are formed historically and 
therefore lack stability. They can be taken out of one context by human subjects and 
placed within another, changing in the process the meaning of the original usage.  In this 
way, a text as always, already in a state of production, and not merely something which
can be understood objectively.  Moreover, an author does not merely create a text from
his/her own mind, the author invariably assembles the texts from existing discursive and 
ideological structures.  In one of her most widely cited definitions of the context
'intertextuality,' Kristeva points out that 'any text is constructed as a mosaic of 
quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another' (Kristeva, 1980:
66). When conducting foreign policy analysis, thus, it is important to consider how
quotes, references, facts and concepts are borrowed from one text and inserted into
another. As different textual traces are appropriated, this almost certainly will entail a
change of meaning as the new discursive context establishes different relationships and 
juxtapositions.  For that reason, foreign policy analysis should not simply be concerned
with highlighting continuities in the ways certain textual traces appear, but also on 
drawing out the differences in one usage compared to another. An understanding of 
how the original text has been 'read' or interpreted becomes crucial.
It is also important to recognize that different types of text exhibit differing types 
of knowledge and claims to authority.  For instance, a policy speech made by the
President of the United States is done so on the basis that he/she has the authority to
take political decisions.  The same policy formulation expressed in a newspaper
editorial, on the other hand, lacks the same authority and readers could be expected to
give less credence to the views put forward.  That said, newspapers are also expected to 
be knowledgeable about events taking place both at a national and international level












   
 
 















shown later, an interesting aspect of early media coverage on the Libyan crisis was that
Human Rights' agencies were often cited in order to give authoritative accounts of the
violence taking place and for instance, the number of people who had been killed.
Hansen (2006) has elaborated three intertextual models for the study of foreign
policy. The first intertextual model that Hansen defines for the study of foreign policy
is that of 'official discourse'. In many ways, this is crucial for any study of actions
carried out by the state in so far as it is understood to entail a political legitimacy that is
unsurpassed in other levels of discourse. As the primary political actors, both in internal 
and external affairs, high level government officials are the ones who not only have the
capacity to take decisions, but do so on the basis that they represent a political party
which has been elected democratically. This means that for the study of any foreign
policy, it is crucial to analyse the pronouncements made by political leaders- the
President or Prime Minister in the case of the UK-, the foreign secretary- in the case at
hand Hillary Clinton and William Hague-, and also the defence secretary. While it is
usually the case that all three of these political actors will defend the foreign policy
being advocated by the government, it is not necessarily the case that all of these will
maintain a strict adherence to what one can consider to be official policy discourse.  For 
instance, the defence secretary can quite reasonably be expected to have different
considerations to make, such as those related with the defence budget and a more acute
sensitivity to the safety of military personnel.  The leader, alternatively, could take a
more global and strategic perspective on the issue in question.  
The second thing which should be taken into consideration for any discourse
analysis of foreign policy is how, and in what way, opposition discourses emerge to
contest 'official discourse'. As will be argued in the theoretical framework, it it simply
impossible that a particular foreign policy is formulated without opposition and this will 
invariably emerge either in opposition political parties or in media channels.  Even in 
the cases where a seemingly indisputable foreign policy is articulated, gaining support
in both the political party in power and those in opposition, different views will be
detectable and these will challenge the premises and basis for the construction of the
policy.  In the case at hand, for instance, it will be shown that there was considerable
acquiesce in the UK between the Conservative-led government and the Labour party
opposition with regards the need to intervene in Libya.  However, a closer inspection 









basis that protection of the Libyan people was the priority, and also the prudent policy to 
follow, not the removal of the Libyan government per se.  
In order to extend the analysis even further, it is also possible to take into 
consideration texts which have been written within more cultural genres, or texts which 
exhibit more marginal discourses.  In relation to the former, one could seek to
understand the textual relationships between official discourses and those detectable in 
films or computer games. This is indeed a burgeoning subfield of ‘critical geopolitics’
as many scholars have used these cultural artefacts as their starting point in order to see
how geopolitical codes and ideological references are filtered down and through a
‘popular geopolitics’.  In relation to the latter and the influence that marginal discourses
might have, it is necessary to establish links with publications that would perhaps not be 
considered mainstream.  Other examples of sites where these discourses could be
detected would be satirical radio and television programs. 
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Key events of relations between Libya and the US and UK since 1969 
The next part of this thesis will explore the historical relations between Libya and both
the US and UK.  The purpose of this section is to trace how these relations have evolved, with a 
particular emphasis on the period leading up to the Western-led military intervention of 2011.
It is assumed that this will provide an excellent preliminary approximation to the case at hand,
and uncover some insights as to why Libya had become susceptible to Western intervention in
the first place. For analytical purposes, a list of some of the key events which have
shaped relations between Libya and the Anglo-powers will be used.  In line with the
methodological principles outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of this is to narrow the
focus in what is a considerable temporal period.  It will be possible to pay greater
attention to the most controversial moments in what has often been a turbulent
relationship since Gaddafi rose to power in 1969.  To mark this trajectory, some main 
secondary texts and well-known academics on Libya have been used, as outlined in
Chapter 1.  From these guiding points of reference, a wide range of texts will be used, 
such as primary documents, to explore further the details of these events.  
Key events from 1969-2011 
Military Coup and overthrow of King Idris September, 1969 
British leave Al-Adem Airbase March, 1970 
US military evacuates Wheelus Airbase June, 1970 
First major laws passed on the nationalization of the oil industry July, 1970 
British Petroleum nationalized December, 1971 
Gaddafi claims sovereignty over the Gulf of Sirt November, 1972 
US accused of infringing 'restricted zone' off the Mediterranean June, 1973 
Coast 
Libyan government nationalizes 51% of Occidental Petroleum August, 1973 








American Oil Company, and California Asiatic. 
US government issues restrictions on military and strategic
equipment purchased by Libyan government 
Libya is placed on the State Department's 'Sponsors of terrorism'
List 
Two Libyan aircraft shot down by the United States 
British police officer Yvonne Fletcher is shot outside Libyan 
Embassy in London 
Terrorist attack in Berlin disco 
US air-attack on Libya 
Lockerbie bombing 
Two more Libyan aircraft shot down by US
United Nations Security Council passes resolution requiring 
Libya to hand over suspects 
Libya agrees to allow trial of Lockerbie bombing suspects 
UN Security Council votes to lift sanctions against Libya 
Libyan government states it will abandon pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction 
Blair and Gaddafi sign oil ‘deal in the desert’ 
A number of US sanctions are lifted 
US trade embargo lifted 
Plot uncovered to kill Saudi King 
Lockerbie bomber released from Scottish prison on 
Compassionate grounds 



















    
 























CHAPTER 3 US AND UK RELATIONS WITH LIBYA �
DURING THE COLD WAR �
LIBYA AND THE ANGLO-POWERS AFTER THE ‘GREEN REVOLUTION’ 
The overthrow of the Libyan King Idris in 1969 by way of a military coup is
perhaps an obvious starting place for an historical study of US and UK relations with 
Libya. This major event represents a crucial disjuncture, the threshold between one
system of governance, which was essentially allied with Western countries15, and 
another which would adopt quite contrary positions to the major issues in the region.  It
is during this early period when many of the most virulent antagonisms between a
Gaddafi-led Libya and the West first emerge, and which would go on to strain relations
for many years to come.  These antagonisms crystallise around certain key issues such 
as: security and territorial boundaries, Israel/Palestine, oil nationalisation and terrorism.
It is also important to recognise that the overarching context which informed and gave
meaning to these disputes at this stage was that of the Cold War.  Recalling the work of 
Michel Foucault in chapter 2, the removal of King Idris is also meaningful in as far as it
marks the ‘surface of emergence’ of ‘Gaddafi’ as a discursive geopolitical object,
assuming for the first time a significant space within Western foreign policy and 
security sites.  Starting the investigation at this point will thus allow for a complete
analysis of how this figure has been constructed by Western officials, and how it has
undergone transformations in accordance with the geopolitical contexts of the time.
 In the aftermath of the coup of September 1st 1969, it quickly became evident
that the changes taking place in Libya would pose particular challenges to existing
relations with Western countries and Israel.  Gaddafi and the newly installed 
St John (2015) has suggested that relations between King Idris and the West were never as close
as some believed.  Nevertheless, cooperation in the realm of security demonstrates a certain level of




















      
        
    
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) set out several objectives to be pursued by the
new government, among which three in general could be highlighted here as important
geopolitically: ‘freedom, socialism, and unity’ (El Warfally, 1988:44).  These three
guidelines translated into concrete foreign policies.  Firstly, there was a pledge of 
neutrality with regards the Cold War taking place between the two ideological blocs
headed by the United States and the Soviet Union.  Closely related to this desire for 
neutrality, which was also an attempt to free Libya from the shackles of subservience to
one of the blocks, was an explicitly staunch rejection of any forms of colonialism and 
imperialism.  Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, there was also a strong call
towards Arab unity and an unambiguous opposition to the state of Israel, which had not
long before emerged victorious in the Six-Day War against Arab powers in the region.
This also entailed a desire to boost the military power of Libya and embark on the
acquisition of more advanced weaponry (El Warfally, 1988:47).   
The official US and UK foreign policy responses to the dramatic changes taking 
place in Libya were essentially ones of passivity and of reluctant acceptance.  Official
US documents from the time show how the particular context in which President Nixon 
and his government were operating was an important factor in this.  In response to 
concerns shown by ‘moderate Arab states’ – included here are Saudi Arabia, Morocco
and Lebanon- a State Department telegram outlined the general position: ‘Intervention 
to support or preserve a specific regime unable to help itself is serious and unpopular
matter in modern context and may raise international legal questions.  Even French,
who have specific commitments with regard to certain African states, carry out their 
responsibilities with greatest discretion.  US experience further has suggested that even 
when foreign government might be sympathetic to intervention, internal political factors 
within its own borders might seriously limit support it is able to give in this regard’.  
While the telegram also demonstrates a natural concern for the ‘survival of friendly
regimes,’ direct military assistance was to be made available only ‘in event of external
aggression’ (US Department of State, 1969)16. 
This does not, of course, rule out more covert operations aimed at undermining unfriendly regimes -as one 
may possibly detect from the allusion in the previous quote to the French and their ‘discretion’-. It is widely known

























The comments made by Secretary of State Rogers allude to the ‘modern 
context,’ this being one in which the US was embroiled in a debilitating conflict in 
Vietnam.  The massive casualties being suffered in the war, coupled with the negligible
progress being made, combined to make this not only a deeply unpopular war amongst
the American people, but also pointed to the limitations of US military power. The
‘quagmire’ of Vietnam had also contributed to a recognition that such conflicts were in 
fact damaging to the US and there was the realization that it could not make a stand 
against any perceived threat wherever it be pin-pointed throughout the globe.  Speaking
principally about Asia- although this can also be extended to developments in Libya- 
President Nixon warned, ‘we must avoid the kind of policy that will make countries in 
Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflicts such as the one we have in 
Vietnam’.  Questions of ‘treaty commitments’ and external threats to allied nations
notwithstanding, Nixon states that ‘the United States is going to encourage and has a
right to expect that this problem (military defence) will be handled by, and
responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves’ (Nixon, 1969)17 . 
The refusal by the U.S. government to intervene more obtrusively in Libyan
internal affairs, thus, can be seen to correlate with the geopolitical context of the time.  
The policy of direct intervention in foreign lands had now taken on an added element of 
danger in as far as it could entrap the superpower, while steps were also being taken to
bridge differences with the Soviet Union through several treaties.  The policy followed
by the US government at this time would come to be known as part of the ‘Guam
doctrine’ or the ‘Nixon doctrine’.  This did not mean, of course, that the ‘Cold War’
discourse had disappeared; it had merely been reconfigured.  On the whole, countries
would still be determined through a dichotomy which graded them as either ‘friendly,’
or as part of the ‘enemy’.  The fact that Libya had just changed from being a ‘friendly’
regime, to one with signs of recalcitrance was certainly a worry for Western policy
makers.  Always present would be the concern that Libya could fall under the Soviet
sphere of influence and this is something which, as will be seen, can be taken from
official documents of the time both in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
This period also coincided with a ‘thawing’ of relations with the Soviet Union. The ‘détente’, as 
it would be known, consisted of several initiatives aimed at easing the pressures generated by the bi-polar
geopolitical struggle; high on the agenda was the issue of arms control and several important treaties 



























One of the first, most pressing concerns, of the new Revolutionary government,
was the status of foreign military installations, which had been in operation in Libya
before the coup (Vandewalle, 2006; St John, 2002).  For the Nixon administration it was 
the status of the Wheeler airbase that was placed in jeopardy immediately following the
fall of King Idris.  The existence of such military facilities on Libyan soil were quite
clearly at odds with the RCC’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist stance. The Wheelus 
airbase, along with British facilities in Tobruk and el-Adem, would therefore have to be
closed, and this is what indeed would happen.  In spite of hopes that Libya would not
fall under the Soviet sphere of influence, the U.S government still showed concern over 
the strategic and military loss: ‘Because we recognize the legitimate concerns regarding
the use to which the Base might be put once we withdraw, we are asking Ambassador 
Palmer to express these concerns to Captain Jaluud, the RCC member who leads the
Libyan negotiating team.  Hopefully, Jaluud will indicate to the Ambassador that the
Base will not be transferred to the control of any third country after the US forces leave’ 
(US Department of State, 1969).     
As far as the British were concerned. Military bases at Tobruk and el-Adem were 
relatively small and yet still valued as important strategic outposts by the U.K political
and military establishment.  Their closure in 1970 was, similar to the case with the
Wheeler airbase, cause for concern as it was also seen to weaken the British strategic
position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  It is known from Foreign and Commonwealth
Office documents that the Soviet threat was very much on the minds of British officials
in the lead up to the overthrow of King Idris.  Since in the Middle East, the Soviet
Union was seen to be working ‘towards the replacement of the present non-
revolutionary regimes by governments more sympathetic to the Soviet Union,’ the
British military presence in Libya was given importance.  Moreover, the ‘increased
Soviet naval threat in the Mediterranean threat’ led officials to believe that it was
‘overwhelmingly in our interest to maintain our support for the treaty until its first
possible expiry date of December 1973’ (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (39/121),
25th March 1968; Cited in Straw, 2011). 
Another issue that was brought to the fore following the ascension to power of 
the RCC was that of arms sales.  Deals between Libya and both the U.S. – ‘F-5’ fighter













   
 






   
  
defence system18- which had been sealed prior to the revolution had now become
troublesome diplomatic issues.  Officials on both sides of the Atlantic found themselves
in a seemingly no-win situation.  Selling the weapons to a Libyan government was
predicted to be an unpopular move with public opinion19 . The Libyan government was
openly belligerent towards Israel, a position that was understood to have possible
repercussions in terms of an exacerbation of tensions and instability in the Middle East-
the sale of the F-5’s to Libya was expected to arouse interest from the Israeli
government in buying ‘Phantom’ aircraft (Department of State, 1970)-.  Whereas on the
other hand, the denial of the orders already concluded could drive a wedge between the
Western powers and Libya, jeopardising economic interests in Libya, with the result of 
potentially driving Libya into the arms of the Soviet Union for its defence needs.  
While one delivery of eight C-130 Hercules aircraft was in fact completed, under 
the rubric of ‘commercial agreement’, a second order for 5 more was not, and neither 
was an order for more F-5’s.  The Nixon government’s preferred course of action was
one of stalling tactics, being justified through appeals to arms legislation and the need
for export licenses.  These tactics can be understood as ways of buying time and/or 
avoiding any provocative or inflammatory gestures.  Ultimately, however, the orders for 
the C-130 Hercules and the F-5 aircraft would not be completed. Another such deal for 
an air defence system – to be carried out by Northrop-Page- likewise faltered at an
advanced stage. This was the result of direct US government intervention, leading the
Libyan government to protest at what it viewed as one sided efforts at improving the bi-
lateral relations.  This was to prove a source of irritant on the Libyan side.  The fact that
the U.S. was not as reticent in its dealings with the Israeli Government was of course
not lost on any of the parties concerned.  In response to Ambassador Shaaban’s
consternation at the Northrop-Page reversal, Chargé Stein was candid in setting out the
limitations of U.S. – Libyan cooperation.  While emphasizing the U.S. desire for 
cultural and economic relations, Stein states that ‘it was only in the military sphere that
18 The air defence system was a particularly troublesome issue as the RCC believed the British to 
have coaxed Libya into accepting it under King Idris. The result was the loss of the £32 million, which 
British Aircraft Corporation BAC refused to return (FCO-39 636 in Ali, 2014). 
19 A ‘military-economic’ assistance program between the French and Libyans had recently agreed 
the sale of 110 ‘Mirage’ aircraft.  While the economic logic behind this deal was undisputed, U.S and U.K 



























we felt we could not cooperate, as a result of Libya’s active opposition to our Mideast
peace process’ (US Embassy in Libya, 1975).  
The British were facing similar problems in their attempts to stall on the
completion of the deals for the technologically advanced Chieftain tanks.  In judging 
that the delivery of the tanks was working out sensitive politically, one of the tactics
used was to offer the Libyans older models the Centurion and the Vickers.  These offers
would be declined in the end by the Libyan administration.  It is interesting to note that
consultations between the British and Americans had resulted in American approval of 
the original deal. This is indicative of the value which was placed on Libya; since the
United States was relatively hindered in concluding arms deals with Libya, the delivery
of the Chieftain tanks was viewed as one way of keeping the RCC within a Western 
sphere of influence.
It is worth noting that although Libya was being understood in relation to a
wider Cold War discourse, this does not mean that Gaddafi and the new Libyan 
government were being viewed as naturally inclined towards any kind of reciprocal
ideological relationship with the Soviet Union.  Commenting on the possibility of such
a rapprochement, the CIA reported shortly after the coup that ‘the junta has kept the
USSR at arm’s length. The Soviets offered military assistance in the first few days of 
the coup, but were quickly rejected.  As far as we know, subsequent approaches have
also been rebuffed’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 1970).  The RCC’s policy of non-
alignment was generally accepted, as can be seen from Ambassador Palmer’s comments 
(The State Department, 1971) to Gaddafi: ‘the U.S admires LARG’S -Libyan
Government-policy of non-alignment which, noted, has been reflected both in words
and deeds’.  Yet was the possibility that Libya should slip away from Western influence, 
which was seen as concerning.  British Ambassador Hannam notes that, ‘while at the
same time they seem set on resisting Soviet blandishments I cannot help but feel
disquiet at the long term prospects on that direction’.  Moreover, he states elsewhere
that ‘we must resign ourselves to watching Russian influence spread over the Libyan 
army’ (Hannam, 1970; cited in Straw, 2011). 
Yet even as relations between the US, UK, and Libya deteriorated further, and 
the prospect of a diplomatic, economic and military vacuum was becoming a more and 






















solstice leading US officials to conclude that an alliance between Libya and the Soviet
Union was unlikely. An Interdepartmental Group report underlines this reasoning 
clearly: ‘Libya’s hostility towards the United States is formidable,’ the report notes, yet
‘its hostility towards the Soviet Union is equally so’ (US Department of State, 1973).  
This reticence is deduced from Gaddafi’s suspicion of the ‘atheistic Soviets’ and their 
imperialist intentions in the Middle East.  Speaking in Algiers at a conference of non-
aligned nations, Gaddafi articulated this sentiment, such as can be detected in his attack
on Cuba and its President Fidel Castro: ‘we have no objections to what Castro does in
his own country, but Cuba is a Communist country, and we object to its membership of 
the nonaligned movement’ (Gaddafi, 1973; cited in Pick, 2015). 
Meanwhile, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the new Libyan 
government’s anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist discourse was manifesting itself in 
different material ways.  Not only were steps being taken to eject both US and UK
military personnel and facilities from its territory, but the revolutionary government was 
trying to assert itself through greater territorial demands.  Full control over Libyan
territorial land boundaries, yet also claims over and beyond its 12 nautical mile sea
frontier, which had been the customary international maritime boundary up until that
point. The so-called ‘restricted area,’ as designated by the Libyan government, 
stretched up to 100 miles from Libya’s shores.  As far as the US was concerned, this
was completely unacceptable; the Libyan coast situated in the Mediterranean Sea was
an important strategic interest due to its sheer length and geographical location, 
potentially providing a launching pad for attacks against its European allies.  The US
government would go on to vigorously challenge these claims and make the water in 
question the scene of several reconnaissance flights and ‘freedom of navigation’
exercises.  These were designed to exercise what the US believed to be its right of 
access to international waters.  Persistent military confrontations between both countries 
would ensue, nevertheless, constituting an impasse to improvements in relations for 
many years to come (St John, 2002).  
If political, military and strategic interests were crucial to the US and UK
governments at this time, the economic interests both countries had in Libya were
certainly of no lesser importance.  of great concern following the installation of the
RCC. This appraisal can indeed be understood from communications which express
that ‘US concern with Libya stems basically from the importance of Libyan oil’ (US
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Department of State, 1973).  The vast quantities of oil which had been discovered 
relatively shortly before the coup had meant that Libya was now an important player in
the worldwide petroleum industry. As far as the U.S. government was concerned,
though, it was not its own reliance on Libyan oil which was most at stake.  It was above
all its Western European allies who were importing considerably greater amounts.  
Again the importance of the ‘Cold War’ discourse can be detected from the U.S
preoccupation for its European allies.  As noted by an official U.S government
interdepartmental report, ‘a prolonged cut-off of Libyan oil production…would severely 
strain European supplies and necessitate a drawdown of European oil stocks’ (US
Department of State, 1973).  The closure of the Suez Canal had to a certain extent
created a European reliance on the short haul supply lying across the Mediterranean in
their search for a stable and cheap oil supply.  Furthermore, the quality of the Libyan
crude oil, being low in sulphur, made this a particularly attractive option for Western 
governments, both since refineries had become orientated towards this and also as
pollution regulations were gradually becoming more of an issue. 
Yet the US and UK governments also had a more direct relationship with the oil
in Libya; companies from both countries held considerable investments in the Libyan 
petroleum sector at the time of the coup, which were now placed in jeopardy as King 
Idris had been dethroned. As far as the US was concerned, this was estimated to be
approximately $1 billion-net book value-, which was making a considerable
contribution to the US balance of payments – $400-500 million in 1972-(US
Department of State, 1973).  The new Libyan government’s policy of incremental
nationalization of the sector, thus, was a direct economic threat to the US and UK
governments, and of course the multinational oil firms operating in Libya.  The
nationalization of BP’s Libyan subsidiary in 1971 would not have come as too much of 
a surprise to the UK government, and yet it would enrage them all the same as it was
seen to have political motivations (US Department of State, 1971).  Appeals to the US
government would gain tacit support, but would ultimately be in vain as the US would 
also become subject to the RCC’s nationalization policies. As of September, 1973, the
measures taken by Gaddafi and the RCC had resulted in a reduction of around half the
value of US assets in Libya compared with beforehand. Among the steps taken in what
was considered to be a policy of ‘resource nationalism,’ was the nationalization of 51 
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percent of most of the important U.S. oil companies including Occidental and Oasis (US 
Department of State, 1973).  
Friction in relations between the US, UK and Libya, as a result of territorial 
concerns, unsuccessful arms deals and oil bartering, cannot be viewed in isolation from 
not only the wider context of the Cold War, but also the Israel/Palestine question. In 
reality, it is impossible to understand Libya’s relationship with the West at this stage 
without an appreciation of how Gaddafi and the Revolutionary Government viewed the 
wider Arab World and Israel. Libya, like other Arab countries, had inherited a legacy 
with the remnants of a colonial past and a history of subjugation at the hands of 
European powers. The creation of Israel, moreover, was understood by the Libyan 
government within these wider colonialist and imperialist parameters (El Warfally, 
1988). Thus, as far as the Libyan government was concerned, the ‘Palestinian cause’ 
and the ensuing conflict between Arab countries and Israel was considered to be the 
major issue in the Middle East region (El Warfally, 1988). What’s more, the RCC had 
been candid about their position on the matter. They took up what was considered by 
the U.S. to be a ‘radical’ position, one which refused to recognize Israel, called for its 
destruction, by military means if necessary, and demanded the return of all Palestinians 
to land they had hitherto occupied.  Only this itself, could bring about the return of Arab 
dignity. Closely tied to these aspirations of Gaddafi and the RCC was the notion of 
Arab unity, or aspirations toward Pan-Arabism. This movement had been fostered by 
the Egyptian revolutionary leader Nasser, who had been a great influence not only on 
Gaddafi but on the Libyan revolution itself. On seizing control of Libya, Gaddafi was 
quick to reciprocate Nasser’s revolutionary nationalist Arab zeal by assuring: ‘Tell 
Nasser that this is his revolution, we are his men, and all Libya’s capabilities are under 
his disposal for the battle’ (Gaddafi, 1969; cited in El Warfally, 1988).  
The United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, were defenders of 
Israel’s right to exist and were pursuing a political process to arrive at a peaceful two-
state settlement. The wide gap in the stances adopted meant that the Israel-Palestine 
question would represent a major obstacle to the potential for better relations. All the 
while, peace and stability in the region were of critical national interest to both the US 
and the UK. An escalation of the conflict could have an immediate impact on Western 
economic interests in the region, and potentially lead to intervention by both super 
powers and the onset of a third, possibly even more catastrophic World War. This 
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seemingly irreconcilable difference in foreign policy was naturally a significant barrier 
to better relations between the countries, as was articulated in official documents of the 
time: 
‘Libya’s primary objective under Qadhafi’s leadership has been the mobilization 
of the Arabs to bring about the elimination of Israel as an independent Jewish state and 
the restoration of their homeland to the Palestinian Arabs. He judges the leadership of 
his brother Arabs, as he does that of the United States, chiefly in terms of their attitude 
toward Israel. Inasmuch as the United States is seen as the chief guarantor of Israel’s 
existence, normal US-Libyan government relations in any field becomes virtually 
impossible, including technical cooperation’ (State Department, 1973). 
This assessment of the state of US - Libyan relations is noteworthy for two 
principal reasons. First and foremost, it conveys a sense of acute pessimism with 
regards the prospects for normal relations, downplaying the likelihood of any 
improvements in the foreseeable future. Secondly, it is possible to detect how the figure 
of Gaddafi was being viewed as critical in terms of his leadership of Libya and the 
foreign policy it was pursuing. In fact, at around this stage it is possible to detect a 
conflation of Libya, or the Libyan Government, with the Libyan leader Gaddafi. That is 
to say, the Libyan problem, the problems emanating from that state, become the Gaddafi 
problem; both identities are almost merged into one. This conflation would become a 
recurring theme in official documents of the time and in future constructions of ‘Libya’. 
In a CIA memorandum from 1973, Director Schlesinger addressed National Security 
Advisor Kissinger about the ‘problem of Qadhafi’. This problem is seemingly 
exacerbated by the strong position which the Libyan leader is believed to be in. 
Schlesinger assesses that Gaddafi is ‘well entrenched in Libya’ and with ‘no successor 
in sight’. Gaddafi is also seen to be the main power broker since ‘he dominates the 
Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which makes all important decisions’.  
The threat being posed by Gaddafi to American interests was beginning to be 
understood as considerable. Schlesinger breaks this threat down into certain key facets: 
his power to nationalize the oil industry, his ‘advocacy of acts of terrorism outside of 
Palestine and to the subversion of regimes which do not agree with him,’ and his ability 
to ‘invoke and manipulate ideas with strong emotional appeal to most Arabs...including 
those in the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula’ (Central Intelligence Agency, 1973). 
Understood in this way, moreover, the conflation of Libya with Gaddafi translates into 
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certain foreign policy options. These revolve around efforts to undermine the Libyan 
leader, if not take measures to bring about his removal. There is indeed evidence to 
suggest that at least part of the US policy at the time was dedicated to ‘covert’ 
operations involving the CIA. One such proposal had the objective of conveying 
‘moderate influences’ to some members of the Revolutionary Command Council so as 
to maintain ‘normal friendly diplomatic and commercial relations with Libya, including 
the protection of US oil interests’. (Central Intelligence Agency, 1974). At any rate, 
the document in question shows that this particular covert action was ‘rescinded’ due to 
changes in the then ‘current political realities’ (Schlesinger, 1973). What is unclear is 
the extent of these operations; that is to say, whether or not claims made by Gaddafi 
about US involvement in unsuccessful coup attempts were indeed accurate.
Gaddafi was also increasingly becoming a notorious figure within British 
foreign policy circles. Comments made by the Libyan leader in support of Irish 
paramilitary organization the IRA were treated with a mixture of consternation and 
anger by British officials. In March 1973 a vessel was intercepted by the Irish 
authorities which contained several tons of arms and explosives. At a Cabinet Meeting, 
Prime Minister Edward Heath was informed that the arms were ‘intended for the 
Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army,’ and also that there was ‘reason to 
believe that they had been loaded in Libya’ (CAB 128-51-20). What followed was a 
period of diplomacy in which the British government sought to receive assurances from 
Libyan leader Gaddafi that there would be no support given to Irish paramilitary 
organizations. Somewhat controversially, these efforts were framed within the context 
of outstanding financial claims- weapons deliveries, missile defence system, 
expropriation of British oil interests- leading to charges much later by the British media 
that this in fact amounted to appeasement and-or bribery in the face of terrorism 
(Verkaik, 2009). As well as the direct security threat the IRA posed to the United 
Kingdom, the UK government at the time was also concerned about economic interests 
in Libya. The policy seemed to be bearing fruit as Gaddafi made a public statement 
affirming that Libya was not providing material support to the IRA, being followed later 
by a period in which Libya seemed to withdraw its support (FCO 87 948; cited in Ali, 
2014). 
The aspiration of Arab unity held by Gaddafi and the RCC would never 
materialize, much to Gaddafi’s own frustration. In fact, one could say that the opposite 
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would come to pass. Significant differences in opinion between Libya and other Arab 
states over how to solve the Israel-Palestine question, among other things, would mean 
that the issue was not only troublesome for Libyan-US relations, nor solely relations 
between Libya and Israel, but also relations between Libya and other Arab states (St 
John, 2002). Continuous accusations of Libyan subversion and terrorist activities 
surfaced, both within the Middle East region and also in Sub-Saharan Africa. Often 
these activities would take place within states which had been previously criticized by 
the Libyan government for having too weak a position on the Palestinian cause (Cooper 
and Grandolini, 2015).  
In particular, one could highlight relations with Libya’s neighbour Egypt, which 
after the assassination of Nasser would become extremely strained. Differences of 
opinion regarding the best way to fight the Palestinian cause, along with tit-for-tat 
accusations about siding with one or another of the Cold War superpowers were never 
far from the animosity between both governments. As far as the latter was concerned, 
Libya was thought to be in favour with the Soviet Union, while Egypt was often 
chastised by Libya for what it believed to be its proximity to the United States. As 
diplomatic relations became increasingly untenable, the Egyptian government was 
moved to withdraw its troops from Libyan territory and actively oppose U.S. arms sales 
to Libya. Such deals were only viewed to be strengthening Libya, something that may 
well make Egypt more vulnerable as a result. What’s more, these acts turned out to be 
mere precursors of an even more ruthless foreign policy aimed at subversive activities 
within Libya and the removal/assassination of the Libyan leader. This can be seen in 
specific U.S diplomatic cables, which speak of an approach made by the Egyptian 
Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Fahmy who had requested assistance from the U.S in 
‘getting rid of’ Gaddafi (State Department, 1975).  
At this stage, it is also possible to detect an increased sense of anxiety amongst 
U.S officials regarding the nature of and the potential threats posed by increased 
Libyan-Soviet cooperation. This appears to have been articulated for the first time -at 
least in terms of the gravity of the potential threat- in a memo from National Security 
Council Staff Robert B. Oakley (1975). While Oakley grades any alliance as 
‘unnatural’, the conclusion reached is that this potentiality ‘must be taken seriously as a 
threat to the objectives of the United States in the Middle East and to moderate Arab 
Governments’. Commenting on the conclusion of a recent billion dollar arms deal 
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between both countries, one which is described as a ‘major expansion of the military 
relationship,’ the allusion is also made to a ‘broader’ issue of ‘whether Moscow will 
gain a new strategic foothold along the Mediterranean. This new articulation of Libya 
within a wider ‘cold war’ discourse points to a change in foreign policy direction for 
Oakley. Acknowledging that the United States policy approach had been up until that 
time ‘essentially passive’, it is suggested that it may be time to switch to a more ‘active’ 
response to the threats that are being posed to U.S. national security and strategic 
interests in the Middle East. 
TERRORISM, SUBVERSION AND HOSTILITY 
Under the premiership of Ronald Reagan, relations between the United States
and Libya would deteriorate even further than what they had done under Carter.  One of 
the more immediate hostilities that manifested itself during this period was in disputes
over territorial boundaries, something that had become somewhat of a recurring theme
by now.  This would ultimately lead to several skirmishes involving navy and aircraft in 
the waters adjacent to the Libyan coast.  One such incident took place following a U.S. 
military exercise in the Gulf of Sidra, which had the dual purpose of asserting ‘freedom
of navigation in the Libyan-claimed waters in the Gulf of Sidra’ and ‘to conduct an open 
ocean missile exercise’ (US National Security Council, 1981).  In spite of the seemingly 
provocative nature of the U.S. military’s plans, Reagan showed himself to be bullish 
and uncompromising should the actions result in some form of Libyan retaliation.  
Reflecting on this hypothetical eventuality, Reagan analogizes recalling an anecdote
whereby a group of ‘Benedictine monks’ would usually ‘treat visitors with open arms’
except should they ‘get unruly,’ in which case they would be ‘taken out back by some
hefty monks and shown the error of their ways’ (National Security Council, 1981).  
This particular intervention by Reagan is interesting for certain reasons.  Firstly,
it shows a President who is not afraid to carry out actions which could have been 
construed as provocative gestures, placing U.S. military service personnel in direct






    
 
 














                  
              
            
    
gives some clues as to how the U.S. government viewed its military presence in the
region and also its relationship with Libya.  From his anecdote, it is the Libyans who are 
considered to be the ‘visitors’, regardless of the fact that the military exercise is to take
place within 50 miles of the Libyan coast. What is more, the Americans or portrayed as
essentially ´the good guys´, the righteous ‘monks,’ who although generally peaceful,
when stirred are capable of punishing those who do not follow the rules.  The reason 
why this particular stretch of water was viewed as so important was because of its
strategic import. This provided access to northern Africa, but more importantly, the
Mediterranean Sea led directly onto Western Europe and so could possible come to 
represent a spot of vulnerability taking into consideration the Cold War context. 
All the same, the flashpoints taking place during the U.S. naval drills must be
understood as something of a sideshow; there were much greater issues now dividing 
both nations.  For one thing, Libya was now being perceived by many in the U.S. 
government to be a ‘proxy’ or ‘client’ of the Soviet Union (Warfally, 2009).  Later in
1984 the neoconservative Heritage Foundation, so influential in assisting Reagan in
formulating policy, was speaking of ‘Moscow’s Thriving Libya Connection’ (Phillips, 
1984). For Phillips it was not a wholly natural alliance, but more of a ‘marriage of 
convenience´; for instance, Libya’s insatiable desire for Soviet weaponry, Libyan oil for 
‘oil hungry’ Soviet satellites, and the shared interest of undermining U.S. influence in 
the region.  Since the Reagan administration was determined to set the U.S on a
different foreign policy path away from détente towards a more assertive role vis-à-vis
the Soviet Union, any incline of cooperation between both adversaries would naturally
be awarded significant attention and concern in policy making.  
From a Libyan perspective, it was the United States and her allies who were
guilty of subversive acts and subterfuge.  Libyan leader Gaddafi was himself the target
of assassination plots and failed coup attempts, the presumed source of which being 
directly traced back to the U.S. government and agencies such as the CIA (Warfally,
2009). These accusations were greeted unsurprisingly with regular denials on the part of 
the Reagan administration20 . It should be noted, nonetheless, that during this particular
period considerable evidence has come to light which shows that covert operations were 
One of the many examples of this can be found in Secretary of State Haig’s presentation to the
media on terrorist activity. On being asked about CIA involvement in attempts to overthrow the Gaddafi 
government, the Secretary categorically states ‘we reject Qadhafi’s charge of US involvement in last






















in fact an important part of Reagan’s foreign policy. These were used in particular to 
undermine governments deemed to pose a threat to the security of the United States by
existing out with its sphere of influence and understood to be aligned with the Soviet
Union.  The Iran-Contra scandal was one particular example and the testimonies taken 
from key military and secret service personnel suggest that the Libyan government
claims may not have been as far-fetched as what U.S. officials claimed them to be.   
Meanwhile, relations between Libya and the United Kingdom were also 
becoming increasingly strained.  In 1984, a diplomatic crisis ensued as a result of an
incident outside the Libyan Peoples’ Bureau in London, in which a British police officer 
Yvonne Fletcher was shot dead from automatic weapon fire coming from inside the
embassy. Along with the British policewoman, a group of anti-Gaddafi protesters were
also shot following the tense stand-off outside between pro and anti-Gaddafi protesters. 
The ensuing siege would last for a further 10 days from the fatal shooting, during which 
the embassy remained surrounded by British army units amid a period of high tension
both in London and in Tripoli where British embassy personnel were also stationed.
The siege only came to an end once the British government allowed for the Libyans to 
leave the embassy, under the banner of diplomatic immunity and in exchange for 
reciprocal measures in Tripoli facilitating the safe return to the U.K of British staff 
there.  The agreement reached was not the end of the matter, however, as the British 
government took measures subsequently to break off diplomatic relations with Libya.
Perhaps unsurprisingly both the Libyan and British governments would go on to 
blame each other for the tragic outcome. The Libyan authorities criticized the British 
for allowing the Libyan dissidents to stage the demonstration in the first place.  On the
other hand, for the British government, this was further evidence of terrorist activity
perpetrated by Libya.  Such actions were understood to be wholly unjustifiable and 
were condemned as a ‘barbaric outrage’ due to the excessive and indiscriminate use of 
deadly force used by the Libyans inside the embassy.  Speaking on the 25th April 1984, 
some days after the shooting, the British Home Secretary Leon Brittan outlined the
conditions for severing diplomatic ties with Libya, referring not only to the exchange of 
diplomatic staff between London and Tripoli.  Brittan was also keen to add that the
British government should ‘be satisfied that all weapons and explosives were removed
from the Libyan People’s Bureau, and that their buildings in the United Kingdom were



























Across the Atlantic it was becoming clear that the Reagan administration was
looking for a more robust response to Libyan terrorist actions.  Even before the
bombing of the La Belle Berlin discotheque- which was given as the primary reason for 
the US assault on Tripoli in 1986-  plans were being made amongst security officials for 
a military response which would serve to deter future terrorist actions against US and
Western targets.  In 1985 National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane outlines the
rationale for ‘decisive action in Libya,’ which moreover, ‘would send a signal’ to other
countries plotting against Western interests.  Libya was deemed to be not only ‘the
weightiest leg of the terrorist tripod,’ having the ‘longest record in support of terrorism,’ 
but also a target which would be ‘less likely to encounter a ‘more serious Soviet
challenge’ (National Security Council, 1985).  It is clear that while US officials were
contemplating a range of measures at this stage, in the last instance the ultimate
objective would be none other than the overthrow of Gaddafi himself.
The seemingly inexorable deterioration in relations between the US and Libya
would give rise to a further range of economic sanctions, as set out in the National
Security Decision Directive 205, which was drafted in January 1986.  Making passing
reference to previous terrorist actions in Rome and Vienna, the directive documents a
‘widening and accelerating’ of the ‘scope and tempo of Libyan-supported-terrorist
activity,’ which was being directed at Western states including the U.S, its allies in 
Western Europe and Israel. The breadth of the sanctions to be implemented was seen to 
be reflective of this ‘unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States’.  Firstly, the directive outlines a unilateral blanket
ban in trade and economic transactions between the US and Libya, both in terms of 
exports and imports, including within its remit the provision of services.  This
development built on an already strict set of measures previously agreed to limit credit
facilities made available for investment in Libya.  Secondly, the directive also aimed at
travel connections between both countries, would be severely curtailed and restricted to 
emergency cases, those which involved individuals fleeing Libya, or alternatively those
which were undertaking journalistic tasks.  The document explicitly states that the
primary objectives of these measures, and the concomitant diplomatic and public affairs 
campaigns, was the isolation of Libya and the restriction of Libyan activities subversive
























At the end of march 1986 another ‘freedom of navigation’ exercise conducted by 
the U.S military would lead to further altercations with Libyan aircraft and sea vessels.  
The objective of the mission was clearly set out national security advisor John 
Poindexter as being a challenge ‘in the Gulf of Sidra to demonstrate that we do not
accept Qadhafi’s claim to the Gulf’ (National Security Council, 1986).  This time the
Libyan armed forces fulfilled earlier threats of retaliation made by the Libyan
government and confronted the perceived breaches of Libyan territorial waters.  After 
firing several missiles at US aircraft, all of which failing to inflict any damage, the U.S
response left one of the Libyan marine vessels destroyed and the other severely
damaged (Clift and Gerstenzang, 1986).  The U.S aircraft proceeded to attack a Libyan 
missile launching site in Sirte rendering out of action the radar system which controlled 
the SA-5 (surface to air missile) defence system. While the Libyans suffered casualties
from the sunken patrol boat- normal crew being estimated at 27-, no American losses
were reported.  
This would not be the last military confrontation between Libya and the United
States taking place in the year 1986.  In fact, around two weeks later US aircraft would 
again be attacking mainland Libya, this time as part of a much larger operation aimed at 
a range of targets including Gaddafi’s own compound. As had been the case for 
practically all Reagan’s presidency, the main discourse used to construct Libya during 
the attack was that of ‘terrorism’. As justification for the US bombings in Libya,
Reagan points to the terrorist attack on a Berlin discotheque which was frequented by
US armed forces.  The carnage accounted for the life of one American Sergeant, one
Turkish woman, with scores more being injured.  Attributing a direct link between this
particular attack and the US retaliation in Libya, President Reagan assures that ‘the
evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of La Belle discotheque was
planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime.’ The American 
response, although violent, is portrayed as a measured act of self-defence: ‘We
Americans are slow to anger.  We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the
use of force – and we did.  We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic
sanctions, and demonstrations of military force.  None succeeded’ (Reagan, 1986). 
The objectives of the decision to use force through air-strikes were also set-out
by Reagan and his government.  First and foremost, although the mission was clearly























deemed to be an accumulation of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens.  By 
attacking Libya directly, the US was sending a clear message that it was willing to use
its military to achieve its foreign policy aims.  ‘We believe that this pre-emptive action 
against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qadhafi’s capacity to
export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal
behavior (Reagan, 1986)’.  This last comment is interesting in as far as it demonstrates a 
belief that the figure of Gaddafi can still be influenced, albeit by coercive means.
As far as the identity of Libya is concerned, what can be ascertained from
Reagan’s speech is the construction of a dual Libyan Other.  On the one hand, the
terrorist actions are attributed almost exclusively to Libyan leader Gaddafi, barring a
few mentions of the Libyan ‘regime’.   In addition to references of Gaddafi’s ‘reign of 
terror’, also mentioned are ‘Qadhafi’s subversive activities’, and Gaddafi’s reckless
'policy of intimidation’. On the other hand, Reagan is at pains to draw a clear line
between the figure of Gaddafi and the ‘Libyan people’.  These were a ‘decent people
caught in the grip of a tyrant,’ who ‘had been friends of the United States’ prior to the
military coup of 1969.  And in a move to establish a clear difference in ethical identity
between the ‘Libyan people’ and Gaddafi Reagan opines: ‘I´m sure that today most
Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for 
barbarism around the world’.  This particular construction of a dual Libyan Other is
significant in as far as it is one that would be returned to much later in the future during 
the military intervention of 2011.  
The UK government was also constructing the US attacks on Libya through a
‘terrorism’ discourse.  In explaining U.K. support for the attacks – support which 
manifested itself through the provision of bases to U.S. aircraft involved in the
bombings- Thatcher refers to the dangers involved in appeasement of such crimes:
‘Terrorism attacks free societies and plays on those fears.  If those tactics succeed,
terrorism saps the will of free people to resist.’  For that and other reasons, thus, 
‘Terrorism has to be defeated; it cannot be tolerated or side-stepped’.  One difference to
be noted from both Thatcher’s and Reagan’s speeches is the construction of the Libyan
Other.  Unlike Reagan’s speech, Thatcher does not make any effort to separate the
Libyan Other into two parts.  In fact, almost all the references point to ‘Libyan 
terrorism,’ ‘Libyan terrorist attacks,’ ‘Libyan involvement,’ or the ‘Libyan government’. 




















terrorism,’ of which Libya was a main player.  ‘The time had come for action,’ she
argues, ‘the United States took it.  Its decision was justified, and, as friends and allies,
we support it’ (Thatcher, 1986). 
All the same, it would soon seem that US bombs would not be enough to 
dissuade Gaddafi and the Libyan government from attacks on US and UK interests.  On 
December 21, 1988, Libyan terrorist activity reached new destructive heights; the now
infamous Lockerbie bombing would see Pan Am flight 103 blow up over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, resulting in the deaths of all 259 passengers on board, and also 11 innocents in 
the Scottish village engulfed by the fireballs and pounded by the shrapnel falling from
the sky.  In the years ahead Western accusations of Libyan involvement would focus on 
two suspected Libyan intelligence officers, Abdelbaset al-Megrahi and Al-Amin Kalifa
Fhimah, although the ultimate responsibility for the atrocity would be attributed to 
Libyan leader Gaddafi and his government.  Strenuous denials of Libyan involvement
notwithstanding, the intelligence gathered by Western agencies was enough to convince
the George H. W. Bush government in Washington and the John Major government in 
London that Libya had blood on its hands.  
Such was the perception of non-compliance by Libya in the high profile inquiry
which followed, and its refusal to extradite the two Libyan suspects for trial, the United 
Nations Security Council was moved to impose sanctions for the first time on a
particular nation-state (De Jonge Oudraat, 2000).  These sanctions to be applied
multilaterally would accompany those which the US was imposing unilaterally to go on 
to have a significant impact on Libyan economic development and its political relations
with Western states.  Ten years would pass before the UN sanctions were lifted and only 
after the Libyan government had given up the suspects for trial in The Hague under 
Scots law.  Libya also assumed responsibility for its officials’ involvement in the case;
agreed financial compensation with the victims’ families; renounced terrorism
categorically and agreed to cooperate with any further inquiries into both the Lockerbie
bombing and that of the French airliner exploded over Niger.  
























During large swathes of the 1990s, the principle US geopolitical discourse
deployed to construct states deemed to be a threat was that of the ‘rogue state’
discourse2122 . Libya, having been hitherto part of a tumultuous and conflictual
relationship with the West, was naturally a prime object for this particular way of 
viewing the new post-Cold War context. This chapter seeks to first of all to trace the
meanings associated with the ‘rogue state’ concept.  It will then illuminate the
implications of these ways of framing Libya; the relationship between identity
construction and the Western foreign policies executed during this period; and a review
of the key events and tensions which helped shape the relationship between Libya and 
the U.S.  
The use of the trope ‘rogue’ in contemporary Western geopolitical discourse can 
be traced back to the Clinton administration.  That said, there are some clear
antecedents, having been preceded by the use of terms such as ‘renegade,’ which was
used by President George H. W. Bush, and before that ‘outlaw,’ which had been used by 
the Reagan administration (Litwak, 2000).  The term ‘rogue’ functions in a similar way.
Etymologically ‘rogue’ can be traced back to the 16th century Latin verb rogare, taking 
on the English meaning ‘to beg’, and which would thus refer to an ‘idle vagrant’.  In 
what concerns us here, the contemporary usage of the word ‘rogue’ now points
semantically to a different range of significations.  Most benignly speaking, one could 
speak of a person with unsatisfactory behavior, but who nevertheless possesses likeable
attributes.  Due to the exclusively pejorative sense in which ‘rogue’ has been used with 
the object ‘Libya,’ the use of this particular referent would be imprecise.  More
accurate, it seems, would be the definition of ‘a dishonest or unprincipled man,’ or 
perhaps better still, a ‘person or thing that behaves in an aberrant or unpredictable way,
typically with damaging or dangerous effects’ (Oxford dictionaries online).
In what concerns US geopolitical discourse, the concept ‘rogue state’ has been 
constituted along lines not too dissimilar; states which are placed in the category are
considered to be dangerous or a threat.  In a variation of this same theme, Anthony Lake 
(1994) had previously offered his own account of what he called ‘backlash states’.  
21 During this period the most pronounced ‘rogue’ states were said to be Iraq, Iran, North Korea
and Libya. 
22 It has been argued by Klare (2000) and elsewhere that the ‘rogue state’ discourse was used as a
means of maintaining U.S. military expenditure at high levels, following the dissipation of the Soviet
























Writing in Foreign Affairs magazine, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor 
spoke of the ‘recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the
family of nations (now committed to the pursuit of democratic institutions, the
expansion of free markets, the peaceful settlement of conflict and the promotion of 
collective security) but also assault its basic values’.  Lake also argues that such states
seem ‘incapable of adapting’ to the ‘international society’ of states. 
This is succinctly articulated by then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright: ‘those
(rogue states) that not only do not have a part to play in the international system, but
whose very being involves being outside of it and throwing, literally, hand grenades
inside in order to destroy it’ (Albright, 1998; cited in Litwak, 2000: 238).  
Albright and Lake’s declarations are noteworthy for reasons above and beyond
the construction of a security threat.  Both politicians delineate a concept which is fully
present to their experiences of the world, seemingly unambiguous, essentialist, and one
which reflects an objective and imminently decipherable reality. These states are
unambiguously threatening.  In spite of the fact that ‘rogue state’ is a highly abstract
concept, which could and would be applied to certain cases and not others, at the whim
and mercy of power structures in Washington.  The identity of the ‘rogue’, or ‘backlash 
state,’ is ascribed here as being ontologically fixed; for Albright, the dangers emanate
from their very being; while for Lake, the states seem ‘incapable’ of changing.  This is a 
move which passes over the complexity of what are very different states –Libya, Iraq, 
Iran, North Korea- and one which is negligent to the complex historical and political
processes, not to mention antagonisms, which have shaped their relationships with the
West.  It will now be necessary to see how ‘Libya’ in particular has been constituted by
the ‘rogue state’ discourse.  
There were several elements to the designation of Libya as a ‘rogue state’.
Firstly, there were the past and continued charges of the country being involved in 
international terrorism.  Speaking in 1993 President Clinton highlighted the Lockerbie
bombing as the major issue defining the US-Libya relationship: ‘we have one huge
barrier that overrides everything else right now, and that is the determination of the
United States to see that the people who have been charged with the Pan Am 103 
disaster are released from Libya and subject to a legitimate trial’.  Another of the criteria 























destruction’ issue.  Speaking in 1994 at a conference in Brussels, President Clinton
referred to the ‘clear and present’ danger coming from ‘rogue states such as Iran and
Libya’ due to ‘growing missile capabilities’.  Not only that, but also ‘there are
disturbing reports of efforts to smuggle nuclear materials into and out of Eastern 
Europe.’ The references Clinton makes here to international terrorism and weapons of 
mass destruction are significant in that they represent two of the main security threats in 
the post-Cold War period. As has been noted previously, the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the bi-polar international system marked a change in how dangers were
being perceived with greater emphasis placed on de-territorialised threats.  
And yet the emphasis on de-territorialised threats does not annul completely the
threats emanating from territorial entities such as ‘rogue states;’ it is just that a link is
now being established between the two.  In terms of foreign policy, the implications
which emerge from the ‘rogue state’ discourse are significant; the identity of the Other 
is constructed in such a way that this leads almost inevitably to exclusionary policies.   
Since these states do not play by the rules of ‘international society,’ the ‘international
community,’ nor the ‘family of nations,’ they cannot be considered legitimate members
and therefore have no place within their boundaries.  The ‘rogue state’ constituted in this 
way is to be punished accordingly by way of being shunned and ostracised from the
‘community’ itself.  Quite obvious difficulties would arise for any Western government
looking to engage with a ‘rogue state’ government. Any possibilities for dialogue and
diplomacy are curtailed, not least because, as Robert Litwak astutely deduces: ‘when a
negotiation involves a “rogue”, even a reciprocated concession can be cast as an 
appeasement’ (Litwak, 2000).     
Returning to the specific case at hand, it is possible to trace the discursive effects 
of the ‘rogue state’ discourse on US foreign policy towards Libya. The identity of 
Libya constructed in this way had some very clear implications for US foreign policy
toward Libya.  Since, as was mentioned earlier, official US discourse constructed Libya
as being ‘incapable’ of change, that is to say its identity is fixed or frozen, Lake was
opting for a policy of ‘containment’.  According to Lake the US. has ‘to contain the
influence of these states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes through pressure, 
sometimes by diplomatic and economic measures’ (Lake, 1994).  



















and extended use of unilateral economic sanctions against the county which began in
1986. The Clinton administration aimed to increase the pressure on Libya -and the US’s 
European allies for that matter-, through the ‘Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA)’ of 
1996. The purpose of the Act was ultimately to deprive both countries of foreign
investment, the deduction being that this investment would otherwise be used to bolster 
the regimes in power and potentially contribute towards the acquirement of WMD or 
the financing of terrorist organizations.  According to President Clinton, ‘The Iran and 
Libya sanctions bill I sign today will help to deny those countries the money they need 
to finance international terrorism.  It will limit the flow of resources necessary to obtain
weapons of mass destruction.  It will heighten pressure on Libya to extradite the
suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103’ (Clinton, 1996).  Moreover, various
sanctions could be imposed on companies operating out with the territorial boundaries
of the United States, thus adding an important twist to the type of unilateral sanctions
often imposed by governments. 
As far as the UK government was concerned, the ‘extraterritorial’ nature of the
ILSA was quite unacceptable –a position in line with its European Union partners-.  The 
vehement EU response declared: ‘The European Union (...) is opposed to the use of 
extraterritorial legislation, both on legal and policy grounds. (...) Such laws represent an 
unwarranted interference by the U.S. with the sovereign right of the EU to legislate over 
its citizens and companies, and are, in the opinion of the EU, contrary to international
law’ (Official EU response, 1997; cited in Ryngaert, 2008).  The culmination of EU
efforts to challenge ILSA would be Regulation 2271/96 which aimed to mitigate the
potentially damaging effects that ILSA could have on European companies.  Both the
EU regulation and the UK response to the extraterritorial claims of the US –being 
essentially one and the same thing- drew heavily on a ‘Protection of Trading Interests’
order passed by the UK government in 1980 (Layton and Parry, 2004). From the
original document it is possible to detect parallels with the more recent response both in 
content and tone: ‘Finally, and most important, the U.S. courts claim subject matter 
jurisdiction over activities of non-US persons outside the U.S.A. to an extent which is
quite unacceptable to the UK and many other nations’ (UK Protection of Interests Order, 
1980: cited from Layton and Parry, 2004). 
The UK government’s posture in opposition to the extraterritorial legislation 
passed by the US government is indicative of a somewhat softer overall foreign policy
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approach towards Libya. That is not to say that John Major’s Conservative government
was not anxious to see a resolution to the case of the extradition of the Lockerbie
bombing suspects; alongside both the US and France, the UK was certainly pushing for 
a successful outcome to this issue.  Yet the efforts being made by the British
government were on the whole restricted to joint incentives within a multilateral
framework.  For instance, attempts were made, by and large successful attempts, to 
bring the European Council on board, as Major stressed in a speech in 1991: ‘The
European Council has endorsed the demands which we, France and the United States
have made to the Libyan Government requiring them to abandon their support of 
international terrorism and to hand over the alleged perpetrators of the Lockerbie
bombing’ (Major, 1991). 
There is also evidence to suggest that the British government was more open to 
dialogue with Libya than their US counterparts; that is to say, in reference to the three
main issues; the proliferation of weapons, the successful conclusion of the Lockerbie
question and ensuring the end of Libyan terrorist activity.  In terms of weapons, John 
Major showed himself to be in favour of pursuing proliferation issues ‘through the
treaty (Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons treaty)’ and also ‘bilaterally’ (Major, 
1994). Speaking in November of 1992, Major reported limited success in terms of 
Libyan terrorist activity, reporting that the Libyan authorities had ‘closed, and in some
cases dismantled, many of the camps previously used to house or train terrorists.  They
have also given us information on their links with the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army which we believe may prove useful’. The Prime Minister goes on to state that it
is the issue of the Lockerbie suspects which was still a stumbling block for improved 
relations between the two countries, highlighting that there was no ‘hidden agenda’ and 
that his government was ‘not seeking to undermine the regime in Libya’ (Major, 1992).  
It is also quite clear that this was being pursued without doing undue damage to 
British economic interests in Libya.  This of course had to be achieved with the greatest
of care nevertheless, being sensitive not to incur negative press, the wrath of the
Lockerbie victims’ families, and the public at large. This delicate position was indeed
difficult to maintain, what with the incessant questioning at House of Commons debates 
regarding British business interests in Libya.  One way this was to be dealt with was
through the appearance of ambivalence.  In response to a question regarding any








   
 









secure contracts the Secretary of State for Trade replied: ‘We have neither encouraged
not discouraged British companies which wish to trade in Libya.  This has been a matter 
for their commercial judgement alone’ (Lilley, 1991).  
 It is also interesting to note that the term ‘rogue state’ never became part of 
British geopolitical lexicon in the same way as it did across the Atlantic.  Politicians in 
both the Major and Blair governments were careful to avoid the term.  The performative 
nature of the ‘rogue state’ discourse has already been touched upon; it not only attempts
to describe an external reality, but it does something since it constitutes Libya in such a
way as to make it difficult to subsequently pursue certain foreign policy options.  This
difference between US. and UK official discourse therefore appears to be significant
and can perhaps explain the different foreign policy approaches pursued at this time.  
CHAPTER 5 COMING IN FROM THE COLD AND THE 
WAR ON TERROR 
RAPPROCHEMENT WITH LIBYA: ON THE ROAD TO 
‘REHABILITATION’ 
The Libyan government’s decision to hand over the two suspected Lockerbie
bombers in 1999 must be considered as a decisive event in the history of its relations
with the US and UK.  Guilt, in this high profile case of terrorism, had all but been 
assigned to Libya publicly and through Western media, if not judicially in a court of 
law. This meant that any tangible concessions by the US or UK governments on this
matter would have surely amounted to political suicide.  From a Libyan perspective,
years of damaging sanctions had perhaps taken their toll, leading them to accept the
negotiated agreement mediated by Nelson Mandela, and leading to judicial proceedings
in the Netherlands under Scottish law.  The conviction of one of the suspects, 























compensatory payments to the victims’ families23, and pressure for an official statement
recognizing Libyan culpability24 . Justice, it would appear, had been carried out, even if 
the terrorist atrocity would live on in the collective memories of all countries involved.  
At this stage, however, a significant obstacle had been removed to improved relations
between the Libyan government and the West. 
What followed was an unprecedented reversal in relations between a once ‘rogue 
state,’ one which had been diplomatically ostracised from the ‘international community,’ 
and the two countries which had hitherto been its chief denouncers.  A foreign policy of 
‘rapprochement’ would lead to increased cooperation in a number of fields.  Chief
among these were: security and intelligence sharing, closer economic relationships – in 
particular in the oil and gas sector with the return of US and UK multinationals-, and
also developments in the cultural and educational spheres.  ‘Libya’ would now be
constructed in the US and UK as a country harnessing the potential to change its past
ways and to follow a path set out for its return to the international fold.  Meaning was
given to these events principally through the deployment of a ‘rehabilitation’ discourse,
which would also be spread in foreign policy circles and media channels.  If Libya was
now being understood in terms of change, reformation, and/or reintegration, the US and 
UK were concurrently being positioned as the reformer, the one with an ethical
responsibility to assist Libya on its path to ‘redemption’ (Takeyh, 2001), as it were.  
This chapter will trace this rapprochement, linking it not only to key
developments in the foreign policy sphere, but also to the new ways in which the
geopolitical world was being understood in the West.  No one event can define any
relationship, however important it may be.  Rather, developments such as that witnessed 
in the Lockerbie case are just one strand in a complex myriad of factors, understood and 
given meaning through higher geopolitical and geostrategic discourses and logics, of 
which the ‘war on terror’ can be viewed as an important case in point.  Ultimately, it can 
23 Families of the victims of French commercial flight -UTA 77-would also seek and successfully
obtain compensation from the Libyan government for the downing of the aircraft in question, act which
killed all passengers on board. 
24 The letter presented by the Libyan government to the UN Security Council in 2003 states that
‘Libya as a sovereign state has facilitated the bringing to justice of the two suspects charged with the
bombing and accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials’ cited from BBC.  This apparent
acceptance of culpability would later be qualified by top Libyan officials who suggest that this was done
to facilitate the lifting of sanctions. See ‘The Conspiracy Files: Lockerbie programme Saif al-Islam al-



























be shown that the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse used by the West failed and the policy of 
rapprochement pursued by the US and UK governments was never actually fulfilled.
As will be detailed further ahead, this can be understood as a symptom of a perceived 
lack of progress in the political sphere, and also more generally in terms of human
rights. The Libyan government failed to bring about the structural changes necessary so 
as to re-insert itself without contradictions within the neo-liberal paradigm, and the
figure of Gaddafi would once again become the source of tension between Libya and 
the West. The consequences of this incomplete ‘rehabilitation’ will be crucial for how
Western leaders construct ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ during the Western military
intervention of 2011.   
While the developments in the Lockerbie case mentioned above can certainly be
considered a crucial step towards the normalization of relations between Libya and both 
the US and UK, it would be premature to deduce a rigid cause-effect relationship.  A
post-structuralist theoretical framework should be able to shed light on how such
developments are also informed by wider changes taking place at a structural level
within the broader Western geopolitical ‘discursive formation’.  That is to say, how
changes at the geopolitical or geostrategic level have informed the US and UK subject
positions, provoking and facilitating changes in their posture towards Libya. Western
governments do not simply formulate policies in a rational way, fully present to 
themselves, and in response to the policies of foreign governments – much as this is
also important-.  Rather, the policy of rapprochement with Libya should also be viewed
in terms of the wider context in which policy makers found themselves at the time, the
power/knowledge relationships, and the most prevalent discourses being used to imbue
that context with meaning.
It becomes apparent when one sets out to analyse relations between Libya and 
the West during this period that certain shifts in the geopolitical context were indeed
underway even before progress in the Lockerbie case took place.  For one thing, the
viability of policies such as the containment of ‘rogue states,’ and the punitive sanctions 
regimes which accompanied it, were being increasingly questioned.  Foreign policy and 
security ‘experts’ had already in the second half of the 1990s begun to question the
wisdom of securing against the new global threats, through policies which were leading
to the isolation of certain states -this scepticism would later find perhaps its maximum













   
 
 
    
 
  
this also meant forfeiting economic interests and/or access to vital natural resources.  
The implications of this for UK, and in particular, US foreign policy towards Libya, was 
that previous policies of ‘containment’ would increasingly be viewed as untenable and
even counterproductive.
In relation to sanctions policies, and writing in the influential Foreign Affairs
magazine, Richard N Haas spoke of ‘Sanctioning Madness,’ which he would go on to 
denounce in the strongest possible terms: ‘with few exceptions, the growing use of 
economic sanctions to promote foreign policy objectives is deplorable’ (1997:75).  
Equally critical of the US foreign policy at the time were Zbigniew Brzezinski- former 
National Security Advisor of President Carter- and Brent Scowcroft -National Security
Advisor under Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush-.  Both of these establishment
figures declared themselves in opposition to policies based on ‘hostile fanaticism,’
calling instead for what they saw as a ‘nuanced containment’ (1997) 25. This is
indicative of what could be understood as a more flexible approach to what were
understood to be problematic states- of which Libya could clearly be included at this
time-.  Meanwhile, focussing on the disastrous human consequences stemming from the 
imposition of sanctions regimes, Mueller and Mueller denounced what in their opinion
amounted to the ‘Sanctions of Mass Destruction.’ The claim made by both authors
being that sanctions ‘may have contributed to more deaths during the post-Cold War era 
than all weapons of mass destruction throughout history’ (1999:43).  
If the resort to punitive sanctions and geopolitical strategies of ‘containment’ had 
now begun to be questioned, related discourses such as the ‘rogue state’ were also being 
reappraised.  Having been generally speaking shunned by U.K. politicians, criticism of 
the recourse to ‘rogue state’ rhetoric was now becoming more widespread among
influential authors on the other side of the Atlantic. Aside from a caustic repudiation by
Noam Chomski (1998), critical works by Klare (2000), O’Sullivan (2000), Litwak 
(2000) and Henriksen (2001), all called into question the use of the 'rogue state' concept
in foreign policy.  Of particular concern was the foreign policy determinism often
triggered by such ‘rogue’ designations, leading moreover to one-size-fits-all solutions.  
Litwak (2000) believes that more ‘differentiated’ strategies can be elaborated. 
While Brzezinski and Scowcroft’s article only deals explicitly with Iran and Iraq, their thesis can 

























It soon seemed to be the case that these developments at the formal
geopolitical/geostrategic level were beginning to encroach on practical foreign policy
formulation.  Shortly after the court judgement declaring an end to UN sanctions against 
Libya -those imposed unilaterally by the US would remain for some years to come- a
substantive shift on ‘rogue states’ can be detected in official US governmental
discourse.  Responding to a question about one of those, North Korea, Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright affirmed: ‘First of all, we are now calling these states ‘states of 
concern’ (Cited in Marquis, 2000).  Recalling the meanings associated with the ‘rogue
state’ concept, this is quite a notable change in terminology.  It points to an important
discursive break, one which separates a before and after.  Not only does it mark a
considerable softening of official US language, the suggestion being that such states do 
not represent the same threat, but it also signals a change in foreign policy direction.  
In response to these declarations by the Clinton administration, O’Sullivan (2000) of 
the Brookings Institute is sure that ‘replacing the rogue rhetoric’ is the ‘way to a better
policy’.  Gone are the ontological certainties imposed by the ‘rogue’ label, whereby the
object in question was defined definitively. The temporal identity of these states is
opened up, unleashing the potential for change and a new range of foreign policy
options.  It is no longer circumscribed and restricted by past behaviour.  Consequently, it 
becomes possible to think of alternative foreign policies and work towards a ‘Politics of 
Dismantling Containment’ (O’Sullivan, 2001).  The underlying theme of interventions
such as these is one of ‘rehabilitation,’ or ‘reintegration’26 . As O’Sullivan now sees it,
‘the goal is rehabilitation, not isolation’.  Moreover, as far as Libya is concerned, this
means that if it ‘were to give full cooperation to the ongoing trial of those suspected of 
bombing Pan Am 103, it could become a candidate for measured rehabilitation’.   
Other authors were also interested in the implications that this could have for the
relationship between Libya and the West.  For Alison Pargeter (2002), Libya was now a
‘pariah no more’. A particularly pertinent example was provided by Ray Takeyh (2001) 
writing in Foreign Policy magazine, who leads his article with ‘The Rogue Who Came
in From the Cold’.  Libya, according to Takeyh, has shown a desire to ‘mend its ways,’
As previously mentioned, Bialasiewicz et al. (2007) trace back similar notions of ‘integration’ in 
a ‘new’ US ‘imaginative geography’ to the end of the Cold War.  In the case of Libya, however, this quite

























    
which itself can lead to ‘the road to redemption’. The key question is not whether or not 
Libya is capable of change- in the past this was implicitly deduced to not be the case-
but rather the onus is placed on how Washington and the West manage the situation.  
For Takeyh the next moves to be made by the US government are thus crucial, and a
‘test of Washington’s ability to reintegrate a reforming “rogue” into the community of 
nations’ (Takeyh, 2001: 62).  The conclusion reached is that the ‘United States should
not waste the opportunity’ (Takeyh, 2001:72). 
The biblical narrative of ‘redemption’ being enacted by Takeyh should not be
lost to any analysis of how ‘Libya’ now appears in the Western geopolitical imagination. 
It is not only that Libya is now being given an opportunity to ‘mend its ways,’ but that
the subject position of the West is concurrently being constituted as the one who must
assist; the redeemer as it were.  The idea of ‘rehabilitation’ or ‘redemption’ entails an 
element of forgiveness for past acts, whether this be in relation to the Western penal
code or Christian values.  In either of the two cases, this is not merely a choice, but an 
obligation. An ethical responsibility is generated, which is entirely consistent with 
Christian theology and liberal judicial practice, in as far as the repentant offender or 
criminal can find forgiveness and a path to redemption. Takeyh’s discourse imbues the
Western Self with the responsibility to oversee this change for not only the good of 
Libya, but for the West, and the greater good of the ‘international community’; ‘Libya— 
and the World – will be watching’ (Takeyh, 2001: 72).  Given the past entanglements of 
Libya, the US and the UK around the issue of terrorism, and the impact that had on US
and UK populations, this point is not without importance.  If Libya had become the to
be redeemed, then the Western Self is concurrently constituted as the redeemer27 . 
What followed would be tangible progress between Libya and the West on a
number of issues.  An indication of this could be found in the State of the Union address 
of 2002 in which George W. Bush conspicuously omitted Libya from his ‘axis of evil’- 
included were Iraq, Iran and North Korea-.  One of the ways in which rapprochement
materialised was in the realm of international terrorism.  Following the decision to hand 
over the Lockerbie bombing suspects, Libya’s renouncement of its support for terrorist
British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw would allude to this very notion in a speech made before
the House of Commons: ‘For our part, we have recognised that we now have corresponding 













   
 
 






groups was another crucial step.  Having said that, this was not as big a step for the
Libyan government as it once might have been.  Radical Islamic groups had been 
operating in Libya for some time while certain others, such as the Libyan Martyrs
Movement and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, had emerged more recently in the
1990s.  Both groups, like those extremist groups which had gone before them, directly
opposed Gaddafi and the government of which he was the leader (Bruce St John, 2008). 
This meant that Libya and the West had a strategic security objective in common, one
which would take on great significance after the events of September 11th . 
As for as the US government was concerned, Libya’s renouncement of any
support for international terrorist groups would eventually culminate in what was
deemed as ‘the most significant step,’ which was the announcement of the 'intent to 
rescind Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism' (Welch, 2006).  This was due 
to Libya’s ‘excellent cooperation…in response to common global threats faced by the
civilized world since September 11, 2001’ (Rice, 2006).  The answers given by
Ambassador Welch are also interesting for the way that he justifies the decisions taken, 
or to be taken by the US government, and the emphasis put on security matters above all 
else. When questioned whether or not the measures taken had been influenced by the
economic possibilities in Libya, including potential oil contracts, the ambassador 
responds:  'This decision is not undertaken because Libya has oil; this decision is
undertaken because they've addressed our national security concerns' (Welch, 2006).  
Nevertheless, the issue of international terrorism was not the only thing which
the US government was concerned about. Also high up on the security agenda was the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), meaning that progress with Libya 
on this issue had become an extremely important part of any negotiations and 
rapprochement between the countries28. Such dialogue was widely considered to be a
resounding success for the West as Libya followed up its cooperation in the Lockerbie
case and its renunciation of terrorist activity, with a willingness to reach agreement on 
this issue.  Official statements were made on December 19th 2003 which confirmed 
Libya’s abandonment of its programmes, affirmed the readiness to disclose information 
of past WMD activity, and accepted unconditionally the presence of weapons inspectors 
Saif Gaddafi claimed in an article ‘Libya-American Relations’ (2003) that the United States had 
‘raised the bar’ to include the issue of WMD programs, when the original UN Resolution governing the
























on Libyan soil with the aim of destroying all equipment related to the WMD programs.  
These commitments would be duly adhered to as an overwhelmingly non-
confrontational three phase process (Bowen, 2006) was carried out leading to the
dismantlement of decades old programs.
The significance of this outcome was not restricted to security concerns vis-à-
vis the relation between Libya and the US; it was also being viewed within a wider 
geopolitical context and in relation to more global security concerns held by Western
countries.  Firstly, there was the suggestion that Libya’s compliance with US demands
was a direct consequence of military action in Iraq, with President Bush stating: ‘for 
diplomacy to be effective, words must be credible, and no one can now doubt the word 
of America’ (Bush, 2004).  Secondly, and linked to this first point, there was the casting
of Libya as an example for other states to follow.  Focussing specifically on Libya’s
decision to renounce its WMD, George W. Bush stated: ‘and another message should be 
equally clear: leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with 
the United States and other free nations’ (Bush, 2003)29 . This idea would be reiterated
by officials in the years ahead such as can be seen from Ambassador Welch: ‘Libya
serves as an important model as we push for changes in policy by other countries such 
as Iran and North Korea’ (Welch, 2006) and Assistant Secretary Desutter: 'from the
perspective of Iran and North Korea, Libya and its people have obtained already
tremendous benefits from having made that decision.  And those are benefits that are
available to the people of countries that make a similar one' (Desutter, 2006; cited in 
Welsh, 2006).  
The way in which US policy makers were inclined to offer up progress made
with Libya on these issues as an example for other countries such as Iran and North 
Korea to follow is suggestive of Thomas Barnett’s security priority of ‘shrinking the
gap’ (2005).  First and foremost, these countries, like Libya had WMD weapons
programs and moreover both countries existed in relative international isolation.  This
meant that like Libya both countries were considered to be a threat.  It was clearly
desirable for Western governments to secure similar agreements with Iran and North 
Korea for the dismantlement of their own programs and to achieve greater transparency; 
Libyan leader Gaddafi was also keen to highlight this aspect of the WMD deals concluded by





























in short, to bring both countries out of the ‘gap’.  Securing Libya’s weapons
programmes was a crucial concern of the West; the problem of WMD could only be
resolved by bringing Libya out of the ‘gap’ in some way.  In terms of a wider strategy,
thus, it can be argued that a Western policy of ‘rapprochement’ with Libya was not only
understandable, but entirely logical.
In any case, as far as the US was concerned, developments vis-à-vis WMD
programs was considered to be a crucial part of Libya’s ‘rehabilitation'.  In reference to 
this progress, President Bush commented that ‘old hostilities do not need to go on 
forever,’ that the ‘prize’ for Libya is clearly marked out for it, and it is to ‘regain a
secure and respected place among the nations’ (Bush, 2003).  In other words, steps
taken to satisfy the security concerns of the US government would be rewarded and met 
with a willingness on the part of the US to accept Libya back into the international
community of states.  Condoleezza Rice would go on to refer to the year 2003 as
‘historic,’ due to the ‘change in direction’ taken by the Libyan government. As can also 
be detected from Secretary Rice’s comments, however, these steps were not being
viewed as definitive.  Placing the emphasis once more on the temporal identity of 
‘Libya’, Rice also states that there ‘is a long way to go’, but it is now ‘possible to really
see a different future’ and a way forward (Rice, 2008)  
Meanwhile the United Kingdom government was positioning itself alongside its
staunch ally in the ‘War against terror’.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s
commitment ‘to stand shoulder to shoulder with America’ (Blair, 2001; cited in White
and Wintour, 2001) would mean that the UK would play a significant role in both wars
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  It would also mean that Libya would be viewed by the Blair
government as an important ally in the struggle against terrorism.  Speaking in 2004 
following a meeting with Gaddafi in Tripoli, Blair states in reference to the terrorist
threat: 'the World is changing and we have got to do everything we possibly can to 
tackle the security threat that faces us'. Moreover, in Gaddafi, Blair saw a potential
partner in this challenge due to his 'common cause with us against al-Qaeda, extremists
and terrorism’.  According to Blair, 'security' is the 'future prize' of improved relations
between the UK and Libya, 'not just of this region but the wider world - indeed our own 
country' (Blair, 2004; cited in Marr).   Andrew Marr from the BBC was hailing this visit 
as 'an important moment in the world fight against terrorism' (Marr, 2004).  The





     

















anything, become more important still as a result of the 2005 terrorist attack in London
killing 52 people and injuring scores more.  
The British government’s own rapprochement with Gaddafi and Libya had a
particularly prominent place in wider British security discourse.  This can be deduced
from the Foreign Affairs Committee’s ‘Foreign Policy Aspects of the War Against
Terrorism,’ which was elaborated for presentation before the House of Commons.  
Having concluded on: ‘the primacy of the need to counter the threats from international
terrorism and arms proliferation (2005:3),’ the report continues: ‘the Maghreb is of 
strategic importance to the United Kingdom and that Algeria, Morocco and Libya are of 
great significance to the international war against terrorism (2005:7)’.  The response
provided by the Foreign Secretary in the same report mirrors these conclusions: ‘The
Government agrees that terrorism, proliferation and other foreign policy priorities are
closely inter-connected...the need to counter the threats from international terrorism and
arms proliferation is at the top of the Government’s international agenda' (2005:3).  
Moreover, ‘The Government agrees that North Africa is of strategic importance to the
United Kingdom.  As well as North Africa’s significance in the war against terrorism,
the countries of the region are also important in the context of UK energy strategy and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy’ (2005:16). 
The security interests shared by the US, UK, and Libyan governments would 
manifest themselves in greater cooperation between security and intelligence agencies.  
Records show that this cooperation developed into becoming a crucial part of the ‘War 
on Terror’ strategy. This strategy was, of course, a multi-faceted operation which did 
not confine itself to information sharing between agencies.  As Human Rights Watch
has documented, during this period terrorist suspects were shared through the now
infamous ‘rendition’ programs.  Most of the suspects transferred to Libya were
seemingly part of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and thus would most likely 
have faced imprisonment and torture on arrival.  As it happens, these practices were not
uncommon at the US end either, as the investigations into torture at Guantanamo Bay
have demonstrated.   This has led Laura Pitter from Human Rights Watch to conclude:
‘not only did the U.S. deliver Gaddafi his enemies on a silver platter but it seems the
CIA tortured many of them first’ (Pitter, 2012). 

















    
 
   
 
 
between British secret services and their Libyan counterparts.  In one high profile case, 
the rendition of Abdel-Hakim Belhaj -then leader of the LIFG and sworn enemy of 
Gaddafi- from the UK to Libya, was undertaken most likely under the knowledge that
the aforementioned suspect would be exposed to torture upon arrival into the custody of 
the Libyan authorities.  The rendition procedure, and the intelligence that this was
supposed to generate, were justified by British intelligence services through its
correspondence with Libyan officials:  'The intelligence about Abu 'Abd Allah
(alternative name of Abdel-Hakim Belhaj) was British.  I know I did not pay for the air
cargo (Mr Belhaj).  But I feel I have the right to deal with you direct on this and am
very grateful to you for the help you are giving us.'  Commenting on the joint
intelligence operations, the fruits of which the British were hoping to reap, the British 
intelligence officer continues: 'This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to
demonstrate the remarkable relationship we have built over recent years...I was grateful
to you for helping the officer we sent out last week.  Abu 'Abd Allah's information on 
the situation in this country is of urgent importance to us' (Identity unknown; cited in 
Sengupta et al, 2011). 
If the resolution of security concerns represented the cornerstone of the new
Libyan-American and Libyan-British relationships, the policy of ‘rapprochement’
would also bring with it economic benefits.  Libya, of course, had long been an
attractive investment opportunity for Western governments and companies, yet the
sanctions and previous policy of ‘containment’ had put paid to any serious exploitation 
of this potentiality.  Now that security issues had been resolved, it would not take long 
before economic ties were strengthened, and the resumption of business would begin in 
earnest30. As US and UK governments knew only too well, the huge quantities of oil
and gas in Libya offered the tantalising prospect of lucrative contracts and a steady,
convenient supply. As has already been mentioned, it is not simply the quantity of oil
residing beneath its territory which is attractive for Western governments –estimated
48.36 billion barrels (OPEC, 2017)-, but that it is of a unique quality, being low in 
sulphur, and is relatively easy to transport due to its geographical location. What
followed were deals made with US based Petroleum giants such as Exxon-Mobil and 
The then UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw would later recognize that the strengthening of
economic ties and trade was an ‘important part of the overall normalisation,’ stating his belief that ‘you







   
 
 



















Occidental Petroleum (Chorin, 2012).  BP was also keen to get in on the action and in
2007, following a meeting between Blair and Gaddafi in what was later dubbed the
‘deal in the desert,’ an agreement was reached between the British based multinational
and the Libyan government for further oil exploration in Libya. According to the
Telegraph newspaper the initial investment of 450 million pounds would be used to drill 
17 oil wells, but that the future worth of the agreement could reach as much as 13 
billion (Blair, 2007).  
And yet the economic opportunities in Libya were not only consigned to
petroleum deals.  All manner of contracts was being signed, including a multi-million-
dollar spare parts contract with the US Company Oshkosh Trucks, along with
infrastructure deals worth $2.0 to 3.0 billion involving AECOM and the Tennessee
Overseas Construction Company (TOCC).  US embassy cables from Tripoli suggest that 
these particular contracts, without ruling out any others signed, were awarded in 
conjunction with political considerations and to ‘symbolize the fact that U.S. – Libyan
ties have moved beyond strictly security (i.e., WMD and counter-terrorism) concerns'
(Stevens, 2007). 
All the while, the mainstream media and cultural publications were making
sense of the improvement in relations through the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse.  While
some alluded to this as a process, mirroring official discourse, others spoke as if this
was a foregone conclusion.  The Financial Times, for instance, proclaimed on the 27th 
April 2004, ‘Libya rejoins the international mainstream’.  Even in Time magazine the
‘rehabilitation’ discourse was activated to explain ‘why Gaddafi’s Now a Good Guy
(MacLeod, 2006)’.  In the article MacLeod repeats typical themes which explain that
Libya and Gaddafi have ‘come in from the cold’ and that ‘Gaddafi is a pariah no more’.
It certainly seems to be the case that there was a concerted effort to re-construct
the identity of ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’.  It is known that efforts were being made by the
Libyan government, hiring firms such as The Livingston Group to lobby on its behalf in 
Washington  It has also come to light that Gaddafi’s government had been working 
with organizations in the West for public relations purposes among other things (Rozen, 
2011).  The Libyan government contracted Monitor Group, a consultancy firm based in 
Boston, USA, through which an ‘action plan’ would be drawn up and implemented ‘as























memo, 2007; cited from Rozen, 2011)’.  What is particularly of note here is not that the
Libyan government should contract Western firms for the purposes of public relations or 
lobbying, it is that these projects were being undertaken through prominent
neoconservatives such as Richard Perle- ex Republican Party official with close ties to 
the White House-.  Quoting from Monitor Group’s 2007 Phase 1 Libya project
summary, Linda Rozen relay’s that ‘Richard Perle...is an American Political advisor and 
Lobbyist,’ and she continues, ‘Perle made two visits to Libya (22-24 March and 23-25 
July 2006) and met with Qadhafi on both occasions.  He briefed Vice President Dick 
Cheney on his visits to Libya (Rozen, 2011).’
One of the tactics employed in this overall strategy to boost the image of Libya
and its leader was to invite distinguished guests over for meetings.  Seemingly, this had 
the aim of demonstrating a new Libya, one which was not only open to business, but
perhaps more crucially a country and leader open to new ideas.  A ‘regular flow of high
quality visitors’ was promised by Monitor Group, who also made assurances as to ‘the
strength of their influence in guiding US foreign policy’.  In one high profile meeting, 
distinguished British sociologist Anthony Giddens travelled to Libya along with a
reporter from the Guardian and as a guest of Monitor Group. Both Giddens and 
Gaddafi were to engage each other in dialogue over the state of social democracy and 
the ‘third way,’ a concept which both at some stage had lay claim to. Writing about the
experience Giddens once again refers to Libya as ‘coming in from the cold’ (Giddens, 
2006). 
LIBYA AND GADDAFI, RECALCITRANT TO CHANGE? 
It has been shown thus far how a policy of ‘rapprochement’ was followed by the
US and UK governments leading to cooperation with Libya on a number of issues.  
Substantive measures had undoubtedly been taken by the Libyan government in terms
of its weapons programmes and through cooperation on the problem of international
terrorism.  Western governments had to give meaning to what was taking place,
especially since Libya and its leader Gaddafi had been attributed the blame for past



















discourse used to achieve this and legitimize the Western policy of ‘rapprochement’ was 
that of ‘rehabilitation’.  It has been put forward that the function of this discourse was
essentially twofold: in the first place, the temporal identity of Libya was opened up 
beyond fixed ontological assumptions, such as those implied by the ‘rogue’ or ‘pariah’
state discourse, offering up the possibility that Libya could be re-integrated into the
‘international community’; secondly, that there was now a responsibility, even an ethical 
responsibility, on Western countries including the US and UK to oversee this.   
Nevertheless, for all the references we find in Western geopolitical discourse to 
‘change,’ ‘reform’, ‘rapprochement’, ‘re-engagement’ or ‘rehabilitation’, it was quite
clear that in official US and UK discourse, particularly, this was being viewed as a
process which would have to run its course.  Concessions made by Libya in terms of 
WMD and cooperation on terrorist based security concerns would not be enough to 
satisfy both the US and UK governments, and this is something which would become
increasingly clear in the period leading up to the military intervention of 2011.  
Alongside increased cooperation, doubts about the nature of the ‘Libyan regime’ and 
Gaddafi were persistent and can be identified quite clearly in official discourse, and also 
in academic/media circles.  There are several events during this period which called into 
question the premise set out by the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse; namely, that ‘Libya’ and 
its leader ‘Gaddafi’ were actually reformable. The aim of this part is to highlight some
of these, trace how they cast doubt on Libya’s re-integration into the ‘international
community’ of states, and show how US and UK government officials responded to 
these challenges to their policy of rapprochement with Libya.  Ultimately, it can be
argued, it is a perceived lack of progress on political reform- with direct consequences
in the economic sphere- along with concomitant concerns over human rights, which
would prevent Libya from realizing the ‘rehabilitation’ path which had been set out for 
it in the West.
In 2004, for instance, as significant progress was being made in terms of WMD
and terrorism related concerns, US Secretary of State Colin Powell showed himself to
be wary and commenting on a possible timescale for Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’ he urges
caution: ‘I wouldn’t put a timeline on it at this point...I think it’s in our interest to 
receive Libya back into the international community.  Let’s not forget, though, the basic
nature of their regime.  It is not exactly a representative democracy.  It is still what it is.  
























be cautious’.  Powell’s emphasis on the ‘nature’ of Libya’s government is evident and is
candid in his assessment: ‘we have no illusions about Col. Gadhafi or the nature of his
regime--it's nondemocratic, totalitarian nature, and we will approach it in that light'
(Powell, 2004).  It was reported that the Libyan response was equally as candid in 
expressing their displeasure at Powell’s criticism.  Libyan Foreign Minister Abdel-
Rahman Shalqam was quoted as saying: 'Minister Colin Powell’s comments are
unacceptable and an insult to the Libyan people’.  And he continued, ‘the Minister Colin 
Powell humiliated the people of Libya and therefore…we will file a lawsuit against
him’ (Haaretz, 2004). 
One of the things which was of concern to the US administration at this stage
was Libya’s human rights record.  Even as Secretary of State Rice was announcing the
removal of Libya from the ‘list of state sponsors of terrorism’ in 2006, she was clear
that there were ‘other issues of importance’ to be discussed: ‘those issues include
protection of universal human rights, promotion of freedom and expression, and 
expansion of economic and political reform consistent with President Bush’s freedom
agenda’ (Rice, 2006).  One of the higher profile cases was that of Fatih el-Jahmi who 
was imprisoned for criticism of Gaddafi and his government.  El-Jahmi’s case was
perhaps more salient to the US government, the media, and human rights groups due to 
his precarious health conditions.  Even so, the fact that him and others like him were
being detained for exercising freedom of speech was something that called into question 
Western governments rapprochement with Libya (Chorin, 2011). 
While this only often amounted to tentative public criticism during the
‘rehabilitation’ period, evidence can still be found to suggest that this was an issue for 
US officials.  Having saw Libya elected to chair of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission, White House spokesman Ari Fleischer graded it a ‘rather odd choice’, 
speaking openly of the ‘repression and its human rights violations’ in Libya.
Amounting to a ‘dismal record on human rights’, Fleischer spells out President Bush’s
position that ‘there would have been far better choices’ for the position, meaning that
the appointment of Libya was ‘regrettable’ (Fleischer, 2003)31. 
This would not be the only time that the White House spokesman was critical of Libya in this 
regard.  In 2008 Fleischer lamented the United States being voted off the same Human Rights 
Commission, stating that ‘it’s hard to be committed to the cause of human rights when you’ve put Sudan



















   
  
Yet generally speaking, US officials would either steer clear of direct criticism of 
Libya in issues of human rights, or resort to no more than tentative criticism.  Criticism
of the human rights situation in Libya can, however, be found in reports produced by the 
U.S. State Department.  Here it is worth noting a divergence from the UK position32 . In 
any case, the United States was not as placid.  In a typically direct condemnation- for 
such reports-, the 2009 report criticized the ‘authoritarian regime,’ stating that during 
the year the ‘government’s human rights record remained poor’.  Of the many issues
listed one could highlight those of a political nature, which, it is implied, stems from the 
monopolization of political power by Gaddafi and his inner circle.  Amongst other 
things there is a failure to respect the ‘integrity of the person,’ which suggests torture, 
disappearances and arbitrary detention; a lack of civil liberties including freedom of 
speech, assembly and association; corruption; and a failure to protect the rights of 
women, ethnic minorities, migrants and refugees (State Department, 2009).    
Nevertheless, the type of direct criticism like that which is to be found in the
Human Rights reports was, generally speaking, not reciprocated by high ranking
officials, who were inclined towards more veiled criticisms. Take once again the
example of the case of Libyan dissident Fatih al-Jahmi.  While being the subject of 
behind the scenes diplomatic efforts to secure his release from incarceration and to
assure his well-being, he was not generally mentioned in public pronouncements.  Upon 
news of his death in 2009, US officials one again did not engage in direct criticism of 
the treatment received by al-Jahmi.  Instead, more general comments were made such as 
those by State Department spokesman Ian Kelly who assured that the two countries
would ‘continue to engage’ on the issue of human rights, and Hillary Clinton who 
would do no more in confirming that human rights issues had been discussed with
Libya including the specific case of el -Jahmi (Human Rights Voices, 2009).  In a
similar way, US officials were reluctant to openly criticise the election of Libya to the
UN Human Rights Council.  Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, preferred to speak
in general terms when asked about Libya’s recent appointment:
 ‘I think it’s fair to say that this year, there is a small number of countries whose
human rights records is problematic that are likely to be elected and we regret that. I’m
The UK Human rights report from 2009 omits Libya from the ‘states of concern’ section, only to 
appear in the following year's report. This is entirely in line with official foreign policy and high ranking


























not going to sit here and name names. I don’t think it’s particularly constructive at this
point. But it’s obvious which countries that are on the ballot have more problematic
human rights records than others…there will always be countries whose orientations
and perspectives we don’t agree with, and yet we have to work with them. And that’s
what we will do in this context as well’ (Rice, 2010; cited in Mission of the U.S in 
Geneva, 2010).       
For Western governments, the type of obstacle which called into question the
ongoing Libyan ‘rehabilitation’ were incidents such as the widely reported news of an 
assassination plot to murder the Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah in 2004.  CNN informed
at the time: ‘Alleged Libyan plot to kill Saudi ruler investigated’.  The problem this
would present for Libya is then clearly spelt out: ‘A Libyan terrorist plot, if verified by
American, British and Saudi governments who are working in close coordination to 
investigate it, would undermine Colonel Qaddafi’s public pledges that his government
has abandoned terrorism’ (Ensor, 2004).  It is not merely that the alleged plot harboured 
the potential of undermining the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse, but also that the target was
one of the US government’s staunchest allies in the region.  Indeed, this close
relationship had in fact been the source of latent tension between Gaddafi and King 
Abdullah in past Arab League meetings33, which of course added some traction to the
accusations now being made against Libya.
The cogency of the reports would force both the Libyan and US governments
into official responses.  As one would perhaps expect, the Libyan government released a 
statement denying any knowledge of the plot: ‘we were surprised by this (report) and 
we deny it completely and categorically’ (Shalqam, 2004). The US government, for its
part, sought to respond in two main ways. The first, echoing Libyan denials, was to 
pour doubt on the truthfulness of the allegations.  At the time, President Bush stated, 
‘we’re going to make sure we fully understand the veracity of the plotline.  And so, 
we’re looking into it...’   In terms of the policy of ‘rapprochement’ being pursued with 
Libya, Bush reiterates that this is in fact a process, and one which has not yet reached its 
conclusion: ‘I have sent a message to him (Gaddafi), that if he honours his
commitments to resist terror and to fully disclose and disarm his weapons programs, we
In an Arab league meeting of 2003 Gaddafi is reported to have accused King Abdullah of having
made a ‘deal with the devil’.  The angry response by the Saudi leader protested that ‘Saudi Arabia has
never worked for US interests’, before directing to Gaddafi: ‘You are a liar and your grave awaits you’






















will begin a process of normalization, which we have done.  We have begun that
process.  And now we will make sure he honours his commitment’ (Bush, 2004).  As the 
issue lingered on in the weeks ahead34, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher 
reaffirmed the US role as watchful supervisor by assuring that ‘we are monitoring 
Libya’s behaviour carefully’ (Boucher; cited in Langan, 2004).  The implications for 
Libya’s ‘rehabilitation’ were also made clear: ‘the reports and the information has
already impacted the speed at which we can move forward with Libya and will continue 
to until it’s cleared up’ (Boucher, 2004). 
During this period of ‘rehabilitation’ there were several other diplomatic
aberrations between Libya and Western liberal states.  One which attracted considerable
attention from media channels, as well as the foreign policy community, was the crisis
in relations which developed between Libyan leader Gaddafi and the Swiss government. 
Following the arrest of Gaddafi’s son Hannibal in Switzerland on charges of assault 35, 
the Libyan government embarked on a range of retaliatory measures against the Swiss
government.  These entailed, among other things, the expulsion of Swiss diplomats and 
public officials; the closure of Swiss business premises and operations in Libya; the
cessation of oil supplies to Switzerland; and the withdrawal of several billion dollars in 
assets from Swiss banks (Chorin, 2012).  In addition, the arrest of two Swiss
businessmen, understood to be carried out in response to the detention of Hannibal
Gaddafi, would add a more sinister, tit-for-tat edge to the diplomatic dispute.  By all
accounts the pressure being exerted on the Swiss government paid off in the end as
president Hans-Rudolf Merz was forced into what was considered to be an embarrassing 
apology for the ‘unjust arrest of Libyan diplomats by Geneva police’ (Merz, 2009).  It
would be several months later before the second businessman Max Goeldi was released 
and returned home, amounting to a period of two years stranded in Libya from the start
of the crisis. 
Further evidence that Gaddafi had not been rehabilitated would emerge from his
first and only United Nations General Assembly speech in 2009.  This intervention was
widely criticized in Western media as some of the old characterizations of the Libyan
34 Evidencing the seriousness of the accusations, Saudi Arabia would actually withdraw its 
ambassador from Libya, an action which would force Libya to express further denials of any involvement 
in the plot (Chorin, 2012).
35 The alleged crime took place against hotel staff and would result in both Hannibal Gaddafi and 
his pregnant wife being arrested by Swiss authorities (Chorin, 2012). 
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leader appeared once again.  'Qaddafi's First UN Speech Is a Rambling Diatribe' was the 
headline of the New York Times (24/09/2009), while the Guardian (23/09/2009) wrote:
'Eccentric Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi lives up to his reputation during his first
visit to America'. The article goes on to ridicule Gaddafi for his albeit unorthodox wish 
to sleep in a tent while in New York.  References to the speech as 'rambling,' 'long' and
'incoherent,' quite clearly borrow from past constructions of Gaddafi as ‘crazy,’
something which is in fact acknowledged in the Guardian article by reference to him
‘living up to his reputation’.  In speaking of Gaddafi's 'big chance to cement Libya's re-
entry into the bosom of the international community after 20 years in the wilderness,'
the suggestion is quite clearly that this is something he indeed failed to do.  His efforts
to 'woo' his peers, it continues, was 'to blatantly insult his audience' having 'abused and
alienated the world's top diplomats'. US officials, likewise, were clearly not impressed 
by Gaddafi’s speech, with State Department spokesman Crowley saying on record that
it involved ‘lots of words and lots of papers flying all over the place, not necessarily a
lot of sense’.  It would appear that Crowley had later been forced into a public apology
to smooth over any possible tensions: ‘I understand that my personal comments were
perceived as a personal attack,’ he explained, however, ‘these comments do not reflect
US policy and were not intended to offend.  I apologize if they were taken that way’
(Crowley, 2009). 
By this stage diplomatic relations between Libya and the United Kingdom were
also being placed under stress.  Critical language from UK officials was directed at
Libya and the conduct of its leadership following the release of Lockerbie bomber
Abdelbaset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison on compassionate grounds-Megrahi was
diagnosed with terminal cancer.  The reception that he received on his arrival back in
Tripoli was reported to be that of a ‘hero’s welcome’.  Echoing criticism coming from
the United States and President Obama, UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband opined:
‘obviously the sight of a mass murderer getting a hero’s welcome in Tripoli is deeply
upsetting, deeply distressing’.  On the understanding that the British Prime Minister had 
expressly asked for sensitivity and discretion upon Megrahi’s return to Libya, he goes
on to spell out the implications of what were viewed as Libyan government actions.  
‘It’s very important that Libya knows that how the Libyan government handles itself in
the next few days will be very significant in the way the world views Libya’s re-entry
























release was turning out to be a real problem for British-Libyan relations in particular.
With a view to his funeral in 2010, Philippa Saunders, North Africa Director for the
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, made clear her concerns about how the
Libyans would handle it.  She is quoted by the US ambassador of the time as saying that 
there was ‘very little political appetite’ for engaging with Libya and that relations
between both countries were ‘in limbo’ cited from (Saunders, 2010; cited in The
Telegraph, 2010).  Although the decision was taken by the Scottish Parliament, future
Prime Minister David Cameron would not hide his opposition to the decision stating on 
numerous occasions that it was ‘completely wrong’ (Cameron, 2010). 
In terms of economic liberalization, it seems that progress in this area was also 
being viewed as limited.  It has been documented previously how Libya, having been
released from the restrictions of international and unilateral sanctions, began to seek
external investment, for instance in its petroleum sector, and to conclude significant
infrastructure contracts with foreign companies.  Many of the large contracts being
agreed were widely spoken of in the media and news outlets, perhaps suggesting that
the liberalization processes were more extensive and profound than was actually the
case. At any rate, it is possible to arrive at a somewhat different conclusion through a
careful reading of some of the US diplomatic cables on Libya which have been released
on Wikileaks. These express an acute frustration with the pace of change, and also the
perceived impact that this was having on U.S. interests.  
In particular, frustrations were tangible with regards negotiations and contractual 
agreements in the petrochemical industry.  From as early as 2004 difficulties were
filtering through into the business press as some such as Energy Compass were moved
to conclude that in Libya, ‘old habits die hard’. The article goes on to warn, ominously,
of the potential impact this could have on foreign companies operating in the country:
‘US firms would be well advised to expect the unexpected’ (Dinesh & Junnola, 2004).  
Uncertainty in the petrochemical industry is one thing which investors and multinational 
companies are averse too.  US Ambassador Stevens had noticed a wider, more worrying 
trend; negotiations at the time were characterized by a ‘resource nationalism,’ of the like 
seen before in its dealings with Western companies.  Ambassador Stevens opined that,
‘although an alluring market for the oil and gas industry, Libya is an exceptionally














   
 






   
 
 
   
It was understood that the principle objective of Libyan ‘resource nationalism’
was ‘to increase the GOL’s -Government of Libya- control over and share of revenue
from hydrocarbon resources’ (my clarification).  An example of this was the
renegotiation of oil contracts such as that witnessed with the Italian company ENI.  
While this particular contract signalled a 25-year extension, the deal would also include
significant negatives, crucially in terms of financial incentives.  According to the
ambassador, this was generating fear amongst other international oil companies that the
Libyan government may extend the practice ‘in an effort to extract more favourable
terms’. These concerns expressed by the US ambassador would appear to become
reality in the years ahead as further re-negotiations took place with oil giants such as
Petro-Canada, Repsol, and Total.  In such cases, the foreign partner’s share of produced
oil was reduced by half (Saleh, 2009).  
There were other things also contributing to what the US ambassador had 
described as a ‘difficult environment’ (Stevens, 2007).  For instance, a range of 
measures were being imposed on foreign companies by the Libyan government which
was understood as efforts to ‘Libyanize’ the economy. These impacted directly on the
workforce of such companies, operating in the petrochemical as well as other industries. 
Demands made by Libyan governmental agencies on introducing quotas for Libyan 
workers in key positions were unwelcome interferences in the workings of multinational 
companies, particularly in the case that this supposed the hiring of lesser qualified
individuals. The US ambassador highlights once more the petrochemical sector,
understandable since it is the largest industry in Libya, informing that ‘IOCs are now
being forced to hire untrained Libyan employees.’ And he continues, ‘The Libyan
National Oil Company (NOC) has recently begun insisting that deputy general
managers, finance managers and human resource managers in local offices of IOC’s be
Libyan’ (Stevens, 2007).  
For all that, perhaps the greatest concern for the US government, and other 
Western liberal governments for that matter, was the possibility that Gaddafi and the
Libyan government could take steps to re-nationalize the petrochemical industry. This
idea was actually proposed openly by Gaddafi in the midst of a slump in crude oil
prices.  In reference to the ‘unbearable’ situation, Gaddafi speculates: ‘Oil exporting
countries may move toward nationalization because of the rapidly declining prices.  










   














quota obligations to OPEC he reflects, ‘Oil maybe should be owned by national
companies or the public sector at this point, in order to control oil prices, the oil
production or maybe to stop it' (Gaddafi, 2009; cited in Pleming, 2009).  The
dependency on oil revenues to which Libya had grown accustomed, coupled with the
extensive range of infrastructure projects being undertaken, meant that understandably
this was of significant concern for the Libyan government.
    Naturally, concerns of Western governments and multinationals revolved 
around their stakes in Libyan oil and how that would be effected by any Libyan
nationalization projects.  That said, US ambassador Cretz (30-01-2009) was confident
enough to grade these latest pronouncements by Gaddafi as a ‘feint’, concluding that
nationalization would be ‘unlikely’. This aroused speculation as to what the real
motivations, objectives and strategy were. While still not categorically ruling out the
possibility of nationalization, Cretz puts forward several other possible manoeuvres
aimed at seeking advantage or gaining concessions in other areas: firstly, the possibility
that Gaddafi is looking to gain ‘leverage’ in the re-negotiation of existing contracts with 
multinationals; secondly, that the threat of nationalization is a mere tactic to coerce
international oil companies (IOC's) to pay money into the US-Libyan ‘claims
compensation fund’ – see below-; thirdly, is the idea that the Libyan leader wants to 
‘establish a context’ for the subsequent reduction in oil production to below that
stipulated by OPEC; and finally, to ‘prepare the Libyan people’ for inevitable cuts
which would have to be made to the national budget, thus reneging on certain promises
already made.  
Issues arising from the question of the US – Libyan 'claims compensation fund'
appear to have been of particular concern to the US government during this period. The
claims settlement agreement had been set up to address financial claims being made in 
relation to previous terrorist acts- on the part of Libya- and military action- carried out
by the United States.  Nevertheless, the Libyan government had been vehemently
opposed to what was essentially a US judicially imposed operation, in order to force the 
Libyan government to make compensatory payments to the victims of past terrorist
actions.  Text in the original agreement stating that ‘contributions’ could be made by
‘private parties’ was seemingly enough for the Libyan government to put pressure on 
the IOC’s operating in Libya to pay into the fund.  As ambassador Cretz (04-02-2009) 





























operating in Libya that they “must” contribute to the U.S. -Libya comprehensive claims
fund by February 28th or suffer serious (but otherwise ill-defined) consequences’.  As
has already been mentiones, it is for these reasons that Libyan threats to nationalize the
petroleum industry were being viewed in relation to this issue.  At any rate, the pressure
being applied to IOC’s was, unsurprisingly, being viewed as unacceptable by the U.S. 
government, leading Ambassador Cretz to reaffirm his advocacy of a ‘no pressure red 
line’ (Not put pressure on the IOCs to pay into the fund).
  In terms of identity construction, a different picture emerges from the previous
analysis of the obstinate, obtrusive business practices of the Libyan government and 
foreign policy analysis.  The representations being made by the U.S. government and 
U.K government officials were ones that showed serious strains with the relations
between the countries and the fault for those were being attributed directly to Gaddafi
and the Libyan government.  In fact, it would appear that the policy of rapprochement
with Libya, along with the objective of ‘rehabilitation’, was being obstructed and 
hindered by a group within the Libyan government. Ambassador Stevens refers to them 
as the ‘old guard’, who were recalcitrant to change and perhaps to renounce the
privileges or spoils of a political system devoid of transparency or public/civil society
accountability. Thus it is possible to discern a dichotomy differentiating on the one
hand, an ‘old guard’, who are composed of more conservative elements in the
government; while on the other, the ‘reformists’ are positioned.  In relation to the
aforementioned perception of ‘resource nationalism’, it is understood that the
‘Reformist elements in the Libyan government’ are against this, understanding the
‘reality’ in which Libya ‘requires extensive foreign investment and participation by
credible IOCs’ (Stevens, 2007). 
The issues that were driving a wedge between the relations of Libya and the
West were also noted by commentators and analysts.  If the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse
was constructing the identities of ‘Libya’ and ‘Gaddafi’ as being ontologically and 
temporally changeable, these interventions cast doubt, even foreclosed, the possibility
of Libya being reintegrated, in its current form, back into the ‘International Society’ of 
states.  Writing in the Middle East Quarterly, Libyan dissident Mohammed el-Jahmi is
unsurprisingly scathing in his assessment of the U.S. policy of rapprochement with the
Libyan government.  He places issues of human rights and democratization within a
security discourse, arguing that ‘real security for both Libya and the United States will
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require democratic reform in Libya.’  However, he laments, ‘there is no indication…that 
Qadhafi is willing to loosen his grip on all levers of power, regardless of his pursuit of 
rapprochement with the West’. Acknowledging the Western discourse of ‘rehabilitation’ 
which has given meaning to the steps taken by the U.S. among others, el-Jahmi argues, 
in spite of this, that the ‘Libyan leader remains resistant to reform and intolerant of 
dissent.’ Indeed, it is the construction of the identity of Gaddafi which is of interest in 
el-Jahmi’s article.  The Libyan leader ‘is impervious to change,’ he argues, ‘his
assurances are fleeting,’ and any signs of reform are in fact illusory, being only the
‘image of reform’ which Gaddafi is interested in (El-Jahmi, 2006; my emphasis added).
Elsewhere, Pargeter believed that it was now a case of ‘reforming the
impossible’ (Pargeter, 2006).  While later, nearer the Western intervention, Dana Moss
condemns the Western foreign policy with Libya up until that point. Writing in the
influential think tank The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dana Moss (2010) 
encapsulates the idea of a failed ‘rapprochement’ or ‘rehabilitation’. According to her 
‘Key Findings’, ‘History repeats itself in various forms’.  Emphasis is thus taken away
from the future, as was prominent in the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse, and we are back
again in the region of historical determinism.  Citing, ‘Qadhafi’s backtracking on key
provisions of the arrangement and the persistence of Libyan foreign policy in direct
opposition to U.S. interests,’ Moss is able to conclude that ‘engagement does not create
behaviour change’.  On the contrary, it is ‘effective multilateral sanctions’ –in other
words punishment of the ‘rogue’- which encourage behaviour change, and even then,
‘change will be limited when there is no regime change’ (Moss, 2010: 48).  
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CHAPTER 6 CONSTRUCTION OF THE BASIC
DISCOURSES 
Through an analysis of a broad range of texts and empirical data, it can be shown 
that the debate on the political violence in Libya of 2011 revolved around two basic
discourses.  Before tracing these, it should be recalled that the purpose of identifying
basic discourses is to give structure to the analysis (Hansen, 2005).  As abstract, 
analytical constructions, they are not to be understood as pure, objective forms; rather,
they should be used as ‘ideal-type’ discourses which can be used as a starting point from 
which to analyse the complexity and temporal progression of policy discourses
deployed as responses to political events like war and armed conflict.  Moreover, the
basic discourses should be assembled from the greatest possible number of sources.  As
has been highlighted in the methodological section, this will be achieved through 
analysis of two discursive levels: official discourse, as exemplified by political leaders
and high-ranking officials, and opposition discourse, which is to be found in national
political debates and media sources.  The basic discourses, once identified, allow for a
further examination of how both the Self and Other identities are given meaning, and
how these identity constructions point to different foreign policy options. 
The basic ‘human rights’ discourse 
In the case at hand, the first thing to be detected is that the violence in Libya of 
2011 was being situated ethically, and a prevalence of references to ‘human rights’ is to 
be found throughout the debate. This translates into a basic ‘human rights’ discourse in 
as far as it is used in attempts to fix the identities of those involved in the violence along 
ethical lines. This can be seen articulated clearly throughout early coverage of the
events in Western media discourse.  One of the ways that this is achieved is through
recourse to human rights groups for their assessment of events.  As such, these agencies





















    
in that they are considered the legitimate agents to define and speak about the situation 
unfolding and indeed that there are in fact human rights abuses taking place.  Human 
Rights Watch, the Human Rights Council, and Amnesty, amongst others, are all cited
frequently to offer authoritative accounts of what was happening and how many people
had died.  One such example can be found in the Guardian as it states that, ‘the
International Federation of Human Rights estimated the death toll at 300 to 400’
(Meikle and Black, 22/02/2011). 
It is not even necessary to refer specifically to ‘human rights’, as at other times
this can be inferred from the humanitarian language being used.  Turning to the human
rights abuses themselves, these are reported in the media in different ways.  At times the 
language used resorts to that which has become commonplace within the humanitarian 
lexicon.  Take for example the headline ‘Atrocities in Libya’, to be found in an editorial
in the Washington Post on the 21nd February.  Such headlines leave us in no doubt that
the events in Libya are characterised by an extreme level of violence, of which human 
rights abuses can be assumed to be a significant part.  In the same article the author 
continues: ‘the beleaguered dictatorship of Moammar Gaddafi was waging war against
its own people and committing atrocities that demand not just condemnation but action 
by the outside world’ (Washington Post; Moammar Gaddafi must pay, 2011)36 .
There were also media reports which drew attention to more concrete instances
of human rights abuses.  Examples of this were reports that the Libyan security services
were shooting unarmed protesters or attacking them from the air with military aircraft.
One example of this can be found in the Washington Post: ‘They have opened fire with 
heavy weapons against unarmed protesters.  They have trained sniper fire on peaceful
funeral processions.  They have terrorized urban neighbourhoods with random gunfire
designed to make people cower in their homes rather than join the uprising’ (Robinson, 
2011).   Another aspect of these claims was that foreign mercenaries were being used to
carry out the attacks.  This was reported in all of the newspapers analysed.  For instance, 
on the 21st February the Guardian ran with the headline ‘mercenary attacks fail to deter 
anti-Gaddafi protests’ (Chirisafis, 2011).  Along similar lines, the Washington Post
wrote, ‘Mr Gaddafi has unleashed an orgy of bloodshed in the capital, Tripoli, using 
36The International Crisis Group (2011) criticized at the time the ‘one-sided view of the logic of events’
presented by much of Western media coverage. This portrayed ‘the protest movement as entirely
peaceful,’ and suggested that ‘the regime’s security forces were unaccountably massacring unarmed 
demonstrators who presented no security challenge’.  
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foreign mercenaries and aircraft to attack his own people’ (Why was, 2011).  Rumour 
and heresy were also being used to express the idea of human rights abuses as one
example from the Guardian suggests: ‘it is like an apocalyptic Hollywood film. There
are even rumours of systematic male rape in this elegant city of jacaranda trees and
Italianate buildings’ Reporter Ian Birrell does, however, express caution on stating ‘who 
knows what is true and what is false’ (Birrell, 2011).  
Reports of violence and human rights abuses taking place in Libya were, 
generally speaking, placed within the confines of a wider ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon.  
The ‘Arab Spring’ context ensured that the geographical scripting of Libya, and the
political violence taking place, was understood within a wider regional setting.
Examples of this can be found in all four newspapers analysed: ‘Middle East unrest:
From Tripoli to Tehran, Arab Spring sprouts new wave of fury’ (Middle East, the
Guardian, 17/02/2011); The New York Times reported, ‘the protests sweeping the
Middle East reached Libya on Wednesday (Cowell, 2011); ‘Middle East Crisis’ in the
Telegraph, (Spencer, 2011); and, ‘..with the Middle East protest movement widening to 
Libya..’ in the Washington Post, (Mufson, 2011).  Attempts to distinguish between 
Libya and the other countries in the region are mostly restricted to economic factors – 
references are made to Libya’s oil deposits- and demographic factors–the relatively
sparse population density in Libya compared with neighbouring countries-.  Generally
speaking, though, the protests in Libya and human rights abuses taking place were being 
constructed in relation to events in the region such as those in Tunisia and Egypt.  
This means that the identity of those involved was often constructed as
‘protesters’, ‘demonstrators’, or generally speaking ‘civilians’.  One instance of this is
in the Guardian: ‘Some protesters armed with stones and petrol bombs had set fire to
vehicles and fought with police in the city’s Shaiara Square’ in what was to be a pre-
planned ‘day of rage’ and ‘Libya became the latest Arab country to experience mass
protests yesterday with violent clashes in Benghazi and a crackdown on protesters and 
media’ (Middle East Unrest, 2011).  Another way that one can infer a ‘civilian’ identity
is by the way in which the political turmoil was constructed as ‘popular’, such as in 
‘popular uprising’ or ‘popular revolt’.    Examples of this can be taken from both of the
newspapers of the United States.  The New York Times makes explicit references to a
‘popular uprising’ (Haberman, 2011), and similarly, the Washington Post also makes
























   
 
 
the town of Misurata: ‘Misurata lies on the coast between Gaddafi’s home town of Sirte
and the capital, Tripoli, where he still appears to command enough support to hold at
bay the popular uprising that has engulfed other parts of Libya’ (Fadel and Sly, 2011). 
In opposition, it is the Libyan leader Gaddafi himself, and often accompanied by
his ‘Libyan regime’, who is assigned responsibility for the violence and human rights
abuses taking place, and often accompanied by his ‘Libyan regime’. When using the
‘human rights’ discourse, all of the newspapers analysed often attribute Libyan military
actions to him, as can be seen from the following examples in first the Telegraph and 
then the Guardian: ‘Gaddafi’s bloody onslaught begins’ (Blomfield, 2011); ‘Gaddafi
relied on brute force to crush what began last week as peaceful protests but now
threaten his regime’ (Black, 2011).   The New York Times refers to him as ‘Libya’s
butcher’ (Libya’s Butcher, 2011), while the Washington Post also appeared to be in no 
doubt as to who was the aggressor: ‘Once again, an Arab dictator is employing criminal
violence in a desperate effort to remain in power...This time, the tyrant is one of the
Middle East’s most evil men – Moammar Gaddafi’ (Why was, 2011).  Later in a New
York Times editorial a good example of how the ‘Arab Spring’ geographical script is
used alongside the demonization of Gaddafi: ‘The courageous protesters who overthrew 
Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia have inspired the
world...It would be a disaster if Colonel Qaddafi managed to cling to power by
butchering his own people’ (Washington’s Options, 2011). 
In addition, the character of Gaddafi is often depicted in ways which clearly
borrow from historical constructions of him, some of which take aim at his mental
stability or somewhat un-Western manner. On the 22nd of February, the Telegraph wrote 
that, ‘A WILD and desperate-looking Colonel Muammar Gaddafi staged a dramatic
defence of his collapsing 42-year rule last night’ (Spencer, 2011).  Another piece in the
Guardian continues this theme as Gaddafi is depicted as crazy. Written under the
headline, ‘The king of king’s speech: Wild words from a ruler who hasn’t learned 
anything’, Jon Henley continues: ‘Muammar Gaddafi's television appearance on 
Monday night was cogent, coherent and, most important, brief. Still pretty weird, 
certainly, but with hindsight - and the explanations of more knowledgeable colleagues - 
it kind of made sense.  But then, sadly, the Brother Leader and King of Kings blew it. 
Yesterday saw the Libyan leader back at his barking best.  It was wild, bombastic, 
























self-styled Figurehead of a Thousand African Nations’ (Henley, 2011). 
Thus, the basic ‘human rights’ discourse constructs ‘Gaddafi’ as the radical Other, 
along with his Libyan ‘regime,’ while the victims were most often depicted as
‘civilians’, in one way or another. This means that the basic ‘human rights discourse is
composed of a split Libyan Other, and one which displays traces of previous historical
discourses identified in Part 2.  The basic ‘human rights’ discourse borrows elements
from the ‘terrorist’ and ‘rogue state’ discourses, previously delineated, and by-passes
mostly the ‘rehabilitation’ discourse.  From the ‘terrorist’ and the ‘rogue state’
discourses come the idea of a violent crazed ‘tyrant’ and his illegitimate ‘regime’. To a
large extent, the stability of the ‘human rights abuses’ discourse relies on this very
distinction, which clearly demarcates who the victims and who the belligerents are.  
Once this is clouded or starts to dissolve, it is no longer entirely clear which side the
Western countries should be on. 
The construction of events in Libya in these ways generates an ethical
responsibility on the part of Western countries, and the international community as a
whole.  It is one which points to a policy of humanitarian intervention and the
protection of the civilian population.  The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine
would be invoked throughout the debate, as can be found in the debate in the House of 
Commons which took place on the 21st of March.  Leader of the opposition in the UK, 
Edward Miliband, was convinced that such an ethical responsibility was to be derived 
from the R2P doctrine. As he put it, ‘a debate is often conducted about rights to 
intervene, but this debate is about not rights but responsibilities. The decade-long debate 
about the “responsibility to protect” speaks precisely to this question’. And in relation
to the events themselves, Miliband is in no doubt why decisive action is needed by the
UK government.  He continues, ‘our intentions are right: we are acting to protect the
Libyan people, to save lives, and to prevent the Gaddafi regime from committing 
serious crimes against humanity’ (Miliband, 2011). 
To demonstrate that the basic ‘human rights’ discourse had dispersion throughout
the general debate on the events in Libya, one need only point to the UN resolutions that 
were passed.  Both Resolutions 1970 and 1973 themselves insisted on the ‘protection’ of 
the ‘civilian population’.  Resolution 1970 expressed severe criticism: ‘deploring the













demonstrators’ while Resolution 1973 approved a no-fly zone in order to ‘protect
civilians’ (UN Security Council, 2011).  And while in these cases the figure of Gaddafi
was not cited directly, the failure of the Libyan authorities to protect civilians was quite
clearly the main concern and reason enough for both resolutions to receive the required
level of support with no vetoes by the five permanent members.  
In addition, turning the attention to academic articles written during the Western-
led intervention, it is also possible to see evidence of the basic ‘human rights’ discourse. 
Several articles written take for granted that the situation in Libya was characterised by
human rights abuses, thus allowing them to speak uncritically about what would appear 
to be a Western policy of protection of the Libyan people.  For instance, Alex Bellamy
(2011) wonders whether Western actions in Libya could spark, ‘a new politics of 
protection?’ Thomas G. Weiss (2011: 291)  is sure that the ‘dominant motivation for 
using military force was to protect civilians’, and that this ‘was due to the kind of 
murderous harm that Muammar el-Qaddafi inflicted on unarmed civilians early in 
March 2011’.  For Jennifer Welsh (2011), it was all about ‘civilian protection,’ while for 
Simon Chesterman (2011: 283), the speed of the response can be explained by ‘the
unusual clarity of the situation in Libya’ and that ‘impending massacres are rarely so 
easy to foresee’.  What will be seen is that Chesterman’s ‘clarity’ about the situation in 
Libya was certainly not shared by others who were witness to a much more complex set











The basic ‘civil war’ discourse 
Not long after the first media reports of serious unrest and human rights abuses
in Libya, a counter-discourse appeared in the media.  This discourse would challenge
and de-stabilize the ‘human rights’ discourse by constructing the events in terms of a
‘civil war’.  In such cases, it is perfectly logical that a counter-discourse should emerge
in a temporally different period from the first, even if this should be only a matter of 
days or weeks (Hansen, 2006).  As violence spreads and increases in scale, events can
start to take on a different shape and may consequently be explained discursively along 
different lines.  In the media coverage analysed, many of the first mentions of ‘civil
war’ are suggestive of this as a future possibility, rather than a distinct reality, yet not
long after though, the ‘civil war’ discourse would transpose to the present tense.  In the





















   
 
  
death’ (Spencer, 2011), and ‘Libya’s descent into civil war’ (Ambrose, 2011).  In his
‘warning to would-be interventionists in Libya’, David Ignatius writes in the
Washington Post that ‘the United States will be injecting itself into a Muslim nation's
civil war’ (Ignatius, 2011).  
The basic ‘civil war’ discourse is a direct challenge to the ‘human rights’
discourse principally due to the fact that it constructs the identity of the Libyan Other in
different ways.  Gone are the references to ‘protesters’, ‘demonstrators’ or ‘civilians’, in 
opposition to ‘Gaddafi’.  Instead, a new opposition is erected between ‘loyalists’ on the
one hand, and ‘rebels’ on the other.  This can be seen in media reports which inform
that: ‘Gaddafi loyalists were engaged in fierce fighting with rebels who had hoped to
march on Sirte, Gaddafi's home town and a strategically vital city still under tight
government control,’ (Hendrix et al, 2011); ‘Muammar el-Qaddafi's loyalists clashed
with rebels,’ (Cowell, 2011); and, ‘On the western border with Tunisia, rebels and 
loyalists fought all day Thursday for control of a strategic crossing that the rebels seized 
in a surprise move last week’ (Chivers, 2011).  
The first thing of note about the use of the term ‘rebels,’ is that it is not
suggestive of the same innocence when compared with ‘civilians’.  Clearly it is one
thing to speak of civilians protesting, and another to position a group –or groups- of 
‘rebels’ against ‘loyalists’.  Indeed, as can be deduced from the previous newspaper
references, it is now impossible to maintain that those people involved in the fighting 
were peaceful. The New York Times makes this connection between the identity of the
‘rebels’ and their readiness to use arms: ‘..but witnesses said that the rebels seemed to
use every weapon at their disposal, including Katyusha rockets, multiple grenade
launchers and antiaircraft guns as they tried to dislodge the loyalists’ (Fahim, 2011). 
Earlier media reports on the ‘rebels’ actions underline this.  Take for example
Guardian reporter Peter Beaumont’s early account of the scene in ‘rebel-held’ Zawiyah- 
it is worth quoting at length here-: ‘In the distance a crowd and flags were visible. Men 
waved us forward.  A short walk brought into view a tank flying the rebels’ tricolour and 
an anti-aircraft gun mounted on a pick-up.  Some of the crowd had shotguns and
hunting rifles.  Others had AK-47s.’ And in another moment, ‘A man in a mix of 
military and civilian clothing pulled me up on to a tank pointing towards abandoned


















believe what the army and government tells you. Zawiyah is under our control. We
answer to the interim government in Benghazi," he said’ (Beaumont, 2011).  
Constructing the political violence in Libya through a ‘civil war’ discourse has
important implications for the geographical scripting of the country.  Since this diverges 
significantly from the events which had transpired in Tunisia and Egypt, references to 
the ‘Arab spring’, the ‘Arab World’ or ‘Middle Eastern’ region are rendered somewhat
incongruent or redundant.  This signals a palpable shift in that the geographical lens
through which the ‘civil war’ must now be understood is predominantly a national one. 
This is in evidence by the way reports either make national-regional distinctions, or 
focus specifically on battles taking place for supremacy in Libya’s cities and towns.  
The New York Times provides a good example of this on the 10th March: ‘In the
western half of the country, elite government troops continued to pound the besieged
rebel-held city of Zawiyah, only 30 miles from Tripoli, the capital and Colonel
Qaddafi's stronghold.  Across the country from each other, in fights of vastly different
complexions, Ras Lanuf and Zawiyah have become proving grounds in Libya's
emerging civil war’ (Fahim and Kirkpatrick, 2011)’.  
A regional emphasis was also particularly prevalent in reports utilizing the ‘civil
war’ discourse.  In particular, ‘west’ and ‘east’ divisions are evident, a spatial
demarcation which is able to differentiate between the two principal regional blocks- 
Tripolitania in western Libya, and Cyrenaica in the eastern part-. ‘If the status quo of 
Gaddafi holding the west and the rebels holding the east is going to change, something 
has to give in the coming days,’ suggested the Guardian (Chulov, 2011).  On the 8th 
March the Washington Post also opts for precisely this spatiality: ‘but with neither side
able to muster overwhelming force, the result appeared to be a bloody stalemate, with 
the death tolls rising in both east and west from the burgeoning civil war over 
Moammar Gaddafi's 41-year-long rule’ (Hendrix and Faiola, 2011).  There is also a
tendency at this stage to focus on Benghazi, Cyrenaica and eastern Libya as the base of 
the ‘rebels’. ‘Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton travels to the region Monday
for meetings with representatives of the rebels' provisional government, the National
Transitional Council, based in the eastern city of Benghazi’ (Leiby and Wilson, 2011).  
While speculating about possibly, ‘the opening battle of a civil war,’ Martin Chulov 

















   




when. On Wednesday morning, sooner than many had expected, Gaddafi's men came
for them’ (Chulov, 2011). 
A national-regional spatialisation of the conflict was also used by Libyan scholar 
Dirk Vandewalle when writing in Foreign Policy magazine around the beginning of the
violence. Vandewalle’s article took the form of a warning to US policy makers, both 
about recognising the National Transitional Council, and underestimating the
complexity of the political situation in Libya.  In his opinion, ‘The United States should 
resist recognizing any regional body – such as the recently created Libyan National
Council in Cyrenaica, which France has just recognized’.  The reason for this, is that
‘the resentment within Tripolitania and Fezzan would be enormous’. As can be seen, 
there is a clear national-regional focus in Vandewalle’s reasoning.  And he continues,
‘though the rebels may claim they represent Libya, they clearly do not at this point; they 
are a collection of Cyrenaica-based tribal leaders, notables, and former military
personnel that leaves Tripolitania in the cold’ (Vandewalle, 2011). 
This does not mean, it must be said, that Libya is always extracted from its wider 
Middle Eastern spatial setting.  It’s just that when this is referred to, it is no longer to 
position Libya as part of a wider regional phenomenon or movement.  Libya is extracted 
from the temporal context of the present and transported back to other historical
reference points.  While the basic ‘human rights’ discourse, with its opposition between 
‘Gaddafi’ and ‘Civilians,’ had found its natural temporal and spatial precedents in the
‘Arab spring’ uprisings of Tunisia and Egypt, the basic ‘civil war’ shows a tendency to 
bypass this.  Instead, analogies would often be anchored in conflicts such as that of Iraq 
or Afghanistan, examples of previous Western interventions which are widely viewed to 
have gone awry.  Significantly, these countries are also indicative of civil conflict
situations.  In this way, references to Iraq and Afghanistan would often be used to warn 
of the perils of intervention in Libya. Writing in the Guardian on the 3rd of March, 
Seamus Milne writes: ‘It’s as if the bloodbaths of Iraq and Afghanistan had been a bad 
dream.  The liberal interventionists are back. As insurrection and repression has split
Libya in two and the death toll has mounted, the old Bush-and-Blair battlecries have
returned to haunt us’ (Milne, 2011).  Meanwhile, Ross Douthat of the New York Times
is even more concise, headlining his piece with simply, ‘Iraq Then, Libya Now.’ Having 





















goes onto to warn that now ‘a similar chorus is arguing that the United States should 
intervene directly in Libya’s civil war’ (Douthat, 2011). 
Another way of constructing a 'civil war' or civil conflict situation was to speak 
of the different tribes in Libya.  Once more, this takes Libya further away from more
general 'Arab' or 'Middle East' spatial categories, towards situating Libya within a
national geographical frame.  Since the tribes were often characterised in terms of 
rivalries, or again in relation with national-regional boundaries, the homogeneity of 
Libya as spatial entity is severely undermined.  A good example of this can be found in
an article by Lisa Anderson, who has written extensively on the Middle East and Libya.
In her attempts at 'demystifying the Arab Spring', she wants to highlight the differences
between what was happening in Libya, and what was happening elsewhere in Egypt and 
Tunisia. Although Gaddafi is named as the principle problem, the distrust that Libyans
have in their government has meant that 'they took refuge in the solace of tribe and 
family'. The result of this is that 'Libyan society has been fractured', and the 'ragtag 
bands of armed rebels in the eastern provinces', can be viewed in relation to the 'tribal
and regional cleavages that have beset the country for decades' (Anderson, 2011: 2 and 
6). 
The basic 'civil war' discourse, without eradicating entirely the ethical
responsibility that Western countries had for the Libyan people, points to a different set
of policy options.  It suggests that it is no longer possible to solve the problems in Libya 
by enforcing a no-fly zone alone -both sides are evenly matched and one may not gain 
the upper hand any time soon-, and even the assisted removal of Gaddafi would most
likely not heal the fractures and divisions in Libya implied from a civil war type
situation.  Most logical under these circumstances would be a policy aimed at bringing
about a political solution to the crisis.  This was indeed what UN special envoy for 
Libya Abdel-Elah Al-Khatib was making clear after visiting 'both sides' in the conflict:
'I think every crisis and conflict needs to be solved in a political manner.  We need to
solve it politically and I do not believe that at the end of the day the military
confrontation can provide the solution that people aspire to.  In the end it has to be a
political solution’ (Al-Khatib, 2011). 
This was also the assessment of the African Union.  Speaking on behalf of the
African Union Ad Hoc Committee at a meeting with the UN Security Council on June






















actions of NATO in taking sides in an internal conflict. As he puts it, 'the UN or 
anybody acting on behalf of the UN must be neutral in relation to the internal affairs of 
states. Certainly, that should be the case with respect to the African countries. The UN
should not take sides in a civil war, for instance, in an African country. The UN should 
promote dialogue, reconciliation, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and help in 
enforcing agreements arrived at after negotiations such as the agreement on the Sudan.'
And he continues, 'The crisis in Libya requires a political solution and not a military
one; and the AU Road Map is the most viable option' (Rugunda, 2011). 
Thus, as analytical constructions, put forward is a basic 'human rights' discourse, 
and in opposition to that there is a basic 'civil war' discourse.  Both discourses construct
the identities of those involved in a markedly different way, pointing thus to alternative
foreign policy options for Western governments.  Yet it is the 'human rights' discourse
which is judged to be of critical importance here.  This is the dominant discourse used 
by Western governments to give meaning to the events in Libya, and it is also the
question of human rights that the 'civil war' discourse is ultimately concerned with.
Should there be no peaceful solution to the conflict, or even an exacerbation of the
conflict through imprudent external actions, the possibility of further, even more
widespread abuses, would be a distinct possibility.  For these reasons, it becomes
important to trace at this stage the history of the 'human rights' concept.  Guided by one
of the main theoretical premises of this thesis, namely that the Western state is
performatively constituted throughout time by a range of discursive practices, the
challenge now is to see how the concept 'human rights' has featured in US and UK
foreign policy discourse, and to see how it has been mobilized in different
performances.  This should allow for a greater understanding of the Western
performance of 'human rights' in Libya in 2011. (See Diagram 7 below) 
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CHAPTER 7 PERFORMING HUMAN RIGHTS: HUMAN
RIGHTS, SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY 
As was argued in Chapter 2, one of the ways in which the Western state has
constituted its identity is through security practices which establish an inside from a
dangerous outside.  By studying how these practices bring the Western state into being,
it became possible for Bialasievicz et al (2007) to uncover a change in US geopolitical
strategy, moving towards one of ‘integration’ after the end of the Cold War. Yet the
identity of the US state is not simply that of sovereign protector; the US state is also 
moral. Taking this assertion to be the starting point for this chapter, the task to be
undertaken is twofold: firstly, to inquire into how the moral identity of the US and UK
has been constituted through a ‘human rights’ discourse; secondly, to understand how
the ‘human rights’ discourse has coexisted with the ‘security’ discourse, teasing out the
complexities of this uneasy, ambiguous and often contradictory relationship. Thus, it
will be important to understand how performances of ‘human rights’ are made in 
accordance with context, specific geopolitical imaginaries, and the security strategies
which result from them. 
This section aims to show how different performances of ‘human rights’ are the
work of re-citation, re-iteration and at the same time re-formulation.  Since discourses
and the identities produced are performatively constituted throughout time, the different
articulations of ‘human rights’ to be found in US and UK foreign policy must exhibit
certain continuities.  It will be shown how these performances of ‘human rights’ have
consistently constituted the Western moral identity by privileging the values of freedom
and democracy, even if action in promoting these values has been unmistakeably
uneven. This, in itself, is not unusual, since it would be impossible for Western 
governments to act or respond in the same way to every incidence considered to be an
abuse of human rights.  The Western state is subject to a range of different discourses – 
such as ‘security’ discourses- and therefore cannot be expected to act in the same way
on every occasion. It will be through the re-iteration of key themes like ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’ within performances of ‘human rights’ that the effects of performativity
can be discerned.  Particular attention will be paid to the post-Cold War period, in which 



















strategy of ‘integration’.  In short, this will be an inquiry into how the projection of 
‘universal’ values has been achieved alongside the pursuit of more narrow national
interests. 
Human rights as an ideological weapon �
Since the end of the Cold War, ‘human rights’ has occupied a significant place
within U.S. and U.K. foreign policy and security discourse. Yet it is possible to go back 
even further.  In particular, the presidency of Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) stands out for 
the emphasis that his administration placed on human rights and the advocacy of a
moral approach to U.S. engagements with the outside World.  That Carter should place
so much emphasis on promoting a moral foreign policy should not have come as too
much of a surprise, taking into account his religious upbringing and staunch beliefs in 
protestant Christianity. Yet one must also recognize the specific context in which Carter 
was victorious.  This came at a time when the war in Vietnam had already sapped U.S. 
political, military, and perhaps more importantly, moral strength.  The failure of brute
force in stalling what was perceived to be the Communist threat in the South-East Asian 
country was evidence that a change in approach was needed.  ‘Our people have learned,’ 
Carter assured, ‘the folly of our trying to inject our power into the internal affairs of 
other nations’ (Carter, 1976; cited in Kirkpatrick, 1981).  
Yet Carter was not merely criticizing the previous administration for committing 
the mistake of projecting its military power into other sovereign states.  Carter was a
firm believer in that a set of universal principles could provide the international
framework, which in turn, could ultimately bring about lasting peace. Thus for him, 
‘peace is the unceasing effort to preserve human rights’ (Carter, 1976).  The cornerstone 
of these universal values had to be that of ‘freedom’.  Speaking after being inaugurated, 
he declared: ‘because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom
elsewhere.  Our moral sense dictates a clear-cut preference for those societies which 
share with us an abiding respect for individual human rights’ (Carter, 1977.  Finally, the
U.S is understood to be the country to bring about the changes required.  In what would 



















that ‘we have once again become a beacon light for peace and hope, for disarmament, 
for human rights’ (Carter, 1977).  
The way in which the Carter administration was constituting the US identity
through these performances is certainly noteworthy.  In seeking to draw a line between 
the previous administration and his own, he is concurrently suggesting that it was not
the real US which had undertaken the controversial foreign policy actions under his
predecessors.  It had been led astray from its values, pursuing the ‘flawed and erroneous 
principles and tactics of our adversaries’ (Carter, 1977).  In this way, Carter’s
ostentatiously ‘new American foreign policy’, with human rights as a ‘fundamental
tenet’, can almost be understood as a return to the past, a re-affirmation of its core
principles and values, a return to the true identity of the United States.  What is being 
advocated is a ‘foreign policy that is ‘democratic’ and based on ‘fundamental values’, 
but one that also remains true to the US’s ‘essential character as a nation’ (Carter, 1977). 
This final point is significant in as far as it is illustrative of the performativity of 
the ‘human rights’ discourse itself.  Carter’s pronouncements are dependent on the re-
iteration of past articulations of human rights, and in particular ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’.  For the Democrat leader, however, the reference points are clearly not
just the Universal Declaration of Human Rights drawn up by the United Nations in
1945. The pronouncements being made are anchored in the historical constitution of the 
United States nation itself and the idea of American exceptionalism which emerges with 
it. As Carter put it, ‘our policy is based on an historical vision of America’s role’
(Carter, 1977). The ‘exceptional appeal’ of the United States comes from the fact that
the US was ‘the first society openly to define itself in terms of both spirituality and
freedom’.  And from these unique origins comes a ‘special obligation,’ obliging its
subjects to ‘take on those moral duties which, when assumed, seem invariably to be in 
our own best interests’ (Carter, 1977).  Two further things are of note here.  ‘Human 
rights’ becomes almost synonymous with the very values that are said to be America’s
own, and that adherence to these values -both inherently American and of the human 
race- will be in America’s own interests.   
That said, Carter’s performance also represents a new historically contingent
articulation of the human rights discourse.  These pronouncements diverge from
previous articulations in two main ways.  The first thing is related with the ontological
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status of the concept itself, which would have important implications for the way in 
which the human rights discourse is to be applied. This was grounded in the insistence
that ‘our commitment to human rights must be absolute’ (Carter, 1977: my emphasis
added). The very fact that human rights are supposed to be universal and inalienable
would seem to render this a somewhat banal assertion or even tautology. Yet this
represented a marked difference in outlook from the belligerence of the realist
conceptions to be found in both the previous and future administrations.  For the Carter 
administration this is an affirmation of the transcendence of human rights.  On the
importance of the ‘human rights condition,’ National Security Advisor Brzezinski
commented: ‘ultimately the human being in whatever the social, economic, or cultural
conditions, yearns for something transcendental, yearns for some self-definition with
respect to his uniqueness, yearns for something which dignifies him as a spiritual being’ 
(Brzezinski, 1978; cited from Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States,
1977-1980). 
Another aspect of Carter’s conception of human rights which shows a diversion 
from past and future accounts is the inclusion of socio-economic rights.  As Forsythe
has noted, with the exception of the Great Depression and the New Deal, tangible
policies in the US which emphasise these as rights are sparse.  The emphasis often 
placed on individual responsibility in political and economic life means that talk of 
socio-economic rights can be viewed as something of an ‘aberration from the norm’
(Forsythe, 2002:502).  Carter’s project was somewhat different, however.  Not only did 
he call for greater equality and help for the poor, but that he was attempting to construct
a universal framework of values- based on human rights- which could appeal to
different peoples from varied cultural, religious and ideological persuasions.  By
including socio-economic rights as part of his human rights conception, therefore, 
Carter is both satisfying his own personal moral outlook, and moreover reaching out to
the demands which were likely to arise from other corners of the globe too.   
The inclusion of socio-economic rights formed part of what would be three main 
pillars of human rights set out by Secretary of State Vance, and which would make up 
the general foundations of Carter’s human rights policy.  Firstly, under what is known as 
‘integrity of the person,’ individuals are understood to have the right to be free from
government violations such as those related to torture, inhuman treatment, and arbitrary

























food, shelter, health care and education. And finally, there is the right to civil and 
political liberties; amongst others, one could highlight freedom of thought, assembly,
speech, the press, and freedom to take part in government (Vance, 1977).  Having traced 
these three poles, questions surrounding which one would take precedence became an
immediate issue to be dealt with. This can be seen in a memo sent by Jessica Tuchman 
to NSC advisor Brzezinski raising precisely this point.  Her personal assessment was
that it is the first of these three which should receive most focus, a judgement which
seems to have been taken on board by Carter (Tuchman, 1977).  There is certainly
significant evidence of this, perhaps most notable in Latin America and amongst states
essentially allied to the U.S.   
The centrality of human rights in the Carter administration’s foreign policy
materialised in certain important ways.  Firstly, the appointment of Patricia Murphy
Derian as Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs –  title later changed 
to Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor- was one
which appeared to correspond with previously articulated intentions.  Derian was a
known civil rights and human rights activist, and would go on to make her presence felt
by her outspoken criticism of certain countries, and her clashes with those officials
harbouring more overt security concerns.  Secondly, the expansion of the Bureau of 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs was felt both in terms of the number of 
Foreign Service officers working on human rights issues, and also the competences
which they were assigned to deal with.  The bureau would be involved with asylum,
refugee and migration affairs, and also the formulation of annual country reports used to 
assess human rights abuses.  These reports were to assist decisions on whether or not to 
withhold economic and military aid to those countries that were not fulfilling their
obligations.  Furthermore, and in order to give credibility to the administrations focus
on human rights, Carter signed five international human rights treaties37 . 
37These were: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and 
the American Convention on Human Rights.  The United States has only ratified the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.
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The conception of human rights as absolute, universal, and as part of an 
international framework, found its greatest expression in public criticism of enemies and 
friends alike, and in how the administration used the provision of aid to coax offending 
governments to change their ways. This points to a struggle for universal values which
was not being undertaken merely on the basis of a bipolar ideological World; there is
recognition that countries under the US sphere of influence also do not reach the
required standards.  Several authoritarian regimes which had aligned themselves with 
the United States were subject to penalties, such as the withdrawal of aid, and-or 
received forthright criticism from the highest echelons of US political power (Carleton 
and Stohl, 1985).  One such example of this was the case of Chile, and this can be seen
quite clearly from comments made by President Carter in a press conference after a
meeting with Chilean Leader General Agustin Pinochet.  In what can only be
understood as candid criticism of an allied country, Carter affirmed that ‘the reputation 
of their (Pinochet and Chilean leaders) country has been very poor in the field of human 
rights’.  In response to a question regarding relations between the U.S and Chile, and 
concretely the appropriateness of relations with ‘dictators’, Carter insists on the
productive nature of having dialogue with such countries and stresses the potential for 
future improvements in political freedoms.  
For all that, this does not mean that strategic concerns in relation to the Cold War 
had been completely discarded. This period is not only significant for the way in which
human rights became a ‘fundamental tenet’ of U.S. foreign policy, it also stands out for 
the way in which human rights began to be used as a ‘major political weapon’.  On the
one hand, the Carter administration was looking to avoid direct confrontation with the
Soviet Union, but on the other, the appeals to universal values allowed them to
challenge Communism ideologically. As Brzezinski (1997) has since acknowledged: ‘I 
will not hide the fact that I also thought that there was some instrumental utility in our 
pursuit of human rights vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, because at the time the Soviet Union 
was putting us ideologically on the defensive’.  Part of the problem, as understood by
Brzezinski, was that the communist doctrine was accompanied by teleological claims
positing the ‘historical inevitability of class revolution’.  To directly counter this very
notion, Brzezinski used, ‘very deliberately’, the phrase ‘human rights has become the
genuine historical inevitability of our times’ (Brzezinski, 1995; his emphasis).  In this





















   
 
 
their head and constitute the Other as morally and ideologically inferior to the Western
Self.
Indeed, human rights were a crucial component of a wider strategy built around 
the concept of ‘reciprocal accommodation’ or ‘détente’.  It is possible to see in 
documents from this period how the strategy was being set out and the situation of 
human rights within it.  ‘Reciprical accomodation-détente-,’ as it was summarized by
Brzezinski, had four key components: ‘containment,’ ‘resistance to indirect expansion,’
‘ideological competition,’ and what he considers ‘most important and above all,’ the
‘creation of a framework within which the Soviet Union can accommodate with us, or 
face the prospect of isolating itself globally’ (Brzezinski, 1978; his emphasis).  One of 
the main objectives during Carter’s presidency was the reduction of weapons and this
was being pursued via the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT).  The ‘framework’
that Brzezinski refers to, of which human rights would be an important part, can be
understood as a mechanism through which to try and pressure or coax the Soviet Union 
into accepting U.S. proposals.  Along more general lines, Brzezinski is also keen to
assert that affirming human rights ‘greatly increases the moral appeal of the United
States’, at a time when the temporal context was seen to be characterised by a ‘global
yearning for human rights’, which was ‘ready to be tapped’ (Brzezinski, 1978).  
There can be no doubt that during the Carter presidency, ‘human rights’ was an
important facet of the U.S – Soviet relationship.  From the very first year of his
mandate, Carter raised the issue directly with top Soviet officials including Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko.  In what appears to be an expression of ‘reciprocal
accommodation-détente-,’ Carter assured his interlocutor: ‘the concern you expressed 
about human rights in our country, as well as our public concern over this question in 
the Soviet Union, could lead to a broadening of human rights in both countries’ (Carter,
1977; cited from Petersen, 2014).  Part of the focus being put on human rights was
translated into support for Soviet dissidents and dissident groups- this support was in 
fact pledged by Carter during his Presidential campaign before reaching the White
House-.  One of the higher profile cases was that of Soviet scientist and dissident Andrei 
Sakharov, who had written a private letter to Carter at the time of his inauguration. The
decision taken to respond publicly to Sakharov was a significant step, and confirmation
enough that the Democrat administration was willing to use the theme of human rights




















Thus, it is possible to conclude that the centrality of human rights in the foreign
policy of the Carter administration fulfilled two main purposes; firstly, it allowed the US 
government to re-constitute its moral identity following a period in which this had taken 
a significant blow- E.G the Vietnam War-; secondly, human rights could be mobilized to 
assist in a wider ideological struggle against the Soviet Union.
The use of human rights as a key part of US foreign policy was not without its
difficulties, however.  One of the more immediate concerns which arose from the
insistence on the universal and absolute application of human rights was the friction that 
this generated with Soviet officials.  This is something that Carter would later allude to 
in this candid admission: ‘I did not fully grasp all the ramifications of our new (human 
rights) policy.  It became clear in the early days (and increasingly so later on) that the
promotion of human rights was to cut clear across our relations with the Soviet Union 
and other totalitarian states’ (Carter, 1982; cited in Heaps, 1984: 25).  Progress on a
range of issues, including agreements on strategic arms controls, was being affected by
the perception that the US was directly involving itself in the internal affairs of the
USSR.  Moreover, Soviet officials had become deeply suspicious that the emphasis on 
human rights was part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the Soviet Union.  In order 
to allay these fears, Carter was at times moved to re-iterate the universality of his
government’s conception of human rights, and that their human rights policy ‘is based 
on principle and that our concerns are applicable to all nations’ (Carter, ; cited in
Petersen, 2012:50).  In fact, Carter would go on to make it clear that the U.S
government did not wish to single out their ideological adversary both in 
correspondence and public statements.  Seemingly, these assurances did not appease
Soviet leaders and the friction caused was such that Carter’s administration would be
pressured into toning down its criticism before the threat that Leonid Brezhnev would 
pull out of SALT negotiations.  
However much Carter was to stress the primacy of human rights in U.S foreign 
policy, and no matter how dedicated was his pursuit of this throughout the World, it was 
to prove decidedly more difficult in practice.  Some of the main difficulties facing the
administration had already been highlighted by NSC official Jessica Tuchman in a
memo to Brzezinski as early as July 1977.  Under the headline ‘Priority of Human 
Rights vis-à-vis other Foreign Policy Interests’, the potential for incoherence or 
inconsistencies to become apparent in the policy is raised as a real concern.  If, as
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Tuchman understands, the U.S approach to human rights is to be done on a ‘case-by-
case’ basis, then this could cause resentment among the countries singled out for 
criticism.  The NSC official makes the comparison between U.S allies Argentina and 
Iran, whereby it’s suggested that the latter is less likely to incur the same type of 
criticism as the former. This was indeed to play out closely along the lines as Tuchman
had foreseen.  Carter’s unwavering public support for the Shah before he succumbed to 
the revolutionary forces engulfing the country in 1980 was perhaps the quintessential
case of human rights being trumped by other more overtly strategic objectives.  While
on the one hand, the brutality of the Shah’s rule had been known for some time; both the 
presence of oil and its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union made Iran just too
important for any recriminatory measures.
One of the main criticisms of the Carter administration’s policy on human rights
was that in being supposedly ‘absolute’, it was not able to distinguish between friendly
autocracies and enemy totalitarian regimes (Kirkpatrick, 1979).  From a strictly
speaking realist vision of the Cold War ideological struggle, this was a crucial
distinction to make.  By not supporting its allies in the best way possible, however
authoritarian they may be, the U.S. was weakening these regimes, and as a consequence
eroding its own power.  Understood in this way, Carter’s human rights policy worked 
directly against US interests, while at the same time assisting the march of communism. 
These strategic calculations were indeed compounded by the perception that there had 
in fact been a growing reluctance on the part of Carter to criticize the Soviet Union and 
its client states.  Events in Afghanistan- the Soviet invasion of 1979- along with the
Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis, without doubt had an impact on Carter losing out
on re-election to Republican leader Ronald Reagan in 1980. 
Ronald Reagan and human rights 
The influence of Jeane Kirkpatrick’s critique of Carter on Ronald Reagan was
such that she would later be appointed as the United States’ permanent representative to 
the United Nations and become an important figure in foreign policy making.  Since at
this stage it would have been almost unthinkable to abandon human rights in its entirety, 
Kirkpatrick was faced with the need to reconceptualise the concept to fit in with her 
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inclinations towards the centrality of the continued struggle against communism and the 
defeat of the Soviet Union.  Human rights could no longer be understood as absolute;
rather, it must be viewed relatively, in relation with other US interests, and ultimately in 
conjunction with the overarching geopolitical strategy being pursued. That meant that
in a return to ‘reality’ and ‘real life’, distinctions would have to be made between ‘rights 
and goals’, ‘intentions and consequences’, and ‘personal and political morality’
(Kirkpatrick, 1981).  
It is indeed possible to detect the influence of Kirkpatrick’s thinking on the
Reagan administration’s initial policy on human rights.  When Reagan swept to power 
in 1981, this was partially on the strength of promises made surrounding a change of 
direction in foreign policy, and by extension, a new way of approaching the question of 
human rights.  Like Kirkpatrick, the Republican administration viewed human rights
sceptically as having the potential to damage US interests.  In early articulations of 
foreign policy, the question of human rights is clearly downplayed. As shown by
National Security Advisor Richard Allen, the administration ‘would not place as much
emphasis on human rights (Allen; cited in Peterson, 2012:108)’.  Moreover, Reagan’s
preferred choice to the post of Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian Affairs and Human
Rights Ernest Lefever had also previously voiced his concerns: ‘making human rights
the chief, or even major, foreign policy determinant carries dangers: (it) subordinates, 
blurs, or distorts all other relevant considerations’ (Lefever; cited in Heaps, 1984:32). 
Even if the Reagan administration was inclined to mirror Kirkpatrick’s critique
of the previous human rights policy, it would not be possible to dispense completely
with the concept.  Rather, it would have to undergo a re-formulation in order to fit in 
with the new geopolitical and geostrategic plan being pursued.  One of the first ways in 
which this was to be carried out was through linking human rights to ‘international
terrorism’.  Secretary of State Alexander Haig wasted no time in articulating this in a
press conference shortly after the inauguration of Carter: ‘international terrorism will
take the place of human rights in our concern, because it is the ultimate abuse of human
rights’ (Haig, 1981; cited in Petersen, 2012:108). The fact that this declaration came
shortly after the Iranian hostage crisis and at a time when terrorist incidents appeared to 
be on the rise is without doubt significant. Yet in a secondary move, Haig attributes
international terrorism to the work of the Soviet Union itself, since it was said to be























and Stohl astutely noticed, in one fell swoop ‘it was possible to bundle human rights, 
national security, and international terrorism into a single package that fit neatly (and 
subtly) into the broader United States fight against global communism’ (1985:208).
This substantive change in direction on human rights appeared to be necessary
so as to fit in with a new overarching strategy being put forward vis-a-vis the USSR.  
Reagan, and his realist ideologues, were keen to return to older notions of power 
politics, increased military spending, and to face head on the Soviet challenge which
was being viewed with significant degrees of alarm.  This new strategy, which signalled
a move away from détente, had as its ultimate objective the erosion of Soviet influence, 
or what has been conceptualised as ‘rollback’ (Bodenheimer and Gould, 1989).  In 
relation to past strategies Reagan assured that ‘the West won’t contain communism, it
will transcend communism’. The main points of this strategy to ‘transcend’ it were set
out in the NSC National Security Decision Directive 75 of 1983, which stated that US
foreign policy must be to ‘contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism’ (my
emphasis added).  In what was to become known as the ‘Reagan doctrine’, the crucial
battleground was to be the Third World. The U.S government was compelled to
‘support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or 
oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet
policy’. 
It is possible to trace the strands of Reagan’s foreign policy strategy back to a
select group of neoconservative think-tanks.  For instance, the proposals to increase
military spending were a key element of both the Council on the Present Danger and the 
Heritage Foundation, amongst others.  The Heritage Foundation was a particularly
important influence on Reagan, as both he and authors writing for the organisation have
openly acknowledged (Blasko, 2004).  As Bodenheimer and Gould (1989) have also 
noted, this think-tank was responsible for pinpointing the countries which would later
comprise the front line in ‘World War III’: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia,
Iran, Laos, Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam.
Influential neoconservative think-tank The Council for Inter-American Security
(CIS) was another which provided the new Republican administration with a set of 
guidelines, and which dovetailed nicely with the aforementioned organisations.  






























defence of freedom and democracy, whatever it may take.  In the influential ‘Santa Fe
Document,38’ it is stated in no uncertain terms that the U.S. was engaged in ‘World War 
III,’ whereby the ‘very survival of this republic is at stake’. The foreign policy of 
‘containment,’ which had gone before them, is considered to be ‘not enough,’ instead 
they look forward to a ‘Pax Sovietica or worldwide counter-projection of American
power’.  Central America, as far as it is concerned, is geographically positioned as
crucial since it represents the ‘soft underbelly of the United States’.  This lays the
ground for insisting on assistance to any country fighting and resisting what is deemed
to be Soviet expansionism in the region. And like Kirkpatrick, the extent of the
influence wielded by the CIS can be inferred from the appointment of some of their key
figures into high profile positions within the administration39. 
In line with the new strategy, immediate changes could be discerned in the way
concrete foreign policy was being conducted.  For one thing, foreign aid, whether it be
in the shape of economic or military assistance, was no longer being used publicly as a
‘carrot’ and dependent on changes in human rights behaviour.  In actual fact, the
administration wasted no time in reinstating economic and military aid to countries that
had seen this side of their support withdrawn during Carter’s Presidency. These
included the authoritarian regimes in: Argentina, Chile, Guatemala and Uruguay
(Jacoby, 1986).  Unsurprisingly, along with this more assertive approach was the
insistence on a need for ‘quiet diplomacy’ when faced with public criticism.   
Direct military and economic aid would also be awarded to groups fighting in
armed conflicts, whether that be in places where the Soviet Union was being directly
challenged, or where US interests were being threatened.  One example of this was the
widely known support given to the Mujahedeen who were resisting the Soviet invasion
in Afghanistan. There would also be a series of now infamous covert operations
involving the CIA and US Special Forces.  One of the more controversial examples was
the support and funding given to the Nicaraguan Contras.  The covert CIA led operation 
famously exploded into the public domain as part of the Iran-Contras scandal, forcing
Reagan on the defensive and into an apology before the American people.  Both of these 
38More formally known as the ‘A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties’ report. 
39Patrick Buchanan would become Reagan’s communications director; Lewis Tambs a consultant to the
NSC and later ambassador to Colombia and then Costa Rica; Gordon Sumner who would work as a
special consultant to the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-American affairs; and Roger Fontaine who

























cases are certainly interesting in their own right, but one must also view them as part of 
the wider strategy to directly challenge the Soviet Union and ‘rollback’ its influence.  It
is not difficult to draw close parallels between these concrete foreign policy actions, and 
the foreign policy assistance being given to the administration from the neoconservative 
theorists and think-tanks already mentioned.
Interestingly, while the notion of human rights had been downplayed early on in 
Reagan’s administration, this stance would shortly undergo something of a
transformation. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Tamar Jacoby referred to this as the ‘Reagan 
Turnaround on Human Rights’, which was achieved by ‘picking up the pieces of a
human rights policy he tried very hard to dismantle in his first days as president’
(Jacoby, 1986:1066).  Jacoby is convincing in her argument that it was external
pressures which were at least partially responsible for the change in approach.  The
rejection of Ernest Lefever as Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs40 was one thing, criticism from the ‘human rights community’
another, and yet perhaps it was the resistance the administration was receiving from
both houses of Congress which forced the change in course.  Certain amount of 
acquiesce with the Congress would be needed for the release of military aid to human 
rights offending regimes, meaning that unwanted restrictions could be placed on the
wider objectives of Reagan and his team.  As Jacoby has argued, it would now be
prudent for the administration to ‘appropriate the banner of human rights for itself- to
use it in battle not only against communist regimes but also, in a more defensive way,
against domestic opponents of its human rights policy’ (Jacoby, 1986:1071).   
 In a memo leaked to the New York Times shortly before the belated
appointment of Elliot Abrams to the position of Assistant Secretary for Humanitarian
Assistance and Human Rights, some of the bases of the human rights policy were being 
put in place.  The memo assures that ‘Human rights is at the core of our foreign policy,’
and this is so since ‘our ability to resist the Soviets around the world depends on our 
ability to draw this distinction (moral) and to persuade others of it’. There is also 
express acknowledgement of the difficulties involved in transferring an explicit
commitment to human rights into practice.  ‘A human rights policy means trouble,’ the
memo warns, since in order to be credible it will inevitably involve ‘hard choices which 
40The Foreign Relations Select Committee’s concern with the nomination was that he had not shown the
requisite desire to tackle human rights abuses as a fundamental part of U.S foreign policy.
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may adversely affect certain bilateral relations.’ The advice given is that ‘we will have
to speak honestly about our friends’ human rights violations and justify any decisions
wherein other considerations (economic, military, etc.) are determinative.’ Yet
significantly, the memo also states that ‘human rights is not advanced by replacing a bad 
regime with a worse one, or a corrupt dictator with a zealous Communist politburo’
(Clark and Kennedy, 1981; cited in Willaim, 1981). 
In comparison to Carter’s conception of human rights, there are certain
important differences to highlight now in how the Reagan administration is tracing and 
deploying human rights.  Firstly, the presence of socio-economic provisions, which had 
been noteworthy in Carter’s conception, is omitted entirely. This perhaps did not come
as too much of a surprise bearing in mind the ideological orientation of the conservative 
Republican Party.  Neither is the greatest emphasis placed on the protection of the
individual from the arbitrary force of the state.  Even when criticism is made of a
particular friendly regime, as increasingly became the case in the ‘country reports’
elaborated at the State Department, this did not usually impact in a significant way the
level of support given to the offending regimes concerned (Forsythe, 1988).  Rather, 
human rights are being almost exclusively understood in terms of liberal democratic
values; that is to say, freedom and democracy. As Secretary of State Haig (1981) put it, 
‘we do not intend, in this administration, to develop our foreign policy and then to add 
on to it a few concerns about liberty…On the contrary, the future of liberty is at the
centre of our policy.  Our concern for individual rights and political freedom is the core, 
and the goal, of our foreign policy.’ 
These comments by Haig are echoed and embellished by Reagan in a now
famous speech given in 1982 before the British parliament.  Reagan is pondering how
the U.S can best ‘contribute as a nation to the global campaign for democracy now
gathering force’.  Freedom, he assures, ‘is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but
the inalienable and universal right of all human beings’.  And with this declaration about 
the universality of freedom, Reagan makes the call for the spread of liberal democracy,
which he believes to be inseparable.  His objective, he insists, is ‘to foster the
infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, political parties, universities,
which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to 
reconcile their own differences through peaceful means’.  One can immediately see that




















peace’.  What ‘we have to consider’, he assures, ‘is the permanent prevention of war 
and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in
all countries’. 
Conceived in this way, human rights or ‘individual rights,’ as Haig refers to
them, are not incompatible with the overarching geopolitical imaginary of Reagan and 
his security chiefs.  It is just that they become subordinate to it.  It is precisely because
the Soviet Union denies its people freedom and democracy that it must be defeated, 
whether this means supporting some unpleasant regimes to bring this about or not.  It is
a strategy based somewhat crudely on the old maxim, ‘the ends justify the means’.  The
true defence of human rights will only be achieved with the defeat of communism, and 
by linking human rights inextricably with freedom and democracy, the battle taking 
place becomes at the same time both ideological and moral.  Prevailing in the
ideological struggle taking place was viewed to be not only essential for the security of 
the United States, but also the moral responsibility since it was a prerequisite for the
spread of freedom and democracy.  Questions of security become questions of morality,
and vice-versa.  Moreover, this also means that in deploying the human rights discourse, 
the United States is at one and the same time constituting its identity as both sovereign
protector and moral agent.  
Until the fall of the USSR, one can see time and again how ‘human rights’ was
used either in direct ideological confrontation with the Soviets, or to justify other more
morally questionable foreign policy decisions.  Nowhere would this appear to be more
evident than by the way in which the United States became involved in Central
America.  Incursions in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Cuba, Guatemala, all illustrative of the
geopolitical strategy being followed by the US government, and how a ‘human rights’
discourse could be used to justify their actions.  The Nicaraguan Contras are classed as
‘freedom fighters’ or the ‘moral equal of our Founding Fathers’ (Reagan, 1985), while
aid and assistance given to friendly, yet questionable governments in El Salvador or 
Guatemala, is justified on the basis that there has been signs of ‘progress’ on issues of 
human rights.  One can also see evidence of the geopolitical ‘domino’ theories in 
relation to the region and the wider Cold War context.  If there is no effective response
by the United States, ‘El Salvador will join Cuba and Nicaragua in spreading fresh 
violence to Guatemala, Honduras, and even Costa Rica.  The killing will increase and so 
will the threat to Panama, the Canal, and ultimately Mexico’ (Reagan, 1983). 
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Table 1: Human Rights and Security in US Foreign Policy 
Government Conception of Identity of Soviet Strategy Foreign Policy 
Human Rights Other 
CARTER Absolute Ontologically Mutual
changeable Accommodation-
Détente 
REAGAN Relative to Ontologically Direct challenge

















Table 1: Source: Own elaboration 
Human rights in an 'interconnected' world 
The election of Tony Blair and a Labour government in 1997 signalled an end to 
Conservative Party dominance in the UK, and moreover marked a change in British 
foreign policy discourse.  In what could have seemed like the echo of President Carter’s
Democrat administration, this was proclaimed as the era of a new ‘ethical foreign
policy’ with human rights at its core (Cook, 1997).    
The formulation of an ‘ethical foreign policy’ based on human rights can be
understood at least in part as a response to the context of the time. As well as being
temporally on the cusp of a new century, there was also more importantly the perception 
that the World had fundamentally changed in the years leading up to the Labour Party’s
crushing victory. This new context had already been starting to make its mark on 
international affairs and International Relations theory with the rise to prominence of 






















             
evident nature of the 'new' state of affairs is exemplified by Blair's insistence that 'we
are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not' (Blair, 1999).  British Foreign
Secretary Robin Cook had previously outlined some of these changes in setting the
scene for what he was positioning as a ‘new’ direction in British foreign policy. To him, 
interconnection would be felt in all areas; these were economical in the emergence of a
truly ‘global economy’; technological, as was being witnessed in the ‘information 
revolution’; and moral, in that the compression of space and time brought us closer to 
human tragedies in other parts of the World41 (Cook, 1997). 
One of the consequences of viewing the World in terms of interconnection or 
‘interdependence’ (Cook, 1997) is that it becomes possible to discern a merging, a
blurring, or a withering away of the ‘natural’ boundaries between the ‘inside’ and the
‘outside’. This means that national interest is ‘to a significant extent governed by
international collaboration,’ and that ‘partnership and co-operation are essential to 
advance self-interest’ (Blair, 1999).  For Blair the new reality of 'inter-connectedness', 
meant not only that nation-states had become ever more dependent on each other 
economically, technologically and morally, but that there was a requirement for a 'new
framework' to govern this ‘international community’.  According to Blair, this 'new
framework' could be shaped to coincide with 'mutual self-interest' and 'moral purpose', 
by establishing and spreading 'the values of liberty, the rule of law, human rights, and an 
open society'.  Interests and shared moral values become inextricably linked, and it is
perhaps for this reason that Robin Cook was eager to declare that ‘the Labour 
Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy’ (Cook, 1997).  
It is within this context of inter-connectedness, which in turn had provoked a
merging of interests and values, that wider security concerns must now be situated.  
First and foremost, the very fact that states are viewed to be more connected than ever
before suggests a heightened sense of anxiety about security threats per se. In this way,
the establishment of a universal framework does not only serve economic and political
aspirations, but that the ‘principles of international society apply also to international
security’-the ‘principles of international society’ referred to here, those which are taken
to be universal, are essentially Western liberal democratic values-.  This is in fact
acknowledged by Blair on stating to an audience in Chicago that the 'spread of our 








   

















values makes us safer' (Blair, 1999).  The conflation of ‘our values’ with ‘universal
values’ in the context of security is not in itself surprising.  It is entirely logical to 
presume that if every country functioned in accordance with ‘our values’ there would be 
greater security. At the same time, to give legitimacy to this project, and for other 
countries to accept ‘our values’, it is necessary for them to be universal or universally
applicable in some way.
Human rights, democracy and security, a grouping made all the more pressing by 
the new state of inter-connectedness, and brought about by processes of 'globalization'.
In this regard, Blair is also able to lay the ground for a new era of liberal
interventionism, or otherwise known as humanitarian interventionism. This is precisely
because events in one part of the World can have effects on other parts of the World;
security in the West can be affected by a lack of security in another corner of the globe.  
This makes it increasingly difficult to 'turn our backs on conflicts and the violation of 
human rights within other countries if we still want to be secure' (Blair, 1999).  The
timing of Blair's speech in Chicago was, of course, not insignificant with a military
intervention in Kosovo underway. And Blair is at pains to frame it in line with his thesis 
that in this new ‘inter-connected’ World values and interests can merge.  On the one
hand, the intervention is justified along humanitarian lines through reference to the
‘appalling crimes’ which have taken place there.  Yet it is also in the interests of the
intervening states since ‘this is taking place in such a combustible part of Europe’ (Blair, 
1999) - amongst other things Blair has in mind here the flows of refugees and the
potential threat this can pose to international peace and security-.   
Yet it is the attempt to universalise this doctrine of interventionism which is
perhaps most noteworthy about his speech.  Indeed, the speech Blair made in Chicago
would go on to be known as the ‘Blair doctrine’.  Acknowledging the fact that ‘there are 
many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts,’ (Blair, 1999) Blair 
is also conscious that Western countries do not have the means or capabilities to 
intervene in every case where human rights abuses may be taking place.  For this
reason, he outlines his doctrine of which things policy makers should take into 
consideration through identifying the ‘circumstances in which we should get actively
involved in other people’s conflicts’.  The first thing, Blair says rather ambiguously, is
to be ‘sure of the case’.  In stating that ‘war is an imperfect instrument in dealing with





















certain severity to warrant intervention.  Secondly and thirdly, it is deemed necessary to
explore all peaceful options first and make sure that it is an operation which can be
feasibly carried out militarily.  One would also have to make a commitment to the long 
term and make an assessment of whether or not national interests were at stake. 
The link Blair makes between the spread of human rights, liberty and democracy 
on the one hand, and security on the other, is certainly not an arbitrary one.  For one
thing, this is something that had already been seen in previous performances of human 
rights articulated by the Carter, Reagan and Thatcher administrations.  In these cases, 
the promotion of human rights was made within the Cold War context, and in 
accordance with the specific security strategies being pursued at the time -whether that
be in search of ‘détente’ or a more aggressive degradation of Soviet power-.  In this
regard, the pronouncements made by Blair and Cook are to a certain extent re-iterations 
of past deployments of a ‘human rights’ discourse, which continues to privilege the
‘universal’ values of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.  The fundamental difference here is
that the context has now changed with the implosion of the bi-polar geopolitical system; 
the threatening Other is no longer the Soviet Union.  Be that as it may, it is not the case
that the new context is devoid of other threats and dangers.  Indeed, the events in 
Kosovo had highlighted one of these - the threat posed by tyrant leaders-, something 
which Blair refers to in his speech in Chicago, speaking of ‘two dangerous and ruthless
men- Saddam Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic’ (Blair, 1999).   
Human rights and the ‘War on Terror’ 
However, the new threats world not solely be perceived from individuals, or 
even ‘rogue’ states. A newfound sense of anxiety would be perceptible, one which was
heightened, at least in part, by the as-yet only partially chartered post-Cold War terrain
‘outside’, and the ‘new’ threats which could materialize in it (Ó’Tuathail, 1998).  In 
contrast to the triumphalism displayed by those who proclaimed and ‘End to History’
(Fukuyama, 1992) others spoke of a ‘New World Disorder’ (Jowitt, 1992) 42 –or a
‘Coming Anarchy’ (Kaplan, 1994).  According to Gearóid Ó’Tuathail (1998), the fall of 
the Soviet Union produced a ‘crisis of meaning in World Politics’, a ‘geopolitical
























vertigo’, of which various strategists and intellectuals of statecraft would seek to
address.  The old certainties of the now defunct bi-polar interpretative framework, of 
which the ‘balance of power’ was an integral part, had suddenly dissipated and left a
gaping hole in the conceptual geopolitical landscape.  At stake here was no less than the
entire US security apparatus; that is, the military, the intelligence agencies such as the
CIA, the whole research and development structures which fed off the old Soviet threat, 
not to mention the power/knowledge relationships which gave meaning to these very
institutions. As Ó’Tuathail notes, the re-legitimation of the aforementioned would come 
from quasi-realist conceptions of a new international system plagued by a new
‘uncertainty,’ ‘unpredictability’ and ‘instability’’ (Ó’Tuathail, 1998:104).  
The last decade of the 20th Century was characterized by the emergence of a
diverse range of de-territorialized threats and dangers43 . The greatest dangers now were
ones which transcended national borders: the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction- particularly nuclear material-, the threat posed by international terrorist
groups, international organized crime networks, and transnational health epidemics, for 
instance.  Moreover, these global threats were often given greater impetus and salience
through discourses which pronounced an increasing globalization and a somewhat
pernicious inter-connectedness.  The greater the proximity of states, and the more fluid
the borders which separate them, the more heightened and immediate specific threats
will manifestly become. The significance of the new geopolitical climate was two-fold; 
firstly, in this chaotic new world security threats were more likely to arise where there
was a void in terms of human rights, freedom and democracy; secondly, the spreading
of shared universal values such as human rights, liberty and democracy would logically
have the effect of mitigating the security threats.  
43A plethora or articles and publications appeared in the 1990s which spoke of: ‘Avoiding Nuclear
Anarchy’ (Alison et al, 1996), ‘The New Threat of Mass Destruction’(Betts, 1998), ‘America’s Achilles 
Heel: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism’ (Falkenrath et al, 1998), ‘Postmodern 
Terrorism’(Laqueur et al, 1996), ‘The Changing Proliferation Threat’ (Sopko, 1996) etc. 
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In light of the new de-territorialised dangers previously mentioned, it is perhaps
unsurprising that democracy and human rights should be awarded such a privileged 
place within the US National Security Strategy of the year 2000.  Under what is deemed 
to be the ‘three core objectives’, the promotion of human rights and democracy is listed 
alongside bolstering U.S economic prosperity and a more general enhancement of 
America’s security. Yet it is the promotion of human rights and democracy that stands
out as the key objective since it is believed that these efforts will help advance and
realize the other two goals.  ‘Our security,’ the report states, ‘depends upon the
protection and expansion of democracy worldwide’.  This is deemed to be the case due
to the fact that ‘democratic governments are more likely to cooperate with each other 
against common threats, encourage free trade, promote sustainable economic
development, uphold the rule of law, and protect the rights of their people’.  
In this document human rights and democracy are intrinsically linked, mutually
reinforcing one another. As the reasoning goes, the expansion of democracy means that
there will be less non-democratic regimes, which consequently points to less repression, 
corruption and human rights abuses.  These factors are understood to exist in a causal
relationship with the potential for stability in the countries or region in which they are
found. The promotion of human rights, for its part, is conducive to building or 
strengthening democratic forms of government, as they are understood to be more
inclusive, thus being a requirement for ‘genuine, lasting democracy’.  The human rights
highlighted in the document are predominantly liberal democratic rights; the right to 
‘political dissent’; ‘freedom of religion and belief’; freedom of the press including an 
‘independent media’; a ‘robust civil society’; legal pillars such as the rule of law and an
independent judiciary; along with free and competitive economic structures.44 The
promotion of these values is understood to be not only ‘practical,’ in security terms, but
also ‘just’, in a moral sense.  
44Also mentioned is the protection of the rights of minorities, workers and women, and also ‘civilian
























The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 in the United States would appear
to give credence to these previous warnings.  The attack was not perpetrated by what
had previously been understood as a conventional enemy, an adversarial state.  
Moreover, the ‘interconnected’ or ‘interdependent’ nature of an ever-increasing
globalized World was seemingly laid bare.  The apparent ease with which al-Qaeda was
able to strike at the heart of the United States, using international transport networks, 
demonstrated for Blair and others the dangers that this new state of interdependence
brings with it.  Commenting in the wake of the attacks Blair warned: ‘we are realizing 
how fragile are our frontiers 45 in the face of the world’s new challenges.  Today
conflicts rarely stay within national boundaries…this interdependence defines the new
world we live in’ (Blair, 2001).  
In this dangerous and threatening climate, the need for universal values would be 
more necessary than ever. The subsequent ‘war on terror’ which was initiated by
George W. Bush, and supported by Blair, would lead both to Afghanistan and then Iraq 
in order to spread ‘freedom’ and eliminate the security threats emanating from these two 
countries.  In Afghanistan, the principle stated aim was to go after al-Qaeda who were
said to have set up various training camps in the territory. Yet this was also 
accompanied with a ‘human rights’ discourse, with the objective of freeing the Afghan 
people from tyranny.  In Iraq one can detect the same combination of security threats
and the spread of human rights.  On the one hand, Blair made the controversial claim in
the report ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’ -what would become known as the
‘dodgy dossier’- that ‘(Saddam’s) military planning allows for some of the WMD to be
ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them’.  On the other hand, like in the case of 
Afghanistan, though, the sub-narrative was one which posited the liberation of the Iraqi
population from the grip of a brutal dictator and his regime. As the then British Foreign
Secretary Jack Straw put it, refusal to overthrow Saddam Hussein ‘would not only be a
betrayal of British national interests, but of our internationalist values and beliefs too’
(Straw, 2003; cited in Gilmore, 2014).  
As the post-Saddam violence in Iraq continued and started to spiral out of 
45The use of ‘frontiers’ here is noteworthy in that the more common word to be used here in the English 
language would be ‘borders’.  ‘Frontier’ can arouse a sense of danger or trepidation in English, being 
used in contexts such as the United States land exploration -separating the white colonist from the












   
 





   
 
 
control, this was not deemed to be a problem with the military campaign and the
removal of the Iraqi government per se. Neither was it the results of trying to install a
liberal democratic system of government in a country which had previously never
experienced anything of the sort.  Rather, the problems were portrayed as a ‘conflict
between the progressive forces of liberalism and those of extremism’ Gilmore (2014).  
This move is made possible by understanding liberal democracy as universal,
immunizing the promotion and pursuit of these political values in Iraq, since these
values ‘do not belong to any race, religion or nation, but are universal’ (Blair, 2006). 
The link between human rights, democracy and security –or indeed lack of- 
would become even more salient in the years ahead.  The terrorist attacks on the World 
Trade Centre confirmed for many that earlier warnings of de-territorialized threats were
in fact very real, vindicating the geostrategic and geopolitical analysts who had hitherto
formulated them. As it was put in the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2002:
‘Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger
America.  Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to 
our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank’.  What’s more, in a globalized, 
inter-connected World, these threats could emerge from any corner and strike at the very 
heart of Western civilization. The fact that the attacks were carried out through
international transport connections, themselves an important symbol of globalization, 
was perhaps another interesting caveat.
Yet moreover, the terrorist attacks also highlighted to Western officials and
security analysts the dangers of adversarial states who exist out with Western influence,
and who do not adhere to Western values of freedom, democracy and human rights.  
The potential for these states actively supporting anti-Western terrorist activity had 
become a very real danger.  For the Bush administration, the attacks on the World Trade
Center were confirmation enough that previous foreign policies aimed at ‘containment’
had become outdated and that it was now necessary to go on the offensive.  As terrorism 
moved to the forefront of US security discourse, through the declaration of a ‘War on 
Terror,’ this meant that the US and its allies would not only go after the terrorist groups












   
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
   
 
    





soil or within home borders.  This would mark a return to Manichean binaries of ‘good’
versus ‘evil,’ as Bush warned that ‘you are either with us, or with the terrorists’.  
Security documents of the period, from both the U.S. and the U.K, demonstrate quite
clearly how the dangers of terrorism had become inscribed in official geopolitical and
security discourse to become the greatest threat to the security of both.
The danger perceived from states existing out with the Western sphere of 
influence, and their links with de-territorial threats, would soon materialize in the shape
of two U.S. led wars.  When the war against Afghanistan was being mobilized by
official and media sources, the primary discourse being used to give meaning to the
impending conflict was that of ‘security’.  This was about going after the terrorist threat
that had come to wreak havoc within the very borders of U.S. territory.  Following what
was an unsuccessful ultimatum made to the Afghan government the Taliban- amongst
other things it was demanded that they hand over alleged terrorist suspects, especially
Osama Bin Laden- the allied war planes and ships moved in for direct conflict with the
impoverished Asian country. Addressing the US and the World, President Bush stated 
that ‘these carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a
terrorist base of operations’, meaning that it will be ‘more difficult for the terror 
network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans’. 
Alongside what was essentially a primary ‘security’ discourse, a secondary
‘human rights’ discourse was also operationalized. The stated aim in this case was the
‘liberation’ of a repressed people, who had been living at the mercy of a barbaric regime 
in the Taliban, and been denied their basic human rights.  In short, a two-pronged action
with both a security component and a moral component. As such, it would seem that
the military action was being undertaken for the good of the United States and the good 
of the Afghan population.  
One of the ways in which the ‘human rights’ discourse was deployed was to 
highlight the plight of women in Afghan society under the Taliban. As President Bush 
stated in 2002, ‘women were given no rights.  Young girls did not go to school’. The
responsibility for which was placed on the Taliban, a ‘barbaric regime’ (Bush, cited in
Hancock, 2007).  In addition to public pronouncements and condemnations, ‘The
Taliban’s War Against Women’ (2001) was also released by the U.S. State Department.  



























part of a ‘new era of human rights and human dignity in that country’ (Bush, 2001).  As
Bush makes clear during the signing ceremony, a link is established between ‘the
terrorists’ and the ‘brutal oppression of women,’ meaning that this is not just about the
security of the United States, it is about ‘the values we hold dear’. 
For the war in Iraq, the same appeals to security and human rights were being 
made by the U.S. and the U.K. governments.  That said, with the links to terrorist
organizations being decidedly more tenuous than in the case of Afghanistan, it was the
threat from weapons of mass destruction which was being pronounced as the most
significant danger emanating from Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Before the initial assault
on Iraq, with the Bush administration in full throws to make the case for war, the issue
of WMD was one of the recurring themes. As Bush said, ‘Iraq is expanding and 
improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons’, while
Colin Powell was sure that ‘Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass 
destruction, is determined to make more’.
What can be seen from these performances of human rights by Blair and Bush is
how they are deployed in relation to the geopolitical imaginary of the War on Terror.  
They are used alongside what has been identified as a wider security strategy of 
‘integration’ (Bialasievicz, 2007).  Whereas under the ‘Blair doctrine’ spreading shared
and universal values such as human rights, freedom and democracy is advantageous for 
all- both in terms of national interests and morally as in the interests of the Other- now
things have changed somewhat.  The threats lurking out with national borders are such 
that the spreading of universal values is now necessary for the security of the nation.  
What is needed now is a more aggressive, offensive integration strategy.  Security and 
human rights thus come together in a discursive alliance.  Afghanistan and Iraq are not
only threatening, but they are also morally inferior. As the military campaigns in 
Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated, the pursuit of 'integration’ could never simply by a
case of diplomacy, a choice, whereby all states existing outside the Western sphere of 
influence would be willing to subordinate themselves to Western power. Where states
or governments display resistance or recalcitrance, force is necessary to bring them into
line.  As Bush put it in 2003, ‘the doctrine of containment just doesn’t hold any water’.
As Bialasievicz et al (2007) have noted, this aggressive integration strategy is




















P.M. Barnett.  Offering up a Manichean division of the World, divided into what he calls 
an ‘integrated core’- where globalization has taken hold and interactions are governed 
by a shared ‘rule-set’- and the ‘gap,’ which is characterized by ‘disconnectedness’, the
task now is to ‘shrink the gap’.  It is within the ‘gap’ where dangers to the U.S. and the
West arise for the very reason that they are not programmed and functioning according
to the same ‘rule-set’ as the West.  In short, it is the very fact that some states are
isolated from globalization and the Western ‘rule-set’ which makes them threats to the
West.  The ‘rule set’ of which he speaks of is the grouping together of Western values, 
democracy and free markets, meaning that it becomes necessary to propagate them.  
And while Barnett’s work can indeed be viewed as a retrospective justification for 
ongoing military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, there would always be clear limits
to this belligerent approach. The strategy of ‘shrinking the gap’, and bringing more
states within the ‘rule-set’ under-girding globalization must also allow for the
integration of countries by their own accord, through milder coercion or incentives.  As
will be seen later, this was indeed the case with Libya during the ‘rehabilitation’ period. 
Human rights in the Cameron and Obama administrations 
David Cameron, Human Rights and ‘Liberal conservatism’
As Gilmore (2014) has noted, the difference in approach to human rights
adopted by David Cameron’s Conservative-led coalition government in 2009 was
marginal in comparison to the previous Labour government’s ‘ethical’ foreign policy.
This did appear to mark, however, a considerable change from traditional Conservative
realism (Dodds and Elden, 2010), pragmatism, and the cold pursuit of national interests. 
The indicators of such a convergence between Conservative Party foreign policy and the 
previous Labour government can be found in the pronouncements of key Tory figures
both from the period in which the part was in opposition, and from when it reached
power in 2009.  Since these individuals have played a key role in both these periods, 
including the Western military intervention in Libya itself, the primary focus will be on 
























   
 
 
   
 
The first thing which is immediately of note from an analysis of David
Cameron’s ‘British’ foreign policy is that it is a self-disclosed ‘liberal Conservative’
one. As Cameron wants to make clear: ‘I’m not a neo-conservative.  I’m a liberal
Conservative’ (Cameron, 2006).  Taking into account the timing of Cameron’s speech
given at the Conservative Party conference, - August of 2006, while in opposition-, this
is not altogether surprising.  With Britain and the United States mired in an increasingly
troublesome and ill-conceived war in Iraq, the neo-conservative impulses which
propelled the Bush administration into the war in the first place were also placed in 
doubt.  For Cameron, therefore, the ‘liberal’ refers to his belief ‘in spreading freedom
and democracy, and supporting humanitarian intervention’. The ‘conservative’, stems
from a recognition of the ‘complexities of human nature’ and scepticism ‘of grand 
schemes to remake the world’.  In this way, the doctrine of ‘liberal Conservatism is
more suggestive of continuity with Tony Blair’s Labour government and his openness to 
‘liberal interventionism’.
The future Foreign Secretary William Hague has also been accredited with 
playing a major part in this policy reformulation and evidence of his own turn to human
rights is certainly not difficult to find. William Hague’s speech on ‘Britain’s values in
a networked world’ does appear to bear a striking resemblance to New Labour’s human
rights in an ‘inter-connected world’, especially if the link is made between
British/Western values on the one hand, and ‘universal’ human rights on the other, as it
certainly seems to be.  This is a vision, like New Labour’s, where values and interests
merge in an ambiguous relationship (Gilmore, 2014).  It is a vision of a moral Britain,
but one in which there is no clear separation of the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, Britain from
the ‘networked’ world at large.  ‘Foreign Policy is domestic policy written large’
(Hague, 2010), where the values we live by at home become the values of people
everywhere. The moral imperative which Hague identifies in the British nation- and by
deduction the British State- is to be found in its ‘character’, which is predisposed to
‘help others’ being founded on ‘real goodwill, generosity and compassion’.  This, claims 
Hague, is something ‘fundamental’, meaning that: ‘it is not in our character as a nation
to stand by while others are in need, or to be unmoved when they are denied the hard-
won freedoms and protections that we enjoy in Britain as a result of centuries of striving 
for individual rights within a democratic society’. With human rights being an




















just our ‘common humanity’ which is at stake, it is our security too.  ’Where there is
lawlessness, human rights abuses inevitably follow, affecting our security in the UK as
well as affronting our common humanity’ (Hague, 2010).
A 'new' and 'potentially immensely destabilizing force', says Hague, is the spread 
of material related with nuclear science.  This is not simply a problem when in the
hands of problematic and threatening states, as would be the case with Iran, but perhaps
more worrying still, if this material and weapons finds its way into the hands of terrorist 
groups.  The threat of nuclear material proliferation, along with the other major concern, 
that of climate change, is compounded by the understanding that 'they are almost
certainly not reversible once they have happened'.  These two risks, together with those
related to 'energy security' and the decline in 'relative economic power' of Western 
nations paints a 'troubling scenario' and 'grimness' for Hague.  One of the problems of 
the cumulative economic decline of Western countries, in relation to China and India for 
instance, is that it 'will have a major impact on the ability of Western nations to achieve
their foreign policy goals'. Of these, Hague highlights 'the calling for economic
sanctions against nations whose human rights records we find unacceptable' (Hague, 
2009). 
In relation to the wider outlook for Britain, Hague wants to reiterate that the new 
approach to foreign affairs is being based on 'liberal conservatism'. An important
component of this is what he calls 'enlightened national interest', which is an attempt, 
like was seen previously in Blair's foreign policy, to fuse interests and values. A belief 
in the values of freedom, human rights, and democracy, and their active promotion
around the World is logical in so far as it is tied to national interests.  In particular, he
assures, 'Britain will be safer if our values are strongly upheld and widely respected in 
the world' (Hague, 2009).  For this to happen, it will be first and foremost essential 'for 
Britain to uphold our own values'. This appears to be a subtle reference to the past
‘rendition’ of prisoners involving the Labour government, where prisoners would then
be tortured in third countries.  Moreover, to achievement the objective of spreading 
values to secure interests – E.G 'enlightened national interest'- it is necessary to have an 
'active engagement in world affairs'. And while it is acknowledged that 'liberal
interventionism', presumably of the type advocated by Blair, has 'generated much
debate', Hague is certainly able to see how this can be warranted.  'To varying degrees,'
























Hague is also keen to point out that the type of engagement he is advocating is a
'realistic' one, in the sense that he is under no illusions as to 'how rapidly nations can be
built or democracy entrenched'- a reference, perhaps, to the nation-building mission in
Iraq-.  Hague is also 'sceptical’, like Cameron, of ‘grand utopian schemes to re-make the 
world'.  This means that 'foreign policy idealism must always be tempered with realism,' 
as it is understood that democratic reforms- particularly in Gulf states- 'will do so at
varying paces and sometimes over an extended period' (Hague, 2009).  This degree of 
measure and relativity in how democracy and human rights should be promoted is in 
many ways necessary to explain the inconsistencies inherent in how the British
government has, and indeed is expecting to deal with this issue.  To criticize Iran for 
lack of freedom and democracy, while by and large passing over the Gulf States
demonstrates an acute incoherence which needs dealt with in some way. This realism
will also be in evidence when it comes to other larger and more powerful nations such 
as Russia and China, where considerable challenges are said to remain between
balancing concerns over values and interests.  
If, as has been shown, both David Cameron and William Hague were embracing
human rights as part of a new 'liberal Conservative' foreign policy orientation, this can
likewise be said to be the case with Dr Liam Fox, Defence Secretary during the Libyan
intervention of 2011.  In acknowledging that human rights have not occupied a central
place in the 'Conservative agenda', Fox's speech is in many ways about arguing for a
reassessment of this.  Since 'freedom is a fragile concept,' Fox continues, 'respect for the 
inextinguishable dignity of each and every human being must be paramount' (Fox, 
2005). And it is with these three things in mind that future UK defence secretary
announces a 'Human Rights Group' within the Conservative Party, to carry out an
'Annual Audit' of 'various Governments' records' for the purposes of developing foreign 
policy and engaging in debate in an 'informed and transparent manner'. This is
essentially Fox's 'blueprint' for the objective of pursuing a ‘freedom’ or ‘democratic
agenda'. Again, as was seen with Tony Blair, the idea that a successful foreign policy
can be formulated by strict adherence to pragmatism and national interests is renounced. 
Values or 'human rights'- principally liberal democratic rights- are also deemed to be
























In arguing that the ultimate goal is a 'democratic agenda', which is synonymous
for the spread of what Fox would consider to be functioning democracies, it is posited 
that three 'basic pillars' are needed- the 'freedom agenda'-, which 'underpin a stable and 
prosperous society', and on which 'stability is built' (Fox, 2005).  The first thing is the
power of the 'free market'. This is due to the fact that free market societies 'are far more 
able to unleash the creative potential of their own population,' with the twin forces of 
'individual' and 'economic liberty' being a 'hugely empowering force in any society'. 
The second aspect of the 'freedom agenda' re-affirms a commitment to the 'rule of law'
as a framework for supporting and allowing democracy to flourish.  This is important to
ensure that procedures and principles are followed, and constraints abided by. The rule
of law, Fox argues, 'pertains to all', being 'equally applied to government and citizen,
consumer and business'. Finally, it is 'human rights' that comprises the third component, 
and this is so since ‘freedom’ is what enables democracy to function and endure. 
Having outlined his vision for a 'freedom' or 'democratic agenda', Fox's speech is 
at the same time laced with warnings about imposing certain systems of governance on 
others, and/or not taking into account the history and culture of a particular country.
These warnings are based, at one point, on recognition of 'our own history' and 'how
long it took us to progress from a free market philosophy to universal suffrage'.  'The
differences between this process,' he asserts, 'and having democracy imposed by the
developed world, can be great' (Fox, 2005).  Yet Fox's discourse is somewhat
contradictory in this respect.  On the one hand he assures that it is definitely not about
'having a single model which is applicable globally', while on the other he speaks of 
'natural rights' or of 'certain principles' which enable 'individuals to take control of their
own destiny'. 
What can be detected here is a belief in 'destiny', the predetermined future, one
which is attainable by way of essentially greater 'freedom' and 'democracy'. One must
deduce that in the absence of these two values, the 'destiny' of individuals would on the
contrary remain out of reach.  It is not so much, then, that the endpoint of political and
social progress is in question- this is the attainment of 'freedom' and 'democracy'- nor is
it that history is not, generally speaking, moving in a linear direction towards this
endpoint.  It is just that this endpoint is not guaranteed, precisely due to the
'complexities of human development'. It is that 'mankind is as capable of backward steps 























'stalling of many Islamic states'. 'Progress towards liberty,' therefore, is not inexorable
or inevitable.  This means that the 'freedom agenda' is 'a battle that must be fought and
re-fought every step of the way' (Fox, 2005).  This, one can gather, is where it will be
necessary for pro-active measures from government to pursue the 'freedom agenda',
instead of passively waiting for these changes to come about on their own.  And like
William Hague, Fox believes that 'humanitarian intervention' will be one way of 
achieving this.   
The dual significance of human rights and security to be found in the words of 
these high level Conservative officials can be found within official security documents
produced by the coalition government once in power.  In analysing documents such as
the UK National Security Strategy (2010), together with the Foreign and 
Commonwealth reports on Human Rights and Democracy (2010) and Building Stability 
Overseas (2011), certain observations can be made with regards human rights.  Firstly,
the spread of human rights throughout the World is understood to go hand-in-hand with
the promotion of freedom and democracy.  In fact, what can be seen is almost a merger 
whereby the ambiguous terms freedom and democracy become universal values and 
take their place within the collective ‘human rights’. The ‘stability’ which will come
from promoting human rights in problem states will benefit Western countries as it will
be less likely that they are drawn into any conflicts and will have to deal with massive
flows of refugees.  
But not only that, the economic, as highlighted by Hague’s discourse, to this
endeavour too.  First and foremost, once human rights is consumed within a wider 
security discourse, it becomes relational to all aspects of that -economic considerations
are crucial to the security of the state since they represent strength, vitality, and also the
procurement of natural resources which maintains the state functioning-.  In this sense,
the ‘stability’ which is understood to exude from democratic, human rights based 
political systems, is clearly desirable for trade and U.K interests.  Recalling the context
of ‘inter-connectivity’, this desire for stability becomes even more pronounced as events 
in one part of the World can impact on countries in another.  This idea was indeed one
already articulated by Tony Blair (1999): ‘Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in 
Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean 























government believes that it is through the advancement of shared values and principles
that these threats are to be mitigated.
As is to be expected from a performative understanding of ‘human rights’ as the
moral constitution of the Western state identity, performances of this discourse are not
only to be found in official sources.  One could, for instance, point to the British think-
tank ‘the Henry Jackson Society’.  Launched in March, 2005, the Henry Jackson 
Society has since then been accredited with wielding considerable influence over 
Conservative Party foreign policy (Dodds and Elden, 2010).  To demonstrate this point
one could highlight a number of prominent Tory politicians who are signatories of the
Henry Jackson Society ‘Statement of Principles’.  In particular, one could highlight
Michael Gove- former Secretary of State for Education and Secretary of State for 
Justice-, and Ed Vaizey- former Minister for Culture and member of Cameron’s
campaign team (Dodds and Elden, 2010)-, as two figures who enjoyed a particularly
close relationship with the Prime Minister at the time of the military intervention in
Libya. 46 
Yet, it is not only possible to make connections between the Henry Jackson 
Society and the Conservative Party by way of the personnel.  A closer look at the aims
and objectives of the organisation themselves and it becomes possible to trace a range of 
similar themes as to those articulated previously.  For one thing, there is the same, clear, 
commitment to the diffusion of democracy throughout the world, and to be supported by 
the defence of human rights.  This, in fact, is the primary goal: ‘liberal democracy
should be spread across the world,’ a task to be carried out by ‘the world’s most
powerful democracies’, but ‘under British leadership’ (Henry Jackson Society, 2006).   
One can also even detect traces of Cameron’s formulation of ‘liberal conservatism’ in 
the heading ‘a principled policy of democratic realism’. 
The organization is also noteworthy for the clarity with which they view British 
foreign policy and the strategy which should be implemented to bring about the key
46In fact, the think tank is actually noteworthy for its cross-party support, boasting an Advisory
Board Comprising Members of Parliament from the three main Parliamentary Parties. The list of
signatories, moreover, shown an even more impressive list of well-known past and present political
figures.  As for as human right is concerned, one can see that like official policy, it becomes almost
























objectives.  Essentially speaking, this is not to be one of passivity, but on the contrary,
one of assertiveness.  Again, this reminds of William Hague’s call for the British to set
an example and for engagement with the world, in spite of its relatively diminutive size
and population.  For the Henry Jackson Society, likewise, foreign policy should be
pursued ‘more actively by intervention and example,’ something which will require
‘political will, a commitment to universal human rights and the maintenance of a strong 
military with global expeditionary reach’. The manifesto, ‘The British Moment: The
case for Democratic Geo-Politics in the Twenty-First Century’ (2006) echoes this call
for a more assertive position, stating that: ‘it is time for Britain, and indeed, the rest of 
Europe, to reclaim the noble tradition of liberal interventionism and pursue an active
strategy across the globe’.  As Dodds and Elden (2010) have noted, it is here where it is
useful to recall the identity of Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson, prominent U.S politician during 
the Cold War.  Jackson was advocate of a strong foreign policy, based on human rights, 
and one that ‘should not be reluctant to use military and economic levers to change the
internal behaviour of other states including superpowers’.  
For the Henry Jackson Society, as was the case with the Conservative
government under Cameron, foreign policy must be undertaken in accordance with 
‘clear universal principles’.  Since the primary aim is to spread democratic political
systems around the globe, it is perhaps not surprising to see values related to this
enterprise dominating the ‘Statement of Principles’.  Cited here, are the ‘global
promotion of the rule of law, liberal democracy, civil rights, environmental
responsibility and the market economy’ (Henry Jackson Society, 2005).  It is of course
highly unlikely that principles such as ‘liberal democracy’ and the ‘market economy,’ in 
particular, could be considered ‘universal’. Yet for many, including traditional ‘liberal
interventionists’ and seemingly ‘liberal conservatives’, the eulogization of ‘freedom’ as
perhaps the universal value or ‘human right’ makes it possible to understand both 
‘liberal democracy’ and ‘market economy’ in this light.  In any case, the x of universals
is in many ways a necessity so as to facilitate their active promotion around the world.
In short, it is not enough that these are ‘our’ values, they must belong to ‘them’ also.  It
is interesting to note her that for the Henry Jackson Society, it was a combination of 
‘strength and human rights’ that was most influential in bringing about the ‘collapse of 













   
 
 






‘American values’ are ‘Human rights’ 
If we are to compare how the ‘human rights’ concept features in UK foreign 
policy with where it is situated in Obama’s Democrat administration in the US, it is
possible to detect a great degree of congruence.  First of all, there is to be found the
same pronouncements from top level officials professing the centrality of human rights
in U.S. foreign policy.  Secondly, in line with Cameron’s government in Westminster, 
and Blair’s Labour government, one can draw parallels by the way in which human 
rights are viewed in terms of liberal democratic values. This link is certainly
established by Obama in his now famous speech given at Cairo University in 2009.  In 
his remarks about democracy promotion around the World, the U.S. President reasserts
his commitment to: ‘the ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are
governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice;
government that is transparent and doesn't steal from the people; the freedom to live as
you choose’.  These values, Obama is quick to add, ‘are not just American ideas; they
are human rights’. 
Speaking in the State Department Human Rights report of 2008, Secretary
Hillary Clinton insisted that the promotion of human rights is an ‘essential piece of our 
foreign policy.  In doing so there are certain claims being made regarding the moral
identity of the US nation and, by extension, the US State. This is constituted by
claiming that their ‘commitment to human rights is driven by faith in our moral values’. 
Elsewhere, in the National Security Strategy of 2010, the link between human rights, 
the U.S’s ‘essential’ character and its global outlook is reinforced.  The U. S’s ‘moral
leadership’ is grounded in the ‘human rights which America has stood for since our 
founding’, providing a ‘source for inspiration around the World’. What is displayed
here is perhaps the quintessential example of ‘American exceptionalism’, driven by the
‘belief in the U.S as a special nation with a moral right to exercise broad power in the
world, to lift up the inferior ‘other’’ (Forsythe, 2011). 
That human rights, once more, becomes almost synonymous with freedom and 
democracy means that the Democrat administration is able to couple values -U.S. and
universal- with interests.  This is because the advancement of freedom and democracy
fulfils specific security goals.  Firstly, ‘governments that respect these values are more
195 
 






















just, peaceful and legitimate,’ and moreover they preside over political systems that are
‘more stable, successful and secure.’ This means that the United States can ‘more
effectively forge consensus to tackle shared challenges when working with governments 
that reflect the will and respect the rights of their people’ (National Security Strategy,
2010). 
One more the advancement of human rights is linked to the context in which
specific security threats and dangers emerge from.  Being a ‘global age,’ the threats
being faced ‘have shifted dramatically in the last 20 years’ and are ‘more
consequential’. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, climate change, pandemic
diseases, global crime networks, are all said to threaten the ‘security of different regions 
and the health and safety of the American people’ (my emphasis added).  As put forward 
by British Foreign Secretary Hague and ex-Prime Minister, the defining characteristic of 
this ‘global age’ is that of ‘interconnection’, whereby the boundaries between the
‘inside’ and ‘outside’ have become blurred.  ‘Our security,’ the report assures, ‘can be
directly challenged by events across an ocean’. And in a ‘World of greater
interconnection,’ power is ‘not a zero-sum game’, making it essential that the U.S. tries
to reach out to different peoples (National Security Strategy, 2010).  One of the ways
this is to be done is through example, from within the borders of the U.S; another, is
through the active support of human rights, freedom and democracy around the World.
Since it can be shown, therefore, that the advancement of human rights is linked
closely to wider security concerns, this also means that performances of human rights
do not only serve to constitute the moral identity of Obama’s administration.  But in 
essence, a fusion between U.S values and ‘human rights’ makes it possible , but that
they will also entail In this way, it becomes possible to remain true to the U.S’s
essential’ character -understood as universal values- and confront security concerns at
one and the same time.  Yet this complex relationship between universal human rights, 
freedom, democracy, and security also means that the pursuit of the former will not
always be realizable.  Like the governments that had gone before them, on both sides of 
the Atlantic, the old problem of interests and values resurfaces.  Concern for human
rights -understood as freedom and democracy- is constrained by what are understood to
be geopolitical ‘realities’ and wider security concerns.  One of these- and to recall this is 
also found in the Conservative government of the United Kingdom- is an element of 


























With what has been widely considered to be the foreign policy debacle of regime
change in Iraq on his mind, Obama articulates the dangers of blindly and violently
following this objective: ‘so let me be clear: No system of government can or should be
imposed on one nation by any other’ (Obama, 2009).  It is acknowledged that this is
something that must be done strategically, insisting that ‘we will not seek to impose
these values by force’.
This is not to say that Obama, or other high profile members of his government, 
were necessarily against the idea of military intervention, in whatever guise it may
appear.  Speaking in Oslo during the acceptance of his Nobel peace prize (2009), the
U.S President speaks of the ‘hard truth,’ being that ‘we will not eradicate violent
conflict in our lifetimes’.  One of the consequences of this, for him, is that ‘there will be 
times when nations- acting individually or in concert- will find the use of force not only
necessary but morally justified’.  The allusion being made here is to the doctrine of 
‘humanitarian intervention’.  And he continues, ‘inaction tears at our conscience and can 
lead to more costly intervention later.  That’s why all responsible nations must embrace
the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the peace.’ 
Yet it is not only the President who has shown himself in favour of liberal or 
‘humanitarian intervention’.  Susan Rice, U.S Ambassador to the United Nations- - and 
later National Security Advisor- is another who has spoken about this and its offshoot
‘Responsibility to Protect.’  One need only point to her work on ‘The Evolution of 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Right to Protect’ (2007) in which Rice laments the
failure of the West to respond to humanitarian disasters. There is also Samantha Power,
National Security Council senior aide during the intervention in Libya, and future U.S
Ambassador to the United Nations.  Power’s commitment to human rights is well
known, as is her Pulitzer prize winning book ‘A Problem from Hell: America and the
Age of Genocide’ (2002) which also clearly demonstrates her advocacy of U.S
humanitarian intervention.  Both Rice and Power, along with Secretary of State Clinton, 
are all widely thought to have influenced Obama in taking the decision to back the
military intervention in Libya (The Nation, 2011). 
Yet undoubtedly what is more problematic for Obama’s administration is the
continuous issue with reconciling the promotion of what are presumed to be universal























advancement of human rights- freedom and democracy- when this would clash with
other security and economic interests47. This is an impasse seen already in the Carter
administration when the President’s undoubted commitment to human rights was
compromised by the geostrategic ‘need’ to remain in favourable terms with the brutal
regime of the Shah in Iran and the behaviour by external actors -E.G. the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan-.  The Obama administration approaches this difficulty
principally through a rejection that there is indeed any conflict of interests. The
National Security Document of 2010 states that the ‘United States rejects the false
choice between the narrow pursuit of our interests and an endless campaign to impose
our values’.  The document then provides room for manoeuvre for the administration on 
the global pursuit of human rights.  While alluding to their universality on the one hand, 
referring to them as being applicable both inside and outside the U.S. and being 
‘timeless’, a clause is also inserted which insists that the U.S. must ‘not rely on a single
approach to overcome tyranny and subjugation’. Thus, it is ‘dialogue’ with ‘repressive
regimes,’ which will sometimes be the correct course of action.
In what Forsythe has referred to as ‘muddling through’, or ‘inconsistency’
(2011), it is possible to see how the uneasy relationship between values- human rights as 
freedom and democracy- and national interests plays out in practical foreign policy
decision making.  It’s worth recalling that this is something which all governments in
the U.S. and U.K have been charged with. The Obama administration is certainly no 
different.  Forsythe has projected three loosely defined areas of foreign policy where
this is inconsistency is to be found: terrorism, multilateralism and bilateralism. With
regards terrorism, many of the issues to be dealt with were products of the Bush 
administration and the ‘War of Terror’.  Having vowed to close Guantanamo detention 
facility, Obama found that institutional constraints would thwart his efforts once in 
government.  Yet Obama would also decide not to pursue prosecutions amongst CIA
figures and high level officials related with charges of torture.  Moreover, and perhaps
most controversially, Obama has continued the U.S. policy of targeted drone strikes, in 
spite of conceding that these have the potential to kill innocent by-standers. 
47As has been touched on throughout this section, this has been a problem that has continually plagued 
the deployment of the human rights discourse.  Brzezinski (1995) has also specifically grappled with this 













    
 
 
In terms of multilateral issues, human rights issues at the United Nations also, at
times, would expose the incongruence of universal values and other security/economic
concerns.  In particular, the Israel-Palestine conflict once more provoked criticism of the 
U.S for ‘siding with Israel,’ (Forsythe, 2011) in the wake of the Goldstone report into
the Israeli offensive in Gaza in 2009.  Being an investigation into war crimes by both
the Israeli army and Hamas, the report was understood by many supporters of the Israeli 
government as to be overly critical of Israel.  The Obama administration subsequently
worked to play down the importance of the report at the United Nations, a move which 
was given more traction due to the fact that the U.S. had been standing for election to 
the UN Human Rights Council.
Finally, in terms of bi-lateral issues, the Obama administration appeared to be
involved in a delicate balancing act with regards human rights and national interests.  
For instance, although China would still not be compliant with the U. S’s liberal
conceptions of human rights, freedom and democracy, economic interests would shape
to a large extent the willingness of the Obama administration to engage in direct
criticism of the Asian giant (Forsythe, 2011).  Of course, one could point to many other 
instances such as bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia. The reliance of the West on 
Saudi oil, coupled with the security role that the Saudi monarchy play in the Middle
East, mean that any concerns over human rights will be generally raised privately along 
the lines of previous notions of ‘quiet diplomacy’.  
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KEY EVENTS OF THE WESTERN-LED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN
LIBYA 
For analytical purposes, a timeline will be used to plot some of the key events
which have defined both the Libyan conflict and the U.S. and U.K. responses to it.
These have been selected from official discourse and also the media discourse analysed 
in accordance with the level of importance which has been attached to them.  Not only
does this indicate heightened media attention and therefore greater scrutiny of official
policy, but it also makes it more likely that official responses from government will be
warranted.  It should be noted that this is not intended to be an all-encompassing list, 
which means that certain things will necessarily be left out.  Nevertheless, as has been
shown in previous work by Campbell (1998) and Hansen (2005), the use of such an 
analytical aid can be fruitful in as far as: firstly, it helps to narrow the analytical lens in 
the midst of the vast myriad of events which make up the Libyan conflict and help to 
focus the researchers attention on aspects of the conflict considered to be of importance; 
secondly, one can better take note of any variations in how these key events are
represented. 
The political violence that engulfed Libya in February of 2011 was
contextualised as the latest in a series of countries showing severe civil unrest in the
Middle East and North African region as a whole.  For that reason, the events in Libya,
like in other countries in the region, would be understood as part of an ‘Arab Spring’,
and become synonymous with a seemingly uniform, universal and overtly political
movement. The phenomenon became quickly understood as a pro-democracy
movement, charging against the authoritarian systems of governance in place across the
Arab World.  Thus, the principle demands were said to be greater political freedoms
such as freedom of speech, a more pluralistic electoral system, but also an end to
corruption and cronyism which were viewed to be an endemic part of the regimes under 
attack.  Preceding events in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt had already shown great political
upheaval, becoming almost characterised by their tragic heroes and nefarious comic-
book villains: on the one side were people such as Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian
stall owner who set himself on fire in protest at the perceived injustices faced in the
country; and on the other, ex-Tunisian and Egyptian Presidents Zine El Abidine Ben Ali
and Hosni Mubarak.  Both leaders were heavily criticised by Western media and the
























hailed by some in the West as great victories for ‘freedom’ and evidence of the
inexorable march towards liberal democracy. 
An intensification of the violence in Libya was clearly discernible after the pre-
planned ‘day of rage’ in Libya on the 17th of February. The anti-government protests, 
which the Libyan authorities had tried to put a stop to by arresting a group of 14 
activists beforehand, nevertheless went ahead in several of Libya’s towns and cities, 
including the second largest Benghazi.  New technologies were taken advantage of, like
social media sites, meaning that significant numbers were still able to turn out with the
aim of directing their anger against the Libyan government and the security forces who 
were charged with maintaining order.  The clashes between protesters and security
forces resulted in several deaths and dozens of injured (Al Jazeera, 17/02/2011).   
The response to the violence taking place in Libya by Western governments was
one of instant condemnation, fuelled perhaps, by criticism received over more passive
reactions to the events in Tunisia and Egypt. In particular, David Cameron, Nicolas
Sarkozy and Barack Obama were quick to denounce not only the violence taking place,
but the ways by which the Libyan authorities responded to it.  As protests spread to
other parts of Libya, gathering force and momentum, and as more injured and killed
were reported by the media and human rights groups, the rhetoric from Western officials 
concurrently began to harden.  The British and the French, in particular, set out their
joint plans to take the case to the supranational level and work on two separate Security
Council Resolutions, condemning Gaddafi and the Libyan government’s failure to 
protect the population (Clinton, 08/03/2011).
The first Resolution (1970) passed by the U.N Security Council was principally
aimed at both condemning the violence taking place, and also the Libyan government
for its complicity in the events.  In the document released the Security Council
denounced: ‘(deploring) the gross and systematic violation of human rights, including
the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern at the deaths of 
civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the 
civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government'. At the same 
time, calls were made for the Libyan authorities to ‘respect the freedoms of peaceful
assembly and of expression, including freedom of the media’.  While the human rights





   
 
 
















to the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm by 'recalling the Libyan authorities'
responsibility to protect its population'.  
Meanwhile, as events were unfolding on the ground, efforts were also being
made behind the scenes by the U.K and France to draft a second United Nations
resolution in support of their policy of introducing a ‘no-fly zone’. This was ultimately
successful and was passed on the 17th March through a vote of 10 in favour with 5 
abstentions.  In a similar vein to the previous one, Resolution 1973 once more
condemned ‘the gross and systematic violation of human rights,’ of which ‘systematic
attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian 
population may amount to crimes against humanity.’ The resolution reiterates that it is
the ‘responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population’.  In light
of this, a demand was made for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the violence and 
attacks against civilians.  A no-fly zone was to be implemented along with a
continuation of the arms embargo put in place under Resolution 1970.  Member States
were duly authorized to ‘take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of 
attack in the country,’ while expressly excluded from these measures was a ‘foreign
occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’ (United Nations, 
17/03/2011). 
The response to UN Resolution 1973 by the Libyan government was to pledge
its support and offer up an immediate ceasefire, as announced by Libyan foreign 
minister Musa Kusa (18/03/2011).  This would not, however, be enough to bring the
violence to an end and in any case, U.S, British and French forces had already swung 
into action.  Following the decisive vote at the Security Council and the passing of 
Resolution 1973, the United States took a lead role in the military operation under the
code name Operation Odyssey Dawn’.  The first air attacks being carried out on the 19th 
March, and barely a day later, the primary goal of eliminating Libyan air defences and 
setting up a no-fly zone over Libya was said to have been accomplished (Mullen,
20/03/2011). The air attacks would continue, nevertheless, and even intensify as U.S
and European forces began to seek targets above and beyond the Libyan air-defences
(New York Times, 21/03/2011).  On the 31st March, command and control of the
mission was passed over to NATO and was now to be known as Operation Unified
Protector.  In total, 26, 000 sorties where made, more than 9, 600 of which were


























General Anders Fogh Rasmussen made an official statement to signal the end of the
mission, with all objectives seemingly accomplished. 
One of the most significant initiatives formulated to implement a ceasefire and
reach a political solution to the Libyan crisis came from the African Union (AU).  Only
in its embryonic stage at an AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting on the 23rd 
February of 2011, the subsequent formation of an Ad Hoc Committee was designed to 
push the proposals forward and engage with both the warring parties in Libya and the
predominately Western governments keen on strong measures against the Libyan 
government.  On the 10th / 11th of April, with the U.N backed no-fly zone already in
place, the resultant roadmap was put to both the government of Libya and the National
Transition Council.  The key proposals made were for an immediate cessation of 
hostilities, a halt in the NATO bombings, a demand for the Libyan authorities to
facilitate the access and delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population, the
protection of foreign nationals, and the implementation of the required political reforms
which had caused the violence.  The ‘roadmap’ was accepted by the Libyan
government, but rejected by the NTC on the basis that it did not include guarantees of 
Gaddafi’s immediate departure (Jabril, cited in al-Jazeera, 12/04/2011). 
As media reports and military assessments of a ‘stalemate’ were reaching policy
makers in London, Paris and Washington, this would lead to an intensification of the air 
campaign over Libya.  Some of the attacks, one particular raid, it was suppo targeting
Gaddafi seemed to confirm that the Libyan leader was indeed in the sights of NATO
commanders and the political leaders guiding them. The attack resulted in the deaths of 
Seif Al-Arab Gaddafi and three of Gaddafi’s grandchildren.  Despite being present at
the time, Gaddafi himself was unhurt (Telegraph, 01/05/2011).  In response, NATO was
quick to play down the attack stating that ‘we do not target individuals’, while
confirming that the attacks the night in question had struck a ‘known command and 
control building in the Bab al-Aziziya neighbourhood shortly after 1800 GMT Saturday
evening’ (NATO, 01/05/2011). 
All the while, the military campaign continuing apace, developments had seen 
the rules of engagement widened to incorporate other objectives.  Having started out
targeting tanks and military vehicles that could theoretically threaten the civilian 























and control and intelligence networks’ (Fox, 2011) of the Libyan government.  This was 
a move of which not all NATO countries took the ‘same view’.  Be that as it may,
further proposals to extend this to include Libyan infrastructure signalled a gradual
escalation and widening of the air-strikes being carried out. This was clearly meant, as
military chiefs recognised, to ensure that Gaddafi did not remain in power and that he
would get the message that he should vacate power immediately (Richards,
15/05/2011).  Finally, this strategy would culminate in attacks on the Libyan
government’s communications capabilities as state TV transmitters were also targeted.
The justification for which being to eliminate any remaining possibility that Gaddafi
and the Libyan government had left ’to incite violence against fellow Libyans’ (Ministry 
of Defence spokesman cited in the Guardian, 01/08/2011).  
As the rebel forces were gaining more and more ground, in particular in the West 
of the country, reports also began to emerge of human rights abuses perpetrated in the
captured towns.  One such case was in relation to a group of four towns in the Nafusa
Mountains- al-Awaniya, Rayayinah, Zawiyat al-Bagul and al-Qawalish- where the
crimes taking place were the destruction of property -including the burning of homes-, 
the looting of hospitals and shops, and beatings of those considered to be loyal to 
Gaddafi and the Libyan government (Human Rights Watch, 2011). 
The advances being now made by the ‘rebels’ on the ground were at this stage
palpable, as all media channels started to signal what would appear to be the beginning 
of the end for Gaddafi and the Libyan government. The final push, as it would appear, 
was being assisted by U.K, French, and Qatari special forces on the ground (Guardian,
24/08/2011), with ‘SAS troopers’ being deployed to provide directions for air-strikes, to
communicate with NATO operational commanders, and for ‘advising rebels on tactics’. 
Reports came in claiming that the ‘rebels’ had taken Zawiya (Guardian, 15/08/2011),
Zlitan (22/08/2011); Tripoli (Guardian, 25/08/2011)48- albeit with continued resistance-;
Sabha (BBC, 22/09/2011); Bani Walid (Reuters, 17/10/2011); and Sirte (21/10/2011).  
News of the fall of Sirte into ‘rebel’ hands emerged also with reports that the Libyan 
leader Gaddafi himself had been captured and killed by opposition fighters.  Calls by
Western leaders for Gaddafi to stand trial were not heeded as he met his brutal end 
48It was reported that in ‘Operation Mermaid Dawn’, British, French and Qatari forces participated on 





       
       
 
      
      
     
     
    
      
 
       
       
    
     
       
       
        
      
being beaten, sodomized and later killed.  Gaddafi’s son Saif was caught and
imprisoned, and has since been sentenced to death.




Reports of protests and unrest in Benghazi. 
Protests and violence take place in pre-planned ‘Day of
rage’.
United Nations Security Council issues statement which 





United Nations Security Council passes resolution to 
impose no-fly zone over Libya.
Libyan government announces ceasefire. 
Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa defects and 
arrives in London. 






US House of Representatives blocks additional
funding. 
Rebels reject African Union ceasefire proposals. 
UK government recognizes National Transition 
Council as ‘legitimate political interlocutor’ of Libyan
people. 
Rebels dismiss Libyan government offer of elections. 
International Criminal Court issues arrest warrant for
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and others.
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16th July U.S. government recognizes NTC as the ‘legitimate
governing authority for Libya’. 
28th July UK government recognizes NTC as ‘sole governmental 
authority’ in Libya. 
28th July Assassination of rebel army general Abdul Fatah 
Younis 
19th August Reports that rebel forces have taken back the town of
Zawiyah. 
21st August Reports that rebels have control of much of Tripoli. 























CHAPTER 8  OFFICIAL UK POLICY DISCOURSE:
BETWEEN  ‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT' AND
REGIME CHANGE 
UK official policy towards the crisis in Libya consists, essentially, of two central 
and interconnected components.  Firstly, not long after the outbreak of violence,
Cameron makes the demand that Gaddafi 'must go'.  While it will subsequently become
difficult for the UK government to express this policy candidly, for reasons which will
be touched on later, there can be no doubt that this in fact was the objective from the
outset.  In addressing the House of Commons with noticeably strong rhetoric, referring
to Gaddafi’s ‘murderous’ and ‘illegitimate regime’, Cameron is quite clear in stating:
‘for the future of Libya and its people, Colonel Qadhafi’s regime must end and he must
leave’.  After summarizing measures being taken against the Libyan government,
Cameron reiterates his and the UK position: ‘My message to Colonel Qadhafi is simple: 
Go now’ (Cameron, 28/02/2011).  Secondly, and in relation to the first political
objective, the UK government articulates around the same time the desire to implement
a no-fly zone above the skies of Libya.  Both policy objectives are inter-related in as far 
as the second will be regarded as a way to bring about the first.  
Understood principally by way of the basic 'human rights' discourse, which
positions the figure of Gaddafi against a uniform 'Libyan people', it follows that the
implementation of the no-fly zone and the protection of the ‘Libyan people’ would be
enough to enable them to overthrow Gaddafi. The first part of this section aims to 
establish the links between official UK discourse, the basic 'human rights' discourse
constructed in Chapter 6, and also the past historical articulations of 'human rights'
which have been detailed in UK foreign policy discourse in Chapter 7.  Since UK
official policy discourse maintains a remarkable level of stability from the start of the
Libyan crisis until the end of NATO operations, it will then be necessary to show how
this was in fact achieved, via an assessment of the political and media opposition faced 
















   
  
   
 
 
   

 Continuity with the basic 'human rights' discourse �
Responses to the events in Libya from UK officials appeared shortly after the
first media reports had filtered through and bear many of the hallmarks of the basic
'human rights' discourse.  Having said that, official UK discourse diverges from this in 
some interesting ways.    Before looking at these variations, the objective will be to first
trace how official UK discourse reproduces elements of  the basic 'human rights'
discourse.  The first thing that one can point out is that Libya is likewise situated 
geographically within the Middle Eastern/North African region, being understood as
part of the wider ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon.  Speaking to the House of Commons
about UK policy towards Libya- that Gaddafi 'go now'- on the 28th February, 2011, 
Cameron immediately positions the events alongside those taking place in the wider
region: 'Mr Speaker, North Africa and the wider Middle East are now at the epicentre of 
momentous events...In many parts of the Arab world, hopes and aspirations which have
been smothered for decades are stirring. People, especially young people, are seeking
their rights, and in the vast majority of cases they are doing so peacefully and bravely.' 
Like with the basic 'human rights' discourse, it is the figure of Gaddafi who is
held directly responsible for the abuses taking place.  It is perhaps interesting to note, 
however, that in formulating his very first responses to the Libyan violence, Cameron
avoids any direct references to Libyan leader Gaddafi. This can be perhaps understood 
as a natural discursive omission in light of the policy of ‘rapprochement’ which had
been hitherto transpiring between the UK and Gaddafi.  Be that as it may, this would 
change very soon after, and the responsibility for the violence in Libya would be
attributed firmly to Gaddafi. The figure of Gaddafi goes on to become quite clearly the
radical ‘Other’ of the Western ‘Self’; 'murderous' (Cameron, 27/02/2011) 'brutal'
(Cameron, 25/03/2011), and 'dictatorial' (Hague, 02/10/2011).  In short, the antithesis of 
the rational, moral and democratic UK identity. As Cameron assessed Gaddafi's
response to the perceived aspirations of the Libyan people, he stated: 'Colonel Gaddafi
has responded by attacking his own people.  He has brought the full might of armed
forces to bear on them, backed up by mercenaries. The world has watched as he has
brutally crushed his own people'. Concomitantly, and replacing the ‘Libyan 























regime’, already prevalent in media sources and used undoubtedly to attribute a sense of 
illegitimacy (Cameron, 28/02/2011). 
In order to justify the haste with which the no-fly zone was agreed at the UN
Security Council and later implemented, UK government officials were keen to make
reference to the apparent critical threat that Gaddafi and the Libyan armed forces posed 
to Benghazi. This would become a recurring theme used by officials to express the
desperate plight of the Libyan people, and to justify the need for urgent Western 
intervention.  Benghazi was portrayed time and again to be on the verge of a ‘massacre'
(Cameron, 13/04/2011), or to delegitimize the figure of Gaddafi himself: 'we should 
remember that this is the man who told the world that he would show the people of 
Benghazi no mercy' (21/03/2011).  In his triumphant speech in Benghazi on the 15th 
September, Cameron also recalls to the cheering crowd, 'Colonel Gaddafi said he would 
hunt you down like rats'. Benghazi was also used in response to questions on whether 
or not diplomatic efforts had been exhausted before the no-fly zone was passed.
Diverging from previous conflicts where past atrocities such as Srebrenica were used to 
garner support for a more robust Western response, in Libya the emphasis was more on 
the potential threat which Gaddafi and the Libyan regime was said to pose Benghazi.
To this question, Cameron was clear to point out: 'we were in a race against time to
avoid the slaughter of civilians in Benghazi' (21/03/2011).49
  Nonetheless, these past cases were mobilised as historical pretexts for action in
Libya. With NATO's mission having all but finished in Libya, Cameron establishes this
link in his speech at the UN General Assembly (22/09/2011): 'And on this occasion a
coalition of nations across the Western and Arab world had the will to act. In so doing, 
they stopped Benghazi from joining Srebrenica and Rwanda in history’s painful roll call 
of massacres the world failed to prevent'. 
One of the key differences between official governmental discourse in the U.K
on the one hand, and the basic 'human rights' discourse on the other, is that
governmental officials are at pains to emphasize and construct the events in terms of a
‘Libyan people’ in opposition to ‘Gaddafi’.  In essence what this means is that
‘protesters,’ 'demonstrators,' or 'civilians', become constituted as an unambiguous
49The UK Foreign Affairs committee report (2016) into the Government's handling of the Libyan crisis 
concluded that the government has 'failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated' and that
moreover it 'selectively took elements of Gaddafi's rhetoric at face value'.
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‘Libyan people’ as they are conflated to mean one and the same thing. At first glance
this may not seem like such a notable discursive move and yet a closer inspection 
reveals that something quite significant is at work here.  First and foremost, by referring 
to a seemingly uniform ‘Libyan people’, the construction of their identity becomes
simpler, unambiguous, and thus perhaps easier to grasp for Western audiences or even
Western officials themselves. This operation establishes a clear-cut division of the dual
Libyan Other; whereas the basic 'human rights' discourse leaves room for possible
support of Gaddafi amongst the Libyan population, UK official discourse elides this
potentiality by placing a universal and aspiring democratic 'Libyan people' in opposition 
to Gaddafi and his 'barbaric' and 'illegitimate' regime (Cameron, 28/02/2011).  Speaking 
later at the London Conference on Libya on the 29th March, 2011, Cameron explained:
'Just as we continue to act to help protect the Libyan people from the brutality of 
Qadhafi’s regime… so we will support and stand by them as they seek to take control of 
their own destiny.' 
Moreover, and in perhaps the most significant discursive move, the ‘Libyan 
people’ are then politicized with the liberal democratic rights of ‘freedom’ and
‘democracy’.  It has been shown in Chapter 7 how in UK foreign policy discourse the
twin-liberal democratic values of freedom and democracy have come to represent the
most significant ‘human rights’.  This could be detected in Cameron, Hague and Fox’s
discourse, along with a willingness to extend these values throughout the World.  Here,
it is quite clear, the Libyan people are being viewed as embodying these very values, 
even if they are being prevented from realizing them by the radical Other Gaddafi.
Thus, it can be said that while the spatial identity of the ‘Libyan people’ is being
anchored to the Middle East/North African region –in a similar way to the basic ‘human 
rights’ discourse- UK officials are also at pains to emphasize the temporality of their 
identity. This is done in two principle ways.  Firstly, with regards that actual events
taking place in the 'Arab Spring', the temporal context is understood to be highly
significant in that it represents a 'momentous' shift in the historical trajectory of the
region (Cameron, 28/02/2011).  According to Foreign Secretary William Hague, on the
dramatic changes taking place in the region, he claims that 'they may already constitute
the most important event of the 21st century -even more important than 9/11 or the 2008 
financial crisis- in terms of their possible consequences' (21/03/2011).  Cameron also 




























he assures that ‘this is a precious moment of opportunity for the region’ (Cameron, 
22/02/2011).
Secondly, and in accordance with the temporality of the events, the identity of 
the Libyan Other is itself also constituted along temporal lines.  The temporal identity of 
the 'Libyan people' deviates from that of the Western Self in as far as it is viewed as
backward and thus different from the civilized, developed Western Self.  Ontologically
speaking, however, they are both essentially the same.  It is just that the ‘Libyan people’ 
are also aspiring to complete their temporal development, which will be achieved once
they realize their universal human rights- at once universal and liberal democratic
rights-.  Therefore, the ‘Libyan people’ are imbued with the potential to realize their
‘human rights’ and politicised with what are predominately Western liberal democratic
rights such as freedom of speech and the democratic right to choose their government.
This means, as Cameron wanted to make clear, that people in the Middle East and North 
Africa were as amenable to liberal democracy as Westerners.  He makes a call, 
therefore, to ‘dispense once and for all with the outdated notion that democracy has no 
place in the Arab world’ (Cameron, 28/02/2011).  Elsewhere in what he refers to as the
‘so-called Arab exception’, he states: ‘For me that’s a prejudice that borders on racism.
It’s offensive and wrong, and it’s simply not true’ (Cameron, 26/02/2011).  With the
identity of the ‘Libyan people’ now so close to that of the West, the responsibility
weighing on the West to take decisive action is heightened.  The ‘Libyan people’ will be 
lead, with the help of the West, to realize its legitimate aspirations of rectifying its
backward state, so as to become like the Western Self itself.  
Moreover, it is not simply that the 'Libyan people' find themselves in a backward 
state of development- in comparison to the privileged Western Self-, it is that the
realization of the key human rights of freedom and democracy becomes the natural
endpoint of their development. That it is to say, a teleology governs official UK
discourse in as far as the events in Libya and the wider region are judged to be part of a
linear change towards freedom and democracy, and moreover that these same liberal
democratic values become the key to the Libyan people reaching the endpoint of their
social and political progress.  It is only by achieving their universal rights of freedom
and democracy that they will be able to reach their own 'destiny', and yet it is the figure
of Gaddafi who is standing in the way of the that.  The UK Prime Minister articulates


























future in which the people of Libya can determine their own destiny, free from violence
and oppression.' Constructed as the radical Other and bypassing the 'rehabilitation'
phase of U.K-Libyan relations, Gaddafi's ontological identity is once more one that does 
not allow for change. This means that he cannot remain in power, nor can he be part of 
any transitional process.  This is why, as early as the 27th February, Cameron's message
was that 'he should go now', and that 'Libya's future has no future with him at the helm,
absolutely none.'
The geographical and temporal significance of the 'Arab Spring' phenomenon
can thus be said to have an influence on how events in Libya where being understood, 
and the identities of those involved.  Conversely, however, it is also possible to discern 
how the outcome of events in Libya could impact on the events in the wider region.  
One can begin to see the indices of a 'domino' logic at play here, something which will
be articulated on several occasions.  It is believed that success in Libya, or indeed
failure, will ultimately have a knock-on effect in relation to the other countries in the
region who were experiencing an important transitional moment.  Speaking of events in
Libya Cameron states; 'we have seen the uprising of a people against a brutal dictator
and it will send a dreadful signal if their legitimate aspirations are crushed, not least to 
others striving for democracy across the region' (Cameron, 14/03/2011).  The
consequences of a passive response to the perceived imminent threat to Benghazi are
also hypothesised with similar conclusions reached by Foreign Secretary Hague
(02/10//2011): 'if Benghazi had fallen it would have been a huge setback for the Arab 
spring in countries like Egypt and Tunisia. It would have shown that a dictatorial ruler 
can successfully fight back and entrench himself again. That would have carried a
strong message. [Syrian president] Bashar al-Assad now would be feeling in a stronger 
position and probably getting active assistance from a well-entrenched Gaddafi regime.' 
This point leads on to another crucial aspect of the UK's performance of 'human
rights' in Libya; it is not only an ethical responsibility to the Libyan people that is
generated.  If the West was disposed to intervene militarily merely on ethical grounds, it 
would already have done so in the wide range of cases which have shown similar levels
of disorder and human rights abuses.  Yet as has been shown chapter 7, 'human rights'
has become subsumed within a wider security discourse, meaning that the discourse
constitutes the identity of the UK state in such a way that it also dependent on its own 






















and rights of the Libyan Other, but perhaps even more importantly the Self too.  In UK
official discourse towards Libya this element is carried forward and articulated at
several stages of the operation.  Speaking after a special European Council meeting on 
Libya on 14th March Cameron explains, 'it is in our interests to see the growth of open 
societies and the building blocks of democracy in North Africa and the Middle East'. 
Later he will point out, ' it is about the Arab spring. If there is success in Libya, in 
Tunisia, in Egypt, then we will see a genuine Arab spring and not an Arab winter. That
is what I think is in the interests of everyone in Europe, that our neighbourhood is made
up of countries that are people, prosperous, have been growing in their democracy, and 
that will enhance not only our own prosperity, but also our security and our safety as
well'. 
Furthermore, the 'security' and 'safety' that Cameron refers to can be understood 
in different ways such as in terms of the migration flows or natural resource
procurement.  Perhaps most pertinent, however, are the threats which stem from
transnational international terrorism.  This is indeed one of the main security concerns
to be found in UK security documents.  Foreign Secretary Hague (21/03/2011) assures
that 'if many of the countries of the middle east turn into stable democracies and more
open economies, the gains for our security and prosperity will be enormous.  If they do 
not, the potential breeding grounds for terrorism and extremism will prosper. That is
why it is so much in our national interest to address these issues'. Re-iterating the links
between the spread of human rights, freedom and democracy on the one hand, and the
dual concerns of security and terrorism on the other, is something that Cameron 
(04/05/2011) makes clear during a press conference with the Israeli President Benjamin 
Netanyahu.  As he explains, 'we think, though, now there is a real opportunity with the
end of Bin Laden, with the Arab Spring, with all that’s happening in the world, we think 
this is a moment of opportunity to continue the work to defeat terrorism in our world, to 
continue the expansion of democracy, civil rights and freedom across the Middle East










Political opposition to official UK discourse 
Political opposition to the U.K governments policies of both implementing a no-
fly zone, and that Gaddafi 'must go', can be found in a debate on Libya which was held 
on the 21st March.  On the face of it, a completely one-sided vote, the House of 
Commons decided by a huge majority-557 MPs in favour and 13 against-, to ‘support
the government, working with others, in the taking of all necessary measures to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya and to enforce the
no-fly zone’ (Hansard, 2011).  Yet this result, convincing as it may seem, must be
tempered by the fact that the United Nations Security Council had already passed 
Resolution 1973 and the vote was effectively carried out to garner further national
legitimacy for the governments’ actions.  In the event that that had not been the case, it



















   
 
  
motion.  As Labour MP Bob Ainsworth stated, 'I would not give my support tonight for 
the resolution if it were not for the fact that the United Nations had given its support, 
and that there was a breadth of support, including from the Arab League, for this
intervention.'  In any case, analysis of the debate shows that concerns, reservations and 
opposition were still voiced, including amongst those who voted in favour or abstained
from the motion.  The primary discourse being used to articulate the broad range of 
challenges to the U.K government’s position was that which understood the situation as
being a ‘civil war’.
Moreover, and in line with this first point, many MPs of all parties voiced 
concerns that regime change would become the de facto objective of the NATO
intervention.  It was stressed on several occasions that the mission, and the mandate
provided by the UN Resolution, should be understood strictly according to the
humanitarian principles of protecting the civilian population.  Conservative MP Edward 
Leigh was one of those, urging that 'we should state firmly that our operation is simply
and only a humanitarian exercise to save people in Benghazi and that there is absolutely 
no intention of our trying to achieve regime change'. MP Diane Abott was also 
concerned that the UN Resolution should be used to oust Gaddafi from power. As she
put it, 'the Government would be wrong to take this evening's vote as some sort of blank 
cheque'. As leader of the opposition and supporter of Resolution 1973 Edward 
Miliband put it, 'None of us, however, should be under any illusions or in any doubt
about the terms of what was agreed. The resolution is about our responsibility to protect
the Libyan people—no more, no less.' With this came demands for assurances that any
escalation in the military operations above and beyond the humanitarian mission that
should be subject to further consultation with the House of Commons and the elected 
representatives (Goldsmith, 2011; Leigh, 2011). 
Questions over the motivations of the government, or what would be the
perceived motivations of the decision to intervene in Libya, were also articulated during 
the debate. These were generally made in relation to the inconsistencies in Western 
responses to similar crises, such as were being witnessed concurrently in Bahrain,
Yemen, and other countries in the Middle East. This posed a challenge to UK official
discourse in as far as it called into question government claims that this was solely
about defending universal human rights.  If such values were really universal, then why
was the government not using its political and military power to put a stop to, or defend 
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these values, wherever they were being threatened. As such, this had the potential to
undermine the very foundations of the justification for military action against Gaddafi, 
and the demands made that the Libyan leader relinquish power.   
Perhaps the most significant challenge made to the Conservative-led
government's policy toward Libya emerged from the apparent discrepancy and 
incongruence between the two stated aims; on the one hand, the military objective of 
implementing a no-fly zone to protect the ‘Libyan people’; yet on the other, the political 
objective and policy that Gaddafi 'must go'. That is to say, there was an evident void 
between what the UN Resolution 1973 had authorized, and the aims which UK officials
were stating publicly; there was nothing in the redacted document which made demands 
that Gaddafi or the Libyan government ‘must go’.  In a similar way, there was no 
guarantee that the success of the stated military objective would be enough to bring 
about the fall of the Libyan leader and his Libyan government.  In practical terms, this
very incongruence raised important questions about what in fact the objectives of the
no-fly zone were, what a successful mission would be, and moreover what would
actually signal the end of the mission.  If the ultimate aim was to depose Gaddafi, the
no-fly zone policy could only realistically be a success if the 'human rights' discourse
was accurate in its representation of the dual-Libyan Other as Gaddafi-Libyan people.  
If, alternatively, the situation was more of a civil war, as many understood the events,
the imposition of a no-fly zone would most likely not be enough to bring about the fall
of Gaddafi and his government.  
Thus, one of the key questions which informed many of the doubters in the
House of Commons debate was that which pointed towards the ‘exit strategy’ of the
coalition’s no-fly zone policy. This raises the danger, as some like MP Angus Robertson 
expressed, that 'mission creep' could become a factor and the UK would be dragged 
further and further into a convoluted conflict situation. With this in mind, Robertson 
asks; 'will the Prime Minister acknowledge the importance of a broad consensus on this
issue, and in doing that, the need to stick to the terms of the UN resolution and to 
address concerns about an open-ended commitment and the potential for mission creep?' 
Along similar lines, Conservative MP Mark Lancaster cautioned: ‘One of the best
pieces of advice I was ever given was never go into a room until you know where the
exit is.’  John Redwood also raises this issue by asking, ‘Can he (the leader of the
























what is really a civil war in which the rebel side is experiencing considerable
difficulties?’
Using the 'civil war' discourse did not only raise questions about 'mission creep'
and what would constitute a successful mission in Libya.  For those who questioned the
reasoning behind imposing a no-fly zone, and the demands for a ceasefire made on the
Libyan government, the continuation of violence was being viewed as the logical
continuation in a conflict where one side is being forced to cease military activity, while 
the other is not placed under the same restrictions.  Reflecting along these lines, MP
Barry Gardiner considers the policy of a ‘no-fly zone’ to be inherently flawed since: ‘it
is naive to think that we can stop one side fighting in a civil war and not expect the
other to take advantage.  In a civil war, the tragedy is precisely that civilians are killed,
if not by one side then by the other.  I do not believe that the international coalition will
be even-handed in stopping rebel forces advancing in the same way’ (Gardner, 
22/03/2011).  MP James Arbuthnot pondered on ‘the difficult question of whether the
ceasefire applies to the rebels,’ and he asks: ‘if the rebels try, in response to breaches of 
the ceasefire by Gaddafi, to retake areas that he has taken, should we use military force
to stop them?’ (Arbuthnot, 22/03/2011).  
During the debate it is also possible to detect traces of the ‘civil war’ discourse
in issues relating to the geographical scripting of the conflict and the belligerents
involved.  MP Jeremy Corbyn traced the prospects of an east-west division of Libya,
which feasibly could be the result of no successful resolution or political settlement.
This, he suggests, would be an unwelcome situation since it would result in ‘a client
state in the east around Benghazi; and a pariah state in the west around Tripoli, led by
Gaddafi, and a source of constant conflict, disturbance and danger in the region.’
Moreover, since the stability of official UK discourse and policy was also dependent on 
an unambiguous split-Libyan Other composed of an aspiring democratic 'Libyan people' 
on the one hand, and a 'barbaric' dictator Gaddafi on the other, this means that British 
MPs could de-stabilise official discourse by calling into question the identity of the
Libyan opposition or 'rebels'. Several MP's urged caution in this regard, such as
Corbyn, who confessed: ‘I do not know the politics, aims, ambitions or anything else of 
the people in Benghazi…we should be cautious about going to war on behalf of a group 
















   
 





Many were Ministers in the Gaddafi Government, again, only three weeks ago.  It is a
very short time’ (21/03/2011).   
By questioning the identity of the groups who had risen up to challenge Gaddafi
and the Libyan government, the government's faith in a seamless transition to a liberal
democratic system was also placed in jeopardy.  MP Barry Gardiner was concerned 
about the democratic credentials of the 'rebels', lamenting that 'no one in government
has sought to explain the policy of the rebels, on whose side we now find ourselves.  We 
know that they are against Gaddafi, and that is a good start, but we certainly have no 
knowledge that they intend to replace him with an open, tolerant, liberal democracy.'
Yasmin Qureshi concurred in that the there was an evident uncertainty surrounding the
identity of the groups that the UK government had committed itself to supporting.  She
opined that: 'We talk about the rebels in Libya. Who are these rebels, when did they
come about and how many are there? How deep is the resistance and the rebellion?
Why is this not just seen as a civil insurrection that is going on in a country? Do we
know what we will get in place of the regime?'  In relation to this perceived ignorance
over the situation transpiring in Libya, and most likely in allusion to Iraq, she
concludes: ‘we have all learned to fear a vacuum in the Arab world.' 
Concerns over the identity of the 'rebels' were just one aspect of the things that
emerged in the debate by those deploying partially or fully the 'civil war' discourse.  
Adopting a more global perspective, it was clear to some that there was a real risk of the 
UK government's actions making things worse. This is in many ways a logical
conclusion if one were to presume that the government would not only implement the
no-fly zone, but would back the 'rebels' to the extent that the Libyan leader and 
government were toppled. Therefore, this would also be enough to suggest that the
consequences of intervention may not be the ones desired by those purportedly aiming 
to bring about freedom and democracy to Libya.  In reference to the Prime Minister's
own claims and the stated ambition that 'we get rid of this regime', Green Party MP
Caroline Lucas warned of the 'real risk of our making matters worse'. The prospect of 
civil war, she states, could lead to 'a partitioned Libya and even a potential breeding 
ground for al-Qaeda'. 
What most of these interventions demonstrate, in one way or another, is a sense
of caution, which stems from a humble sense of ignorance of the situation and the part
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of the World that MP’s were dealing with. This can be understood as a warning against
misjudgement based on ethnocentric understandings of the events.  With regards this
general idea, Yasmin Qureshi warns: 'I always urge people to understand—even in the
case of Iraq, although I was not in the House at the time—that we in this country and 
this House do not really understand the middle east and north Africa.  We are meddling
in things that we should not meddle in, because there are so many uncertainties’.  And 
directly referencing the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, she states that we
have ‘spent trillions of dollars on being involved in conflicts in the middle east, and 
what have we left? We have not resolved any of the situations involved or made
countries any better than when we went into them'. Somewhat more concisely Richard 
Drax resumes: 'there is not going to be a brave new world in Libya where western
democracy rules, and we would fool ourselves if we thought that'. 
Media opposition and the onset of ‘stalemate’ 
Informed by the ‘civil war’ discourse, the idea of an ensuing ‘stalemate’ would 
begin to become a recurrent and dominant theme in the UK newspapers analysed in the
weeks and months following the implementation of the no-fly zone.  First reports of this 
speak of it as more of a distinct possibility resulting from the measures being taken,
rather than a reality.  For those in the media using the 'civil war' discourse, this was a
logically conclusion to draw in that the situation on the ground was already understood
as being more balanced.  ‘The conflict could degenerate into a prolonged stalemate,’ the 
Guardian (19/03/2011) warned, while the Telegraph opined that ‘stalemate in Libya is
the greatest danger’ (25/03/2011). This would entail some unwanted consequences.  One 
of these is the possibility that Libya remains divided between a ‘rebel’ held east and a
Gaddafi controlled West.  More reports focus directly on the possibility that Gaddafi
would remain in power, with the Guardian suggesting that, ‘the dictator could remain in
place, ruling over part of a divided Libya for a long time to come’ (23/03/2011).  A
prolonged conflict not only threatened to be a test of the coalition’s unity, but also the
public’s patience. A lengthy military campaign would be accompanied by an inevitable






















Guardian calls, ‘yet another foreign foray at a time of austerity at home’, public
approval, it suggests, ‘is sure to be tested if the total costs reached its own estimates of 1 
billion pounds’. 
By borrowing the 'rebels' - 'loyalists' dichotomy from the 'civil war' discourse, 
the media was also able to question, as many MP's had done, the objectives of the
mission and the outcome of a no-fly zone. The protection of innocent life, as sanctioned 
by UN Resolution 1973, is a much simpler affair if one understands the violence
through the 'human rights' discourse and the unambiguous separation of a 'Libyan
people' on the one hand, and Gaddafi or the 'regime' on the other.  Yet the ambiguity of 
the 'civil war' discourse introduced doubts for some UK journalists in terms of the
policy being pursued and the perceived situation on the ground.  One Guardian editorial
(20/03/2011), 'shifting sands', poses the question: ‘How does a responsibility to protect
civilian life work in the circumstances where Gaddafi loyalists are defending their patch 
and the rebels are standing outside at the gates?’ (Guardian, 21/03/2011).  According to 
the article, ‘the rationale of the resolution would then be to enforce a ceasefire, but that
would be keeping Gaddafi in power’. 
Perhaps more significant for the coalition and proponents of the ‘human rights’
discourse, the type of drawn-out conflict being predicted would have the effect of 
magnifying further the apparent incoherence in UK official discourse.  Firstly, the more
balanced situation on the ground implied by ‘stalemate’ would simultaneously be
suggestive of a ‘civil war’ situation, undermining and destabilizing the UK
government’s ‘human rights’ discourse which had been used to justify involvement in
the first place.  Secondly, this illuminates the chiasm between the repeated claim that the 
coalition’s role was to enforce the no-fly zone and protect the Libyan people, while also 
stating that Gaddafi ‘must go’.  A ‘stalemate’ on the ground implies that Gaddafi will
not be deposed if the UK adheres strictly to UN Resolution 1973 and concentrates
solely on protecting the Libyan people. This would become increasingly clear as events 
transpired. 
It would not be long before the ‘civil war’ discourse progressed to what could be 
said to be its natural conclusion; the first reports of human rights abuses by the ‘rebels’
started to surface. The very logic of a civil war, suggestive of a more balanced conflict, 

























does not, of course, mean that one side, or all sides, are as ruthless as each other-.  This
development would appear to strike at the very heart of the UK government's ‘human
rights’ discourse; namely, that Gaddafi and his ‘regime’ were brutally repressing an 
innocent, unified, and democratic ‘Libyan people’.  By constructing the identities of 
those involved, albeit loosely, as ‘rebels’ versus ‘loyalists’, the ‘civil war’ discourse
must take account of civilian life in ‘loyalist’ areas, particularly once ‘rebel’ forces
advance into these spaces.  Ruth Sherlock, writing in the Telegraph (21/07/2011), 
reported on a ‘mass grave’ of what appeared to be Gaddafi loyalists, prompting 
‘awkward questions for Libya’s rebels’.  Such reports had the effect of questioning the
democratic and human rights credentials of the 'rebels', and moreover what the outcome
would be once the inevitable happened and the Libyan government was finally brought
down.  As such, the UK government's 'human rights' discourse and stated policy aim
could be undermined fatally.
The onset of ‘stalemate’ as informed by the ‘civil war’ discourse leads certain 
journalists to favour a negotiated settlement to bring an end to the violence.  Writing on 
the 27/07/2011 in the Guardian, Jonathan Steele believes this to be the most ‘logical’
solution.   It has been one of the assumptions of this thesis, and that which was
constructed in the basic ‘civil war’ discourse, that this is indeed the most logical foreign
policy option which emerges from the ‘civil war’ discourse and the identities which it
attempts to constitute.  Since through this discourse, Gaddafi and his government are
understood to have significant support within Libya, meaning that unlike Mubarak in 
Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia, the conflict may not be resolved easily by removing the
leader. This was the view of the African Union, the UN Special Envoy to Libya, and 
Steele too: ‘it is better to resolve these issues through negotiations than to break Libya’s
military stalemate with yet more war’. 
The assassination of 'rebel' commander General Younis in September of 2011, 
having defected at the start of the troubles from the government side to the National
Transition Council, was one incident which called into question the unity of  the rebels, 
destabilizing further the 'human rights' discourse's representation of a homogenous
'Libyan people' in opposition to Gaddafi.   After the death of the general was announced, 
reports in the Guardian spoke of a chaotic press conference which had ‘ended in gunfire 
from enraged members of Younis’ tribe, the Obeidi’. And the piece continues, ‘one of 




























leadership had some role in the general’s death’.  For the author this is ‘ominous’ in as
far as ‘it raises the spectre of a democratic movement degenerating into tribal conflict
(The Guardian, 30/07/2011).’ 
The construction of the conflict as a ‘stalemate,’ alongside reports of heavy
bombardment by NATO, leads the Guardian newspaper into some heavy criticism of 
British foreign policy thus far (03/08/2011).  In a 1,000-word diatribe, Simon Jenkins
lambasts David Cameron’s policy as having ‘done no more than impose stalemate on a
distant civil war at a cost of hundreds of millions of pounds’.  Libya is portrayed as
‘careering onward from reckless gesture to full-scale fiasco’ whereby the ‘Libyan
rebels, portrayed by Whitehall propagandists as plucky little democrats, are hardly more 
sympathetic than Gaddafi’s supporters -to each other and to those in the West’.  Here, 
Jenkins utilises some of the main aspects of the 'civil war', and in doing so attempts to
destabilise official U.K discourse and criticise government policy. The 'stalemate' in the 
'civil war' has been caused by an indecisive foreign policy which has swung 
unconvincingly between claims to protect the Libyan people and those which state the
aim of removing the Libyan government.  Finally, in this quote Jenkins lays bare his
understanding that the 'rebels', those being backed by the UK government, are not as
democratic as was being suggested, thus putting in doubt the ultimate stated aim of 
bringing about a democratic transition in Libya. 
Shortly after this there were more reports coming through of which factions
made up the Libyan ‘rebels’.  In an article in the Guardian on the 23/08/2011, Martin
Chulov whittles this down to three main groups: firstly, the ‘Benghazi rebels’, those
who are accredited as being the ‘founding fathers of the revolution,’ and which would
later develop into the National Transitional Council (NTC); secondly, the ‘Misrata
rebels’, who endured what were considered to be the ‘toughest and longest engagements 
of the war’; and finally, the ‘western rebels,’ who coming from the western mountains
were able to reach Tripoli before the other two main groups.  Questions had already
been raised about the cohesion of the group.  Chris Stephen reported that the NTC’s
claim to represent the whole of Libya had been ‘all but rejected by Misrata…whose
inhabitants are scathing of Jalil’s rule and of the poor performance of NTC army units’
(Stephen, Guardian 22/08/2011).  Chulov was keen to highlight the ‘disparate identities























contributed to the NTC being ‘slow to win the support of many who fight under its
banner’. 
How the UK government maintained discursive stability �
Perhaps the most immediate challenge which the UK government faced was
from charges of double standards and an inconsistent past record of both condemning
human rights abuses, and intervening militarily to put a stop to those taking place. This
was something UK officials had to deal with in relation to violence in the Middle East
as a whole, and as their condemnation of Gaddafi and the Libyan government became
more pronounced.  One of the first tactics used to usurp this particular criticism was to 
deny straight up that past British foreign policy could be defined in such terms.  While
on a visit to Kuwait as violence in Libya was flaring up, Cameron insisted: 'we have
condemned violence and repression against people wherever it has happened.  I would
not accept the contention that somehow we have been inconsistent between different
countries or different situations’ (Cameron, 22/02/2011).  Once increased pressure
began to be put on Gaddafi, the inadequacy of this response was clearly apparent and
Cameron would be obliged to offer up a more nuanced and forthright response: ‘just
because you can’t do the right thing everywhere, doesn’t mean you shouldn’t do the
right thing somewhere’ (Cameron, 18/03/2011).  Two things stand out here. In the first
place, Cameron alludes to the limitations of Western power, but secondly, he manages to 
evade perceptions of pure self-interest by claiming it to be the 'right thing' to do.  
Drawing attention to the UK's inconsistent history of human rights denunciations 
was a clear attack on the notion that this action against the Libyan government was
inherently humanitarian and undertaken to defend the human rights of the Libyan
people.  Yet more problematic still, was the difference between the stated political aims-
that Gaddafi 'must go'- and the military mandate authorised by the U.N.  This was
complicated further by the fact that the U.K governments construction of events in 
terms of a 'Libyan people' against the Libyan leader Gaddafi would become harder and 




















   
 
   
 
 
only implementing a no-fly zone, but also bringing about the fall of Libyan leader
Gaddafi, it was crucial for them to maintain discursive stability of the 'human rights'
discourse being deployed.  In order to achieve this, it was necessary to adopt two 
discursive strategies:
First and foremost, it was imperative that they did not actually recognize that
their policy was regime change and the toppling of Gaddafi.  It was not simply the case
that this objective had not been authorised by the UN Security Council, and would 
almost certainly have received severe criticism from various political actors and the
general public at large. Accepting that the removal of Gaddafi was the ultimate aim
would have destabilized the 'human rights' discourse being deployed since it would have 
undermined the dual-Libyan Other constructed by UK officials.  If it was recognised 
that Western power was being used and was necessary to remove Gaddafi from power, 
then this suggests that the level of support for the opposition in Libya was not as high as 
indicated, and at any rate, would certainly not encompass the whole of the Libyan
population.  Moreover, this would critically endanger the idea that this was a home-
grown movement through which the Libyan people were rising up to claim their
universal rights of freedom and democracy.  In short, the natural endpoint of freedom
and democracy would be exposed as a myth.  Rather, it would seem more like Western
imperialism or opportunism in intervening to get rid of a recalcitrant leader Gaddafi.
This would run the added risk of solidifying and galvanising support for Gaddafi
himself.  
Secondly, it was important that UK officials dealt effectively with the challenges 
being posed from those employing variations of the 'civil war' discourse, as was being
articulated in political and media opposition.  As has been argued previously, a civil war 
situation does not imply the same ethical responsibility as generated by the 'human
rights' discourse, and moreover does not imply a successful resolution in the event that
Gaddafi is toppled.  Rather, it suggests a much more complex situation on the ground, 
where possibly multiple interests are in play, and the risk of exacerbating the conflict
and instability is a real possibility. Yet perhaps more than anything, in recognizing that
a civil war situation was ongoing in Libya, UK officials would also have to admit that
Western force was necessary to bring down Gaddafi. As such, the first discursive
strategy outlined would have failed.  It was therefore important that Cameron, Hague























constructions such as 'rebels' - 'loyalists', and the reports of a 'stalemate' on the ground.  
It can be shown that it is the 'human rights' discourse itself that provides the resources to 
overcome the challenges, meaning that UK policy is able to remain more or less
constant until Gaddafi's forces are defeated and the Libyan leader captured by
opposition forces.  
In order to satisfy these two discursive requirements for stability of the ‘human 
rights’ discourse, the first way that this was dealt with was by denying outright that
regime change was in fact an objective in the first place.  As the Prime Minister put it
during the House of Commons debate on Libya on the 21st of March: 'this is different
from Iraq. This is not going into a country and knocking over its Government, and then 
owning and being responsible for everything that happens subsequently.'  Secondly, UK
officials would repeatedly insist on their intentions to adhere stringently to the letter of 
UN Resolution 1973, meaning that the mission was just about protecting the Libyan
people.  Thus, for instance, when questions were asked over the extent of UK
involvement in Libya, what the plans were to depose Gaddafi, or when the job would be 
considered done, Cameron, Hague and Fox all showed a tendency to reaffirm their 
commitment to stick to the Resolution and to 'take all necessary measures to protect
civilians'. In garnering support for his policy in the House of Commons, Cameron
(21/03/2011) wanted to assure members: 'the action will be limited by what the UN
Security Council resolution says...I urge all hon. Members to read the resolution in full, 
because it gives a pretty clear explanation of what we can do, and we must act within
both the letter and the spirit of that'. 
Since there was an evident gap between the political aims and military aims in 
that the military aims would quite feasibly not be enough to get rid of Gaddafi, a quite
natural question to arise was that of how long the mission was going to take.  This
would be dealt with by first of all claiming that this was unknown.  'Of course, no one
can be certain of what the future can hold,' Cameron (21/03/2011) was happy to
acknowledge.  Having said that, this then enables the Prime Minister to use the UK
government's modified 'human rights' discourse and construct the identity of the 'Libyan 
people' as essentially democratic.  'But as we stand here today, the people of Libya have
a much better chance of determining their destiny and, in taking this action, we should
be proud that we are not only acting in British interests but being true to our values as a










   
 










   
 
future is to a certain extent uncertain, yet on the other, there is only one future
imaginable and that is the 'people of Libya' being able to determine 'their own destiny'
-realize their human rights of freedom and democracy-.                             
Yet this position, as set out be Cameron in the House of Commons, would 
become more and more difficult to sustain as events on the ground were increasingly
understood as a 'stalemate'. It has been argued in the previous section, that this posed a
dual problem to British policy makers in that it destabilised the construction of the
'Libyan people'-Gaddafi identity dichotomy, and that it magnified the incongruence in 
the stated political and military aims of the mission.  One of the ways in which officials
attempted to neutralise this challenge was to simply deny this was in fact the case.  In 
spite of widespread acceptance of this in the media and amongst US officials-including 
Obama (15/04/2011)- Defence secretary Liam Fox opined: ‘I don’t think we’re in a
position of stalemate’, and instead cited ‘substantial progress being made in some areas
in recent days’. This effectively allows Fox to resort to the basic ‘human rights’
discourse and the protection of the ‘Libyan people’: ‘All that we want is that men, 
women and children can sleep safe in their own homes knowing that they will not be
attacked by their own government’. The focus would then be shifted to the job at hand,
issuing a steadfast warning and assuring: ‘its resolve (international community) will not
falter until we have achieved militarily and politically what it has set out to do’ (Fox, 
27/04/2011).
At other times, UK officials would emphasise the inevitability of Gaddafi being 
forced from power and the ‘intensification’ of the measures being taken. This was of 
course a delicate balancing act; pressure had to be increased on the Gaddafi and the
Libyan government, but the UK government could not be seen to be forcing them out.
In fact, it was almost impossible to resolve this tension and at times UK policy makers
could not but expose themselves.  ‘Time is not on Gaddafi’s side,’ Hague (27/04/2011) 
assured, ‘because the diplomatic, economic and military pressure on him will only
intensify in the coming weeks’.  That intensification would take on different facets.  On 
questions of whether Gaddafi himself was a target of the airstrikes, UK officials were
coy, without specifically ruling the action out.  Speaking shortly after the imposition of 
the ‘no-fly zone’ Fox said: ‘There is a difference between someone being a legitimate
target and whether we go ahead and target him. You would have to take into account





















damage.  We don’t simply with a gung-ho attitude start firing off missiles’ (Fox, cited in 
the Guardian, 21/03/2011).  Later on the Foreign Secretary Hague would also be reticent 
to discard the possibility, pointing out: ‘People are targets depending on the way they
behave.  It depends on their behaviour not on who they are.  It depends whether 
providing all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya requires them to be a
target’ (Hague, 27/04/2011).  On whether or not ‘ground forces’ would be deployed,
earlier guarantees  had only been given that it would not happen ‘at the moment’
(Hague, 20/03/2011).  Nevertheless, Hague also wants to make conceptual clarifications 
in stressing that for him: ‘There can’t be an occupation force.  But I don’t think that
means you can’t have a ground invasion of Libya’. And he continues, ‘it doesn’t
exclude every possible type of operation’ (Hague, 21/03/2011).  
However much UK officials aimed to maintain stability of the 'human rights'
discourse being deployed, this is something that cannot be attained entirely and
contradictions become apparent.  The aporia that UK officials cannot ultimately
overcome is that on the one hand, they are stating that it is about protecting the 'Libyan 
people' in order to give them the opportunity to determine their own 'destiny'. In short, 
it is a question of self-determination.  Yet the intensification of the military campaign to
remove the Libyan leader and government would betray this very notion.  Said in 
another way, the UK government's discourse professes to be aimed at allowing the
Libyan people the chance to choose their own government, and not to impose
something on them externally.  But, at the same time, they are not being permitted to 
choose Gaddafi and the current Libyan government should they so wish.  
This was something that William Hague displayed significant difficulty in 
negotiating, and at times he tried to assure that an intensification of pressure on Gaddafi
was not actually an indication that the mission had changed in any way. As he put it,
'we will continue in that way, intensifying what we’re doing, the Apache helicopters are
an example of that but that’s different from mission creep, this is not mission creep 
changing the nature of the thing, this is intensifying what we are doing in order to make
this mission a success..'.  The message here is clear: ‘this is not mission creep', neither
has the mission changed in any way, nor this is about regime change.  As UK officials
would repeat time and again, this was about giving the Libyan people the opportunity to 





























As it was becoming increasingly clear that Gaddafi still held considerable
support within Libya, and that real doubts concerning the aftermath of the conflict were
being raised, the UK government would resort to putting greater emphasis on the
National Transitional Council and the Libyan people themselves.  They would even hint 
at the need for a 'political' solution, whilst maintaining its refusal to accept that Gaddafi
should play any part in that process.  As it was put, 'our military actions can protect the
people from attack; and our humanitarian actions can help the people recover. But
neither are sufficient to provide the path to greater freedom. Ultimately, the solution
must be a political one - and it must be for the Libyan people themselves to determine
their own destiny. That means reinforcing the UN sanctions to exert the greatest
possible pressure on the Qadhafi regime.'
Part of the concerns over the path to democracy stemmed from ambiguity that
reports of a 'stalemate' had been generating about the identity of the 'rebels’; it was
becoming less and less credible to claim that Libyan opposition forces were those of a
homogenous 'Libyan people', nor that they were all democratic.  When asked if he was
clear about who in fact the UK was supporting, Foreign Secretary Hague's response
demonstrates a double strategy:  the first thing is to admit his partial ignorance- 'well a
fairly clear sense.  We've got to know some of them quite well'. And he continues, 
'there’s also a great mixture who support them; there are representatives of all areas of 
Libya, there are representatives of many shades of opinion'.  The second thing is to 
place the emphasis on the NTC and to re-assert his faith that they are essentially
democratically orientated: 'I think it is important to say that these people at the top of 
this organisation are genuine believers in democracy, in the rule of law. It is quite
inspiring as I, as I said earlier this morning to see their real hope for the future of their 
country.' And perhaps rather less convincingly, he states: 'I think they are genuine in 
wanting a democratic Libya and in their hopes for a free country.' 
Prime Minister Cameron also preferred at this stage to focus on the democratic
credentials of the Libyan opposition.  'If we are patient and persistent', he assures, ‘we
will see the steady growth of the National Transitional Council which is an organisation
that wants to make sure Libya is one country, is a democracy, is not extremist Islamist,
is not tribalist but is actually joining the mainstream of the world as a successful
democracy'. At other times though, he too resorts to confessing his partial ignorance























complete, but the evidence suggests that it consists predominantly of ordinary Libyans
from all walks of life who want freedom, justice and democracy’.  One the one hand 
Cameron admits that he doesn't know who exactly the opposition forces are composed 
of, and yet on the other, he assumes them to be motivated by a desire for 'freedom' and 
'democracy'.
The killing of General Younis was a notable development in as far as it raised
further questions about the identity of those groups that the U.K was supposed to be
supporting. First and foremost, this raised doubts about how democratic and moderate
they actually were.  Secondly, the killing could serve to refute any ideas of ‘unity’ which 
had hitherto been suggested of the Libyan opposition. The U.K. Defence Secretary
would thus have to deal with these questions, which he did using tactics to essentially
buy time.  Dr Fox first of all tried to make appeals to the ambiguity surrounding the
events, saying that ‘it’s not yet clear who carried out the killing’, and that ‘there are
claims and counter-claims.’  Secondly, in relation to the lack of unity in the ranks of the
opposition forces, Dr Fox is now obliged to acknowledge this stating that ‘there has
always been a mixture of people who make up the opposition forces.’ This is ‘hardly
surprising given the country’s history,’ and yet it will be for the ‘Libyans themselves to
sort out exactly how and what power structure develops post-Gaddafi’ (Fox, cited in the
Guardian, 31/07/2011). 
The emphasis now being placed on the NTC and the Libyan people was in
tandem with the fact that it was becoming more and more likely that the Libyan
opposition prevailed and toppled Gaddafi and the Libyan government. As a quite
significant side issue, this allowed the UK government to avoid committing itself to any 
major responsibility for the aftermath and reconstruction.  On the question of whether or 
not British troops would be deployed after the fall of Gaddafi to maintain stability,
Cameron stated that this was a ‘Libyan-owned, Libyan-led process’ and dismissed the
idea that British or other troops would be deployed there on a grand scale.  ‘I don't
believe that the Libyans want to see, as it were, large numbers of international forces or 
foreign forces on their soil and that is not what Britain's role has been or will be,’ he
said.  NATO had ‘protected civilian life by hitting very hard the Gadhafi war machine’, 
he said, which had allowed the Libyan people to ‘choose their own future’ through their 


















   






Nevertheless, clearly this point was not of marginal import. As the homogeneity 
of Libyan opposition forces had all but been dismissed, arousing concerns about
potential instability after the fall of Gaddafi, the aftermath of a Libya in which Gaddafi
had been ousted was plagued with uncertainty.  In response to questions of this nature
from BBC correspondent Andrew Marr, William Hague is only able to deflect
responsibility for that on to the National Transition Council itself as can be seen from
this quote: 'Andrew Mitchell and I went to talk to them -National Transitional Council-
about yesterday because there needs to be such a plan and it’s only in an embryonic
stage...we’re also encouraging the National Transitional Council to put more flesh on 
their proposed transition, to lay out in more detail this coming week what would happen 
on the day that Gaddafi went; who would be running what? How would a new
Government …'. 
Yet the intensification of the air campaign and continuous threats were being
directed at Gaddafi and the Libyan leadership. This meant that the U.K government did 
have a responsibility for what happened afterwards and that this responsibility could not 
simply be shifted on to the Libyans as Hague was trying to do.  Moreover, Hague's
negative with regards ‘peace keeping forces’ or any kind of ‘boots on the ground’ – 
Hague claims that 'Britain does not normally these days play a huge part in peace
keeping forces'-, leaves him exposed to charges of negligence or abandonment of duty.
‘Our moral responsibility is different,’ Marr suggests, ‘I mean we will have helped to
bring this regime down, we will have broken the Government as it were, so in terms of 
the pieces afterwards, we have an obligation presumably as a country to ensure that, you 
know, that there isn’t chaos.' 
Hague's response is to fall back on the what he envisages to be the promise of 
liberal democracy. Avoiding 'chaos' is about a 'stabilisation response,' which for Hague
is the establishment of liberal democratic institutions and relations between Europe and 
Libya characterised as such: 'That is making sure that we have a whole new partnership 
with the Arab world, between the European Union and the Arab world, the way Europe
acts as a magnet for positive change, encouraging really open market economies, the
rule of law, an independent judiciary so that these things flourish in North Africa'. And 
again, not only will the emergence of a liberal democratic system in Libya benefit the
Libyans, but that 'once this fighting is over,' this is 'the immense contribution that
























world.'  In other words, it is the spread of liberal democracy, whether that be done by
force or not, that will provide greater prosperity and stability in the world.
On receiving news of Gaddafi’s demise, British foreign minister William Hague
was quick to reiterate this point: ‘there is a lesson here for others in the world that once
a critical mass of people of a country set out to achieve change or bring democracy to 
their country, then attempts to repress that by violence will not permanently succeed’
(Hague, cited in the Independent, 23/08/2011).  This is another example of how U.K
officials are able to maintain stability of the ‘human rights’ discourse being deployed
since the start of the conflict.  It is not the U.K government, or the U.S or French for 
that matter, which has brought about the toppling of Libyan leader Gaddafi.  Rather, it is 
the Libyan people who have done it, fuelled by an inexorable democratic force that will
inevitably succeed. As Hague puts it, ‘attempts to repress’ those democratic forces ‘will 
not permanently succeed’.  
  Coming towards the end of NATO involvement, one can see again how the U.K 
government is unable to accept prime responsibility with its allies in bringing about the
fall of Gaddafi and the Libyan government.  It is somewhat paradoxical that the 'destiny' 
of the Libyan people can only be reached in concordance with Western military power,
which provides another reason why Cameron is reticent to accept any credit for the fall
of Gaddafi and the Libyan government. As Cameron was keen to point out at a joint
press conference with President Sarkozy in Paris on the 2 September 2011: 'I am proud 
of what British forces did together with our allies..But let us be clear, it is the Libyan
people who have liberated Libya. The citizens of Misrata who stood out against a
murderous siege; the people of Zawiya who faced overwhelming odds but came back to 
rid their city of Qadhafi’s forces; the fighters of the Jabal Nafusa who took shelter from
Qadhafi’s rockets in their ancestors’ caves but then who fought back to liberate Tripoli;
and, of course, the people of Benghazi who threw off oppression in their city'.
The violence in Libya, however, would not cease there and as more reports of 
‘human rights’ abuses came in, more questions would arise surrounding what the new
Libya would be like.  The challenge presented by these reports was one which would 
not rest easily with the ‘human rights’ discourse, nor its proponents.  After all, the
legitimacy for Western intervention derived from the need to prevent these abuses from











were seen to be doing the same, the credibility of the intervention would be placed in 
jeopardy.  UK officials would respond in certain distinct ways.  First, these abuses
would be referred to as ‘reprisals’ or ‘revenge’ attacks.  In response to a question about
the plight of black Africans in Libya, Foreign Secretary Hague (31/08/2011) assures that 
the NTC is ‘urging forces not to engage in reprisals and revenge attacks, and we’ve
made it clear human rights abuses should not occur’.  For sure this does not absolve the
perpetrators of their crimes, yet it does mitigate them to an extent; both words point to 
an original wrongdoing which is the cause of the present actions of opposition forces. 
Another way in which officials reacted to these claims was by a double move:  firstly,
questions were deflected onto the shoulders of the National Transitional Council, 
thereby absolving the coalition of substantive responsibility; and secondly, it was
stressed that the NTC was a different type of interlocutor from the ‘Gaddafi regime’.  
William Hague claimed that: ‘Where there are reports of abuses, they do take action and 
people are arrested...this is very, very different from the old regime of Libya, which























   
CHAPTER 9 OFFICIAL U.S POLICY DISCOURSE:
‘RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT’ 
It has been shown in the previous section that UK official discourse remained
remarkably stable for the duration of the government's discursive and military
engagement with the crisis and violence in Libya.  Part of the reason for this was the
lack of significant political opposition.  In many ways, the decision to hold a House of 
Commons debate after UN Resolution 1973 was passed served to provide the
Conservative-led government with national legitimacy for their Libyan policy, even if 
the subsequent escalation in military activity would go beyond the stated aim at that
time of protecting civilians. Another reason for the stability of official UK discourse
was that media opposition was successfully dealt with through resources inherent in the
'human rights' discourse itself.  In particular, the temporal identity of the 'Libyan people' 
was highlighted, the democratic 'destiny', which lay before them, and the need to
remove Gaddafi for that 'destiny' to be realized.
In the U.S, a significantly more complex discursive panorama can be witnessed.
What's more, the Obama administration's discourse and policy came up against
considerably more political opposition than Cameron received. While, as will be
shown, much of this seemed to centre on constitutional matters and in particular the War 
Powers Act- itself suggestive of party politics point scoring as some Representatives
indeed claimed (Lee, 24/06/2011)- a closer inspection reveals that much of this criticism 
was made borrowing from the basic 'civil war' discourse, thus throwing up other issues
related with national interests, costs, and feelings that European allies should accept a
greater share of the burden -in relation with military interventions-.  This also allowed 
for other discourses to emerge in opposition to the governments stated position, making 
for more complex constructions, such as a terrorism discourse which was used to 
question the identity and objectives of some of the rebel groups, and moreover the
likelihood of a post-Gaddafi democratic transition.
For the most part, official U.S policy towards Libya remained in close
acquiesces with the one being advocated by the Conservative-led government in 




















   
 
in both UN Resolutions 1970 and 1973, and would then take leadership of the
implementation phase of the no-fly zone before handing over to NATO.  What is more,
like their British and French counterparts, U.S officials had already decided that there
was no future for Gaddafi in Libya.  Clear demands are made on Gaddafi and the
Libyan ‘regime’.  Speaking on the 26th February, Hillary Clinton states that Gaddafi
‘needs to do what is right for his country by leaving now.’  Continuing, ‘Qadhafi has
lost the confidence of his people and he should go without further bloodshed and
violence.’  If there were any doubt, speaking in Santiago on March 22nd Obama
underlines U.S intentions: ‘It is US policy that Gaddafi needs to go'. 
Yet, generally speaking, U.S official policy demonstrated an inclination towards
a more passive and cautious approach when compared to official U.K discourse.  For 
instance, while Cameron and Hague were openly talking about the possibility of a no-
fly zone over Libya, US Defence Secretary Gates was showing himself to be more wary. 
With regards to the 'loose talk' that he had been hearing regarding the no-fly zone, Gates 
wanted to add a touch of realism to the discussion.  Before the passing of UN Security
Council Resolution 1973, the U.S Defence Secretary endeavoured to spell out what in
fact a no-fly zone would entail: ‘let’s just call a spade a spade..a no-fly zone begins with 
an attack on Libya to destroy the air defences.  That’s the way you do a no-fly zone.
And then you can fly planes around the country and not worry about our guys being 
shot down.  But that’s the way it starts’ (Gates, 02/03/2011).  This can be understood as
a warning that first and foremost, a no-fly zone would not simply imply patrolling the
skies above Libya, and secondly that this is 'the way it starts,' an ominous reference to 
what may come afterwards and the size of the operation which may be needed to
implement a measure of this kind. 
There are also further divergences to be found between the U.S and U.K
governments policy positions.  Specifically, both appear to adopt a different view on the 
future possibility of deploying ground troops.  While, as has been seen, the U.K. 
government would not rule the option out, President Obama was quite categorical about 
this particular issue, perhaps reflecting growing criticism at home: ‘I also want to be
clear about what we will not be doing. The United States is not going to deploy ground 
troops into Libya. And we are not going to use force to go beyond a well-defined goal
-- specifically, the protection of civilians in Libya’ (18/03/2011).  Defence Secretary
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Gates is also very clear about this, assuring that there would be no ground troops 'as
long as I am in this job' (Gates, 31/03/2011). 
What this effectively amounts to is a policy position that Gaddafi 'needs to go', 
indicative of regime change, but without any suggestion to increase the US's own 
military engagement with Libya. This is in line with Obama's repeated claim that the
U.S had undertaken a 'limited' (28/03/2011) role in the operation, whereby the onus is
on the Libyan people to bring down Gaddafi.  The U.K government, for all the rhetoric
about aims 'to protect the Libyan people' (21/03/2011), had been careful not to discard
any of the military options and indeed would speak openly about ratcheting up the
military pressure on Gaddafi as the mission progressed.  This, in itself, was evidence
that the U.K and French governments were in fact the main pursuants of forcible regime 
change in Libya, and the U.S government was more of a reluctant partner. 
As could be perhaps deduced from the hesitation evident in the Democrat
administration's policy formulation, U.S policy discourse portrays a more confused 
picture of the Libyan crisis.  That said, there are still considerable convergences to be
found with both the basic 'human rights' discourse, and the amended one deployed by
U.K officials.  For instance, one can see immediately that the U.S government and the
President Obama also frame the country within the Middle East geographical setting:
‘Now, throughout this period of unrest and upheaval across the region the United States
has maintained a set of core principles which guide our approach.  These principles
apply to the situation in Libya’ (Obama, 23/02/2011).  An analysis of Obama's discourse 
can also show how this 'upheaval across the region' was being conceptualised in Official 
U.S discourse.  This first thing is that it is understood to be a uniform phenomenon -in
spite of the fact that Obama is quick elsewhere to highlight the specificities of each
case, especially when the question of US inconsistency emerges (Obama, 29/03/2011)-. 
Secondly, it is implied that the phenomenon is heading in a particular direction, where a
particular endpoint is implicitly assumed -the achievement of freedom and democracy-. 
In relation to the crisis in Libya, Obama opines that 'this is just one more chapter in the
change that is unfolding across the region'.  Here, Libya is a 'chapter' in a metaphoric
story, or unity -the region as a whole-, with presumably a beginning and a concrete end. 
The U.S, like the U.K. government, deploys a 'human rights' discourse which 




















rights abuses which are said to be taking place have been picked up from claims which
had hitherto appeared in the media.  For instance, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton showed herself to be ‘deeply concerned’ about ‘Gaddafi’s security forces’ using 
‘violence against women and rape as tools of war’.  This practice, she claimed, was
‘widespread’.  Moreover, there was also the assertion that foreign mercenaries were
being used from parts of sub-Saharan Africa.  The potency of this claim was twofold:
firstly, it purportedly demonstrated the ruthlessness of a government who were attacking 
and killing its own people, and one who was prepared to pay foreign fighters to solve its 
internal problems and the heightening conflict for them.  Secondly, this claim was also
coherent with the basic ‘human rights’ discourse in as far as it points to a lack of support 
for the government within Libya.  Recalling that the basic 'human rights' discourse
places in opposition to one another Gaddafi, or the Libyan 'regime,' and a uniform
‘Libyan people’, consistency would therefore be maintained if there was a need to enlist 
forces from out with Libya’s borders, suggesting that the ones doing the killing were not 
actually Libyan at all.  
Moreover, the U.S government was at pains to express the same sense of 
urgency in taking military action. Again, the focus is placed on Benghazi, the apparent
de facto heart of the uprisings.  As Obama put it, ‘if we waited one more day, Benghazi, 
a city nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated 
across the region and stained the conscience of the world’ (Obama, 2011).  This is a
crucial part of both official discourse in the U.S and in the U.K.  As has been seen, the
U.K government used what was described as an impending 'massacre' in Benghazi to 
account for the speed with which the U.N Resolution authorizing the no-fly zone was
passed, and also to add national legitimacy to the policy being pursued.  The quote from 
Obama shows that this was being replicated in Washington and while there can be no 
way of ascertaining whether or not this massacre would have taken place, it is also 
reasonable to assume that genuine concerns were being felt over the possibility of 
morally unacceptable violence in Benghazi. 
In addition to concerns over the physical well-being of the Libyan population,
U.S government discourse also mirrors U.K discourse in politicizing the 'Libyan






















Libyan government to respect the universal rights of their own people, including their
right to free expression and assembly.'  It is being argued in this thesis that this is in fact
the crucial discursive move being carried out by both the U.S and U.K governments.  
By imbuing the 'Libyan people' with liberal democratic 'human rights', their temporal
identity is opened up and a path laid out for them which leads to a realization of these
values, and the attainment of the position of the privileged Western Self.  On March 3rd 
Obama demands that 'the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and 
dignity must be met'. What is more, like in the case of official U.K discourse, the
'human rights' discourse is being performed here in accordance with a linear view of 
history and governed by a teleology which has the 'human rights' of 'freedom' and 
'democracy' positioned as the endpoint of the social and political development of the
'Libyan people'. In supporting ‘the universal rights of the Libyan people,' Obama states, 
including the 'rights of peaceful assembly' and 'free speech', this will also entail helping 
the 'Libyan people to determine their own destiny.’  ‘Destiny’ here is understood as the
still to come, but suggestive of a future which has been pre-determined.
That the U.S should follow the U.K government in emphasizing the 'universal
rights' of 'freedom' and 'democracy' is hardly surprising, bearing in mind that this was
also shown to be the case when tracing the conceptual history of 'human rights' within
U.S and U.K foreign policy discourse.  There it was shown how 'human rights', 
'freedom' and 'democracy' were grouped within a wider 'security' discourse so as to
create a fusion between 'values' and 'interests'. In the case of Libya, a similar thing
happens.  The deployment, or performance of 'human rights' in Libya shows precisely a
fusion of these two components: interests and values.  In reference to the difficult
decision that a President may have to take when faced with the possibility 'to use force
to solve the world's many challenges', Obama concludes that there is a responsibility to 
act 'when our interests and values are at stake' (28/03/2011).  
This raises questions about what were the 'interests' that Obama and the U.S. 
administration held in the outcome of the Libyan crisis.  Indeed, Obama's Defence
Secretary had quite openly spoken about the lack of a 'vital' national interest in Libya.
Yet this did not mean that other interests were not in play.  In particular, and in relation 
with U.S 'security' discourse, the spread of 'freedom' and 'democracy' is understood to 
entail greater stability in the countries in consideration. This means that the turmoil and 


























of not having liberal democratic political systems and institutions.  And since stability in 
the region was considered to be a 'vital' national interest, this meant that 'it's in 
America's interest for the Middle East and North Africa to be more democratic, more
free..'.  
Like in the case of official UK discourse, the idea of a region and Libya
revolting due to repressive regimes and striving for, progressing towards more liberal
and democratic systems of government, allow for the emergence of logics which link
quite different countries, with quite different cultural forms, and divergent historical
trajectories.  This makes it possible to reach the conclusion that events in one country
may have an effect on the others.  As U.S officials were keen to point out, the
exacerbation of the Libyan conflict could de-stabilize the democratic transitions taking 
place both in Egypt and Tunisia.  What is more, as was seen from U.K officials, an 'anti-
domino' logic is made possible, whereby the failure to overthrow Gaddafi in Libya
could affect the prospects for democratic transitions in other countries such as Syria.  
Understood in this way, the defence of 'freedom' and 'democracy' becomes both a
question of 'values' and 'interests'. As Obama put it, ‘the United States has an important
strategic interest in preventing Qaddafi from overrunning those who oppose him….the
democratic impulses that are dawning across the region would be eclipsed by the
darkest form of dictatorship, as repressive leaders concluded that violence is the best
strategy to cling to power’ (28/03/2011). 
However, whereas in the U.K the British government demonstrated a remarkably 
strict adherence to the basic 'human rights' discourse, as mentioned at the outset of this
section, this cannot be said for U.S officials.  What can be shown is that while officials
did indeed show a tendency to deploy the modified 'human rights' discourse used by the
U.K government, emphasizing the transient temporal identity of a 'Libyan people'
aiming for 'freedom' and 'democracy', this picture was complicated by oscillations
toward constructions of the violence which borrowed elements from the basic 'civil war' 
discourse.  If, as was argued in the construction of the basic discourses, that the basic
'civil war' discourse implied a lesser degree of ethical responsibility, and emphasizes
greater dangers to outside intervention, this is highly significant discursively. The
somewhat ambiguous use of both the basic 'human rights' and 'civil war' discourses can
be seen in early statements made by Hillary Clinton with regards to events in Libya.  On 


























discourse where she omits the figure of Gaddafi in favour of a more neutral 'Libyan
government,' and erects it in direct opposition to the 'Libyan people.'  In these
pronouncements, there is no doubt as to who is the violent and radical Other, who are
the innocents, and moreover that there is a clear responsibility on the West to take
action.  On the 26th of February, Clinton mobilizes precisely this construction of events: 
'The United States strongly condemns the ongoing violence and human rights violations 
committed by the government of Libya against its own people. As President Obama
said, these actions violate international norms and every standard of common decency.
They must stop.' 
On other occasions, however, she leans towards and borrows elements from the
basic 'civil war' discourse. For instance, while responding to a question about lifting the
arms embargo and 'supporting the rebels', Clinton is keen to express the difficulties
involved in such actions and the complexity of what she sees transpiring on the ground:
'well, I think everything is being looked at, but it is difficult in the midst of this civil
conflict that is going on now to even know how you would do that, because right now, 
it's not clear what part of the country is actually under rebel control.  We know the east
is, but how much in the middle, and then we've got Qadhafi' (09/03/2011).  Two things
are apparent from this assessment of events.  In referencing the 'rebels' and also the east-
west spatialisation of the 'civil conflict', Clinton veers away from a simplistic 'Libyan
people' - 'Gaddafi' opposition, and the ambiguity that this entails means that 'it is
difficult...to even know how you would do that' (support the rebels with arms).  In 
addition, U.S officials appear to adopt a marginally different view of the temporal
identity of both the context- 'Arab Spring'- and the 'Libyan people', when compared with 
their U.K counterparts. As has been noted previously, there is evidence that Libya was
being understood in relation with wider changes taking place in the region, and that
these changes were being conceptualised in a linear way, as a movement of 'progress'
and towards greater 'freedom' and 'democracy'. Nevertheless, at other times it is
possible to see that this picture is blurred somewhat, whereby the outcomes are not so 
clear and this linear development is complicated.  In an interview, Obama makes the
case for prudence, dismissing what he views as the clamour for an 'Obama doctrine,'
and making a call to take into account the particularities of each country (29/03/2011).  
Secretary of Defence Gates is another who, while essentially endorsing the

















   
values', he also recognizes that 'each country in the region faces a unique set of 
circumstances' (29/03/2011).  On the one hand, thus, Gates re-affirms his belief in
'universal values,' but on the other, he suggests that these are not necessarily achieve
able in the same way or through U.S intervention.  
What can be seen here is a wider appreciation of the limitations of U.S military
power, and the concomitant uncertainties involved in the quest for the promotion and 
spread of 'universal values'. As such, while Gates seemingly accepts that the 'Libyan
people' are the holders of 'universal values', their temporal identity is confused in that
there is still uncertainty over whether or not they will be able to realize them.  This leads 
Gates to what appears to be an unequivocal rejection of the policy of 'regime change' in 
Libya. The historical antecedent for his position, it is clear, is Iraq.  On stating his
insistence that the 'military mission does not include regime change', he continues:
'sometimes it has worked and sometimes it has taken ten years.  And it does, as has been 
the case in Iraq, sometimes involve both enormous human and fiscal cost' (29/03/2011). 
The deduction being made is that the removal of Gaddafi by force may not lead to the
attainment of 'freedom' and 'democracy, in the same way that this was not achieved in 
Iraq.  For him, therefore, the idea 'was basically to establish the no-fly zone and protect
the Libyan people'. 
Part of the problem for U.S officials was that the identity of the 'rebels', as called 
into question by the basic 'civil war' discourse, remained unclear.  Defence Secretary
Gates does not accept the simplicity of the strict dual-Libyan Other imposed by the
basic 'human rights' discourse- 'Libyan people' vs Gaddafi-.  Answering questions
surrounding the identity of the 'rebels' at the House Armed Services Committee, Gates
dispels any notion of homogeneity in referring to them as 'disparate' and 'scattered'.  
Gates is also not averse to showing his ignorance with regards the identity of the groups 
themselves.  The U.S does not 'have much visibility into those who have risen against
Gadhafi' and furthermore that there were in fact 'multiple agendas' at work.  As events
progressed, it seemed like Gates would not become any more knowledgeable about who 
in fact was being backed by NATO and the U.S government. When asked, 'who are
these rebels in Libya?' on the (12/05/2011), the Defence Secretary responds with 




    









   
 










'Well, I think that the honest answer to your question is that with the exception of 
some of the people at the top of the opposition or the rebels in Libya, we don't know
who they are.  And I think this is one of the reasons why there has been such reluctance, 
at least on our part, to provide any kind of lethal assistance to the opposition....We deal
with a handful of people in Benghazi, but we forget about those who led the uprisings in 
cities all over Libya when this whole thing started. And who are they? And are they
genuinely anti-Gadhafi? Are they tribal representatives? Are they --kind of who are
they? And we have no idea who those people are, but they were the ones that led the
major uprisings in Tripoli and a variety of other cities’. 
This is quite a significant admission from Secretary Gates in as far as it naturally 
calls into question a foreign policy which has unambiguously committed itself to
supporting the opposition groups against the present Libyan leader and government.
This does not mean, it must be said, that Secretary Gates was necessarily against the
intervention in Libya.  In spite of his candid lack of knowledge about the 'opposition' or 
the 'rebels' in Libya, Gates is sure that 'we know a lot about Gaddafi'.  Citing
'clandestine reports' which pointed towards an assassination plot against Ronald Reagan
and the Berlin disco terrorist attack, Gates believes the reason why the U.N and NATO
has taken action is because 'they know a lot about Gadhafi. They know what Gadhafi
was not only going to do to his people, but his potential for disrupting everything going
on in the Middle East right now.' This means that Gates' understanding of the Libyan
Other deviates from both the basic 'human rights' discourse and the modified 'human
rights' discourse deployed by U.K officials.  He still feels that the removal of 
Gaddafi would be in US interests, but that the ambiguity surrounding the identity of the
'rebels' and the lack of a 'vital' national interest means that for him a 'supporting role' is
what most 'comports with our interest'. 
It was not only Defence Secretary Gates who was reluctant to get too heavily
involved in Libya.  The same kind of caution can be detected from President Obama's
pronouncements, displaying an awareness that regime change is not something to be
undertaken lightly, what with the potential for unleashing forces and reaching the type
of unintended consequences seen in Iraq.  The uncertainty, even anxiety, which 
President Obama was feeling about engaging once again militarily in a Muslim country



















detect traces of the basic 'civil war' discourse as he references Iraq and the perils of 
military intervention-in particular regime change-.  Asking himself in soliloquy, 'why
can't we simply impose our will (on the other countries by force)?', he responds, 'it's my 
job as president to make those decisions based on all the consequences, understanding 
that we have some experience here in trying to impose our will in places like Iraq, and I 
think the American people understand the cost of that'. It is interesting to recall here
that U.K leader Cameron had been adamant that this was completely different from
Iraq.  Obama, though, establishes a tacit connection between the desire to change a
regime by force in Iraq, and that same approach towards the 'Arab Spring'.  This
translates into concern for the U.S armed forces as he speaks of their deployment being
the hardest decision a President has to take.  
Therefore, what can be discerned from a global perspective on the different
strands of official U.S discourse is a much more complex picture than what was seen in
the U.K.  U.S officials are willing to accept the main principles of both the basic 'human 
rights' discourse and also the official U.K discourse -most significantly that the 'Libyan 
people' possess a transient temporal identity and are aspiring to reach their 'destiny' of 
the ‘'human rights' of 'freedom' and 'democracy'-, but this is complicated by the
incorporation of some of the elements of the basic 'civil war' discourse.  Key elements
like 'civil conflict' and 'rebels' are enough to cast doubt on assumptions that the 'Libyan 
people' are heading in one direction towards political emancipation. The difficulties
involved in the Iraq war, and the ongoing operation in Afghanistan, are quite clearly still 
in the minds of Secretary Gates and President Obama.  The result is that while both 
official UK and US discourse has erected Gardai as the obstacle to the forces of social
and political progress in Libya, thus signalling that he has no future in Libya, official
U.S discourse is more aware of the potential for exacerbating an already critical
situation.  Not only would this negate the 'human rights' issues at stake - in the sense of 
'values' and 'interests'-, but it would leave the U.S government with a responsibility to
























 Political opposition and the ‘War Powers Act’ �
The main political opposition against the Obama administration's policy towards 
Libya had an important constitutional edge to it.  Since the President had only engaged 
in consultation with senior congressional figures before summoning US forces to
implement the no-fly zone, a cross-party mixture of representatives and senators were in 
agreement that the President had transgressed the War Powers Act. According to the
White House, Libya did not constitute a war or conflict situation strictly speaking, and 
should be considered as a 'limited action' (Obama, 2011) of humanitarian dimensions.  
While, as Defence Secretary Gates was willing to recognise, the Act had been subject to 
an ongoing debate between the White House and Congress for some time (Gates, 2011), 
many were of the view that it was the President's duty to garner Congressional approval
before engaging in any military operation.  This opposition culminated in the
formulation of two resolutions to be presented before the Republican-controlled House
of Representatives on the 24th of June: the first was aimed at providing post hoc
Congressional authorisation for the military mission already under way; the second, and 
more substantial resolution, called on Congress to cut off funding for the mission.
Representatives voted 295-123 against authorising the President's actions in Libya,
while also voting against what would have been a highly controversial privation of 
funds to the White House- the Resolution failed by 238-180-.  What both votes
demonstrate quite clearly is a significant amount of political opposition to Obama's
policy in Libya.  
The number of votes cast against the President in both resolutions can not simply 
be understood as party-political point scoring -many Democrats voted with Republicans 
on both resolutions-, nor should it be understood as a matter of purely constitutional
import.  Of course, many representatives had legitimate concerns about protecting the
constitution and moreover denying the White House the mandate to begin future wars as 
and when it sees fit. As Republican Congressman Tom Rooney (24/06/2011) put it, 'the
last thing that we want as Americans is for some president, whether it's this president or 
some future president, to be able to pick fights around the world without any debate
from another branch of government'. All the same, a closer inspection of the debates
















   
  
 
it also unearths opposition to the President's Libya policy in itself.  Already around three 
months into combat operations, some key problems were becoming increasingly
evident: the seemingly irreconcilable gap between the political aims and military aims
of the mission, the possibility for backing groups of 'rebels' who were unknown or 
potentially antipodal to US and Western interests, the potential for exacerbation of the
conflict, and moreover the lack of a 'vital' US interest (Gates, 2011) along with the
spiraling cost of the operation.  It is to an analysis of how these issues were articulated
in opposition to Obama's policy that the analysis will now turn.  
Not long after the passing of Resolution 1973 at the Security Council and 
initiation of US air-strikes on Libyan defences, some of the first criticisms of Obama's
policy surfaced from a debate in the Senate on 30th March, 2011.  According to 
Republican Senator Rand Paul, the President's actions constitute 'a very serious breach 
of our constitution' and 'it is something that we should not let happen lightly'. 
Referencing the founding fathers, Paul states that history has shown that 'the executive
is the branch most interested in war,' and it is for that reason 'the congress has with 
studied care invested the power to declare war in the congress,'  It is 'a real problem,' he
believes, to allow 'a president to continue to act or to initiate war- or to initiate war 
without the representatives of the people having a say.' What is clear from Senator
Paul's speech and his recourse to the War Powers Act is that the lack of debate is not the
only issue at stake in the case of Libya; the lack of consultation has the effect of 
concealing other concerns that were being felt about the mission.  
There were two immediate issues apparent through claims over a breach of the
War Powers Act.  Firstly, this had the inevitable result of highlighting that Libya and the 
Libyan government did not actually pose a threat or imminent threat to the United
States.  This is precisely one of the mechanisms through which the President is
authorised to unilaterally launch a military attack and therefore it is the very absence of 
this threat that the War Powers Act becomes an issue in the first place.  Moreover, it
would be pointed out during a later debate in the House (03/06/2011) that not only did 
Obama's foreign policy in Libya contravene the original text of the Act, but that Obama
himself had even recognised the role of Congress in authorising military action.  Mr 
Scott makes precisely this point in recalling the then Senator Obama's exact words when 
setting out the constitutional procedure for taking the country to war: 'The President





















a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation'
(Obama, 2007; cited by Scott, 2011).  The second thing that contravention of the War
Powers Act supposed at this stage was that the mission had gone on for longer than 
sixty days.  Being the period in which the President is given to seek authorisation from
Congress for military action, the fact that by the 3rd of June this period had expired was 
itself significant in that it suggested the mission was not as simple as what was perhaps
imagined at first.
What can also be detected from the debate is that there was considerable concern 
that the US administration had not articulated well what the objectives or 'end game' of 
the mission was.  As has been noted in the previous section, the US government, while
erecting a dual-Libyan Other  (Gaddafi- 'Libyan people'), were also cautious about using 
force to bring about their stated aim of forcing Gaddafi out.  This, it has been argued,
was in part due to elements of the basic 'civil war' discourse being incorporated into 
official discourse.  In any case, the hesitation and reluctance to even hint at further more 
belligerent measures was damaging in that it supposed an even greater void between the 
stated political aims of the government- to depose Gaddafi- and the military means
committed to in order to bring that about. This was something which both Senators and 
Representatives seized upon as evidence of a poorly formulated policy.  On precisely
this point, Mr Scott (2011) states; 'the President has not outlined the purpose or the
scope of our action in Libya.'  During the same debate, Mr Duncan concurred in that 'we 
did not go into Libya with a clear, attainable objective.  The risks and costs do not
appear to be fully analysed.' Moreover, 'we don't know whether we have a viable end
game'. Three weeks later during the debate on the 24th of June and some
Representative were still not clear about what in fact the government's objectives were.  
Mr Waxman (2011) stated, 'we need a clear definition of the mission and our objectives'. 
While several Representatives and Senators had been expressing their 
bemusement over what in fact the objectives were, at the same time, deductions were
being made that it was the removal of Gaddafi.  Indeed, as has already been 
documented, this conclusion was not difficult to reach since it was the stated policy
from early on.  Yet if this were indeed the case, and moreover the objective was to bring 
about a democratic transition in Libya, the issue over who in fact the government was
backing in Libya would become a crucial one.  And the fact that high ranking US


















   
 
 
many Senators and Representatives.  Borrowing from the 'civil war' discourse, Rand
Paul (2011) asks, 'Do we know who the rebels are?'  He then goes on to speculate by
way of reports in the media suggesting possible ties between al-Qaeda and the rebels: 'a
former leader of Libya's al-Qaeda affiliate says he thinks freelance jihadists have joined 
the rebel forces.  NATO commander says some of the forces are fighting Qadhafi forces. 
1, 000 jihadists in Libya are estimated. These are the rebels. We have to ask ourselves
when Qadhafi is gone, who will take his place?..will we now have an al-Qaeda-
supported government in Libya?'. Representative Scott is another who believed that it
was the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of intervention which was troubling.
Concurring with Paul that Gaddafi is reprehensible, using even stronger language to 
assert that he 'is one of the most notorious terrorists of our time,' Scott goes on to 
question what might replace him:  'Who will replace Qadhafi? And what assurances do 
the American people have that the alternative will be any better than Qadhafi?'. 
When viewed from a different perspective, using elements of the 'civil war'
discourse, the political crisis in Libya starts to take on different meanings for politicians
critical of the Democrat government; other considerations start to come into play.  For 
Senator Paul (2011), one of the main conclusions that he is able to reach is that 'Libya is 
not in our national interest'. Paul's 'national interests' discourse also allows him to 
consider the practicalities of being 'engaged in a war (Libya) when our country is
struggling under enormous debt, at a time when we are engaged in two wars.' The cost
of the war so far, he assures, after three days of combat operations, is $600 million.
This also enables him to speak of the responsibility that the Congress has to the 'young 
men and women' of the US, by putting them 'into harm's way, into another war'.  It
would be very difficult for Senator Paul to speak so strongly about issues such as
Congressional authority, national interests, and the cost of the operation, should he be
using the basic 'human rights' discourse. The unambiguous ethical responsibility
generated by the 'human rights' discourse would render somewhat redundant these
points.  If this was simply about Gaddafi massacring the Libyan people and denying 
them their basic human rights, for instance, it would not be ethical, nor make political
sense for that matter, to be speaking about the cost of the mission.   And even though 
Paul is in no doubt that 'Qadhafi is a tyrant, an autocrat, and someone that freedom-























This point can also be highlighted by way of Senator Ensign's discourse.  Ensign 
is another, who in using the 'civil war' discourse, is then able to speak of national
interests.  This means that he 'did not believe that the President had outlined a vital US
interest in our engagement in Libya' and that the 'United States cannot afford to be the
police force of the world'.  His discourse is complicated further, however, by the fact
that he borrows from both the basic 'human rights' discourse and the basic 'civil war'
discourse.  On the one hand, he understands Gaddafi to be the main belligerent and
human rights abuser.  Passing through and dismissing some of the key justifications
given for US intervention- E.G the potential refugee crisis flooding into Egypt and 
Tunisia, the aim to carry out the will of the UN Security Council, the limited mission, to 
send a clear message to other dictators o to save lives- Ensign reached what for him is
the crux of the issue; this is an over inflation of 'our interest in Libya's civil war'. 
There are two things immediately discernible from Rand Paul and John Ensign's
discourse.  The first thing that comes across is the complexity of the events taking place
in Libya. The basic 'human rights' discourse, and the modified version of this deployed
by UK officials, presented a simplified view of events whereby the foreign policy to be
pursued emerges with a certain clarity from the ethical obligation generated.  However,
when the 'Libyan people' component of the dual-Libyan Other is compromised, this
ethical obligation begins to yield to other concerns such as 'national interests', the cost
of the mission, or the risk posed to US service personnel.  Even when Gaddafi remains
the radical Libyan Other, as was the case for both Paul and Ensign, the uncertainty and 
ambiguity surrounding the identity of the 'rebels' who were fighting against him
destabilizes the 'human rights' discourse and mitigates the ethical responsibility for 
intervention and/or removal of the Libyan government.
US media discourse and the identity of the ‘rebels’ 
All of these issues were being articulated in the media and especially since the
situation on the ground was beginning to resemble more and more a 'stalemate'. Similar 
to the UK newspapers analysed, it can be shown that those in the US would also report
that the Libyan conflict was in danger of, or indeed had reached a point of 'stalemate'. 
With this in mine the New York Times on the 25th March states: ‘Mr. Obama has not
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made clear what will happen if the international coalition succeeds in establishing
control of the skies over Libya, but Colonel Qaddafi’s loyalists and rebels continue to 
attack and counter-attack each other in a bloody, protracted stalemate’. Writing for the
Washington Post, Roger Hertog from the Council on Foreign Relations hypothesizes:
‘The result (Western airpower) could easily be a drawn-out grinding stalemate.’  Making 
an analogy with Slobodan Milosevic, Hertog asks, ‘will Gaddafi stand fast longer? If so, 
what then? Nothing in the ostensibly new Obama doctrine offers an escape from this
underlying issue.’ In short, the materialization of a ‘stalemate’ on the ground would 
expose the ineffectiveness of a no-fly zone in facilitating the ousting of Gaddafi 
One of the main concerns that was being voiced in the media was of Islamic
extremist groups operating in Libya, the deduction being that they could be the ones
who end up benefiting from any Western support, whether that be political, economic,
or military.  In the New York Times, Ross Douthat offers one ‘disquieting data point,’
referencing the Center for a New American Security, which claimed: ‘Eastern Libya, the 
locus of the rebellion, sent more foreign fighters per capita to join the Iraqi insurgency
than any other region in the Arab world’ (13/03/2011).  This was, in fact, the argument
that the Libyan government had been making all along, assigning the responsibility for 
any violence to radical groups such as Al-Qaeda.  Such claims had been wilfully
dismissed by Western officials and the Libyan opposition. There was no way that this
could have been accepted by government figures as it represented simply too much of 
an incongruence with the ‘human rights’ discourse being deployed; firstly, these people
could not be equated with the unitary ‘Libyan people’ subject being constructed; and 
perhaps more importantly, these groups would by no means be representative of the
human rights which were said to be in question.  The whole coherence of the ‘human 
rights’ discourse would thus crumble, leaving any Western policy to support such
groups exposed as ludicrous.
It is quite clear that one of the main challenges provoked by the ‘civil war’
discourse was precisely the ambiguity which it introduced to the situation.  Not only did 
adherents of the ‘human rights’ discourse have to tackle questions as to the identity of 
the ‘rebels’, the flip side of this was that the identity of civilians was now being 
muddied.  According to the U.S. and U.K. government’s position, the ‘no-fly zone’
policy was introduced on the basis of a clear separation between the ‘Libyan people’ or 
























defined are the victims from the aggressors, whereby there is no doubt as to who the no-
fly zone was there to protect.  By constructing the identities of the Libyan ‘Other’ in 
terms of ‘loyalists’ and ‘rebels’, the ‘civil war’ introduces a significant seed of doubt;
that is to say, the unequivocal bifurcation of belligerents and civilians becomes
distorted.  This is encapsulated by a New York Times piece written on the 1st April
under the headline, ‘Lines of Battle Blur in Libya, NATO Warns Rebels Not to Attack
Civilians’: ‘The warnings, and intense consultations within the NATO-led coalition over 
its rules for attacking anyone who endangers innocent civilians, come at a time when
the civil war in Libya is becoming ever more chaotic, and the battle lines ever less
distinct. They raise a fundamental question that the military is now grappling with: who 
in Libya is a civilian?’ (Shanker and Savage, 01/04/2011).  Pondering on the strength of 
the ‘Islamist’ groups in her article, ‘Islamists rise to the fore’ (Washington Post, 
15/09/2011), Leila Fadel argues that ‘Islamists were at the heart of the fight, many as
rebel commanders.’ Yet, and quoting ‘influential cleric’ Ismail Sallabi, the ‘secularists
don’t like islamists’.  
At times the New York Times, somewhat confusingly, mixes completely the
basic 'human rights' discourse and the basic 'civil war' discourse.  Take for example the
article written on May 2nd by Fahim and Mazzetti, Commenting on the air-strikes being 
carried out in Libya, the authors write that these were 'authorized' by the UN to prevent
Colonel Qaddafi's military from killing civilians in Libya's two-month-old civil war'. 
The assessment of the situation is purely focused on NATO air-strikes on Gaddafi and
the Libyan government, and also the 'government's bombardment of rebel strongholds'. 
What is missing is any consideration of attacks being made by the 'rebels', which one
would presume was taking place in a 'civil war', or eve. At other times, a 'civil war' can
be inferred from references made which are indicative this type of situation.  For 
instance, when a 'rebel' military leader is killed, the New York Times reports that this
raises 'fears of tribal conflict'.
What is striking about the articles analysed in the New York Times, is that while
they undoubtedly use the 'civil war' discourse to represent events, there is no serious
criticism of Obama's policy.  Returning to the basic 'civil war' discourse constructed at
the outset of Part 3, the ethical justification for foreign military intervention in a 'civil
war' type situation is highly questionable and thus significant criticism of the















   
 




and clearer that the policy being pursued was the toppling of the Libyan leader and 
government.  In the case of the New York Times though, any negligible criticism is
restricted to questions over whether or not the stated military goals were in synch with
the political goals and how to break the stalemate.  Speaking of Hillary Clinton's
insistence that Gaddafi leave power, Sanger writes 'The statement seemed to underscore
the limbo the administration finds itself in, with the rebels unable to achieve regime
change on their own, and Washington and its NATO allies hesitant to leap deeper into a
civil war'.  The result of this, for Sanger, is that Obama is left with 'a vexing choice';
either he lives with a 'civil war that may drag on for weeks, months or years, at a
gradually rising human cost,' or he becomes 'more deeply involved, either directly or 
through NATO, in a third war in a Muslim nation'.  
This is in contrast to the Guardian newspaper in the U.K who did offer criticism
of the intervention itself, and the actions of NATO and the U.K government themselves. 
The possibility that the 'civil war' situation could have arised in Libya as a result of the
Western-led NATO intervention in the country is simply not considered.  On this point,
it is perhaps illuminating to consider the comments of Senator John McCain whose
comments were published in the same NYT article: 'if we had declared a no-fly zone
early on, three or four weeks ago, Qaddafi would not be in power today.' And he
continues, 'so now the Libyan people are paying a very high price in blood because of 
our failure to act, and because of this overwhelming priority of having to act
multilaterally.'  Now it must be noted that McCain, enthusiastic and vocal supporter of 
the intervention, is using the 'human rights' discourse -as he was prone to do-,  in 
contrast to the article written. Yet it does show the power of the 'human rights'
discourse in that Western actions are believed to be in the interests of the 'Libyan
people', they all naturally should welcome the intervention, and it is almost





















Maintaining discursive stability: convergence with official U.K discourse and �
the 'destiny' of the Libyan people �
If, as has been seen, official U.K discourse was faced with the challenge of 
reconciling seemingly incoherent political and military aims- on the one hand stating
that Gaddafi 'must go', yet on the other forced to at least accept in principle that the
military mission was about protecting the Libyan people- the U.S government found 
itself in an even more difficult position.  Faced with a similar void in the stated political
and military aims, Obama had also committed the U.S to a strictly speaking 'limited'
role, meaning that it was extremely difficult to put more military pressure of Gaddafi
and the Libyan government either in words or in actions.  This, as has been shown in the 
previous section, was a problem that would only become worse as reports of a
'stalemate' became more widespread and accepted amongst top U.S military officials.  
General Carter Ham (08/04/2011), and later Obama’s top military officer Admiral Mike
Mullen (22/04/2011), were all in agreement that 'stalemate' had been reached, meaning 
that President Obama himself would be forced to publicly acknowledge this
increasingly widely accepted portrayal, admitting: ‘you now have a stalemate on the
ground militarily’ (15/04/2011). 
Acknowledgement of a ‘stalemate’ situation on the ground posed significant
problems for Obama and official U.S discourse.  First and foremost, this led directly to 
questions about the objective of the mission and how the situation could be resolved, 
indeed if it could be resolved following the President's 'limited' mission of 'protecting'
the Libyan people.  Secondly, this aroused further questions about the identity of who 
the 'rebels' were.  For instance, in relation to the option of arming directly the ‘rebels’, 
more reluctance was called for since the arms could quite easily fall into the wrong 
hands.  Expressing his reservations, General Carter Ham was clearly concerned about
who in fact would be the recipients of such lethal support: ‘my recommendation would
be that we should know more about who they are- the opposition force- before we make 
any determination to arm them’ (08/04/2011; my clarification).  
What this meant was that, in effect, the only option available to Obama to bridge 
this gap between military and political goals, and moreover put pressure on Gaddafi,


















tools in addition to our military efforts to support that policy’ (Obama, 22/03/2011).
When insisting that the Libyan government ‘must be held accountable for its failure to 
meet those responsibilities (refrain from violence), and face the cost of continued
violations of human rights,’ the response given by Obama is: ‘I’ve also asked my
administration to prepare the full range of options that we have to respond to this crisis.’ 
While the responses given here by Obama seek to show strength, a lack of definition 
and conviction can be perceived which is in itself indicative of a hesitation or reluctance 
to use the full might of the U.S armed forces to depose the Libyan leader.  
Another way in which U.S officials tried to overcome the challenges made on 
their perceived passivity was by relinquishing their own responsibility.  In many ways, 
this could be viewed as a natural response, not merely because of the difficulties
involved in formulating more belligerent responses to the Libyan situation, but also 
since it was in fact the British and French governments who had been the main driving 
force behind the operations against Gaddafi in the first place.  By displacing the
responsibility on to others, Clinton is able to avoid pressure on the U.S to take political
and military leadership of the 'international' efforts.  As Hillary Clinton was keen to 
point out: 'well it's not only the U.S, it's the international community. And your 
government (to British journalist Kay Burley of Sky News), the Government of the UK, 
and the Government of France are working on a resolution to try to get authority from
the United Nations Security Council'. Elsewhere, on the question of how Gaddafi could 
be forced to leave, Clinton assures that 'there are many different aspects to the strategy
that the international community is pursuing'. 
Deflecting the focus on to other international actors, whether it be the U.K, 
France or Arab League, was also something which was also useful for U.S officials
when faced with questions about the relatively negligible place that Libya occupied
within U.S national interests.  This was indeed a particularly difficult question for policy 
makers, not least because Secretary Gates had been very open in his views that Libya
was 'not a vital interest' and that Libya and Gaddafi did not pose a 'threat or imminent
threat to the United States'. Therefore, on the subject of national interests, Clinton
wanted to make clear; 'when it comes to Libya, we started hearing from the UK, France, 
Italy, other of our NATO allies. This was in their vital national interests. The UK and
France were the ones who went to the Security Council and said, “We have to act, 





















of unpredictable violent acts right on our doorstep.” This means that it was also 
possible for Clinton to resort once more to the 'domino' logics which had informed U.S
policy formation in the first place.  'Did Libya attack us?', Clinton asks, 'No, they did 
not attack us.  Do they have a very critical role in this region and do they neighbour two 
countries? You just mentioned one, Egypt, the other Tunisia, that are going through 
these extraordinary transformations and cannot afford to be destabilized by conflict on 
their borders. Yes.'
That the mission was an 'international' action had been something that U.S and 
U.K officials had highlighted from the implementation stage of the no-fly zone, 
generating greater legitimacy for the breach of sovereignty which was implied.  Here
though one can see this used as a way to devolve, or mitigate responsibility for U.S
actions.  This tactic was also useful to contest claims that the foreign policy being 
pursued was misconceived, poorly defined, or lacked a concrete aim or 'endgame'. By
stating that this was an 'international effort,' U.S officials were able to firstly return to
the claim that their role was 'limited' and that others were taking on a greater share of 
the burden.  And secondly, it was possible to alleviate criticism about the cost of the
mission.  In response to concerns that 'the rebels become bogged down' or that 'this
becomes protracted', Obama assures; 'keep in mind that what we have already done is
transition, so that this is now a NATO and international mission, our role was to provide 
support, intelligence..and so we have been able to spread the burden of maintaining a
no-fly zone' (29/03/2011).  
A similar discursive tactic was used by Defence Secretary Gates.  In his case,
however, it was not simply a case of highlighting that it was the British and French who 
were pushing for a change of regime in Libya. At times, when questioned about the
'endgame' or the likely duration of the mission, Gates draws a line between the stated 
political aims - Gaddafi 'needs to go'- and the military aims, of which he is ultimately
responsible.  In response to the question of when the mission will be 'done'
(27/03/2011), Gates turns straight to the no-fly zone and assures 'that mission it largely
complete'. This allows him to resort back to the humanitarian situation, the threat posed 
to Benghazi, and the number of lives that have been undoubtedly saved by the no-fly
zone. 'I think we have made a lot of progress on the humanitarian side and his ability to 
move armor, to move toward a Benghazi or a place like that has pretty well been 
























beginning to take place, has taken place in some places.' Now, he states, it is a question
of 'sustainment'. On the other side, Gates is also able to avoid questions or 
responsibility for what was increasingly being viewed as a policy of regime change.  'As 
we have seen in the past', he reminds, 'regime change is a very complicated business. It
sometimes takes a long time. Sometimes it can happen very fast.' And yet ultimately,
for him, 'it was never part of the military mission'.  In fact, it seems that Gates is at
times willing to accept the possibility that Gaddafi remains, something that was never
contemplated by U.K officials.  At the House Foreign Relations Committee, Gates
concedes that 'you could have a situation where you achieve the military goal and not
achieve the political goal (regime change)'.  
Alternatively, U.S policy makers display a tendency to switch the discussion 
from talk of the 'end' or how the mission finishes, to go back to the reason for 
intervention in the first place.  This is a manoeuvre which plays on the ambiguities of 
moral action; that is to say, whether one should focus on the outcomes
-consequentialism- or the causes of the intervention- 'just cause'. Since in the case of 
the Libyan intervention the outcomes were characterised by uncertainty at this stage, it
made sense to place greater emphasis on the moral basis for action. This was something 
that Obama was always keen to do, as can be seen in an interview (29/03/2011) and in
response to the question 'how does it (the intervention) end?'. Obama begins by
pointing out, 'what was clear to me was that we had a unique circumstance to save a lot
of lives in this Libyan situation'.  By taking action, Obama is then able to explain, 'what
we've done is accomplish what we set out to do at the outset, which is to make sure that
Benghazi was not over-run and that thousands of people, potentially, were not killed'.  
Hillary Clinton also speaks of the aim to protect civilians, taking the focus of the end 
point or outcome of U.S action: 'And if you look at the region – can you imagine,
David, if we were sitting here and Qadhafi had gotten to Benghazi, and in a city of 
700,000 people, had massacred tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands had fled over 
the border, destabilizing Egypt? Everybody would be saying, “Why didn’t the President
do something?”
Nevertheless, the problem of an 'endgame' was one which would not go away
and would become even more acute as events progressed and a general acceptance of a
'stalemate' situation became commonplace.  In response to these doubts, Obama tried a






















previous official constructions of the conflict- namely that the mission was to protect
the ‘Libyan people’ from their brutalizing illegitimate leader- Obama was quick to focus 
on the range of measures being taken to bring about Gaddafi’s demise.  ‘Gaddafi is still
getting squeezed in all kinds of other ways.  He is running out of money, he is running
out of supplies.  The noose is tightening and he is becoming more and more isolated’
(Obama, 15/04/2011).  Obama here is willing to take the idea of ‘stalemate’ head-on, at
the same time showing his faith that the other measures being taken will be decisive in 
the end.  In fact, this apparent dismissal of the situation on the ground suggests that it is
in fact of no great consequence whether or not there is a ‘stalemate’ and what this
means.  The policy of the U.S remains the same; Gaddafi ‘must go’. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would also be forced to respond to questions
about the situation on the ground.  On one occasion, in response to a question about the
'quagmire-like' situation in Libya, Clinton focusses on the 'organisation and operational
capacity' of the opposition- the National Transitional Council-, the 'military efforts on 
the ground', and the support for the NTC; 'money is flowing, other support is flowing'.  
Apart from the progress being made on the ground, Clinton aims to restrict criticism of 
the administration’s policy on Libya by falling back on the basic 'human rights'
discourse and a strict division between Gaddafi, on the one hand, and the 'Libyan 
people' on the other.  As well as introducing an unambiguous, dichotomous
representation of Libya and the events taking place in Libya, this can also be used to 
present skeptics with an either-or choice. This can be seen in Clinton's response, 'the
bottom line is, whose side are you on?' And she continues, spelling that choice out: 'are
you on Gadhafi's side, or are you on the side of the aspirations of the Libyan people and
the international coalition that has been created to support them?'. 
That said, it remained necessary for U.S officials to deny that the foreign policy
being pursued was in fact regime change.  At times this would be naturally difficult to
maintain, as can be seen in an interview between Hillary Clinton and CBS News anchor 
Katie Couric.  In response to the rhetorical question, 'the whole notion of regime change 
isn't working very well in Libya, is it?', Clinton does not make any attempt to correct
her interlocutor.  Rather, her response is aimed at correcting the premise of the
argument, and to demonstrate to Couric that the mission was in fact working well.  'I 
disagree', the Secretary of State begins, 'I think we are seeing slow but steady progress'. 









   














the Transitional National Council and their military forces are getting better'.  Overall,
she appraises, 'we're on the right path'.  One month later, however, and Clinton had 
returned to the official policy.  In response to a question suggesting that 'regime change'
was now the 'principal interest' Clinton responds: 'I think, Chris, that's a misconception, 
but I understand it because NATO and Arab States that are flying with NATO are trying
to protect civilians'. 
More than anything, as the NATO mission continued, it is possible to detect a
greater convergence with official U.K policy discourse. Whereas at the beginning of the 
mission, U.S officials had been keen to point out the dangers of intervention and regime 
change, their ignorance over the identity of the ‘rebels’, and later their acceptance that a
‘stale mate’ situation had occurred on the ground, these issues would be gradually given 
less and less attention.  Instead, Libya’s place within a wider ‘democratic transition’
taking place in the region would be emphasized (Obama, 19/05/2011).  As indicated in 
this speech, this was a moment of ‘extraordinary change’ where people ‘have risen up to 
demand their basic human rights’.  Events are understood teleologically. They have
been caused by a ‘longing for freedom’. This means that the events in the Middle East
and North Africa ‘should not have come as a surprise’.  Nor should the changes towards 
greater ‘freedom’ since ‘strategies of repression and strategies of division will not work 
any more’.  In short, ‘change cannot be denied’.
In emphasizing once more Libya’s place within this wider phenomenon, Obama
is able to achieve certain crucial things.  In effect, this frees up once more the temporal
identity of the ‘Libyan people’ in as far as the potential obstacles to them realizing their
‘human rights’, or potential for unintended consequences, is downplayed.  And while
Obama does speak of the dangers of ‘regime change’, the NATO mission in Libya can’t
be considered in this way as the changes taking place are being driven by the people
themselves in a spontaneous and natural way. This is one way in which the apparent
contradictions inherent in dropping bombs in Libya is dealt with. This is not being done 
to force change towards greater freedom and democracy, it is being done to remove the
obstacles that are preventing the natural progression to take place. Thus, it is only when 
Gaddafi ‘inevitably leaves or is forced from power’ that ‘the transition to a democratic






















In eliminating any significant traces of the ‘civil war’ discourse, Obama is able
to re-assert unambiguously the ‘human rights’ discourse and the twin goals of spreading 
universal values and securing security interests.  The U.S is faced with an ‘historic
opportunity,’ where it will be possible ‘to pursue the world as it should be’.  Values and 
interests become one, and the defence of ‘universal values’ will necessarily promote U.S 
interests.  ‘America’s interests are not hostile to people’s hopes’, Obama assures, 
‘they’re essential to them’.  There is no longer any suggestion that the removal of 
Gaddafi could lead to the exacerbation of a civil conflict and/or the rise to power of 
radical extremist groups.  If this were the case, the efforts to spread freedom and
democracy would be in vain and the national security interests being pursued in the
region would be critically undermined.
This means, the re-affirmation of the ‘human rights’ discourse by the U.S
administration also meant that questions surrounding the identity of the 'rebels', would 
have to be side-stepped.  As has been seen, this is something that the U.K government
was forced to respond to also.  Yet the difference here was that while U.K officials had 
strived to avoid the term 'rebels' and did their utmost to deflect any aspect of the 'civil
war' discourse itself. Top U.S officials, had already acknowledged the complexity the
situation in Libya, openly articulating the term 'rebels', and displaying a certain
ignorance of the identity of those who the U.S was effectively backing. At first, one of 
the ways in which this was being dealt with was to recognize that knowledge was
incomplete, but also to suggest that this was a temporary situation and would be
remedied in the future.  As Clinton put it, ‘we don’t know as much as we would like to 
know and as much as we expect we will know’ (29/03/2011).  
Yet as the conflict progressed and further questions were being raised about the
myriad groups fighting on the ground, this was a question which would not go away- as
has been seen in the House of Representatives debate- and would pose a significant
problem for the stability of U.S official policy discourse.  If, as policy makers had been 
stating since the beginning of U.S involvement, the aim was to bring about a democratic 
tradition in Libya, this could not be assured if the ones fighting were not doing so with 
the common objective of establishing a Western style liberal democracy. This challenge 
was dealt with by taking the focus away from the groups doing the fighting on the
ground, and emphasizing more and more the democratic credentials of the National






























legitimacy both inside and outside, but there was a need to assert that the opposition
‘has organized a legitimate and credible Interim Council’ (Obama, 19/05/2011).  On 
July 15th, after the latest Libyan Contact Group meeting, a further endorsement would 
be made Hillary Clinton.  In underlining the U.S recognition of the NTC as the
'legitimate governing authority for Libya,' Clinton centres on their plans for 'setting 
Libya on a path toward security and progress' through 'democratic reform' which is
'inclusive geographically and politically'. 
This was a necessary step for many reasons.  First and foremost, the U.S has
claimed all along that its role was 'limited', with the objective being to protect the
Libyan people.  As Gaddafi's government was coming to an end, Libyan political
representatives would therefore be needed to bring about the actual 'transition' that U.S
officials had consistently spoken about.  Secondly, since the uprisings were being
understood as part of a linear historical process towards greater democracy, it was
crucial that the role being played by the U.S was seen as minimal. Yet another 
important factor at this stage was that a certain realization was also setting in over the
magnitude of the task at hand.  This was something that Clinton was keen to emphasize
in her speech after the Libyan Contact Group meeting, and be putting the focus on the
TNC themselves, the U.S was able to absolve themselves for what might happen 
afterwards.  In relation to the 'TNC's own roadmap', Clinton assures that 'we are well
aware of how difficult and challenging the road ahead of them is' (15/07/2011).  At this
stage, Clinton is willing to recognize the difficulties in going from 'one kind of regime
to a 'democracy', and even more so in a country like Libya where it was 'Colonel
Qadhafi's modus operandi and modus vivendi, actually, to have no institutions.' And 
even though the Western powers were playing a crucial role in bringing down Gaddafi
and the Libyan government, it is clear from Clinton's statement that it is now all about
the TNC, who 'have made great strides and are on the right path'.
Thus, what can be seen in official U.S discourse over the duration of the NATO
intervention in Libya is a move towards greater convergence with official U.K
discourse.  It has been argued that this was necessary as previously articulated elements
borrowed from the ‘civil war’ discourse were having the effect of undermining the
stability of the ‘human rights’ discourse being deployed and the foreign policy being
pursued.  In emphasizing once more the temporal identity of the ‘Libyan people,’ the





possible to present the vision of a future democratic Libya and one characterized by
‘freedom’.  In so doing, the U.S government is concurrently able to position itself 
unambiguously on the side of those fighting against the authoritarian governments in 
the region.  It is also able to resort to a performance of ‘human rights’ which is true to
the promotion of ‘universal’ values - ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’- and the securing of 









            
            
         
            
          
           
        
           
            
         
             
            
              
           
             
          
            
             
             
  
CONCLUSIONS 
This research was designed in order to explore Western responses to the political 
violence which broke out in Libya around the start of the year 2011.  The primary focus
has been on the Western-led military intervention, and the concrete roles which the
United States and the United Kingdom governments played in calling for, and then
carrying it out, alongside their ally France.  First and foremost, a primary set of research 
questions were set out from the outset to broaden knowledge of this important
geopolitical event.
1) The research sought to identify the main discourses used by the US and 
UK governments to give meaning to the events taking place in Libya, together 
with any counter-discourses which emerged in opposition to official discourse. 
This has meant that the emphasis was put on how these discourses constituted 
the Self and Other identities, uncovering any internal logics or mechanisms 
triggered, and understanding what policy options emerged as a result of these 
discourse-identity constellations. Since both governments strictly pursued a 
policy that Libyan leader Gaddafi ‘must leave’ power until he was indeed 
forcibly removed, it has been important to explain how policy discourses on both 
sides of the Atlantic maintained stability in the face of political and media 
opposition.    
2) A secondary, and complementary question, was also raised from the 
outset. This question aimed to assess to what extent Western actions in Libya 
corresponds with what David Slater has called the ‘imperiality of power’. That 
is to say, whether or not one can attribute longevity to US and UK discourse and 
actions, and whether they are characterized by imperial notions such as the 
diffusion of universal values and practices.  Also, and in relation to this, it has 
been important to gauge to what extent preconceived assumptions about Libya, 
the conflict, and the identities of those involved, have led to an underestimation 
of the resistance which would be faced, or an overestimation of the capacities of 
those who were being supported. It will then be necessary to reach conclusions 























In relation to the first set of questions, it has been shown that the debate on the
Libyan crisis of 2011 was structured around two basic discourses: a basic ‘human rights’ 
discourse, which constructed a dual-Libyan Other in situating ‘civilians’ in opposition to 
a ‘barbaric’ and ‘violent’ Gaddafi and/or Libyan ‘regime’.  Consequently, an ethical
responsibility is generated on the part of the West to intervene militarily and protect the
Libyan civilian population.  At around the same time, however, one can also detect a
basic ‘civil war’ discourse, one which would construct the dual-Libyan Other in terms
of ‘rebels’ and ‘loyalists’.  In contrast to the basic ‘human rights’ discourse, this was
suggestive of a more ambiguous, balanced and complex event. As such, the ethical
responsibility of the West is significantly diminished.  The basic ‘civil war’ discourse
pointed instead to a more cautious approach to stop the violence, suggestive of dialogue, 
negotiations and national reconciliation.  
The foreign policy discourses used by the UK and US governments maintained a 
remarkably strict adherence to the basic ‘human rights’ discourse, with subtle, but
highly significant discursive deviations.  In place of ‘civilians’, ‘protesters’, or 
‘demonstrators’, both governments showed a tendency to speak of a unified ‘Libyan
people’.  In this particular Self-Other identity constellation, the identity of the 'Libyan
people' is constructed as ontologically similar to the Western Self, and yet temporally
backward since they lack their basic, ‘universal’ human rights.  And as is so often the
case, what is being referred to as ‘universal’ human rights, quickly turns out to be
particular both in terms of content and temporal/spatial deployment.  The ‘Libyan
people’ are being imbued with liberal democratic rights, meaning that they are
politicized as the holders –or aspiring holders- of the ‘human rights’ of ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’.  In official UK and US discourse, the radical Other ‘Gaddafi’ remains the
same, but this time he becomes the one responsible for the stagnation of the temporal
identity of the ‘Libyan people’, preventing them from securing their ‘human rights’.  
Whereas before the violence erupted, ‘Libya’ was understood to be open to reform and 
in a process of ‘rehabilitation’- as was shown in Chapter 5-, it is now Gaddafi who has
become the obstacle to the completion of that very process.  The Western powers are
























and a champion of the repressed.   It is for these reasons that UK and US policy was not
only to ‘protect’ the civilian population, but that demands were also made on Gaddafi
that he ‘must go’.  
In spite of the overall continuity and stability which can be seen in official UK
and US discourse – US discourse showing a slight adaptation to converge with the UK-, 
opposition, both political and in the media, did emerge to challenge both governments.  
This was articulated, to a greater or lesser extent, through elements of the basic ‘civil
war’ discourse.  Many critical voices used the identity marker ‘rebels’, when speaking 
of the groups fighting against the Libyan government, and there was an almost
unanimous consensus that a ‘stalemate’ on the ground had been reached. These ideas
posed a challenge in certain key ways.  Firstly, questions were raised over an
‘endgame’, as the gap between military objectives- to protect the ‘Libyan people’- and 
political objectives –Gaddafi ‘must go’- became fatally exposed. A ‘civil war’ situation 
suggests that by merely implementing a no-fly zone to achieve the former, this would 
not necessarily bring about the latter.  As the conflict wore on, officials would be
increasingly forced to respond to questions about the identities of the ‘rebels’ and to
confront what a post-Gaddafi would look like.
   Nevertheless, it was shown that these challenges would ultimately not be
enough to provoke a change in the course of UK and US policy.  On the contrary, the
demands grew for Gaddafi to go, coinciding with an escalation of the already incessant
NATO bombardments, and public declarations of wide ranging support for the National
Transitional Council (NTC). Together these would lead to the fall of Gaddafi and his
government.  In order to achieve this it was necessary for UK and US officials to
maintain a strict adherence to the main discursive themes projected from the
implementation of the ‘no-fly’ zone: E.G. this was about the ‘protection of the Libyan 
people’, giving the Libyan people the chance to ‘determine their own future’, whilst
assuring that the mission was sticking rigidly to the terms of Resolution 1973.  When 
doubts were raised about the identity of opposition forces, the response was to re-iterate
the democratic credentials of the NTC.  Claims of human rights abuses perpetrated by
the ‘rebels’ were depicted as ‘reprisals’ –one wrong done in response to an original one, 
thus mitigating the severity of the action- or assurances were made that the NTC would 




   
 
    
 
 









    
 
 
     
   
 
 
   
One of the main conclusions reached in this thesis, is that once the ‘human
rights’ discourse is invoked, constructing the identities of the Libyan Other in these
particular ways, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for Western governments to 
change track. An unavoidable ethical responsibility is generated, which is done in
relation to the demonization of the Libyan leader, meaning that to leave the radical
Other Gaddafi in power would be a betrayal of the West’s own moral identity. This is
the case whether events on the ground had transpired into a civil war or not.  Moreover,
looking a little closer at the ‘universal’ values being eulogized in the ‘human rights’
discourse, it is possible to discern that they are governed by a teleological ontology; that 
is, they are posited as the natural endpoint of the Libyan people’s political development. 
An unambiguous present and a transcendental future path which is already ontologically 
drawn out and which will result in the Libyan people realizing their ‘destiny’.  The word 
‘destiny’ was used frequently by high level officials on both sides of the Atlantic. Thus, 
the ‘human rights’ of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ are situated as the zenith of human 
social and political progress and the future for the ‘Libyan people’- corresponding with
what is assumed to characterise the West’s very own identity-.  However, while the
future has already, in effect, been decided, the path to that future is uncertain- mainly
due to the radical Other Gaddafi-.  This is why Western intervention is needed to ensure
that the Libyan people are able to follow the correct path.
Yet for all that, this uncovers a paradox in that Western governments cannot fully 
adhere to their own ideal of human rights, freedom and democracy.  Constituting their
very being as a sovereign and moral agent-as is the case in the Libyan intervention-, 
they simultaneously unearth exclusions which lie 'outside', and which represent a direct
threat to the Western Self-identity. These threats cannot be part of any democratic
process; they must be punished, banished to the outside, or eliminated.  Gaddafi ‘must
go’ because he is not only a threat to the 'Libyan people', who are aspiring Westerners, 
but he is also a threat to the West's own moral and democratic identity. Yet, in seeking
and achieving the removal of Gaddafi through raw Western military power, the West
denies the Libyan people the very ‘universal’ right which they are supposed to possess;
namely, the right to choose democratically the existing leader should they so wish.  
There are appeals to universal values, the ‘right’ to decide, and yet at one and the same
























bombing campaign, therefore, ultimately resort to the very dictatorial logic that they are
actually supposed to be challenging. 
In the case of Libya, though, outside intervention and the removal of Gaddafi is
necessary not only to safeguard the ‘destiny’ of the Libyan people.  Echoing past
geopolitical ‘domino’ logics, it is repeatedly claimed that a failure to take decisive
action in Libya could produce a negative knock-on effect in other countries, which had 
been showing signs of democratic murmurings.  An anti-‘domino’ logic, as it were,
whereby the ‘domino’ logic is inversed to argue that one event could restrict, stifle and 
stagnate desirable events from taking place in other countries.  That is to say, one event
in one country, will necessarily cause a similar effect in other countries, due to their 
geographical proximity, and regardless of how different they may be.  This is clearly a
consequence of Libya being scripted geographically as part of the ‘Middle East’ and 
ethnically as ‘Arab’, thus concurring with the geographical and ethnic parameters of the
'Arab Spring' phenomenon.  For sure, it cannot be disputed that many individuals and 
groups displayed the commonly held assumptions of the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon,
and were demanding greater political and economic freedoms.  However, the unity with 
which the ‘Arab Spring’ signifier aspires to group together a range of disparate
countries is problematic; it becomes possible to make erroneous links which are
suggestive of uniform responses.  In the case at hand, Gaddafi ‘must go’, as Ben-Ali
and Mubarak did before him, this way the momentum is not stopped and the chain
reaction –the spread of ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’- is not broken.
2. 
In terms of the secondary research question(s) raised, concerning the extent to 
which Western discourses and actions display contiguity with Slater’s concept the
‘imperiality of power’, the following conclusions have been reached. Western actions
correspond with an ‘imperiality of power’ in so far as the appeal to 'universal' values
can be traced back to historical performances of a 'human rights' discourse.  Moreover, 
the US and UK governments awarded themselves the power to not only intervene in 
Libya, but to bring about the fall of the Libyan government. This was done in 
accordance with the trend Slater has recognized; the military campaign was carried out
on the basis that Western countries were defending not only ‘universal’ values, but























actions, undertaken for the good of the Libyan people, even if many inside the country
had taken up arms against the intentions of Western governments.   
In terms of the historical constitution of this imperial ‘privilege’, as Slater has
called it, it is possible to go further to understand how this ‘privilege’ is acted upon.  
After all, the military intervention in Libya and the removal of Gaddafi was not
inevitable, nor is Western intervention inevitable in any cases.  Not all authoritarian
states are accused of human rights abuses in the same way, nor are their leaders
constituted as a threatening 'barbaric' Other, with corresponding attempts to subjugate,
banish or eliminate them. This confronts us with an apparent chiasm between Western 
identity claims- as unambiguously moral and defenders of democracy and human rights-
and Western actions- a clearly inconsistent record of doing precisely that.  Yet this
chiasm cannot simply be bridged by claiming that Western governments are
disingenuous, as one may be tempted to do, cloaking pure self interest within claims of 
humanitarianism. This would be to presuppose a government that is fully in control of 
its own discourse and its actions, able to construct events as it pleases.  As such, the
supposition falls once more into the metaphysical trap of the fully present sovereign 
subject.  
Neither can the military intervention and the removal of Gaddafi be simply
understood as the causative effect of the ‘human rights’ discourse.  This would be to
displace and assign the sovereign subject -Western governments- on to discourse itself.
Of course, one must recognize that an ethical responsibility is triggered by the 'human 
rights' discourse, and that in turn, this discourse resonated in some way with the events
taking place in Libya.  Otherwise, no credence whatsoever would be given to Western
governments’ interpretations of events.  Yet one must also take into account that ‘human 
rights’ has its own genealogical history within Western philosophical thought, and more
narrowly within Western foreign and security practices.  This means that one can speak
of a 'human rights' discourse, which has been historically constituting the Western Self
identity as moral, but in specific, identifiable ways.  Thus, an appreciation of this is
vitally important for any rigorous analysis of the geopolitical event in question. 
Understanding the Western state as being performatively constituted allows for a 
more nuanced understanding of the military intervention in Libya.  Firstly, the irregular 
pattern of outside intervention and condemnation of human rights violations becomes an 
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inevitable occurrence.  Since states exist as profoundly complex entities, a battle-ground 
of competing discourses, they are constantly being forced to take up different subject
positions. This will sometimes lead to policies which emphasize human rights-as in the
case of Libya-, but not always.  Being defined principally by an economic and regional-
security-strategic relationship, the US’s relationship with Saudi Arabia makes it much
more difficult for the West to perform its moral identity in this particular case.  For such 
reasons, the Western Self will necessarily appear hypocritical, self-interested and-or 
morally questionable, but this is precisely due to the fact it cannot intervene in every
case, nor can it fully constitute its moral identity.
A performative theory of the state also enables a wider historical appreciation of 
how both the US and the UK states have been constituted as moral agents by the
‘human rights’ discourse, and, as such, shines light on how both governments came to
intervene in Libya. This has comprised a plethora of re-iterative discursive practices
involving not only political officials, but also ‘intellectuals of statecraft’, think-tanks, 
and human rights organizations.  This means that the Western Self has increasingly
viewed itself as moral, and thus able to pass judgement on human rights transgressions-
even in some limited cases their own-. Yet a closer examination of how the Western 
State has performed ‘human rights’, especially in the post-September 11th period, 
shows how this has been consumed within a wider Western security discourse, and has
played an important part in the current geopolitical strategy of ‘integration’.  Interests
and values come together, whereby the diffusion of the latter will aid the attainment of 
the former.    In constituting the moral identity of the Western state as defender and 
promotor of the dual, inter-linked, liberal democratic values of ‘freedom’ and
‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ becomes inextricably bound up with questions of national
interests and security. This is something that Slater’s conception of the ‘imperiality of 
power’ does not give enough emphasis too.   In short, values and interests merge into
one another in an uneasy, and often contradictory relationship.  Integration, whether it
be voluntary, through coercion, or military means, is not achieved solely on the basis
that it is good for the West vis-a-vis its own security.  Rather, it must also have a
normative component; it is not only 'good' for the West, but for the Other too.
Understood this way, the performance of ‘human rights’ carried out by Western
























   
 
 
range of re-iterative practices which have constituted the Western state as both moral
and sovereign.  
In Libya, the security prize for the Western countries was the spread of liberal
democracy in accordance with a wider geopolitical strategy of ‘integration’.  That is to 
say, the strategic objectives of liberalizing and democratizing Libya so as to bring it
further under Western influence. There is a clear belief that liberal democracies are
more stable and more sympathetic to Western interests.  Gaddafi and his government
had become susceptible to such a 'human rights' discourse and the violent actions that
sprung from it precisely since they had failed to demonstrate sufficient progress in 
political and economic liberalization.  This means they could not demonstrate to 
Western governments that they had really changed; they had not completed the
‘rehabilitation’ that was set out for them; they were not playing in accordance with the
neo-liberal 'rule-set', nor had they been integrated fully back into the 'functioning core', 
as Thomas Barnett (2005) would perhaps put it.  Ultimately, one could say, Libya had 
remained on the ‘outside’, and the eruption of violence in Libya in 2011 would bring
these underlying issues to the fore. 
However, if the continued violence and instability which has reigned in Libya
since Western intervention is a marker, they objectives have quite clearly failed.  In his
article of 2015, Slater asks himself how it could be possible that the US, as the
quintessential imperial power, does not seem capable of learning from past mistakes
intervening in foreign countries. These campaigns appear to be invariable accompanied 
by a profound misunderstanding of the culture, political or otherwise, and a
misjudgement of both friend and foe alike. The military intervention in Libya shows
that once more these are charges are applicable to Western powers.  Both UK and US
discourse made assumptions about the level of opposition that the Libyan government
was facing- this was deemed to be almost unanimous- and concurrently an
underestimation of the opposition that they would face.  It simply did not appear to
register with policy makers that once the West had effectively signalled their intentions, 
and NATO began the military campaign, significant parts of the Libyan population 
would rally against what was perceived as imperial incursions into their country. The
fact that the military intervention took six months of intensifying bombardments to






















   




It is significant to note that the UK government, and especially high level US
officials, did display caution with regards the dangers of intervention and removing a
government by force.  However, this was ultimately not enough to detain their efforts to
work towards the toppling of Gaddafi. To explain this one must look more closely at
the ‘human rights’ discourse deployed, and moreover the general belief in ‘universal’
values.  In understanding that it is through the ‘human rights’ discourse that Western 
countries constitute their moral identity, this means that its deployment becomes
necessary for this particular side of the identity to come into being.  In a similar way to 
what David Campbell has argued in his seminal work on Western security practices- 
namely that they are required if the Western state’s identity as sovereign protector is to
have any meaning- the West requires human rights transgressions in order for it to 
constitute its moral identity.  For this reason, one should not expect the ‘human rights’
discourse to die out any time soon, nor should one necessarily expect the West to learn
from its past mistakes intervening in other countries.  In a way, the West’s moral identity 
is inextricably dependent on it.  
Returning specifically to the Libyan conflict, once it is defined in terms of 
'human rights', we are already into the realm of abstraction and transcendence.  The
emphasis is fixed on the present situation, but this situation is characterized and 
understood in terms of abstract values such as 'freedom' and 'democracy'. These are
eulogized as they are deemed to be 'universal' rights, which at the time were being 
denied to the 'Libyan people'. It is of course unlikely that Western officials believed at
any time in a strict opposition between an unambiguous, homogeneous 'Libyan people'
on the one hand, and Gaddafi or the ‘Libyan regime’ on the other.  At the beginning of 
the conflict, especially, US officials expressed with candour their ignorance of which
groups were actually fighting on the 'rebels’ side.  All the while, assurances were being
made that everything was being done to increase the pressure on Gaddafi and 
effectively force him from power. This seemingly reckless endeavour is not altogether
surprising.  The universality implied in the 'human rights' discourse purports to speak on 
behalf of all Libyans, meaning that by deduction Western intervention and the removal
of Gaddafi would be in the interests of all, irrespective of whose side they were actually






















   
 
   
 
 
This is another reason why Western officials cannot acknowledge that their
actions have as their ultimate objective the removal of Gaddafi.  Not only does it
compromise the UN mandate authorized, but it would undermine the 'human rights'
discourse being deployed and the very possibility of a pure ‘democratic’ Self identity.
In the moment that Western governments recognize that they do in fact act in ways
which are incongruent with a pure conception of democracy, the very notion of a fully
present, stable, democratic and moral identity is undermined.  Likewise, the teleological 
reasoning which positions ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ as the natural endpoint of their 
social and political progress- they are ‘human rights’- is called into question.  For these
reasons, the US and UK must consistently stress that it was the ‘Libyan people’
themselves who were deciding the future of their country.
Ultimately, what the ‘human rights’ discourse succeeded in doing was to add a
degree of abstraction and transcendence to the events, distancing policy makers from
the dynamics fuelling the violence in Libya, and insulating their foreign policy from the
main force of a counter ‘civil war’ discourse. The identities of the Self and the Libyan
Other are essentialized and fixed, and governed by a teleological ontology which 
paradoxically requires Western military power to remove Gaddafi, so as to enable the
‘Libyan people’ to decide their ‘destiny’.  By constituting the ‘Libyan people’ with 
‘universal’ rights, the internal complexity of what lies within the signifier is effectively
bypassed, occulting the indeterminacy of the term as it masquerades as an unambiguous, 
objective reality.  Such lack of nuance is quite clearly problematic when dealing with 
any large geographical space; it is particularly dubious in the case of Libya.  For one
thing, it elides the fact that Libya has in fact a relatively short life span as a territorially
bound state- the state of Libya having been essentially created after the Second World
War-.  These borders were brought together as an autonomous state as recent as 1951 
under King Idris, meaning that official borders do not reflect accurately the internal
ethnic, regional or tribal fragmentation. The modern day Libya bears the remnants of a
coexistence amongst peoples who have been forged together to compose a unified
Libyan identity. This is clearly not to suggest that people in Libya do not
overwhelmingly associate themselves with a Libyan national identity; it is to be
conscious of the fact that this is just one of various political identities to which people















   






In Derrida's reading of Fukuyama’s thesis, the ‘End of History and the Last
Man’, the liberal telos is privileged at the expense of any empirical evidence to the
contrary, which may jeopardize the ‘promised land’ of liberal democracy. The
teleological reasoning in place ‘locks up, neutralizes, and finally cancels historicity’.  In 
the Western intervention in Libya, a similar thing happens.  The idea that it is only
through attainment of their ‘universal human rights’ that the Libyan people can reach 
their own ‘destiny’ is privileged over past accounts of Libya as a fragmented territorial
space, a present situation which was being increasingly understood as a 'civil war', and a 
future which is therefore ridden with uncertainty.  Indeed, as has been shown, the
oppositional 'civil war' discourse failed in its attempts to check Western foreign policy.
It is of course impossible to reach definitive conclusions as to what would have
happened in Libya if the West hadn't intervened and brought down the government of 
Gaddafi.  It would also be speculative to suggest that any of the peace deals being 
spoken of would have come to fruition and led to a more stable political situation in 
Libya.  Having said that, it is possible to offer up an appraisal of Western foreign policy. 
Taking into consideration the complexity of the country, the various regional, ethnic,
tribal, religious and ideological cleavages, the lack of a liberal democratic tradition and 
civil society, the lucrative economic prize that the Libyan oil reserves represented, it is
difficult to understand how a policy of toppling the Libyan government, crushing the
army and security services, and arming multi-factional militias in the process, could
lead to a more stable Libya and ultimately the emergence of liberal democracy. This
means that one can conclude that the most prudent option, if not the only option, to 
bring back stability to the country, would have been to work towards some kind of 
negotiated, political solution. As Alex de Waal (2013)  suggested, the African Union
peace plan may have represented a missed opportunity to achieve this. 
It is believed that the findings outlined here have important implications for 
future Western intervention, and thus are of interest to policy makers.  First and
foremost, one must make a renewed call for an acute sensibility to the different
spatialities of any given conflict. This research has shown that it is extremely risky to 
neglect local and regional scales, as so often one can pass over crucial facets of complex 
geopolitical events.  While the quick response by the ‘international community’ in 
agreeing collective action was regarded as a success for diplomacy, the way in which



























nature of the 'human right' discourse should be taken into consideration, as it can often 
lead blindly and irreversibly to certain foreign policy outcomes, which may not be
desirable.  Concurrently, they have the tendency to marginalize and exclude other
options which may well offer greater chances of reaching stability.
At a more general level, if it is understood that the Western state attempts to
constitute its moral identity through the 'human rights' discourse, then this is something
which Western governments should be conscious of.  In his seminal work 'Writing
Security', David Campbell controversially asserted that the Western state must
continually create its own dangers to justify its existence as an entity. The rise to 
prominence and incorporation of human rights within a wider security discourse is a
significant development as the state becomes not only responsible for securing its own 
borders, but for defending human rights out-with these boundaries.  Should the West
cease to document human rights abuses and-or make interventions on behalf of those
'universal' values, the West would consequently relinquish its position as their champion 
and its position of moral privilege.  Policy makers should therefore be wary of the
effects that are produced from a performative theory of 'human rights'. It should be
made clear that this not to reject the pursuit of human rights per se, or abandon the
search for peace and justice, it is a call for a more nuanced appreciation of the
complexity of geopolitical events.   
Finally, and returning to Libya, there are certain things which seem imperative at 
the present time. The chronic instability and violence which Libyans have found 
themselves embroiled in points to a particularly challenging political environment and 
an uncertain future. The Libyan population has been critically fractured along ethnic,
regional, tribal, religious, and ideological lines.   Having said that, and whilst significant 
challenges clearly lie ahead, the very contingency of identity offers up hope that
national reconciliation can still be achieved. This will undoubtedly involve the re-
assertion, or possible re-configuration of a shared Libyan identity around which all
ethnicities, regions, groups and militias can identify. That is to say, there is a need for a
‘hegemonic formation’ which will serve to form a new social order from the disperse
and disparate subject positions currently in place.  
There are some possible objections and limitations of the research which could
be mentioned.  First and foremost, one may take issue with the fact that this thesis does
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not identify or assign a principle cause to explain the Western intervention in Libya.
Inspired by this type of ontological and epistemological grounding, other studies have
highlighted amongst other things the West’s insatiable appetite for Middle Eastern oil, 
strategic aims of controlling the Middle Eastern geographical space, or indeed
humanitarian principles which do not permit the position of standing a-side and doing 
nothing. Yet it is precisely the type of cause-effect theorizing which this investigation
has strived to avoid.  It is believed that these accounts of complex social and political
phenomena do not stand up to scrutiny and lead ultimately to reductive accounts of 
complex events.  Rather the emphasis has been on how multiple factors have come
together to make up the ‘reality’ of the Libyan crisis and the Western role to be played 
in it. 
One could also possibly point to a lack of explicit ethical engagement with the
decision to intervene militarily in Libya. This could involve more direct normative
evaluations of either the motives or the consequences of taking direct action, as opposed 
to allowing the Libyans to resolve the issues on their own.  While it is acknowledged
that this would undoubtedly add an extra dimension to the analysis, the added 
complexity which any serious ethical engagement would involve has regrettably
rendered it out with the bounds of this particular study.  Since this thesis has principally
concerned itself with how the Western military intervention in Libya came to pass, the
discourses utilized and the internal logics at play, a more sustained ethical intervention 
has been side-stepped.  Having said that, it is recognized that it is extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to avoid this issue completely and at least implicitly, this thesis will
present some inclination. 
The conclusions reached in this thesis point to certain areas for further research.  
In terms of the relationship between Libya and Western countries, it would be
interesting to carry out an in depth, comparative study of past colonial relationships- for 
instance Italy-Libya or Great Britain-Libya, and the Western-led intervention of 2011.  
Assuming the longevity of certain civilization discourses, it would be interesting to
trace any discursive continuities between past attempts to control and administer the
Libyan geographical space, and present attempts to ‘protect’ the Libyan people and





















 Another potentially fruitful area could be through the incorporation of the �
concepts ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’.  In the case of Libya, the deployment of a 'human 
rights' discourse suggests that the object of power in this case is a biological
understanding of the 'human being' itself. That is to say, power is exercised to protect
and safeguard particular bodies, considered to be worthy of protection-eg Western 
populations and the Libyan population-, while on the other hand, other bodies, those
considered to be dangerous, must be eliminated- eg Gaddafi-.  As Cairo (2006) has
noted, 'Biopolitical considerations are also a driving force of current interventions, and 
biopolitical accounts are also easily understandable: after all, people, bodies and their
conduct, are the immediate object of action.  Following one after another, the armed and 
violent Western interventions are legitimized in function by the necessity to eliminate
dangerous bodies, which would allow the reform of the conduct of the population
through its rebuilding into a "civilized," "developed," or "democratic" polity' (Cairo, 
2006:288).
Another potential line of inquiry for future research could be a more profound 
engagement with what has been called ‘chronopolitics’.  The military intervention in 
Libya was carried out in relation to an acute degree of urgency, represented and 
enhanced by the different media and social network technologies.  Indeed, the haste of 
response to the Libyan case appears to be one of the defining characteristics of the
intervention , whereby any delay was viewed as being potentially catastrophic, with the
result being a further stain on the Western conscience should no response be
forthcoming. The question of time in relation to geopolitical reasoning is one which has 
been well documented by certain influential writers such as notably Virilio (1986).  
Moreover, analysing the strategic reasoning which accompanied the US engagement in 
the Gulf War, Ó'Tuathail concluded that there is 'provocative evidence for the eclipse of 
place by pace.'  Paraphrasing Der Derian and Virilio before him, he stated that:
'whereas strategy in the past was dominated by geopolitics (defined as the control of 
territory), today it is dominated by chronopolitics, the politics of time and acceleration.'
(Ó'Tuathail, 1993: 19).  What may be missing is a wider comparative study to inquire
into how time has played a role in different interventions, including the most recent
Libyan actions.  
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